The New Global Superpower Geo-Strategic Rivalry In The Red Sea And Its Implications For Peace And Security In The Horn Of Africa

1.1. The objective of the research

The objective of this research is to analyses the strategic and economic interests of the major global powers in the Red Sea region and the Horn of Africa, including China, the United States, and Europe. The research aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of the political, economic, and security implications of this rivalry for the countries in the region and beyond.

1.2. Research question

• How the competition for access to ports and military bases heightens geopolitical and geo-economics rivalries in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa

• What is the implication of the increased geopolitical rivalries among superpowers for peace and security in the Horn of Africa?

• What are the main drivers and motives for the new superpower geostrategic competition in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa?

1.3. The scholarly contribution of the research

The scholarly contribution of this research is that it provides a comprehensive analysis of the strategic and economic interests of major global powers in the Red Sea region. It also offers insights into the political, economic, and security implications of this rivalry for countries in the region and beyond. This research can be useful for policymakers, scholars, and analysts who are interested in understanding the dynamics of global power politics and its impact on regional security and stability.

1.4. Methodology

This review was done using secondary sources. The information was gathered from the internet. The qualitative method has been used to perform this investigation. As part of this study, various pertinent materials related to superpower competition in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa have been evaluated. Many studies have been done in the past on the issue of the superpower struggle in the Horn of Africa. The research on the geostrategic superpower race was extensively examined to determine its significance. Information was acquired from publications like books, journal articles, periodicals, newspaper articles, and websites. Analytically, the information gathered from secondary sources is discussed.

2.1. A brief overview of the superpower geostrategic competitions in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa

The Red Sea and Horn of Africa region is of great geostrategic and geo-economics importance. The region is home to some of the world’s busiest shipping lanes, which connect Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. The Red Sea is also a vital route for oil exports from the Persian Gulf to Europe and North America. The Horn of Africa is strategically located at the crossroads of the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea, making it a critical gateway for trade between Asia, Europe, and Africa (Carbone, 2020; Vertin, 2019).

The Red Sea, which is surrounded by six African and four Middle Eastern countries and is sandwiched between two continents, is the conduit for about 10% of global trade (Heath, 2019). 40% of trade between Asia and Europe and more than 12% of all seaborne freight currently transit via the Red Sea (DW, 2021). The majority of international trade—about 80% of it—is moved by sea. The Suez Canal, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Strait of Bab al-Mandab are three maritime chokepoints that determine which countries in the region have access to this crucial economic route, adding to the region’s high sensitivity to chokepoints. These chokepoints are of great interest to many international actors. Free and unrestricted access, as well as freedom of movement, is crucial for Southeast Asian economies, including those of China, Japan, South Korea, India, and the EU (Vertin, 2019).

The Red Sea’s advantageous location close to a number of major energy sources explains the area’s current wealth and predicts further economic growth. Africa produces more than 500,000 barrels of oil per day (bpd) only from Egypt and Sudan. On the Middle Eastern side, Saudi Arabia and Oman produce more than 12 million bpd of oil. The total daily oil production from nations including the United States, Russia, China, Libya, and Iran exceeds 50 million barrels (bpd), along with a daily liquid natural gas production of about 3.5 billion cubic feet. Along with the $700 billion in seaborne trade that now traverses the route each year, China’s new maritime Silk Road, Africa’s expanding middle class, and oil discoveries in the Horn have all been hot topics in the region and beyond (Heath, 2019; Narbone and Widdershoven, 2021).

The region has been a site of intense geopolitical competition for centuries. The Ottoman Empire, the British Empire, and other European powers vied for control over the region in the 19th and early 20th centuries. In recent years, the region has become a battleground for regional powers such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, and Egypt (Mesfin, 2016; Van de Giessen, 2011; Humanitarian Development Program, 2017). The Red Sea and Horn of Africa regions are also home to several fragile states that are vulnerable to conflict and instability. Somalia has been in a state of civil war since 1991, while South Sudan has been embroiled in a civil war since 2013 (Narbone and Widdershoven, 2021; Aidi, 2020; Vertin, 2020). Yemen has been in a state of war since 2015, with devastating humanitarian consequences. The Red Sea and Horn of Africa region is a vital area for global trade and security. The region has been facing several geostrategic and geo-economics issues that have far-reaching implications. The Red Sea is a critical maritime route for global trade, connecting Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. The Horn of Africa is a region that includes Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan. (Narbone and Widdershoven, 2021; Aidi, 2020; Vertin, 2020). The following are some of the key issues in the region:

• Growing Geo-economic Projections: The Red Sea region is becoming increasingly important in global geopolitics due to its strategic location. Several countries in the broader Gulf region and external powers are extending their influence to the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. This has led to growing geo-economic projections, military rivalries, and the risk of confrontation between key regional players and international actors (Narbone and Widdershoven, 2021; Vertin, 2019).

• Military Competition: The Red Sea region has become a site of military competition between regional and international powers. Several countries have established military bases in the region, including China, France, Italy, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United States. This has led to concerns about the militarization of the region (Narbone and Widdershoven, 2021; Aidi, 2020; Vertin, 2020).

• Economic Challenges and Opportunities: The Horn of Africa is one of the poorest regions in the world. However, it has significant economic potential due to its strategic location. The region is home to several ports that are critical for global trade. However, several factors, such as political instability, corruption, and inadequate infrastructure, have hindered economic growth in the region (Narbone and Widdershoven, 2021).

• Stabilizing the Region: The Red Sea and Horn of Africa region is facing several challenges that require regional cooperation to address. These challenges include terrorism, piracy, human trafficking, and illegal fishing. Several initiatives have been launched to promote regional cooperation in the region. (Narbone and Widdershoven, 2021; Omar, 2019; Elana, 2021).

In conclusion, the Red Sea and Horn of Africa region is a complex and dynamic geopolitical landscape that is of great importance to global trade and security. While there are significant challenges facing the region, there are also opportunities for cooperation and development that could help to promote stability and prosperity. In conclusion, the Red Sea and Horn of Africa region is facing several geostrategic and geo-economics issues that require regional cooperation to address. Growing geo-economic projections, military competition, economic challenges and opportunities, and stabilizing the region are some of the key issues that need to be addressed.

2.2. Superpower rivalry in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa during the Cold War

The competition of post-Cold War superpower rivalry in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa is a complex issue with deep historical roots. During the Cold War, a fierce rivalry with a focus on the Horn developed between the USA and the Soviet Union, making the region a flashpoint for international confrontation in the 1970s and 1980s (Yordanov, 2017). The USA and the Soviet Union became involved in the Horn for a mixture of ideological and realpolitik reasons, but also because countries in the region sought out The Horn of Africa, which includes countries like Ethiopia and Somalia, was a significant area of interest during the Cold War due to its strategic location. The Cold War’s impact on the region was profound and enduring. It accelerated and intensified the Horn of Africa’s zero-sum brand of ethnic politics from 1977 to 1985 (Schwab, 1978). The rivalry between Moscow and Washington from 1977 to 1978 re-aligned the superpower dynamics in the region Superpower intervention led ruling regimes to eschew diplomatic solutions to various ethnic rebellions against their rule, which precipitated a famine in Ethiopia (Wilkins, 2023).

The end of the Cold War in Africa ended critical lifelines for the notorious regimes in Addis Ababa and Mogadishu, precipitating their collapse in 1991. This conclusion laid the groundwork for the Horn’s bloody 21st century. The Ogaden War between Ethiopia and Somalia is a key event to understand during this period. At the beginning of the 1970s, Somalia was in the Soviet sphere, hosting a Soviet base and fielding a Soviet-supplied army. Ethiopia, meanwhile, was a reliable American partner (Schmidt, 2013). The overthrow of Emperor Haile Selaisse in 1974 by a group of young leftist officers known as the Derg unraveled this alignment. Following the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, the regional rivalry with the USA that had helped to drive a series of devastating conflicts in the Horn of Africa came to an end. In place of the proxy conflicts fought in developing countries in the 1970s and 1980s, including in the Horn, a new focus on internationally sanctioned humanitarian interventions emerged (Melvin, 2019). In conclusion, the superpowers could have probably better managed the Cold War’s conclusion in the Horn. After all, competition in the Horn of Africa brought scant geopolitical gains to the dueling superpowers.

3.1. The main driver and motive

The competition for ports and military bases in the Red Sea region and the Horn of Africa is driven by a complex interplay of geopolitical, economic, and strategic factors. This competition involves both regional and global powers, reflecting the strategic importance of these regions.

Geopolitical Factors: The Red Sea and the Horn of Africa are situated at the crossroads of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. This makes them critical points of control for global trade routes, particularly for oil shipments passing through the Suez Canal. Control over these regions allows countries to exert influence over these vital trade routes (Vertin, 2019; Horton, 2022).

Economic Factors: The Horn of Africa is Asia’s and the Gulf’s door to Africa’s vast natural resources. The region’s vast underdeveloped natural resources have attracted significant investment from countries like China (Vertin, 2019; Horton, 2022).

Strategic Factors: The presence of military bases in these regions provides countries with strategic advantages. For instance, China opened its first-ever overseas military base in Djibouti in 2017 (Bateman, 2017; Chaziza, 2018; Grieger, 2019). This base overlooks a major strategic chokepoint and one of the world’s most heavily trafficked shipping lanes. It also brings new attention to Beijing’s economic investments in the Red Sea region (Vertin, 2020).

The players involved: Countries such as China, France, Italy, Japan, the USA, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, India, and Russia are all involved in this competition. Each country has its own interests and strategies. For instance, China has long recognized the importance of Africa’s vast, underdeveloped natural resources^. After two decades of investment and the clever use of debt, China’s influence now spans the entire continent (Vertin, 2019; Horton, 2022).

3.2. The competition for access to ports and military bases and heightening geopolitical rivalries in the Horn of Africa

The new superpower competition for ports and military bases in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa is a manifestation of the changing geopolitical landscape. This competition is driven by the strategic importance of the region, which serves as a critical passage for global trade and military operations. Countries such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey are seeking to expand their influence in the Horn of Africa (Michelle, 2021). They are doing so through commercial ports and military outposts on Africa’s Red Sea coast. This has led to what some refer to as a “new scramble for Africa,” characterized by the proliferation of seaports and military facilities (The United States Institute of Peace, 2021). Moreover, great powers like China, France, Italy, Japan, and the United States have established their presence at the junction of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. India and Saudi Arabia have also signaling interest in establishing bases in Djibouti, while Russia has shown interest in having its own strategic presence in the Horn (Vertin, 2020; Horton, 2022).

This surge in political, economic, and strategic engagement across the Red Sea is challenging old assumptions and erasing old boundaries (Vertin, 2020). However, it’s important to note that this new engagement from outside powers presents both challenges and opportunities for the fragile African states on the western shores of the Red Sea. In conclusion, this new superpower competition is reshaping the geopolitical dynamics in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa regions. It’s a complex issue with potential implications for regional stability, economic development, and international relations.

3.3. The geopolitics of ports in the Horn of Africa

In general, the main function of ports throughout history has been the movement of cargo from ships to other modes of transportation and vice versa (De Langen, 2007). Ports act as hubs for manufacturing and industry because they have lower transaction and transit costs. For these reasons, ports frequently serve as the focal point of a nation’s entire economic strategy, particularly in developing countries. The Red Sea and the Horn of Africa have become focal points for a new kind of geopolitical competition. This region is witnessing an intense race among superpowers for control over ports and military bases, driven by its strategic maritime importance.

Djibouti, a small country in the Horn of Africa, has emerged as a significant player in this race. Its strategic importance lies in its geographic position at the Bab al-Mandab Strait, which connects the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean and carries over 30% of today’s global shipping trade (Dahir, 2019; Jan, 2021). Djibouti hosts several overseas military bases, including those of France, the United States, and China (Bateman, 2017; Chaziza, 2018; Grieger, 2019; The Economist, 2018). In recent years, Djibouti has seen a shift in its alliances. After a falling-out with Dubai Port World (DPW) in 2018, the country turned its attention to China. China, which built its first overseas military base in Djibouti in 2017, provides a one-size-fits-all model based on the port city of Shekou (Young, 2016). In December 2020, China’s largest port operator, Logistics Company, reached an agreement with Djibouti to invest $3 billion in the expansion of the port.

The Gulf States, Turkey, and China are also racing to secure footholds in the Horn of Africa. For instance, Somalia hosts Turkey’s largest overseas military base, and Turkish companies run Mogadishu’s port and airport. The United Arab Emirates (UAE)-based companies operate the ports of Berbera and Bosaso in Somaliland and Puntland, respectively (Vertin, 2020). The UAE has also built a naval and air base at Assab in Eritrea. However, this high-stakes battle for influence and access is not without risks. The insertion of regional disputes into the politics of these countries could exacerbate instability in what are already fragile states. As these outside powers invest billions of dollars in the region, it remains to be seen how this will shape the future of the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region. Djibouti, situated at the mouth of the Red Sea, hosts bases for several countries, including France, the United States, and China. The race for ports in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa is a complex geopolitical issue involving regional, global, and superpower powers. The Gulf States, Turkey, and Iran are intensifying their efforts for access and influence in the Horn of Africa (Vertin, 2020; Melvin, 2019; Horton, 2019). Here’s a detailed breakdown.

• The United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey are shaping how these countries interact with state and non-state actors in the Horn (Vertin, 2019; Horton, 2019).

• The UAE-based companies operate the ports of Berbera and Bosaso in the autonomous region of Puntland (Stevis and Fitch, 2016).

On the other hand, Ethiopia, whose foreign trade mainly relies on seaports, is the other major player in the Horn of Africa interested in the port industry. Following Eritrea’s independence in 1991, Ethiopia was forced to bear the harsh consequences of being one of the few landlocked nations in the world, with ramifications for its economy and politics. Ethiopia has both short- and long-term strategic interests to access due to its rapidly developing economy, rapidly increasing demand, and landlocked location (Rebuma, 2020). To carry on its international trade, it went to all these ports on the Horn and the Indian Ocean. For Ethiopia’s rapidly expanding population and economic development initiatives, diversification of ports and diminishing dependency on Djibouti have emerged as major foreign policy and national security priorities. Following the Ethio-Eritrea War in 1998, Ethiopia’s over-dependence on its neighbor Djibouti for its foreign trade made the nation vulnerable in terms of both strategy and national security (Gessesse, 2015).

From a geostrategic and foreign policy standpoint, Ethiopia’s interest in other neighboring countries, such as Eritrea, Kenya, Sudan, and Somaliland, makes sense. The 2018 Ethio-Eritrea reconciliation has opened up a fresh geopolitical window for both nations to invest in ports to restore Assab and other Eritrean ports. In an effort to expand its port outlets, lower port fees, and provide new choices for Ethiopian shipping interests, the Abiy administration has also struck agreements with Sudan for access to Port Sudan. The nation has also reached an agreement with Somaliland, for a 19% stake in the port of Berbera. This agreement also includes a plan to build a road connecting the UAE’s 51% holding to the port (BBC News, 2018).

This race for ports is driven by strategic maritime importance, access to abundant natural resources, and regional rivalries. However, as this high-stakes battle intensifies, so does the risk of increased instability in the Horn of Africa. It’s important to note that this race is not just about military bases but also about economic models and development pathways (Horton, 2019).

3.4. Geopolitics of military bases in the Horn of Africa

A foreign military base (FMB) is a location that houses a specific number of armed forces and is beyond the territorial control of a sovereign state. It has military operations, organized institutions, and infrastructure (Harkavy, 2007). In terms of strategy, it’s crucial for the projection of military might in international relations, a Launchpad for military operations and interventions, the protection of foreign interests, the demonstration of soft power, and the expansion of political influence abroad. The Horn of Africa’s regional security complex is increasingly being influenced by foreign powers, according to a primary observation of the region’s security environment since the turn of the twenty-first century. This involvement involves a variety of means, mechanisms, and methods, including but not limited to establishing military bases, installations, programs, and money (Tesfaye, 2021).

4.1. Beneficial effects economic security, regional integration, and increased investment

The region’s geostrategic significance has grown as a result of geopolitical events, including but not limited to maritime security, energy security, economic development, and international and regional conflicts. Diverse literature has demonstrated that the creation of numerous overseas military installations in the Horn of Africa subregion has an impact on economic security. On the one hand, authors like Melvin (2019) and Esrael (2018) contend that having foreign military installations in the Horn of Africa region has benefits for economic security. Additionally, Melvin (2019) argues that the rise of new commercial prospects associated with the Horn region has resulted in some economic security benefits due to the increased presence of Middle Eastern and Gulf countries in the Horn region (Melvin, 2019). This has led to an increase in global competition for access to port facilities in the Horn, particularly those that are near the entrance to the Red Sea. This competition has caused the race for ports to become more securitized because of the Horn’s strategic location. In Sub-Saharan Africa, Saudi Arabia has the highest level of agricultural investment (nearly 70%), particularly in Ethiopia and Sudan, and it is said to have invested the most in Ethiopia’s agriculture of any Arab country.

The simultaneous involvement of the new major power rivals in the Horn of Africa has the potential to have significantly positive effects for the area. The infrastructure projects, first and foremost, produce favorable net results for the Horn countries, who have typically welcomed the escalating stream of capital (Jos & Guido, 2021). The construction of a railway by a Chinese business accelerated the regional economic integration of Ethiopia and Djibouti, for example, as a result of a new investment in infrastructure. In addition, the existence of many investors can intensify rivalry, possibly igniting a “race to investments” and raising total financial inflows into the underdeveloped infrastructure sector in the Horn. This idea is supported by the vast number of projects that have been started and grown over the past few years (Henry, 2016). For instance, in terms of ports, in addition to the locations created by the UAE (in Berbera, Somaliland, and Bosaso, Puntland), and China (in Djibouti), additional infrastructure projects have already recently been finished in the area (for example, Turkey’s rehabilitation of Somalia’s Mogadishu port), and more are on the way (for example, Turkish and Qatari efforts to revive the old Sudanese port of Suakin; development of a port at Hobyo, in Somalia’s Galmudug region, by an Anglo-Turkish consortium) (Jos & Guido, 2021).

Such an investment race might have significant economic benefits for the Horn of Africa, given the underdeveloped infrastructure sector and the expanding market potential. Multiple investors could have a good political impact in Horn in addition to increasing investment levels and resulting economic benefits to the countries. Local governments may be able to play off prospective investors against one another if they are presented with a larger range of investors, giving them another instrument with which to make their voices heard. For instance, the existence of alternative sources of investment, most notably China’s CMP, may have permitted government officials to take a harder line in their interactions with DPW as the government of Djibouti grew increasingly doubtful about DPW’s commitment to the development of Doraleh’s ports. The competition for a position at Sudan’s ports between DPW, China Harbour Engineering, and a Qatari business is also likely to strengthen the Sudanese government’s negotiating position with each of the three parties. The Gulf States have been helpful in resolving crises and promoting peace in the region; examples include Qatar’s mediation of the Darfur war and its assistance in brokering a peace agreement between Eritrea and Djibouti. The peace agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea, which was signed in Jeddah in September 2018, was also facilitated by Saudi Arabia (Aidi, 2020). The UAE has the chance to lessen opposition to its current military facility in Assab, Eritrea, through reduced opposition from Horn actors like Ethiopia and because the removal of U.N. sanctions on Eritrea removes barriers to financial and military support (Aidi, 2020). Despite little actual activity, it also offers prospective economic benefits by linking Eritrean ports with Ethiopia, the most populated landlocked nation in the world. In general, the global political and economic changes that are influencing the Horn region’s new external security dynamics are also a significant opportunity, bringing with them new investments, infrastructure, and links to global markets. However, the Horn countries’ attitude towards their interactions with external security players will need to change significantly if they are to take advantage of the potential and manage the challenges.

4.2. Harmful outcomes: unpredictability, proxy conflict, and patrimonial

The multilateral norms, values, and institutions and the transactional politics of money and force of the Gulf monarchies are two distinctly different methods and philosophies for peace and security, and the Horn of Africa is situated on a fault line between them (Dahir, 2018). A number of nations are now operating in the region under a complex web of bilateral security agreements, with a variety of national and international mandates connecting the Horn to a range of geopolitical and geo-economic agendas due to the proliferation of military bases and facilities as well as the expansion of naval forces. The Horn’s external security politics have a number of effects on the regional security system. Proxy competition has increased as a result of several factors, most notably the expansion of foreign security interests in the Horn of Africa and the growing significance of mixed military-commercial partnerships (Melvin, 2019). In an already unstable environment, instability and insecurity are being exacerbated by the recent competition for dominance in the Horn between the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia on the one hand and Turkey and Qatar on the other (Melvin, 2019). The Horn of Africa Project Director for Crisis Group, Rashid Abdi, stated in a commentary titled “A Dangerous Gulf in the Horn: How the Inter-Arab Crisis is Fueling Regional Tensions” that the ever-increasing competition for military bases in the region is escalating tensions and raising the possibility of a conflict. (Abdi, 2017). Some real-world examples include the circumstance in which Djibouti and Eritrea’s already strained relationship worsened after Qatari Marines preserving an armistice on the Red Sea island of Doumeira withdrew in June 2017 after the two nations allied with the Saudi-led alliance (Omar, 2019). The consequences of the intra-GCC conflict and rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the one hand and Turkey and Qatar on the other have both had a bad effect on the situation in Somalia and have added to its centrifugal strains, more so than they have on Sudan (Feierstein, 2020).

The UAE’s engagement in Somalia has traditionally been mostly focused on business and commercial concerns, in contrast to Saudi Arabia, whose interest in the country was primarily motivated by competition with and concern over Iranian interventions. However, the Federal Government of Somalia, which does not recognize Somaliland’s sovereignty over Berbera, is embroiled in a diplomatic conflict as a result of DP World’s decision to sign the first significant international contract with Somaliland (Styan, 2018). Somaliland and four of Somalia’s five federal states—Puntland, Hirshabelle, Galmudug, and South-west—have contested the central government’s attitude and pushed for a pro-Saudi stance, despite the fact that Mogadishu has supported Turkey and Qatar. Tensions have been created within Somalia’s political classes as a result of these opposing viewpoints (Dahir, 2018). The relationship between ports and regional security dynamics beyond commerce is a blatant example of how complex the region’s evolving geopolitical dynamics may be. Accordingly, the Gulf states and Turkey assert an interest in the “peace and security” of the Horn, but their meanings of these terms are very different, and their competing interests are ripe for conflict (Crisis Group, 2019).

The establishment of overseas military installations in the Horn region would increase the likelihood of fanaticism. The Middle Eastern nations’ religious alignment is primarily to blame for this. The Saudi Arabia-led organizations are on one side, and Iran and Qatar are on the other, restricting one another’s growth (Esrael 2108). While Turkey and Qatar are more supportive of the Muslim Brotherhood and organizations with similar ideologies, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt generally work to limit the movement’s influence at home and abroad. The international dimension of the Brotherhood, which Riyadh and Abu Dhabi see as possibly undermining their individual monarchies, is the main cause of Saudi and Emirati worry about the movement (Guido, 2020). Additionally, efforts to stabilize the areas of the region that are most rife with conflict have been hampered by this competition. The central authority in Mogadishu in Somalia has been supported by both Qatar and Turkey against the federal states backed by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, eroding unity in a nation that is synonymous with state breakdown (The United States Institute of Peace, 2020).

Additionally, the resurgence of a fierce cross-border water dispute on the Nile River as a result of Gulf power politics in the Horn has raised the possibility of a clash over the GERD (Grand Ethiopia Renaissance Dam) (Abigail & Timothy, 2018). In particular, Egypt has been advancing its hydro-hegemony in the Horn region by using the Arab League as a diplomatic vehicle (Addis Standard News, 2018). Egypt also makes use of the alliance between Sudan, Turkey, and Qatar to rekindle its interest in the Nile River conflict, particularly the GERD project, and to wage war against Sudan, which has a bigger problem. The Egyptian and Ethiopian governments are at odds over the progression of the GERD; therefore, the Saudis and Emiratis are unable to satisfy both allies. This looked to be impeding cooperation with Ethiopia on a multilateral strategy for security in the larger Red Sea region at the time. As a result, the conflict over GERD and the contrasting geopolitical and geo-economic race in the Horn of Africa have larger security implications (Ursand and Berg, 2018).

In other operations that were less overtly focused on conflict resolution, Middle Eastern involvement in the Horn has exacerbated already-existing disputes or fueled new tensions. The UAE’s separation from both Djibouti and Somalia is an example of the latter. Additionally, the GCC dispute put great pressure on the smaller countries of the Horn to pick a side. Results have been patchy despite these substantial initiatives. Most treatments have not produced ground-breaking results. A spirit of competition has lately been present in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) conflict, which began in 2017 when Saudi Arabia and the UAE placed an embargo on Qatar. For instance, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates’ participation in the peace deal between Ethiopia and Eritrea could be seen as a geopolitical maneuver to isolate Ethiopia. Qatar and Turkey are ahead of the changing regional dynamics.

Violence in Darfur has persisted despite years of conversations and a number of settlements; implementation has been challenging, and the conflict’s underlying causes have not been addressed. It appears like Khartoum’s new administration has surpassed Qatar’s protocol after being sworn in August 2019. This is due to the fact that ongoing negotiations with armed parties are now taking place in South Sudan. On the other hand, Somaliland criticized Turkey for alleged biases in its facilitation efforts between Somalia and Somaliland, which stagnated in 2015 without yielding any significant progress. Similar territorial disputes occur between Sudan and Egypt over the Halayeb Triangle and despite the normalization of relations in late 2018, the border between Eritrea and Djibouti remains unresolved (Mahmood, 2020).

Additionally, Saudi and Emirati participation in the ouster of Al Bashir in Sudan after the coup ran the risk of initially playing more of a spoiler role by backing the Transitional Military Council (TMC) over the civil protest movement. Support, such as the provision of financial help to the TMC, was more concerned with supporting one side than it was with resolving the conflict. This was due to a variety of factors, including the desire to keep Sudanese soldiers in the conflict in Yemen and prevent the Muslim Brotherhood from gaining ground in the post-Bashir era. Whether it is successful or not, the return of interaction between the Horn of Africa and the Middle East demonstrates the potential for Middle Eastern engagement to exacerbate tensions (Mahmood, 2020; Michelle, 2021).

Another significant geopolitical concern is the Horn of Africa’s continued militarization and the growing influence of Asian nations there. As China’s position in Djibouti grows, a geopolitical rivalry between Asia’s Horn nations has emerged, and there is growing concern over the presence of Japan and India in the Indian Ocean (Melvin, 2019). Additionally, as China approaches Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, there may be increased hostilities between U.S.-aligned actors and those supported by former Gulf allies if the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden are at stake. However, this is only a remote possibility and not likely (Michelle, 2021).