This article, “The Saudi Arabia-UAE ‘Cold War’ in Yemen,” analyzes the growing rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the UAE in Yemen. While initially aligned against common enemies after the Arab Spring, their interests diverged, turning Yemen into a battleground for influence.
Key points:
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Divergent Priorities: Saudi Arabia views Yemen as crucial for its southern border security and stability. The UAE, however, focuses on Yemen’s strategic importance for its maritime trade network.
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Escalation: By late 2025, tensions escalated with Saudi airstrikes against the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC), halting their territorial gains. The STC was subsequently dissolved.
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Saudi Consolidation: Following the UAE’s military withdrawal, Saudi Arabia aimed to strengthen its influence, investing heavily in Yemen to reshape its political and security landscape.
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UAE Resurgence: The UAE, despite setbacks, retains significant stakes in Yemen and is expected to seek opportunities to reassert its influence, potentially at Saudi Arabia’s expense.
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S.-Iran-Israel War: This conflict temporarily overshadowed the Saudi-UAE rivalry, prompting them to present a united front against Iran. However, differing strategies in dealing with the conflict could reignite tensions.
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Scenarios: The most likely scenario is a fragmented Yemen, while a unified Yemen under Saudi guidance is less probable.
In essence, the article describes a “cold war” between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, where Yemen is a key theater for projecting power and securing their distinct strategic interests. While the conflict between Iran, Israel, and the U.S. temporarily masks this rivalry, the underlying tensions remain and could resurface.
The complete piece is as follows:
The Saudi Arabia-UAE ‘Cold War’ in Yemen
Saudi Arabia’s strikes on the UAE-backed STC and the group’s subsequent dissolution mark a turning point in the intensifying rivalry over Yemen.
By Giorgio Cafiero
In a nutshell
- Divergent priorities turned Yemen into a focal point of Saudi-Emirati rivalry
- Riyadh sees Yemen as both buffer and vulnerability on its southern border
- The UAE uses covert and proxy networks to project influence
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In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates became the main architects of a counter-revolutionary axis that profoundly shaped the Middle East’s post-2011 geopolitical order. Their shared goal of countering Iran, Qatar, Turkiye and the Muslim Brotherhood forged years of close alignment between these two Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members. Over time, however, differing interests began to create mounting tensions, with Yemen increasingly becoming a central point of contention.
Friction escalated openly by late 2025, culminating in Saudi airstrikes on December 30, 2025, against the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) forces at the Port of Mukalla. These strikes halted the STC’s rapid territorial advances in southern and eastern Yemen, leading to its official dissolution on January 9, 2026. While these setbacks are notable for the UAE, Abu Dhabi does not view them as conclusive. This suggests that Yemen will remain a contested theater in the emerging Saudi-Emirati “cold war,” which will significantly influence regional dynamics, despite the U.S.-Israel-Iran war taking attention away from this rivalry for the time being.
In March 2015, the UAE joined a Saudi-led Arab military coalition that launched Operation Decisive Storm to combat the Houthi rebels, who had taken control of Sanaa and other regions of Yemen the year before. Although Riyadh and Abu Dhabi viewed the Houthis and Iran as shared threats, their objectives differed. Saudi Arabia focused on fighting the Houthis along the Saudi-Yemeni border, while the UAE concentrated on its geoeconomic interests in southern Yemen and engaged in battles against Sunni Islamist groups in that area.
By 2017, the STC was established and became a powerful separatist group, largely bolstered by Emirati support. The clashes between the STC and Saudi-backed Yemeni forces strained the anti-Houthi coalition. With both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi focused on de-escalation, these tensions were largely managed through a series of compromises, most notably the 2019 Riyadh Agreement.
The formation of the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) in 2022 was an attempt to unite Yemen’s anti-Houthi factions, including the Saudi-aligned forces in favor of preserving post-1990 Yemen’s territorial integrity and the STC, under a single governing body. Nonetheless, the PLC proved largely ineffective and incapable of overcoming the major sources of deep-rooted strains within the council, especially those between the STC and Saudi-backed al-Islah party.
By December 3, 2025, the STC had conducted sufficient military operations to essentially bring all the territory, which was once part of the former state of South Yemen, under the control of the UAE-backed group. Their reach extended as far north as the Saudi border in Hadramawt and as far east as the Omani border in al-Mahra.
Saudi Arabia considered the actions of the STC to have crossed a crucial “red line,” especially since its destabilizing activities had reached Saudi borders. What was especially provocative for Riyadh was the timing of this operation, which coincided with the 46th annual GCC summit. This led officials in Riyadh to conclude that Abu Dhabi had given the separatist group tacit approval to proceed with its plans.
The direct Saudi military intervention on December 30, 2025, was combined with coordinated operations by Riyadh-backed Yemeni factions. This resulted in the UN-recognized Yemeni government’s forces first taking back the land seized by the STC in Hadramawt and al-Mahra and then taking the fight to Aden. By January 9, 2026, the STC announced its dissolution, just 10 days after the UAE announced the withdrawal of its counter-terrorism forces, a move that Abu Dhabi framed as a means to de-escalate tensions.
Facts & figures
Yemen after the Port of Mukalla strikes
Riyadh’s bid for consolidation
Following the UAE’s military withdrawal from Yemen and the dissolution of the STC in late 2025 and early 2026, Riyadh has worked to strengthen its influence across territories outside Houthi control. The effort is extensive and expensive, backed by billions of dollars in pledged aid aimed not just at stabilizing Yemen but also at reshaping its political and security landscape to align with Saudi strategic interests.
Yet the scope of Saudi ambition is matched by the scale of the obstacles it faces. The fragile ceasefire with the Houthis in the north remains tenuous and is further complicated by the Iran war, while in non-Houthi areas, long-standing rivalries among militias and tribal groups complicate any effort at central control. Yemen’s economy is in serious distress, adding to the burden of Saudi aid. For 2026 alone, Riyadh has allocated about $3 billion to pay the salaries of military personnel and civil servants, including southern forces previously supported by the UAE.
On February 6, 2026, the PLC announced the formation of a new Saudi-backed government led by Prime Minister Shaya Mohsen al-Zindani, following months of consultations in Riyadh. The government inherits a state apparatus weakened by corruption, patronage and wartime polarization – structural distortions that cannot be quickly undone. Its main challenge is whether it can turn nominal authority into effective control and domestic legitimacy, especially in Aden. With security fragile, expectations high and fragmentation a constant risk, this moment may represent a narrow window to reestablish coherent state authority.
Riyadh believes that bringing together a united front against the Houthis, with Saudi Arabia leading the way, will push Ansar Allah (the Houthis) to make meaningful concessions. However, the entrenched divisions in Yemen raise questions about whether financial incentives and political backing can create lasting unity among groups whose loyalties are often shifting and uncertain.
The UAE, for its part, does not see its setbacks in Yemen as permanent. The withdrawal of Emirati counterterrorism forces does not prevent Abu Dhabi from advancing its interests through proxies, surrogates and local partners. Having invested heavily over many years, the UAE still has significant stakes in the country. Under President Mohammed bin Zayed, who is known for strategic persistence, there is every reason to expect Abu Dhabi to look for opportunities for a resurgence in Yemen – potentially at Saudi Arabia’s expense.
Divergent visions
For the Saudis, Yemen is both a hinterland and a fault line. It is a vast area that represents both strategic depth and significant vulnerability along the Kingdom’s extensive southern border. No other neighboring country affects Saudi Arabia’s internal security, economic ambitions and regional influence as directly. A fragmented or hostile Yemen leaves the Kingdom vulnerable to cross-border militant activity, arms trafficking and the destabilizing spillover of conflict.
In contrast, a unified and stable Yemen, governed by a Riyadh-friendly administration, acts as a protective buffer and a geopolitical anchor. In this view, stability in Yemen is not just peripheral diplomacy; it is a key national security priority, closely linked to Riyadh’s broader goal of projecting order and stability in the region.
In addition to the security concerns, there is a pressing economic factor at play. Riyadh perceives Yemen’s long coastline and its network of ports along both the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea as vital strategic assets. These could serve as alternative export routes, especially since the Strait of Hormuz has been severely disrupted by Iran’s de facto blockade since early March 2026.
The sharp decline in tanker traffic, which has dropped to well below 10 percent of normal volumes amid the U.S.-Israel-Iran conflict, has necessitated a significant reworking of shipping routes.
In this environment of active confrontation, fragile ceasefires and competing blockades, the prospect of diversifying transit pathways is no longer theoretical planning but immediate, practical hedging against geopolitical disruption. Saudi Arabia has accelerated the use of its East-West pipeline to Red Sea terminals, such as Yanbu, to bypass the Strait of Hormuz, though recent Iranian attacks have temporarily reduced its throughput.
The threat of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait being closed by Houthis as a means of bolstering Iran’s hand in this war adds to Saudi Arabia’s interests in developing alternative energy corridors via a stable and cooperative Yemen, which could offer the Kingdom additional flexibility. Under such conditions, Yemen’s ports and coastline could provide Riyadh with insulation from instability and greater resilience in safeguarding the uninterrupted flow of energy exports on which the Saudi economy depends.
For the UAE, Yemen holds a different – though equally strategic – place in its regional vision. Abu Dhabi sees the country as a key link in its growing maritime network, part of a wider chain of commercial ports, logistical hubs and security partnerships stretching across the Red Sea and into the Horn of Africa.
From this perspective, engagement in Yemen is less about territorial control and more about strengthening influence along vital sea lanes that connect global trade to Emirati commercial and naval interests. Control or partnership in Yemeni ports enhances the UAE’s ability to influence maritime dynamics and reinforces its identity as a major power along the Red Sea rim.
While both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi recognize Yemen’s strategic significance, they interpret its value through distinct prisms: For Saudi Arabia, Yemen is an indispensable shield and contingency lifeline; for the UAE, it is a keystone in a wider maritime strategy designed to extend influence across interconnected waters. The divergence in these strategic outlooks helps explain the rivalry between the two Gulf powers, as each seeks to secure not only stability in Yemen but also a vision of regional order aligned with its own ambitions.
For now, Saudi Arabia seems to have the upper hand in Yemen. The UAE has not lost its foothold and will probably wait for the right moment to reassert its influence. Yet this apparent Saudi advantage in Yemen is unfolding against a larger regional backdrop that is temporarily suppressing open rivalry between the two Gulf powers.
The U.S.-Israel-Iran war: Fragile truce masks deep rivalry
The U.S.-Israel-Iran war has prompted Saudi Arabia and the UAE to set aside their differences – at least temporarily – and pursue greater unity among Gulf Arab states in response to Tehran’s missile and drone attacks on GCC countries. Discussions between Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and President Mohammed bin Zayed during the conflict highlighted their shared resolve to confront the Iranian threat. However, this unity has not eliminated the underlying issues between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.
The fragile two-week ceasefire brokered by Pakistan officially expired on April 22, but President Donald Trump announced its indefinite extension just hours before the deadline at Pakistan’s request. Tensions persist, particularly over control of the Strait of Hormuz and broader regional security concerns.
Although Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have done much to set aside their differences and focus on the Iranian threat since late February, there are signs that Saudi Arabia and the UAE are diverging in their strategies for dealing with the destabilizing effects of this war. Saudi Arabia is more focused on de-escalation and questions the wisdom of the Trump administration’s blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, whereas the UAE has proven more aligned with the White House’s hawkish posture toward Tehran throughout this conflict.
Looking ahead, regardless of the current truce’s fate, the Iran war has the potential to slowly become more of a flashpoint in Saudi-Emirati tensions, along with other files such as Yemen, Somalia, Sudan and Palestine.
Scenarios
Most likely: Fragmented Yemen
Saudi Arabia struggles to unify Yemen under its tutelage. Ongoing ambitions for southern independence continue to motivate groups like the STC, which capitalize on local opposition to Salafist and Sunni Islamist actors empowered by Riyadh’s influence and support. Deep divisions among Yemeni factions weaken hopes for nationwide reconciliation through Riyadh’s influence. In this situation, Abu Dhabi’s strategy of withdrawing and then reasserting itself proves successful, allowing the UAE to make a strong reentry into Yemen’s fractured political scene.
Less likely: Unified Yemen under Saudi guidance
Yemen achieves a degree of stability under Saudi oversight. Riyadh effectively engages former STC leaders and fighters, addressing southern grievances through a comprehensive and inclusive dialogue that reduces the risk of fragmentation, while also maintaining the Kingdom’s de facto truce with the Houthis, who enter into good faith talks with their adversaries in Yemen. In this scenario, the UAE retains some influence in Yemeni affairs but has considerably less influence than Saudi Arabia.
Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics, a Washington, DC-based geopolitical risk consultancy. He is also an Adjunct Assistant Professor at Georgetown University and an Adjunct Fellow at the American Security Project. Mr. Cafiero is a frequent contributor to The New Arab, Gulf International Forum, TRT World, Stimson Center, and Amwaj.Media.
