The U.S. is quietly eyeing Somaliland as a Red Sea foothold—raising tensions with Somalia and turning the Bab el-Mandeb into a high-stakes geopolitical battleground
HARGEISA, Somaliland — A quiet but consequential geopolitical shift is unfolding along the shores of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, where U.S. strategic planners are increasingly looking to the self-declared Republic of Somaliland as a potential anchor in a widening contest over maritime security and regional influence.
In an analysis titled “The Bab el-Mandeb Gambit,” writer Diogenes Chakin argues that Washington’s engagement with Somaliland signals a recalibration of priorities in the Red Sea theater—one shaped as much by proxy rivalries as by global trade vulnerabilities.
“A senior delegation from U.S. Africa Command recently touched down in Hargeisa,” Chakin writes, describing a move that “signals more than routine diplomacy” and instead reflects “a deliberate recalibration of American security priorities.”
A Strategic Pivot in the Horn
For U.S. policymakers, the Horn of Africa is emerging as a critical node in a broader contest stretching from the Strait of Hormuz to the Red Sea.
Chakin notes that Somaliland’s geographic position offers a potential “logistical node that could complement or bypass existing regional basing arrangements,” particularly as threats from Yemen-based Houthis and Iranian maritime activity continue to disrupt shipping lanes.
The appeal is straightforward: proximity to one of the world’s busiest shipping corridors, combined with a relatively stable local administration compared to neighboring Somalia.
Access for Recognition
In exchange, Somaliland is offering something equally strategic—access.
“Hargeisa’s leadership has made its intentions unmistakably clear,” Chakin writes. “They openly welcomed American and Israeli operational use of their territory.”
At the center of this offer is the port city of Berbera, a deep-water facility modernized with backing from the United Arab Emirates and viewed as a potential alternative to congested regional hubs.
The approach reflects what Chakin describes as “pragmatic statecraft,” with Somaliland leveraging “its only irreplaceable asset” — geography — in pursuit of long-sought international legitimacy.
That strategy gained momentum after Israel formally recognized Somaliland in December 2025, a move that reshaped diplomatic calculations across the region.
Mogadishu Pushes Back
The federal government of Somalia has responded with sharp opposition, framing the outreach as a violation of sovereignty.
Somalia’s ambassador, Abdillahi Warfa, issued a stark warning that states engaging Somaliland could face restricted access to the Bab el-Mandeb corridor.
Chakin notes that while Somalia’s ability to enforce such threats remains limited, the strategy is aimed at mobilizing diplomatic pressure.
“By framing external engagement with Hargeisa as a violation of post-colonial border norms, Somalia aims to impose reputational and operational costs,” he writes.
That effort is reinforced through institutions such as the African Union and the Arab League, both of which have reiterated support for Somalia’s territorial integrity.
A Proxy Battlefield Emerges
The dispute is increasingly drawing in outside powers, turning the Horn of Africa into what Chakin describes as a “layered proxy arena.”
On one side, the United States and Israel view Somaliland as strategic redundancy—a vantage point to monitor maritime threats and reduce reliance on bases in Djibouti.
They are joined, implicitly, by the UAE, whose investments in Berbera align with efforts to counter Iranian influence.
On the other side, Turkey and Qatar back Somalia’s federal government, while Iran and Houthi forces benefit from any disruption that complicates Western operations.
“The region’s stability increasingly depends on managing these intersecting fault lines,” Chakin warns.
Chokepoints Under Pressure
The stakes extend far beyond regional politics.
The Bab el-Mandeb Strait—alongside the Strait of Hormuz—handles a significant share of global oil shipments and commercial trade. Disruptions in either corridor can reverberate across international markets.
“Shipping insurers, freight operators, and energy traders monitor every diplomatic statement for signs of disruption,” Chakin writes, emphasizing how geopolitical tension is translating into higher risk premiums.
“When sovereign claims are weaponized and access becomes conditional,” he adds, “the illusion of frictionless global trade gives way to a fragmented logistics environment.”
A Fragile Equilibrium
For now, the situation remains contained. Limited military cooperation, intelligence sharing, and port visits are expected to continue quietly.
But the risks are mounting.
Chakin outlines a range of escalation scenarios—from Houthi miscalculations to increased Iranian arms flows or Turkish countermeasures—that could rapidly destabilize the region.
“Somaliland’s opportunistic outreach and America’s pragmatic basing strategy form a temporary alignment of convenience,” he writes. “Neither resolves the underlying sovereignty dispute.”
As global powers circle one of the world’s most strategic waterways, the future of the Red Sea—and the balance of power in the Horn of Africa—may hinge on whether diplomacy can keep pace with ambition.
