The article refers to an in-depth examination of the diplomatic relationships between Taiwan and African countries. It focuses on:
- Recognition: How and why certain African nations have officially recognized Taiwan as a sovereign state, allowing for diplomatic relations.
- Derecognition: Instances where African countries have withdrawn their recognition of Taiwan, often switching allegiance to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) instead.
The overview likely covers the historical context, the motivations behind these decisions, and the implications for Taiwan’s foreign policy and international standing within the African continent.
By Kristina Kironska
Taiwan (ROC) has little problem establishing unofficial ties with countries around the world, but it encounters obstacles when attempting to formalize diplomatic relations, due to China’s concerted efforts to prevent such developments. China (PRC) sees itself as the sole representative of China and does not allow states to have official diplomatic relations with both the PRC and the ROC. The One China principle is a major Chinese foreign relations objective – an exception from the usual no-strings-attached policy of China.
Taiwan has 13 remaining official diplomatic allies, all comparatively weak countries in the developing world, with the exception of Vatican. In Africa, Taiwan has only one diplomatic ally – Eswatini (formerly Swaziland).
This was not always the case. At one point the ROC had around 30 African allies. In 1971, when China managed to gain the seat in the UN as the legitimate representative in China, replacing the ROC, the African continent was evenly split between the two contenders. Since then, China has attracted one African country after another to its side. Today China has relations with 54 countries out of 55 African countries.
The road to this achievement, however, was quite fierce. In the 1970s, -80s, and -90s, Taiwan’s economic power enabled it to win recognition from several countries in need of cash, with the help of the so-called dollar diplomacy. Also, Cold War rationales initially benefited Taiwan (fighting communism). China was winning allies at first on ideological grounds – likening China and African countries to each other as victims of Western imperialism – and after China undertook reforms, ideological motives made way for economic ones.
During this time, some African countries used the China card to gain as much as possible and switched frequently, each time requesting more incentives. Senegal, Liberia, and CAR switched five times, many other countries three times. Liberia is an interesting case, as it established ties with both the PRC and the ROC at the same time between 1993 and 1997 (however, when in 1997 Liberia wanted to recognize “two Chinas” the PRC severed ties).
In the 1990s, there was still a kind of fair fight between the two entities, because China was not so rich; now, there is no longer any contest. China is now a powerful economy that can use its economic might to woo poor African countries. Indeed, for most countries that made the switch, suddenly, China-bound exports grew quite substantially.
Thus, Taiwan now uses a different strategy – establishing unofficial ties. In Africa, besides having Eswatini as an official ally, Taiwan has three representative offices – in South Africa, Somaliland, and Nigeria. Additionally, TAITRA, established in the 1970s and tasked with developing economic relations with countries, even the ones that recognize China, has offices in Egypt, Kenya, South Africa, Nigeria, and Algeria.
The following table gives an overview of all African countries and their relationship to both the PRC and the ROC, and the switches that some of them made over the years.
This work has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon Europe coordination and support action 101079069 — EUVIP — HORIZON-WIDERA-2021-ACCESS-03.
Funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or the European Research Executive Agency (REA) . Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.
Cover photo: Flickr / jbdodane
Authors
Kristina Kironska
Advocacy Director
Kristina Kironska is a socially engaged interdisciplinary academic, with experience in election observation, research, and advocacy. She is the Advocacy Director at the Central Europe Institute of Asian Studies (CEIAS) and Assistant Professor at Palacky University Olomouc in the Czech Republic, where she co-coordinates the EU-funded project “The EU in the volatile Indo-Pacific” (EUVIP; 2023–2025). Prior to EUVIP, she was a Senior Researcher in the EU-funded project “Sinophone Borderlands – Interaction at the Edges” (2018–2022), also at the Palacky University. Since 2024, she also lectures at the Department of East Asian Economy and Society (EcoS) at the University of Vienna
In the past, she lived in Myanmar, where she conducted her doctoral research and worked for a local NGO. She also lived in Taiwan for many years, where, after her studies she lectured at the University of Taipei and organized monthly public human rights talks. She still frequently visits Taiwan for her research. From 2023, she also serves as a Board Member of the European Association of Taiwan Studies (EATS).
In her research, she focuses mainly on IR and human rights in Southeast and East Asia. She is the author/editor of several academic articles and books, such as “Contemporary China: A New Superpower” (Routledge, 2023) or “Asian Champion: All you need to know about contemporary Taiwan” (in Slovak) (Hadart, 2022). She is also the Deputy Editor-in-Chief of the International Journal of China Studies.
She is also very invested in the protection of human rights and is an active member of the European Myanmar Solidarity Network, and currently serves as the Chair of the Board of Amnesty International Slovakia.
She is fluent and articulate in eight languages.
Research interests: Taiwan, Myanmar, China, international relations, human rights, public opinion
Contact
kironska@ceias.eu
