This article, “DP World’s Berbera Deal: The Legal Shield against Mogadishu’s Withdrawal,” argues that DP World’s deal in Berbera, Somaliland, is legally protected from Somalia’s attempts to withdraw agreements because of Somaliland’s unique status.
Here’s a breakdown:
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Somaliland’s Independence: Somaliland was briefly independent in 1960 before uniting with Somalia. It declared independence again in 1991 and functions as a de facto state.
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Berbera’s Distinction: Unlike other ports Somalia is trying to reclaim, Berbera is in Somaliland, which has a history of independent trade autonomy.
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GATT/WTO History: Somaliland was listed in GATT records, the predecessor to the WTO, suggesting it was a recognized customs territory.
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Current Customs Regime: Somaliland operates its own customs regime, meeting WTO requirements for independent trade.
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Agreements with Somalia: Somalia signed agreements in Turkey committing not to politicize trade with Somaliland. This creates “estoppel,” preventing Somalia from contradicting its commitments and blocking Somaliland’s WTO accession.
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WTO Continuity: Somaliland can argue it never withdrew from GATT/WTO and can re-assert its membership like Britain did after Brexit.
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DP World’s Protection: Once Somaliland pursues WTO membership, DP World’s investment in Berbera will be protected under WTO rules, shielding it from Somalia’s interference.
In essence, the article claims Somaliland’s history, independent trade practices, and Somalia’s own agreements provide a legal basis for protecting DP World’s investment in Berbera port from Somalia’s attempts to undermine it.
The complete piece is as follows:
DP World’s Berbera Deal: The Legal Shield against Mogadishu’s Withdrawal
By M. Amin
Somalia’s Federal Government this week announced the withdrawal of all agreements with the United Arab Emirates, ordering Emirati companies to vacate the ports of Berbera, Kismayo, and Bosaso. Yet Berbera stands apart from the others.
Unlike Kismayo and Bosaso, which lie in Somalia’s former trusteeship territories, Berbera is located in the former State of Somaliland, which gained independence from Britain on June 26, 1960 before entering into a union with Somalia. That union was never cemented by a finalized bilateral treaty, but instead functioned as an administrative practice from Mogadishu between 1960 and 1991. After years of repression, including the Isaaq genocide, Somaliland restored its independence and has since operated as a de facto state with its own government and institutions[1].
This distinction is crucial for DP World’s Berbera concession. While Mogadishu may claim authority over ports in Somalia proper, Berbera lies in a territory that has long exercised independent trade autonomy.
Historical records from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the predecessor of the WTO, list Somaliland Protectorate with the symbol *•, meaning that although Open General Licences were not issued for administrative reasons, specific licences were freely granted on application[2]. This placed Somaliland within the framework of Most‑Favored‑Nation treatment even during colonial administration. Legally, Somaliland can argue it is not a new entity but the continuation of a recognized customs territory deposited by the UK and never formally withdrawn.
Today, Somaliland operates a fully independent customs regime, controlling imports, exports, and tariffs, and managing border customs with Djibouti, Ethiopia, and the UAE. This satisfies WTO’s requirement for “separate customs territories possessing full autonomy in the conduct of their external commercial relations”[3].
In addition, Somalia and Somaliland signed agreements in Turkey between 2012 and 2015, witnessed by Ankara, committing not to politicize humanitarian, development, trade, and investment issues[4]. If Mogadishu or its allies attempt to block Somaliland’s WTO accession, they would contradict their own signed commitments.
Under international law, this invokes the principle of estoppel, which prevents a party from denying or contradicting its previous commitments. Somalia’s signature bars it from politicizing trade against Somaliland, and Turkey’s role as witness further undermines any attempt to challenge.
The only procedural hurdle is WTO’s consensus requirement, but Somaliland can argue continuity. Just as Britain re‑asserted its independent WTO schedules after Brexit without re‑applying, Somaliland can claim it was already listed in GATT records, never withdrew, and now practices full customs independence. If Somalia and its allies attempt to block, their own Turkey‑signed commitments transform the dispute into estoppel, exposing them to charges of bad faith and damaging their credibility internationally.
For DP World, this legal architecture is decisive. Berbera is not just another port; it is the legal frontier where Somaliland’s continuity, WTO principles, and DP World’s strategic foresight converge. Once Somaliland activates its WTO membership path, DP World’s investment will fall under the WTO umbrella of protection, insulating it from Mogadishu’s attempts to cancel or obstruct. In this way, Berbera becomes not a battleground of politics, but a showcase of law — and DP World holds the winning hand.
Footnotes
[1] BBC News – Somaliland profile, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14115070
[2] WTO – Historical GATT documents archive (Annex IV), https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=Q:/GG/L1799/1002.PDF&Open=True
[3] WTO – Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO, Article XII, https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto_e.htm
[4] Heritage Institute – The Somalia–Somaliland Negotiations (Turkey talks), https://heritageinstitute.org/the-somalia-somaliland-negotiations/
