What a Difference a Year Makes: Port MoU Saga Ends with Embraces in Addis Ababa

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What a Difference a Year Makes: Port MoU Saga Ends with Embraces in Addis Ababa

By Ashenafi Endale

Exactly a year ago, in January 2024, former Somaliland President Muse Bihi was the subject of praise and acclaim in Addis Ababa as he sealed a fateful deal with Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. Although the full details of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) remain a mystery, the agreement hinged on maritime access for landlocked Ethiopia, in exchange for recognition of Somaliland’s sovereignty.

Almost immediately, news of the deal caused an upheaval in regional geopolitical dynamics, heightening diplomatic tensions and forging alliances. Mogadishu, in particular, viewed the MoU as a violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Over the next 12 months, these tensions would define relations between Ethiopia and Somalia.

However, a year down the road, the story has changed dramatically. January 2025 has seen Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud receive an honorary reception in Addis Ababa, giving the appearance that his government has turned over a new leaf.

To many, Hassan Sheikh’s visit last week raised more questions than it answered. But to experts who have been keeping a close eye on elections in Hargeisa and the Ankara Declaration, it came as no surprise.

The visit also coincided with the start of the latest African Union-led peacekeeping mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), which Mogadishu had previously iterated would not include Ethiopian troops. The position was clear as recently as last month, when Mohamed Rabi Yusuf, Somalia’s permanent representative to the UN, told the UN Security Council that Ethiopia would not be part of the third AU-led peacekeeping mission in Somalia.

“Due to documented actions of Ethiopia and Somalia in the past eleven months, the federal government of Somalia has undertaken a comprehensive review of its security arrangements, as we transition from ATMIS to AUSSOM. In that period, our regional partners from troop-contributing countries have shown remarkable solidarity, pledging to maintain our necessary force of 11,000 troops of AUSSOM. This commitment addresses any security vacuum created by Ethiopia while sustaining progress in the fight against Al-Shabaab. In that vein, we emphasize that the current AUSSOM troop allocations are completed through bilateral agreements which have been in place [since] November. As Somalia moves forward, we will continue to engage in future security partnerships that serve our national and shared regional interests,” said the representative.

Egyptian military presence in Somalia meant that tensions were running high, with fears the situation could devolve into clashes and a proxy war with Ethiopia, plunging the Horn even deeper into chaos.

Ethiopia’s representative to the UN, Tesfaye Yilma, warned that the presence of “extra-regional actors who have no constructive role in the region and in fighting terrorism in Somalia should…abandon their reckless pursuit.”

The strain was plain to see, which is why it has been so surprising to many that Mogadishu and Addis Ababa have patched things up in the weeks since those comments were made. The past month has seen an intensified diplomatic dialogue, with the two governments exchanging high-level delegations.

First, Somalia sent over a team led by a deputy Foreign Affairs Minister. This was followed by a visit to Mogadishu by Defense Minister Aisha Mohammed. Last week, Hassan Sheikh himself showed up in Addis reportedly at the invitation of Abiy Ahmed.

“But during the days when Hassan Sheikh was in Addis two weeks ago, another delegation led by Somalia’s Foreign Minister was in Cairo,” observes an analyst working at a public think tank, who spoke to The Reporter anonymously.

“This is not a genuine reconciliation. It is the part of the brokerage politics that has now become common in East African politics. There are other powerful leaders of the West and Middle East who are pulling the strings behind. Ethiopia and Somalia normalized relations only because those foreign powers warned them to de-escalate tensions and normalize. This is because the issue of recognizing Somaliland would put the AU, as well as China, in a precarious position. It would also backfire on Ethiopia,” said the analyst.

Constantinos Berhutesfa (PhD), a political commentator and former AU anti-graft commissioner, sees that a number of factors led towards the recent amicable exchanges between Abiy Ahmed and Hassan Sheikh following a year of threats and accusations.

“First is the fact that Muse Bihi was not re-elected as president of Somaliland,” said Constantinos.

He notes that the new president’s (Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi) comments about his administration’s unfamiliarity with the terms of the fateful MoU offered the administration of Abiy Ahmed a way out of the deal.

“But the new president also did not want to close off that option, either. He stated that Somaliland has the right to enter agreements with other countries,” said Constantinos.

He observes that Türkiye has a vested interest in both Somalia and Ethiopia and played a significant role in mediating between the two.

“Any agreement comes from pressure. If countries have a vested interest, they can use sanctions. Türkiye is supporting Somalia very heavily. At the same time, Türkiye’s companies have a lot of investments in Ethiopia. So both Somalia and Ethiopia were pressured into accepting the mediation,” said Constantinos.

“Another factor is that Somalia has serious internal strife. Some of Somalia’s regional states support the MoU because they also want to claim independence from Somalia one day,” he said. “Ethiopia is also highly concerned the Egyptian military could come to Somalia if the Ethiopian army leaves.”

However, the commentator argues that recent events bode ill for Egypt’s desire to establish a military presence in the Horn.

Constantinos argues the way the MoU was disclosed played a role in the hostile responses from Somalia, Djibouti, and Egypt.

“The fact that the naval base issue was mentioned as a primary goal in the MoU created heated concern from Somalia, Egypt and others. The naval base issue could have been kept as a secondary output of the MoU. Several countries, including Djibouti, have a vested interest in the Bab El Mandeb strait. If Ethiopia, with a huge army, gets a naval base presence in the Red Sea, it poses a threat. Djibouti’s port revenue also drops if Ethiopia shifts to Somaliland’s ports,” he said.

Constantinos argues that normalization is in the best interests of Ethiopia and Somalia. The MoU ordeal, he says, challenged Somalia’s sovereignty and cast a shadow on Ethiopian diplomacy and diplomatic history.

“For Ethiopia, this is the best way out. We have peace now with Somalia. Ethiopia paid the price for the MoU,” he said.

But where does this leave the MoU and Somaliland’s quest for recognition? Some experts argue the breakaway territory will have an even tougher time ahead in its bid for sovereignty.

“Somaliland’s recognition quest triggers very many loose ties around the world, especially across Africa. The reason the AU is so silent regarding Somaliland’s statehood quest is because there are so many fragile states in Africa, ready to pursue statehood. Ethnic factions, armed struggles and colonial legacies have created many groups in African states who are considering secession. If the AU recognizes Somaliland, that will blow open Pandora’s box. The AU cannot even consider de facto recognition of Somaliland,” said one expert, who spoke anonymously.

The expert observes that Somaliland’s consular representation in several countries has done little to forward its ambitions of sovereignty.

“They say it is not benefiting them. They say Somaliland is being held hostage because of Somalia. But Somaliland’s recognition could help Ethiopia, for port diversification,” said the expert.

Constantinos, on the other hand, believes that growing support from the US, the UK, and others means that Somaliland still has hope.

Dareskedar Taye (PhD), lead researcher at the Institute of Foreign Affairs (IFA), believes the political tensions of the past year have worked to Ethiopia’s advantage by amplifying the country’s ambitions for maritime access on the international stage.

“Today, Ethiopia’s quest for sea access has received wider attention from the international community, extending beyond Addis Ababa,” he said during an interview with The Reporter. “We hope this increased recognition will secure a stronger position for Ethiopia in the future.”

Professor Mohamud Ahmed is a political analyst and researcher who has studied Horn geopolitics extensively, specializing in the dynamism within Somali politics.

He argues the past year has done more to harm Ethiopian diplomacy than benefit it, and says the normalization of relations is a “win-win.”

“I think Ethiopia was in diplomatic isolation when it signed the MoU with Somaliland, which has no legitimate state of affairs. Somalia reached out diplomatically to everyone they could, which eventually put Ethiopia in an isolated position. It was a mishap from the Ethiopian government when they signed that MoU and thought that they could get away with it, and people thought that it was an infringement of Somalia’s integrity. It took over a year and the Ankara peace accord may lead people to say Somalia got a diplomatic win and Ethiopia a loss. But I don’t think so. The Ankara peace accord grants Ethiopia more diplomatic gain because it is back in the diplomatic game from its isolated position. It’s a win-win situation,” said the Professor.

Dareskedar sees the MoU as a carefully pre-planned and researched initiative undertaken well before the formal signing rather than a random development.

“IFA conducted research on the MoU’s potential benefits and possible challenges before it was signed,” he told The Reporter.

Dareskedar said that the recent Ethio-Somali agreement, particularly following the Ankara Declaration, has provided a significant opportunity for Ethiopia in its pursuit of sea access.

He argues the federal government is now in a stronger position to negotiate with a sovereign state that possesses the autonomous right to determine its national interests. Dareskedar emphasized that the agreement with Mogadishu is not solely about sea access but also encompasses economic benefits and national security.

“Somalia’s decades-long state of vulnerability and governance challenges have posed a persistent security threat to Ethiopia over the years,” he said. “Historically, both nations share profound economic interests spanning many years. The recent bilateral agreement we made with Somalia is far better in its benefits than the previous one. This is because the agreement advances Ethiopia’s quest for sea access one step ahead while also enhancing its ability to address security issues that might arise from the region, either directly or indirectly.”