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The article “Navigating the Diplomatic Complexities of Ethiopia’s Role in Shifting Regional Alliances” features an interview with Dareskedar Taye, who is among the experts tasked with keeping track of these complexities at the Institute of Foreign Affairs (IFA), where he works as lead researcher. He discusses the complexities of Ethiopia’s role in shifting regional alliances, particularly in the Horn of Africa. The expert, provides insights into the country’s foreign policy and national security, highlighting the importance of Ethiopia’s quest for sea access and its implications for regional dynamics.

Key points from the interview:

1. Ethiopia’s MoU with Somaliland: The agreement has caused diplomatic tensions with Somalia, but Dareskedar believes it has also brought significant advantages to Ethiopia, amplifying its voice in the international community.

2. Recent rapprochement with Somalia: The Ankara Declaration has created an opportunity for Ethiopia to negotiate with Somalia, potentially leading to sea access and economic benefits.

3. Tripartite agreement between Eritrea, Egypt, and Somalia: This alliance is seen as a challenge to Ethiopia’s security, with Egypt leveraging its influence to undermine Ethiopia’s interests.

4. Impact on Somaliland’s position: Somaliland’s stance has shifted, with the new administration preferring to align with the Somali government rather than asserting its independence.

5. Ongoing conflict in Sudan: The situation poses a risk of spillover effects, including refugee flows and security threats, but Ethiopia’s primary interest is to work towards a lasting solution through collaboration with neighboring countries.

6. UAE’s influence in the Horn of Africa: The UAE’s influence is significant, but it interacts with the influence of other external actors, such as China, Turkey, and the United States, shaping the regional security landscape.

7. Competing interests and regional security: External actors have the power to shape the regional security landscape, and Ethiopia must play its role effectively to benefit from peace in the region and address national security concerns.

Overall, the interview highlights the complexities of Ethiopia’s foreign policy and national security in the context of shifting regional alliances and competing interests in the Horn of Africa.

The complete excerpts from the interview are as follows:

Navigating the Diplomatic Complexities of Ethiopia’s Role in Shifting Regional Alliances
Dareskedar Taye (PhD)

Navigating the Diplomatic Complexities of Ethiopia’s Role in Shifting Regional Alliances

By Abraham Tekle

In January 2024, Ethiopia signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Somaliland, aiming to lease part of Somaliland’s coastline for an Ethiopian naval base and a commercial port facility. Somalia viewed the MoU as a violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity, leading to strained relations and diplomatic spats between the two countries.

This prompted Turkiye to mediate between the two nations, resulting in the Ankara Declaration in December 2024. The agreement emphasized mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, with both nations committing to technical talks to resolve their disputes by next month.

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Concurrently, the geopolitical landscape of the Horn of Africa has been evolving. In October 2024, Egypt, Eritrea, and Somalia formed a tripartite alliance, perceived as a strategic counterbalance to Ethiopia’s regional influence. The ongoing conflict in Sudan has also had significant geopolitical implications, affecting regional stability.

Reportedly, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and other regional as well as foreign actors’ growing influence in the Horn continues to shape the region’s power dynamics. Experts see these developments and the overall geopolitical environment in the Horn of Africa as growing increasingly complex.

Dareskedar Taye (PhD) is among the experts tasked with keeping track of these complexities at the Institute of Foreign Affairs (IFA), where he works as lead researcher. Although his current work is focused on European and US affairs, Dareskedar has a thorough understanding of regional geopolitics.

He earned his PhD in Political Science in 2017 and an MSc in International Relations and Political Science in 2009, both from Addis Ababa University. His academic achievements are complemented by extensive international and local training programs.

The Reporter’s Abraham Tekle caught up with Dareskedar to learn more about the mandates of IFA, where the MoU with Somaliland stands a year down the road, the details of more recent agreements with Mogadishu and how they will affect regional politics, and Ethiopia’s next steps in the quest for maritime access, among other pertinent topics. EXCERPTS:

The Reporter: Could you provide an overview of the specific tasks your organization undertakes, considering that the IFA is mandated to conduct research and analysis on foreign affairs, as well as propose alternative policy options to policymakers and the government?

Dareskedar Taye (PhD): Our institution primarily focuses on foreign relations and national security. Developments in foreign countries often influence or shape the nation’s foreign relations. These developments may arise from global powers, the Horn of Africa region, or neighboring countries. Our role is to monitor these changes and conduct research based on these developments.

We also conduct research in alignment with policies formulated by policymakers or the government and produce related outputs. Additionally, we are responsible for providing analyses on current issues in the country’s best interest and communicating them to the relevant government bodies. We disseminate our findings and policy recommendations through various channels, such as policy briefs, articles, media platforms, or conferences. These forums allow researchers to share their findings and perspectives with the public.

How often are your findings acknowledged, and what kinds of feedback do you usually receive from the government?

I cannot speak on behalf of the institution, but there are various think tanks around the world that operate entirely independently from government influence, both financially and in terms of their research agendas. These institutions often employ diverse mechanisms or platforms to share their findings. On the other hand, some think tanks enjoy partial methodological independence in conducting scientific research but rely on government funding, which may also influence the issues or agendas they research.

However, our institution operates differently. We are a part of the government, with our budget funded by the state, and most of our research topics are determined by governmental directives. Our leaders, appointed by the government, communicate the government’s priorities to us. Therefore, the research we conduct, the information we provide, and the responsibilities we fulfill are closely aligned with the government’s interests. We do not perceive any issues with the acceptance of our work, as we play a critical role in Ethiopian diplomacy and maintain close collaboration with the Ministry [of Foreign Affairs] itself.

Given that your organization conducts research and offers policy options to policymakers, you will be familiar with the MoU agreement with Somaliland and the diplomatic tensions it caused with the Somali government. Can it be said that the agreement was based on thorough research? What were the primary areas of focus during the study? Did your institution play a role in conducting the research?

I don’t believe I am the right person to answer this question directly, but I can speak as an expert. First and foremost, the MoU agreement Ethiopia signed with Somaliland not only caused diplomatic tensions but also brought significant advantages to the country. This is something we must not overlook.

The agreement played a crucial role in amplifying Ethiopia’s voice within the international community beyond Addis Ababa. We also believe it holds potential for even greater benefits in the future. To highlight this, our institution published a book just a few months after the agreement was signed. It is worth mentioning that the research for this book was conducted even before the agreement was finalized.

When addressing issues that challenge the status quo or touch on sensitive areas, it is inevitable to encounter negative consequences. However, national interests should not be abandoned out of fear of criticism or potential dangers. Keep in mind, some countries are even willing to go to war to protect their national interests. While war is not desirable, it underscores the lengths to which nations go to safeguard their goals.

Regarding the MoU, it is also important to note the involvement of other countries that attempted to derail Ethiopia’s objectives, which was an unintended outcome. That said, our research process carefully considered and identified expected, unexpected, and potential challenges. Based on these findings, we devised strategies to navigate these challenges, recognizing that diplomacy often requires managing discomfort while pursuing national interests.

Therefore, while our institution contributed its expertise to the MoU agreement, it is essential to focus on the positive outcomes it brought to the country rather than framing it solely in terms of its negative consequences.

Given the recent rapprochement between Ethiopia and Somalia, how do you assess the long-term implications of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s visits to Ethiopia? What are the potential benefits and challenges for both countries?

The recent Ethio-Somali agreement, particularly following the Ankara Declaration, has created a significant opportunity for Ethiopia in its quest for sea access. Ethiopia and its federal government are now better positioned to negotiate with a sovereign state that has the autonomous right to determine its own national interests.

Additionally, the agreement with Mogadishu is not solely about securing sea access; it also includes economic benefits and national security considerations. Somalia spent decades as a failed state, and the associated national security challenges often impacted Ethiopia. Moreover, if Ethiopia were to disregard Somalia as a strategic interest, the country could become a springboard for other nations, as we saw shortly after the signing of the MoU.

Thus, Somalia is not a country that Ethiopia can afford to ignore. I believe our recent engagement with Somalia has had positive consequences, offering a chance to mitigate risks originating from the region while advancing Ethiopia’s most significant national interest—its quest for sea access.

When considering potential challenges, it is essential to evaluate how far Somalia is willing to go to meet Ethiopia’s needs, as Somalia will also prioritize its own national interests. Ultimately, the success of the agreement will depend on the balance of what Somalia can offer and what it expects in return. These dynamics will unfold over time.

Nevertheless, the agreement represents a step forward in Ethiopia’s pursuit of sea access one step ahead and strengthens its ability to address security concerns that might arise from the region, whether directly or indirectly.

How might these developments impact Somaliland’s position?

I believe Ethiopia’s position on Somaliland has not changed; however, what has shifted is Somaliland’s stance. We have observed signs of change in how they approach their own interests. Specifically, the new administration in Somaliland appears to prefer aligning with the Somali government rather than asserting itself as an independent state.

Notably, they do not oppose Ethiopia’s use of ports, whether in Somalia or Somaliland, including the Berbera port. However, their closer engagement with the Somali government suggests a shift in their position. Until the situation becomes clearer, we are not in a position to make definitive statements, as the issue lies between Somaliland and Somalia rather than Ethiopia.

It is crucial to monitor developments and evaluate what actions Somaliland may take. Additionally, the global order and international politics are undergoing significant shifts. In the coming weeks, we expect further changes regarding Somaliland. Therefore, it is essential to assess these changes carefully and take actions that align with Ethiopia’s national interests.

The recent tripartite agreement signed by Eritrea, Egypt, and Somalia, endorsing Somalia’s sovereignty, has raised eyebrows. What are the key geopolitical drivers behind this agreement, and how might it impact regional dynamics, particularly regarding Ethiopia’s interests and the broader balance of power in the Horn of Africa?

The intention behind the agreements between Eritrea, Egypt, and Somalia is evident. For instance, Ethiopia once maintained a positive relationship with Eritrea before the issue of sea access became a priority. However, knowing Ethiopia’s interest in securing sea access, Eritrea turned its back on us. This shift likely stems from the understanding that Ethiopia might request an outlet through Eritrea if similar negotiations succeed with Somaliland.

Regarding Egypt, as is commonly known, its position is tied to the GERD. For over a century, Egypt has played a significant role in obstructing Ethiopia’s access to the sea. Therefore, the alignment between Eritrea and Egypt is unsurprising, given Ethiopia’s renewed focus on securing sea access.

As for Somalia, their inclusion in the alliance appears to stem from frustration over Ethiopia’s agreement with Somaliland instead of prioritizing Somalia, despite prior discussions. The tripartite agreement among Eritrea, Egypt, and Somalia essentially places Ethiopia’s security at risk. Egypt, as the primary driver of this alliance, is leveraging its influence over Eritrea and Somalia—our close neighbors—to undermine Ethiopia. In this context, while Ethiopia holds the MoU with Somaliland, the Tripartite Agreement adds another layer of challenge for the country.

At the same time, the agreement with Somalia has left Egypt and Eritrea somewhat isolated. This reduces the immediate challenge for Ethiopia, as the threat now primarily originates from one direction. However, it has become clear that whenever there is a gap in Ethiopia’s diplomatic efforts, Egypt will exploit it to create problems. This pattern is likely to persist as long as Ethiopia remains the focal point of these issues.

Would the agreement bring a broader balance of power in the Horn of Africa?

If the agreement is effectively realized, it will not only shift the power balance in the region but also enhance regional integration. Consider Ethiopia’s collaborative relationship with Kenya. The two countries cooperate on hydroelectric power, road networks, and other initiatives, while Kenyan companies continue to show interest in investing in Ethiopia. This success stems from the peaceful relationship between the two nations and the mutual benefits derived from it.

If we make significant progress following the recent agreement with Somalia, I am confident it will lead to stronger integration in the future, marked by robust collaborative deals between the two nations. Somalia is already among Ethiopia’s top five market destinations, and the agreement has the potential to deepen this relationship even further. Beyond enhancing economic integration, the deal is also expected to yield significant security dividends.

How does the ongoing conflict in Sudan impact the Horn of Africa region? What are the potential spillover effects, including refugee flows, security threats, and economic disruptions?

Everything has unfolded as anticipated in Sudan, particularly with the flow of refugees to Ethiopia initially being assessed as a primary threat. However, the number of refugees hosted by Ethiopia is lower than expected, as most fled to other neighboring countries. Despite this, Ethiopia’s primary interest has been to work towards a lasting solution through collaboration with neighboring countries or IGAD. Unfortunately, the involvement of multiple actors in Sudan’s conflict has made the situation far more complex than before.

In terms of Ethiopian interests, I do not believe the situation poses a significant direct threat, primarily due to the presence of various external actors within Sudan. However, as Sudan is a neighboring country, there remains a risk of experiencing spillover effects from the ongoing conflict.

What is the extent and nature of the UAE’s influence in the Horn of Africa, and how does it interact with the influence of other external actors, such as China, Turkey, and the United States?

What is expected from Ethiopia is to play a significant role in the region while simultaneously addressing its internal issues and bringing lasting peace to the country. Achieving this internal stability is essential for Ethiopia to take on an active and influential role in regional affairs. This is the shared expectation across the region. However, for this to materialize, collaborative efforts and meaningful negotiations must take place.

While many countries have their own national interests regarding Sudan, the most effective approach remains negotiations and resolving conflicts through dialogue.  

How do these competing interests shape the regional security landscape?

Undoubtedly, external actors have the power to shape the regional security landscape. Ultimately, Ethiopia stands to benefit from peace in its surrounding regions, including Somalia and Sudan. However, the collapse of Sudan would have a direct spillover effect, not only in terms of refugee flows but also by creating a significant security vacuum in the area, including within Ethiopia. This vacuum could lead to the proliferation of illegal activities in the region, attracting various actors with interests that conflict with Ethiopia’s national security.

As mentioned earlier, Ethiopia benefits greatly from peace in the region. However, the involvement of external actors adds an additional burden to the country. It is crucial for Ethiopia to play its role effectively; otherwise, it must support others in taking the necessary steps to address these issues.

What are the key emerging issues and trends in the Horn of Africa that require closer attention from policymakers and researchers like yourself? How can the Ethiopian Institute of Foreign Affairs contribute to a deeper understanding of these issues and inform effective policy responses?

State failure remains the most significant threat in the region, with some countries showing signs of potential collapse. Additionally, there is a persistent lack of trust between nations, leading them to seek security alliances rather than pursuing regional integration. This is despite the clear opportunities for enhanced economic and political integration. Unfortunately, what we are witnessing is the opposite of what is needed.

The organization expected to facilitate regional integration and address the gaps between nations is IGAD. However, IGAD has not been as active or effective as anticipated. This calls for a thorough evaluation of its role and functionality, along with a commitment to utilizing our shared resources through well-structured and collaborative methods.