Strategic Analysis
The political events that have come to pass in the breakaway territory of Somaliland following the fall of Siyad Barre’s regime have been, arguably, the most democratic in the region. In addition, the organized political climate has created an air of stability, opened the free market, and created “an oasis of peace.”[20] Why then has the international community refused to acknowledge the territory as sovereign?
There is fear within the UN and AU that if Somaliland’s secessionist goals are fulfilled, the situation will “open a Pandora’s Box” of separatist claims among African nations.[21] What seems to have been forgotten is that Somaliland is a former colony that seeks a return to its colonial borders rather than an ethnic minority seeking new ownership over previously united land. Also overlooked is the fact that many African countries have entered into unions and later left them behind: Egypt – Syria(1958-61), Mali – Senegal(1960), Senegal – Gambia (1982-89), Rwanda – Burundi(1962).[22] Precedence has been set, and Somaliland has the additional advantage of having existed for ten years now as a functioning democracy despite its geographical and theoretical ties to Somalia. Even the AU has said that “Objectively viewed, the case should not be linked to the notion of ‘opening Pandora’s box.’[23]
Another concern among the international community has been the possibility that secession will intensify the conflict between the Islamic Courts and the TFG. But time has shown that “Somalia will remain in crisis regardless of what is done with respect to Somaliland recognition.”[24]
While the global players deliberate over the appropriate course of action, inside Somalia what little control the TFG has is waning, and support for the Islamic Courts continues to grow in regions outside the capital. If no changes are made to the way in which foreign aid and diplomatic intervention is deployed in Somalia, we will see the power of the Courts spread and begin to impede on the stable north: Somaliland. Radical Islamic ideals could polarize the populace of the region and lead to increased insecurity, human rights injustices, and an indefinite loss of productive capacity.
On a more positive note, examples of renewed faith in Somaliland are abundant. Since 1991, 700,000 of the 1.2 million Somalis who fled the Barre conflict in Somalia have returned to Somaliland,[25] and in 2005 landlocked Ethiopia signed a trade agreement with Somaliland to conduct marine trade through the port of Berbera and travel hence to the border town of Togwajaale.[26] These developments offer a valid sense of hope for the region, but they will come to an end if the political stability the government of Somaliland provides ceases to exist.
UN, AU, and Canadian policy will continue unimpeded without significant pressure from independent sovereign states. Furthermore, Somaliland will not attain recognition from the UN or the AU unless a member state initiates the process of acknowledgment.
Policy Options
Canada’s current foreign policy regarding Somalia asserts full support for the UN-backed Transitional Federal Charter, signed in 2004, and subsequently the Transitional Federal Government of Mogadishu. Canada has demonstrated this support, by the directive of the UN, by providing humanitarian assistance in Somalia. The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) is responsible for distributing the capital and contributed $16 million to multilateral organizations operating in Somalia from 2006-2007.[27] By promoting the actions of the TFG, Canada has in effect rejected Somaliland’s claims to independence.
In continuing to support the TFG, Canada can choose to maintain its current role as a passive contributor of foreign aid or to take an active role in calling for a new mandate of peace and reconciliation to be drafted within the UN framework. This new mandate, the fifteenth formal attempt at reconciliation, could reflect John Prendergast and Colin Thomas-Jensen’s recommendations for a comprehensive multilateral diplomatic strategy centered on resolution and effective governance. [28]
The strategy requires a three-part directive focusing on resolving conflicts, keeping the peace, and implementing multilateral penalties. The conflict between the TFG, the Islamic Courts, and warring clan factions remains to be resolved. The UN could broker a deal with participation from the African Union to negotiate the realization of a coalition government. Following negotiations, peace-keeping forces would be deployed in Somalia, through UN direction, to guarantee a smooth transition to new governance. The UN, rather than the AU, would assume leadership due to the inability of the AU to mobilize enough troops to successfully accomplish objectives. That said, the AU would have a significant role to play through garnering military support.
Following the successful implementation of a coalition government, the international community, organized through the UN, might then impose strict penalties on Somalia for any return to violence or anti-democratic practices. These penalties would come in the form of embargoes, sanctions, and prosecution of individuals by the International Criminal Court (ICC).
A multilateral peace agreement, UN leadership in peacekeeping, and punitive measures is plausible policy alternative should the Canadian government decide to continue its policy of Somalian reconciliation.
Alternatively, Canadian foreign policy could be rewritten to reflect support for Somaliland’s claims to independence, through both bilateral and multilateral cooperation and aid. Initially, Canada could simply recognize Somaliland’s sovereignty as one sovereign nation to another. It could subsequently send people to support the administration of the internationally recommended voter registration process that Somaliland has undertaken in preparation for their parliamentary and presidential election in March 2009, and work towards establishing a consulate in Somaliland. Finally, Canada could use its position as a member state of the United Nations to pressure other member states into recognizing Somaliland’s sovereignty.
[20] Ali Farhiya Ahmed, “Somaliland Elusive Independence,” New African 447 (January, 2006): 34.
[21] “Dilemma of the Horn: The West Pushes for Somaliland Recognition,” Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy 34, no. 2 (2006): 7.
[22] Jahzbahy, Iqba. “African Union & Somaliland: Time to affirm ‘Africa’s best-kept secret’?”: 8.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Peter J. Schraeder, “Why the United States Should Recognize Somaliland’s Independence”.
[25] Ali Farhiya Ahmed, “Somaliland Elusive Independence,”: 35.
[26] “Dilemma of the Horn: The West Pushes for Somaliland Recognition,”: 7.
[27] Canadian International Development Agency, “Somalia,” Canadian International Development Agency, http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/somalia.
[28] John Prendergast and Colin Thomas-Jensen, “Blowing the Horn,”: 127.
