Somaliland argues that the African Union has spent six decades misapplying its own border principles—punishing Somaliland, which upheld the doctrine, while rewarding Somalia, which rejected it. Citing new historical and legal evidence about the disputed 1960 union and Somalia’s expansionist record, Somaliland urges the AU to correct these distortions or risk deepening instability across the Horn of Africa
By M. Amin
In Cairo in 1964, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) laid the foundational principle governing African borders: respect for colonial boundaries and the territorial integrity of member states.
All states accepted this doctrine—except Morocco and Somalia. Both pursued expansionist agendas that challenged the preservation of inherited borders.
For Somalia, this position was rooted in its earlier consolidation of what Somaliland calls an “imposter occupation union” on 1 July 1960. The union had been envisioned by Somaliland as a voluntary, bilateral arrangement between two sovereign states. Somaliland’s own Act of Union, passed on 27 June 1960, clearly stated its intention: “The State of Somaliland, a sovereign independent country, to unite with the State of Somalia to form the Somali Republic.” This documented language remains central to Somaliland’s interpretation of the events.
However, the former Italian Trusteeship Territory—Somalia—introduced a different version of the union. Through what Somaliland officials describe as clever wordplay, Mogadishu unilaterally proclaimed the name “Somali Republic” as though it already belonged solely to the former Italian territory, rebranding itself as the legitimate successor state. Italy, bound by its friendship treaty, recognized the Trusteeship Territory under this new name on 1 July 1960.
On the same day, Somalia submitted its application for UN membership—unilaterally—under yet another name, “Republic of Somalia.” The UN admitted the entity as a single state, not as a union between two sovereign states.
These inconsistencies drew attention. On 6 December 1961, the UN Secretary-General formally inquired about the status of Somaliland and the applicability of its international treaties. Mogadishu failed to respond. Later, the UN International Law Commission cited Annex No. 11 (1960)—President Aden Abdulle Osman’s confirmation of Somaliland’s distinct treaty succession status—as recorded in the Commission’s Yearbook (1962, Vol. II, p. 118, para. 106).
Despite this recognition of Somaliland as a separate entity, the union was imposed and treated as binding.
Somalilanders resisted. Across the country, public protests erupted. Professionals—teachers, doctors, civil servants—joined nationwide demonstrations. The public overwhelmingly rejected the proposed union constitution in a referendum. Yet Somalia declared it ratified through a retroactive legal procedure it justified by invoking the Vienna Convention.
In 1961, Somaliland military officers attempted a coup to restore Somaliland’s sovereignty as recognized by the UN under Article 102, when its statehood was registered in the exchange of letters with the UK on 26 June 1960. The attempt failed. Thereafter, Mogadishu silenced anyone who questioned the legitimacy of the enforced union.
By the time the OAU gathered in Cairo in 1964, Somalia—alongside Morocco—was the only African state opposing the continental principle of maintaining colonial borders. Somaliland argues that this position was an extension of Somalia’s earlier imposition of a fictional, retroactive union on Somaliland. Somalia then reinforced this narrative through language that blurred distinctions between the State of Somaliland and the Trusteeship Territory of Somalia, framing history as if “British and Italian Somalilands merged to form the Somali Republic and later the Republic of Somalia.”
This formulation, Somaliland contends, obscured its sovereign status and allowed Somalia to maintain de facto control from 1960 to 1991.
Somalia’s expansionism extended beyond Somaliland. It fought the Shifta War in Kenya and initiated conflicts with Ethiopia between 1964 and 1978. After being repelled by Ethiopia in 1978, Mogadishu feared that similar resistance would emerge in Somaliland. To deter rebellion, it launched what international observers later described as the Isaaq genocide (1978–1991)—an attempt to destroy Somaliland’s largest clan community.
More than 500,000 civilians were killed. Infrastructure, homes, wells, and agricultural lands were destroyed. Mines were planted across farmlands. When the genocidal regime collapsed in 1991, Somaliland forces liberated their territory.
Yet the policies designed by Somalia before its collapse continued to influence regional geopolitics. Many Arab and African states opposed legal scrutiny of Somalia’s occupation of Somaliland. In 1989, Somalia signed a diplomatic cooperation protocol with Egypt, aligning with Cairo’s Nile interests and using Somalia’s expansionist ambitions as leverage against Ethiopia’s development plans.
After Somalia’s regime fell, its diplomats—together with Egypt—advanced isolation policies to block Somaliland’s bid for restored sovereignty. At the OAU Council of Ministers meeting in Abuja in May–June 1991, Egypt’s State Minister for Foreign Affairs Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Djibouti’s leadership, and Somalia’s former UN ambassador (1984–1991), Said Abdullahi Osman, collaborated to push a resolution asserting the territorial integrity of the Somali Republic, including Somaliland. The resolution portrayed the union as legitimate, despite its contested nature.
The same resolution was subsequently cited by the Arab League under Egypt’s leadership, by the OIC under Morocco’s Secretary-Generalship, and—eventually—by Ghali himself when he became UN Secretary-General in late 1991. IGAD, then led by Djibouti, echoed the same position.
In effect, these multilateral institutions reinforced a narrative that treated Somaliland as if it had been leveraging the AU’s border principles, while Somalia—historically a challenger of those principles—was repositioned as their defender.
Yet in 2005, the AU’s own fact-finding mission concluded that Somaliland’s case was not a violation of AU principles and warranted a special legal and political approach. Despite this, the report was shelved, sidelined by geopolitical and economic pressures.
Somaliland was later compelled to enter talks with Somalia’s fragile Federal Government (FGS). In 2012, both parties agreed to joint airspace management from a headquarters in Hargeisa. Somalia later unilaterally transferred control to Mogadishu, asserting full airspace sovereignty.
In 2024, after consolidating airspace control, Somalia reinstated practices reminiscent of the anti-Isaaq policies of the late 1980s. Somaliland-origin staff faced extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detention, and false accusations—such as the killing of Abdinasir Muse Dahable, which international forensic investigations disproved.
In 2025, Somalia introduced an e-visa system that caused chaos at international airports and raised serious data-security concerns. It also announced plans to impose an ECTN directive on Somaliland’s ports.
Many in the Horn argue that if Somalia’s FGS succeeds in containing Somaliland, Ethiopia could be next—pointing to Somalia’s nomination of Faysal Roble, a Somali-Ethiopian, to represent Somalia in the East African Legislative Assembly as an early indication of this broader ambition.
Against this backdrop, Somaliland asserts that the only responsible path for the African Union is to convene a parallel session during the upcoming AU Summit, where both Somaliland and Somalia can present their legal and historical claims before member states.
If Somaliland demonstrates a distinct legal identity separate from the former Trusteeship Territory—and Somalia fails to legally counter the evidence—then the AU should consider granting Somaliland observer status as a protective measure against renewed repression. Such status could also facilitate a structured Somaliland–Somalia dialogue, as envisioned in the London Conference of 2012.
If the AU fails to address these unresolved issues, it risks fueling instability. History shows that when people lose faith in peaceful pathways, destructive alternatives emerge.
For this reason, Somaliland insists the AU must finally operationalize its own motto: “African solutions to African problems.”
The time has come, it argues, for Africa to correct the unintended misapplications of its founding principles.
