A legal analysis of how the AU and UN misapplied Somalia’s territorial integrity over Somaliland in 1991, raising unresolved conflicts of interest.
This article, by M. Amin, argues that the international community, particularly the African Union (AU), has unfairly denied Somaliland recognition based on a misapplication of the principle of “territorial integrity” and a conflict of interest within the AU itself.
Here’s a breakdown:
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Somaliland’s Argument: Somaliland argues it isn’t seceding from a legitimate Somali state because the original union between British Somaliland and Italian Somalia (which formed the Somali Republic) was never legally binding. British Somaliland was independent for a few days before the union and never ratified a formal Act of Union. Therefore, the AU’s principle of preserving colonial borders (meant to prevent post-colonial expansionism) should actually support Somaliland’s claim to independence, as it existed as a separate British colony. The author claims that Somalia was the aggressor violating the charter.
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The Conflict of Interest Claim: The author points to Said Abdullahi Osman, Somalia’s former UN Ambassador, becoming Assistant Secretary-General of the OAU (now AU) shortly after Somaliland declared independence in 1991. The author asserts that Osman was in a position to influence OAU resolutions against Somaliland, creating a conflict of interest because he previously represented the Somali regime accused of atrocities against Somalilanders.
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The Core Argument: The author believes that the international community’s refusal to recognize Somaliland isn’t based on sound legal principles but on political expediency, institutional self-interest, and the influence of individuals within international organizations who favored maintaining the fiction of a unified Somalia. They argue Somaliland’s consistent rejection of the union and its eventual dismantling through popular will should be acknowledged.
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Call to Action: The author isn’t asking for special treatment but for the AU and UN to apply their own principles consistently and without bias. They suggest the decision to deny Somaliland recognition was politically motivated and legally unsound.
The complete piece is as follows:
Somaliland: Territorial Integrity or Institutional Conflict of Interest?
By M. Amin
For more than three decades, Somaliland has been told that its case is simple: it is a “secessionist” region challenging the territorial integrity of the Somali Republic. This claim has been repeated so often by the OAU/AU and the United Nations that it has hardened into dogma. Yet repetition does not turn a legal error into truth. What has been missing from this narrative is an honest examination of how and by whom Somali Republic territorial integrity was misapplied over Somaliland—particularly at the decisive moment of 1991.
The Somali Republic, as recognized under international law at independence, referred strictly to the former Italian Trusteeship Territory of Somalia. British Somaliland was a separate colonial entity, attained independence on 26 June 1960, and never concluded a binding, ratified Act of Union transferring its sovereignty. The so-called union that followed was unilaterally proclaimed by the former trusteeship territory and later rubber-stamped through international inertia, not legality.
This matters because the OAU’s founding principle—now Article 4(b) of the AU Charter—was designed to preserve colonial borders, not to sanctify post-colonial expansionism. By that standard, Somaliland is the border-abiding entity, not the violator. Somalia itself violated this principle repeatedly: the 1977 invasion of Ethiopia, the Shifta war, and its irredentist ideology were all condemned within the OAU system, including in Cairo in 1964. The organization knew exactly who the charter deniers were.
Yet in June 1991, at Abuja—just weeks after Somaliland restored its independence—the OAU adopted a resolution misapplying “the territorial integrity of the Somali Republic” over Somaliland. This was not a neutral act. It occurred at a moment when Somalia had collapsed as a state, had no functioning government, and no legal authority capable of asserting sovereignty over another former colonial territory.
More troubling still is the conflict of interest embedded in the process.
At the same Abuja meeting, Said Abdullahi Osman—Somalia’s former Ambassador to the UN from 1984 to 1991—was elevated to Assistant Secretary-General of the OAU. He himself confirmed this appointment in a 2006 interview. This was the same diplomat who had represented the Mogadishu regime during the years of mass atrocities against Somalilanders, the same period when humanitarian appeals were used internationally to mask political and legal accountability.
To pretend that senior Secretariat officials play no role in drafting, framing, or supervising resolutions is to misunderstand how international organizations function. Secretariats draft texts, shape legal justifications, choose precedents, and advise member states. At Assistant Secretary-General level, this influence is structural, not incidental. It is also standard practice to consult officials from the “concerned country”—especially when that country has collapsed and information is contested.
There was nothing that prohibited Mr. Osman from influencing the framing of Somalia-related resolutions. There were no effective conflict-of-interest rules. There was every incentive to preserve the legal fiction of continuity: it protected careers, diplomatic legacies, and the narrative of a unitary Somali state. This is not speculation; it is how institutional power works.
Meanwhile, Somaliland’s consistent resistance to the imposed union was ignored. Somalilanders rejected the 1961 constitution, resisted militarily, endured genocide, and ultimately dismantled the union through popular will. A union that never functioned, never gained consent, and survived only through force cannot be retroactively declared valid. Calling Somaliland “secessionist” is not only inaccurate—it is legally incoherent.
The real question, then, is not why Somaliland insists on its sovereignty. The question is why international institutions sided with a charter-denying entity against a charter-abiding one, without legal adjudication, at a moment of total Somali state collapse—and did so through processes clouded by clear conflicts of interest.
Territorial integrity cannot be invoked selectively. If the AU is serious about its own principles, it must confront the uncomfortable truth: Somaliland’s case was never defeated by law. It was buried by politics, institutional self-interest, and the quiet power of those who controlled the pen.
Conclusion
This is not a call for sympathy. It is a demand for intellectual honesty. Somaliland does not ask the African Union or the United Nations to invent new law—only to apply their own principles consistently and without conflicted hands shaping the outcome. History will not judge institutions by the narratives they preserved, but by the injustices they refused to correct.
