The Uses of Tradition
This remarkable process of bottom-up state-building using traditional forms, now reinforced by three successful democratic elections, has yielded a system in which the public feels it has a strong stake together with a robust sense of national identity and patriotic pride. It has produced
[A]n unprecedented degree of interconnectedness between the state and society . . . in stark contrast to the past when previous regimes received enormous infusions of external assistance without which they could not survive, and as a result became completely divorced from the economic foundations of their own society.9
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The success of this bottom-up state-building process is evidenced by the high sense of security that Somaliland’s people feel, and by the growing buoyancy of their economy. Hundreds of thousands of refugees have returned home and tens of thousands of landmines have been removed and destroyed. The capital city of Hargeysa, reduced to a mere ten-thousand people in 1991 by Siyad Barre’s bombings, is now home to more than half a million. Its peacefulness and economic vitality draw migrants from Ethiopia and southern Somalia. Markets throughout Somaliland are filled with products from around the world; telephone charges are among the cheapest in Africa; and the private sector, not the government, provides electricity, water, education, and health care. Three new universities have been built, privately funded hospitals and schools proliferate, and a number of non-governmental organizations are working to improve administrative capacity. Members of the Somali diaspora, more than a hundred thousand of whom live in the United States and Europe, support these efforts with extensive international networks, expert knowledge of how modern societies operate, and monetary contributions thought to be worth US$500 million a year.10
Although many of its governing structures need work and many of its politicians, bureaucrats, and judges lack experience, Somaliland has already passed a number of democratic milestones that few states in Africa and the Middle East have reached. Altogether, the country has successfully managed the May 2001 constitutional referendum, the December 2002 local elections, the 2003 presidential campaign, and the September 2005 legislative poll. (The next round of voting includes local and presidential elections, scheduled at the time of this writing for October and December 2008, respectively.) The 2005 House of Representatives elections saw 246 candidates contest 82 seats in an undertaking that involved 982 polling stations, 1,500 ballot boxes, 1.3 million ballot papers, 6,000 party agents, 3,000 police, 700 domestic observers, and 76 foreign observers. The latter “were fairly unanimous in their views that [the elections] were, on the whole, the freest and most transparent democratic exercises ever staged in the Horn of Africa.”11
The National Electoral Commission (NEC) has rightly been widely praised as the most competent of Somaliland’s government institutions. In dealing with the many challenges of running an election in a poor, war-scarred, and semiliterate country—one that lacks not only electoral rolls, but even reliable estimates of the number of eligible voters—the NEC has repeatedly chosen a highly transparent method of engaging political parties and other key stakeholders in decision making, has debated problems and possible solutions openly and at length, and has sought outside assistance. The use of indelible ink on voters’ fingers to prevent double voting, the presence of representatives from all parties at every site where votes are cast or counted, and the participation of a significant number of observers have ensured elections that are remarkably free and fair.
Somaliland’s democracy has repeatedly surprised outsiders with its robustness. When, on May 2002, President Egal died abroad, power was smoothly passed to Vice-President Dahir Rayale Kahin, even though Rayale is from the small Gadabursi clan and had fought for Siyad Barre against the Isaaq. The April 2003 presidential poll was possibly the closest-ever fought in Africa, with Rayale winning by only the slimmest of margins—just eighty votes out of almost half a million ballots. The opposition contested the result in the courts, but when its judicial appeals failed, it accepted the outcome peacefully.
Constitutional governance has not been completely free of glitches and has deteriorated to some degree over the past two years. The Guurti election scheduled for August 2006, the last stage of the democratic transition begun in 2001, was postponed in May 2006 because Parliament could not agree on issues such as how to distribute seats and choose members—tricky issues in an institution based on traditional structures and delicately divided among the clans. Extending the term of the current Guurti to October 2010 provoked fierce controversy. Similarly, the Guurti’s unilateral April 2008 attempt to extend the president’s term for a year, supposedly because of security concerns, was highly controversial. (At the time of this writing, it is unclear when this election will actually take place.) In 2007, three politicians were jailed for almost five months for attempting to form a new political party. Although women have the same rights to vote and run for office as men, only 2 out of 379 municipal councilors and 2 out of 82 members of parliament are female. Some legislative, executive and judicial procedures have not been followed according to the letter of the law. The electoral-management system, despite its relative success, contains much room for improvement.12
The country also suffers from many of the maladies common to all poor, underdeveloped states: The rule of law and civil society are weak, corruption is rife, nepotism and clannism sway many official appointments, the executive towers over the other branches of government, Parliament lacks the power to initiate legislation, the poorly trained and underfunded judiciary can do little to check the administration, and competent officials of all kinds are in short supply. As in many countries—underdeveloped and developed alike—the government has shown itself tempted to sacrifice civil liberties in the name of security. Somaliland’s print media are relatively free and criticize the government, but a weekly magazine that dared to discuss the idea of Somaliland reuniting with Somalia (a particular sore point for the government) was banned, and in early 2007 the chairman of Haatuf Media Network and two of his journalists spent two months in jail for having written about presidential corruption. Meanwhile, the executive branch continues to operate a Security Committee that has sweeping powers of arrest and sentencing despite calls from the legislature, judiciary, civil society, and the diaspora to disband the body.
The beel system of government, though responsible for bringing peace and democracy to Somaliland, also places significant limits on the development of fully representative and effective democracy. As Somalilanders who advocate fuller modernization have complained, clan elders hold disproportionate power. People from powerful lineages have an edge in obtaining government posts, and clannism has hobbled efforts to make the civil service more meritocratic. Compromises intended to ensure that the smaller clans are fully included in the system have given them a disproportionately high number of seats in Parliament. The government has been unable to finalize the delineation of regional and district boundaries because these are closely associated with traditional clan territories. Women remain excluded from traditional governing structures, and hence from the regime that is built on them.
Despite these problems, however, Somaliland has achieved much with very little outside assistance. In fact, the dearth of external involvement has been in many ways a blessing, for it has kept foreign interference to a minimum while fostering self-reliance, self-confidence, and a distinct Somaliland identity.
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