Chapter 4
The clan, governance and the build-up to Breakdown
The 1991 coup that ousted long-term Somalia dictator Siyad barre resulted in the failure and fragmentation of the Somali state and the start of statebuilding in Somaliland. Much of the current literature on the state of Somalia focuses on the immediacy and the supposed anarchy created by the absence of a central government, as well as the successive failed attempts to rebuild the state. It is insufficient, however, to assess the current political situation in Somalia, and within that Somaliland, without examining first the social forces and historical legacies and developments that shaped the state and those that impacted upon its breakdown. By only focusing on the immediate, an incomplete account of this state is created. This is also true when discussing the circumstances surrounding the creation of the state in Somaliland. As Bradbury notes, the current political situation in both Somalia and Somaliland cannot be examined without first understanding the pervasive Somali clan system, including the non-state based clan governance structures that exist within Somali society and territories and are a significant component of statebuilding in Somaliland.[170] The current political situation, including statebuilding projects, also cannot be understood without examining colonial and post-colonial governance structures. The place to start in examining contemporary Somaliland politics, therefore, is not with the history of Somaliland itself, but rather with the Somali and with the history of governance and government in the territories comprising Somalia, including that within the clan system. As the interest here is primarily on Somaliland, the historical focus inevitably will be directed there. However, Somaliland has a shared history with Somalia, and as such cannot entirely be treated in isolation. With a focus on the history of governance and governance structures, the background given here lays the foundations for understanding not only the Somali people and the Somali state, but also the systems of governance underpinning and guiding the creation of the Somaliland state. Whilst southern Somalia is not ignored here, the emphasis is on Somaliland.
The Basis for All: The Somali Clan System
As an indigenous source of structure and governance, the Somali clan system plays an important socio-political role in Somali society. The Somali population inhabits the Horn of Africa, extending from the middle of Djibouti, into northern and eastern Ethiopia, throughout Somalia, and into northern Kenya.[171] Although some cite slight linguistic and cultural differences between the settled populations (Sag) and nomadic pastoralists (Samale), Somali society is not divided by ethnic, religious or significant cultural differences, and the Somali themselves often refer to the Somali ‘race’. The Somali rarely view themselves as African, and identify more with their Arab heritage than their geographic placement. Despite their Arab heritage, though, the Somali do not consider themselves part of the Arab world. The Somali self-portrait is more of an exception than a component: neither African nor Arab, they are Somali.[172] However, there are divides within the Somali population despite the homogeneity. Many of these divides are based on geography or historical divergences and divisions.
The key to understanding Somali social, political and economic organization is the clan system. These kinship relations binding the Somali are at the center of Somali life; the clan not only provides a basis for identity but is also what Drysdale labels the Somali ‘insurance policy’ as each clan takes collective responsibility for its members, their losses and their security.[173] In his seminal works on Somali history, Lewis details these social, political and economic characteristics of the nomadic pastoral lifestyle and the role of the clans as an organizational system. In the sphere of politics, Somali genealogy holds importance in:
It represents the social divisions of people into corporate political groups … By virtue of genealogy of birth, each individual has an exact place in society and within a very wide range of agnatic kinship it is possible for each person to trace his precise connection with everyone else. Somali political philosophy is thus an evaluation of agnatic connection.[174]
As such, relations with others in Somali society, including the lines of political allegiance and division, are determined by these patrilineal genealogies. They also determine an individual’s political, social, legal and economic status within Somali society. some have argued, however, that increased attachment to territory or other social groups, together with damaging impacts of factors such as the emergence of a state, urbanization, migration and harmful colonial or government policies, have lessened the impact of the clan system.[175] Whereas this can be seen in Somali society, any rejection of categorization by the clan takes place primarily in urban areas and within non-clan specific militias or religious movements such as the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) and al-Shabaab. As indicated by many urban elite within northern Somalia, and summarized by Bradbury, though, ‘the clan system remains an important feature of Somali social, political and economic life’ despite drawn out statebuilding practices, urbanization, industrialization, civil war, and international migration.[176] Although the clan is pervasive in all aspects of Somali life, the discussion here focuses on five key areas of clan provision: identity, governance, law and justice, co-existence and conflict resolution. Certainly, the clan and clan governance are more prevalent in some areas and less in others. although in the area of focus – Somaliland – the clan system has been less disrupted and is thus more prevalent, what follows here should be read as a historical generalization rather than a universally applicable description across all Somali inhabited territories. Identity
As Bradbury notes, ‘[a]ll Somalis are born into this social structure and because it defines a person’s relationship to other Somalis and non-Somalis, kinship is a critical source of an individual’s identity’.[177] Drysdale claims that although some non-Somalis view the clan as archaic, restrictive or unnatural, most Somalis accept the inevitability of adhering to traditional or traditional values through the clan; the Somali are not ‘prisoners of the system’ but are rather bound to the clan by necessity, both within the often harsh physical and political landscapes of Somalia as well as within and from the diaspora.[178] The complex Somali clan system is composed of six main structuring clan-families – the Dir, Isaaq, Hawiye Darood, Digil and Rahanweyn – and is further divided into numerous sub-clans, sub-sub clans, primary lineage groups and diya-paying groups. The Somali nation is one of nomads, with pastoral nomads making up a majority of the population.[179] Touval’s 1963 estimate that 80 per cent of Somalis are nomadic is commonly cited throughout the literature, although factors such as war, migration, modernization and urbanization have undoubtedly lowered this percentage.[180] Because of the dominance of pastoral nomadism, clans and their divisions became important for the cohesiveness of the nomadic groupings as well as their physical security. Conflict over grazing land or access to water was frequent, and historically, war was not used to vanquish the enemy but instead became a way through which political ascendancy and access to resources could be established. As Bradbury notes, disputes over land or resources, although often violent, also involved negotiation and the formulation of political or social alliances. Because of this, the Somali have ‘strong traditions of mediation, reconciliation and consensus-building alongside traditional institutions of law and order’.[181] Most of this is centered on the clan.
The segmentary nature of the clan system ‘reflects the need for groups to be in constant motion, expanding and contracting as needs demand, while eking out a living from a harsh environment’.[182] Most certainly established as a means of control in the non-centralized pre-colonial Somali society,[183] the clan continues to influence a person’s individual place as well as determining relations between members of competing or allied clans. Whilst the clan families define and bind large groups, but are too big to act as collective political units. Thus, the Somali sub-clans serve a more important function in daily life and society as the division of a clan into smaller sub-clan groupings allows for more comprehensive control and protection of clan members within geographical regions as well as creating a means of genealogical distinction that allows for linear identification.[184] Whereas a Somali may be a member of the Isaaq clan, his membership in his sub-clan distinguishes him and his family geographically, politically, economically and socially from the other Isaaq sub-clans. The clan creates basis for identity in Somali society, but the sub-clan creates a stronger sense of identity and placement within the clan itself. This form of identity and kinship does not stop at the borders of Somali inhabited territories, but continues to thrive within Somali communities elsewhere. Somali communities in the diaspora tend to form themselves around clan or sub-clan groupings, and kinship relations with Somali communities outside of Somalia are strong within Somali inhabited areas. Indeed, much policy and scholarly attention is made to the importance of financial remittances to the Somali economy. These remittances – payments sent to Somalia from the Diaspora – are kinship based; financial assistance is almost always sent to the family or the sub-clan, rather than any central governance structure. This is a means through which the clan takes care of its own, a modern form of practice that is not far removed from the original intent of protection associated with its nomadic origins.
Most Somalis adhere to Sunni Islam, and Sufism is commonly practiced. The close relationship between Islam and the Somali clans themselves has created a culture in which religion and the clan are so closely intertwined that they cannot be separated: both Somali and Islamic traditions, customs and laws remain distinct, yet are mutually dependent on each other within Somali society. The result is an amalgamation of Somali traditional practices and customs and those of Islam, with the two acting in conjunction to provide not only a socio-religious component of Somali identity, but also a moral and legal code upon which Somali society is based.
Governance
As Lewis notes, ‘few societies can so conspicuously lack those judicial, administrative, and political procedures which lie at the heart of the western conception of government … Yet, although they thus lack to a remarkable degree all the machinery of centralized government, they are not without government or political institutions’.[185] Much of the governance existent in Somaliland is abstract and unspoken; it is complexly ingrained in the social structures of the population. The Somali clans are predominantly non-hierarchical structures. Whilst some of the clans have titled leaders – a legacy of colonial rule – the inherited role does not grant executive power but rather bestows responsibility to act as arbiter.[186] Somali pastoralist society is traditionally not constituted on central institutional rule but it is not without governance or rules. As Lewis notes, the ‘lack of any stable hierarchy of political units is characteristic of the Somali social system. In conformity with this, there is no formal hierarchy of political or administrative offices’. Historically, because of this, ‘political leadership lies with the elders of the group concerned’.[187] Although altered through time, interactions, occupation and the creation of central government, much of the political association and of the governance provided by the clan continues to play an important role today. This is especially true in the nomadic population as well as in the north, where the clan system has been less disrupted than in the south and where clan governance has been significantly invoked and incorporated in centralized structures. The ‘ordered anarchy’ that characterizes this way of life maintains political and social order through ‘collective social institutions and through reciprocal, rule-bound behavior delineated in customary law’.[188] As the sub-clan is the ‘upper limit of corporate political action’ in Somali society these lineage groupings are central to governance in Somali inhabited territories.[189] As historically the majority of Somali society was not located within permanent settlements or subject to centralized government prior to colonization, governance took place in community councils (shir) which were convened when need determined. These ad hoc councils were held primarily within the sub-clans, but clan shir and inter-clan shir also took place. It was at these meetings that clan or sub-clan affairs were controlled in what Lewis describes as a manner verging on anarchy. The traditional decision making process within the councils was not hierarchical but rather was a highly democratic system in which all adult males were allowed equal access and participation.[190] These councils provided a governing structure that acted as a means of enforcement of law and justice, as well as the decision and lawmaking body. The unit-wide binding contractual agreements made during these councils concerned everything from marriage practices to resource allocation, trade agreements, punishment for crimes and movement of the clans or sub-clans. It was through these shir that regular governing of the clan or sub-clan took place.
During times of conflict, crisis, disagreement between clans, when law had to be enforced or when negotiations within or between the clans were needed, a council of clan elders (guurti) met as a component of the shir. The guurti are traditionally the highest political council in Somali society, comprising titled and non-titled clan elders selected for their knowledge and wisdom.[191] With the clan elders being the most respected men within the clans and sub-clans, the guurti was the closest equivalent to hierarchical rule within Somali society and the decisions of the body bound the clans and sub-clans involved, creating a traditional legal system through a form of customary law (xeer). With power not being exercised by a chief, decisions were made through consensus and often the guurti and the shir lasted for months. These clan councils continue to function within Somali society, particular in the context of state collapse and in the absence of state institutions. In many areas of post-collapse Somalia the clan system provides a ‘structure for inter-group relations and governance, for organizing and managing violence and for organizing trade’ through shir and guurti.[192] As will be seen in later chapters, these clan and elder councils have also been instrumental in the establishment of peace and the establishment of a central government in the northern territory of Somaliland.
Law and Justice
As part of the governance provided by the kinship structure, agreements within and between clans provide a system of law and justice. In addition to kinship lines, Somali society is also divided into inter and intra-clan diya-paying, or blood-money, groups. Within these groups collective action is feasible; they are a means of policing the clans and enforcing the traditional legal system enacted by the shir and guurti. Diya-groups comprise a number of families who are typically united not only through genealogy but also marriage ties. Members of these groups are part of a ‘self-help’ justice system: they are obliged to protect each other and to pay and receive compensation for murder, injury or other forms of redress. The diya-groups are stable political units in ‘a shifting system of agnatic attachment’ in that within these groups, ‘which [are] in effect the basic political and jural unit of pastoral society, contract and clanship meet’ regardless of the relationship between the clans or the sub-clans of its members.[193] As Bradbury notes, the bloodmoney system ‘provides a sanction against violence and reinforces collective responsibility’.[194] Largely based on Islamic law (shari’a) as well as customary contractual law (xeer) formed through clan agreements, the traditional Somali legal system defines the rules of collective rights and responsibilities as well as common interests.[195] Unwritten, these laws are the ‘lynchpin of orderliness’ and are handed down orally through the generations, binding members of a clan or diya-group to the agreements of the previous generations and forming a repository of customary law and practices.[196] Although the traditional Somali legal system emerged prior to the introduction of centralized governing structures, it continues to function in areas exhibiting central governance as well as those in which no government exists.[197] In Somaliland, broadly based contractual law not only forms the basis of the government being created, but xeer and diya-groups also supplement the codified legal and justice systems in the forming state.[198]
Co-existence
although diya-groups and customary law act as important components of the legal and justice system in Somali society, they also play an important role in maintaining a balanced co-existence within and between the clans; these traditional values and codes are the ‘secular lifejackets which keep Somalis afloat irrespective of formal systems of governance’. Because the strong bond of kinship and therefore identity can both unify and divide society,
[The] contract cements and temporarily stabilizes fission and fusion in the lineage system … [xeer] denotes a body of explicitly formulated obligations, rights and duties. It binds people of the same treaty together in relation to internal delicts and defines their collective responsibility in external relations with similar groups.[199]
However, xeer is more than a contract between the different groupings within Somali society: ‘[I]t defines the basic values, laws, and rules of behavior. It is the closest equivalent to the notion of a “social contract”’, and thus plays an important role in establishing and maintaining forms of governance.[200] As these treaties and contracts are passed down through the generations, they bind a lineage to the agreements and laws and therefore become a form of custom found at every level of lineage segmentation and as the foundation of politics and legal relationships.[201]
Clothes from people (non-Somali) in the house I lived in. The police, the owners of the house and representatives of the sub-clans of those suspected of committing the thefts were involved in lengthy discussions to determine the culprit and to resolve the matter. The person responsible – the house’s cook – fled to Djibouti before she could be arrested. Members of her family’s diya-group residing in Djibouti were responsible for returning her to Hargeisa, after which she was taken into police custody. The government’s ‘Westernized’ legal system did not handle her case, however. Instead, elders from her sub-clan and diya-group and elders from the sub-clan and diya-group of the people she wronged (as the people she stole from were not members of a clan, it was determined that she had wronged the owner of the house and the person who had secured the cook her job) negotiated compensation to be paid. It was not until restitution was made between the sub-clans and the groups that the cook was released from jail. The police were involved because Westerners were involved; if it had been a dispute involving only Somali, the first call would have been to the elders rather than the police and the matter would have been settled through negotiation by the elders.
The dual purpose of xeer, as both law and custom, is further highlighted by Lewis in his explanation of the word itself. [202] He states that in the Somali language:
[t]here are several other uses of the word which serve to elucidate its meaning. the rope placed over the top of the nomadic hut to give it stability, and either fastened to the ground on each side or secured by stones, is called xeer. Similarly the verbal form means ‘to surround’ as, for example, in the phrase ‘we are surrounded by an enemy party’. Thus the implication of binding, fastening, and of securing, underlies each use.[203]
These customs not only bind society, but the legal framework created by xeer also underpins interactions in the inherently divided clan system; knowledge of and abidance by these customs and laws creates an overarching form of governance that facilitates co-existence between the clans and sub-clans in both areas with central government and those without. The agreements and treaties that become customs and laws form the stable grounding necessary to negotiate peace and balance between the clans, and as Somali society encounters new situations and conditions the contracts and customs are revised accordingly. Co-existence through customary law is particularly prevalent in the more nomadic north, where the clans have a long history of interaction, cooperation and competition stemming largely from contests over grazing land and water resources. As a result, ‘the clans and sub-clans [in the north] have evolved a common xeer … [t]he retention of such values helped later in resolving conflicts’ during the lead-up to and following the 1991 collapse of the Somali state.[204] These customs and negotiated co-existence also played a significant role in establishing peace, stability and a government in Somaliland.
Conflict Resolution
Whilst the existence of diya-groups has always been the most effective sanction for redressing wrongs and resolving problems between small groups, they do not provide a framework through which to provide security to the clan or society as a whole. Divisions within the clan are essential to the organization of Somali society, but threats to the clan unite the sub-clans in defense of the larger family group. The most common threat to the clan historically was, and in some areas still is, losing access to vital resources. traditional notions of political power were therefore based in terms of physical strength and control of resources, as the more powerful clans were those that were able to capture and defend the best grazing lands and water sources;[205] thus, political power was ‘won by the sword’. Co-existence between the clans depended upon conflict resolution mechanisms such as marriage agreements or diya paying groups for lesser, more personal crimes, and clan councils in the instance of inter or intra-clan warfare.[206] As Bradbury notes, ‘Somali society works on a system of balanced oppositions between groups … If peace is thought to exist where there is an equitable balance, anything which upsets the balance will continue the conflict’.[207] Because of this need for balance, conflict resolution mechanisms have become embedded in the clan structure itself, with clan elders through guurti being responsible for resolving conflicts. This mechanism most likely began in the early days of the clan system as a means to ameliorate bloody wars between the early clans. negotiation became commonplace in resolving conflict most likely resulting from refusals of early sultans or other hereditary leaders to subordinate themselves to another or cede their clan as a spoil of war. Negotiation and compromise became essential tools in the resolution of conflicts; tools that continue to exist and are rich and powerful traditions in Somali politics and society.[208] It must be noted here, though, that negotiation in Somali society has its own character that is far different from that commonly found in Western society. It is a lengthy, loud and dynamic process, and often includes verbal abuse, quarrels and exchanging insults. Poetry writing and recitations, as well as storytelling, are often included, where heroic tales of previous accomplishments or moral stories are used to gain the upper ground or calm the discussions. Negotiations often involve chewing sessions where the stimulant qaat is used to loosen tongues and facilitate discussions. The negotiations process also often involves the exchange of compensation and ceremonial gifts as means of appeasement or restitution. Through all this, grievances are brought to the attention of all involved and the ‘air is cleared’.[209] This dynamic process is central to conflict resolution in the Somali clan system, and many of these practices continue today.
Resolutions to conflict are typically negotiated by the most respected elders of the guurti, with the agreements binding lineages through the creation of customary law. As such, xeer becomes the first route for settling disputes and hostilities.[210] Because of the intricacies of xeer, clan elders are responsible for ensuring that conflicts are resolved rather than merely placating the parties involved, as future violations would be subject to diya compensation. contemporary elders in Somaliland list other tools used in their peacemaking role as: age; shari’a law; proverbs and poems; shir; devotion to the public interest; impartiality; using clan resources as indication of commitment to process; compromise and consensus; and persistence. Significantly, the elders also list ‘transparency, fairness, trust and sincerity’ as ‘tools for the mutual trust and confidence building’.[211] Respect for the elders provides the basis for their abilities; without the respect and trust of the people their actions would be meaningless. Through negotiation, compromise and compensation in conflict resolution, the trusted clan elders ensure balance and coexistence within the volatile clan system. As Drysdale notes, in areas of southern Somalia ‘where traditional value systems are bypassed in favor of show of force, continuing conflict is manifest’.[212] In places where the clan system is central to law and governance, though, the elders continue to constantly negotiate the balance within Somali society and to resolve conflicts when they arise.
Clan Elders: The ‘Holders of Tradition’
although throughout Somali history clan elders have played a vital role in the maintenance of society, Bradbury notes that it is misleading to talk about ‘traditional’ elders in Somali society, ‘for this suggests an institution’. Instead, he notes, it may be more appropriate to consider elders as representatives ‘holding the “traditions” of the clan’.[213] The dynamism of Somali society means that it is constantly adapting to changing circumstances, causing the clan elders to adapt as well to enable them to fulfil their roles in the changing environment. Regardless of these changes, however, clan elders continue to maintain importance in Somali society, largely in the arenas of governance and of peace and reconciliation. As long as the clan remains the primary ordering principle in Somali society, clan elders will continue to be of vital importance to stability.
As the egalitarian nature of Somali society means there is no hierarchy of authority in the clan or sub-clan other than the primarily symbolic position of the few titled elders, within the Somali clans and sub-clans it is the non-titled elders who hold the respect as leaders and guides. The position of clan elder can be confusing for a non-Somali, as there are no clear criteria for holding this position or choosing an elder. Likewise, there is no uniform standard for what authority an elder will possess and exercise. The only firm stipulation is that only men can be elders. Elders can be found at all levels of segmentation, from clan to nuclear family. Elders further up the segmentary line, however, hold the most respect as peacemakers, with elders of the main clan families held in the highest regard. As with any leader or negotiator, though, some elders are more respected than others, with respect largely tied to cultural and religious knowledge, trustworthiness, negotiating abilities and successes, and age.[214] The position of elder is not hereditary, although in some instances a particular line of lineage may be preferred to others for numerous reasons, including following a particular xeer or custom. Although the selection procedure varies from clan to clan or even sub-clan to subclan, the consistency across the clans is that ‘an elder is a representative who is delegated authority, rather than assumes it. In council meetings they are delegates or emissaries of and for their clans, whom they represent and by whom they are supported’.[215]
Whilst elders have exercised numerous roles throughout Somali history and across clan lines, they are best known for their constant peacemaking or balancing role. their position as ‘professional negotiators and mediators in all clan matters’[216] makes them vital to maintaining balance needed to thwart the implosion or explosion of the clan system. As previously mentioned, much of this balancing act takes place through the guurti. These special councils composed of representatives chosen by all the involved clans were considered the highest authority in Somali society prior to the introduction of central government, and many maintain that the guurti continue to exist as such even with the presence of a central government.[217] Held at the local, regional or national level, the ad-hoc guurti exist only until a resolution is obtained thereby establishing xeer, or until an agreement for a further meeting is reached. In many ways, the guurti can be viewed as a type of judiciary – historically without a permanent institution or body – that maintains customs and establishes peace through upholding and creating xeer. These negotiating bodies, called upon when necessary and then disbanded when not, are vital in maintaining stability in the decentralized Somali clan system. as will be seen in later chapters, in Somaliland the social institutions of the clan, including the elders and the councils, together with traditional practices and traditions of mediation, arbitration, consensus decision-making and the upholding of xeer played a crucial role in the post-collapse peacebuilding and state building process in the territory.
Although potentially divisive, the complex Somali clan system not only provides a basis for identity but also acts as an ordering principle in all areas of life, including politics, economics, war and peace. These traditional forms of social and political organization were not entirely lost during the disruptive period of colonization followed by the turbulent post-colonial era. Instead, the fundamentals of the clan system survived, albeit altered by experience, to exist in present day Somalia. as Lewis noted in his 1965 edition of A Modern History of Somaliland, ‘in many respects, modernism provides new scope for the working of traditional social principles rather than creating entirely new circumstances to which the old order of society is irrelevant’.[218] The adaptable nature of the clan system has allowed for these mechanisms, procedures and customs to continue to provide governance and stability in the decentralized Somali inhabited territories for centuries. It would be inaccurate to suggest, however, that the clan system did not emerge from the colonial period or the post-independence governments unscathed. For this reason, the preceding sections will examine the impact of colonial rule on clan governance structures as well as that of the two different governments that ruled the state of Somalia prior to 1991.
Colonial Rule and Legacy
Throughout its history, Somalia experienced a host of foreign settlers entering and claiming possession of the territory. The most lasting of the pre-colonial influences were Arabian traders who established permanent trading posts along the coast as early as the seventh century.[219] It was not until European colonization in the late nineteenth century, though, that the whole of the Somali population felt the influence of foreign rule and government. As previously stated, what is present day Somalia was colonized concurrently by two European powers: Italy in the northeast and the south, and Britain in the northwest. The ruling styles of these two colonizing powers were drastically different, and both left lasting impacts on the modern political and social climate of Somalia and of Somaliland. Just as pre-colonial governance structures are important to understanding the basis of Somali society, the impact of colonial structures on that society is important for understanding Somaliland society today and the governance structures that exist within and above it.
Italian colonization of southern Somalia was done with the intent of first expanding into Ethiopia and after failing that, establishing a settler colony in which plantations could be established and land acquired to solve a problem with a surplus population at home.[220] British colonization in the horn of Africa, on the other hand, was an accidental acquisition rather than a designed component of the expansive British Empire. Britain had an established military garrison at Aden, in what is today Yemen, which quickly became an important stopping point for traders going to and from India. Due to a lack of resources in the southern Arabian Peninsula the British were forced to look externally for supplies for the residents the troops stationed there. British interest in the Somali territory across the red sea, therefore, was not for territorial conquest or as a ‘civilizing mission’, but instead was undertaken to protect and support British interests at Aden. Beginning in 1827 through a series of non-expansive treaties of protection made with the clan leadership of what is now northwest Somalia, a mutually beneficial relationship was established: the British gained provisions for the troops at Aden and at the same time guaranteed that no other foreign presence would be stationed across the sea from the British settlement; and the Somali clans were guaranteed a key market for selling fresh meat and other goods. British authorities at Aden did urge the government in London to use this territory in Somalia as a ‘definitive British occupation of the Somali coast’ to provide order to the feuding and ‘lawless’ Somali clans, but the response was that no occupation was to take place unless the coast was seriously threatened.[221] The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 increased the importance of the Somali coast, but it was not until France, Ethiopia and Italy began seeking territory in the Horn of Africa that Britain formalized its territorial claim.[222] With the changing perception that northwest Somalia was strategically important in its empire and therefore necessitated a formal British presence in the territory, in 1886 Britain created the British Somaliland Protectorate and introduced British rule into the horn of Africa.[223]Instructions from the British government in London regarding the new Protectorate were to restrict involvement to the coastal areas and to make the occupation as ‘unobtrusive as possible: there was to be no attempt to extend British control inland’.[224] The British officials initially employed methods of indirect rule, and the administrators within the Protectorate were instructed that ‘no grandiose schemes were to be entertained; expenditure was to be limited to a minimum, and [it] was to be provided by the local port revenues’.[225] Britain’s policy of ignoring the interior of the Somaliland Protectorate and running the territory ‘on the cheap’[226] were disrupted in 1899, however, when the anti-British dervish uprisings forced the attention of the British administrators as well as military forces inland.[227] The long and costly conflict caused the British to invest large amounts of financial and human resources in the Protectorate and moved the British authorities far from utilizing the colony primarily as a meat supply.
After 21 years of clashes between British troops and the dervish forces led by Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah Hassan (known as the ‘Mad Mullah’ by the British), the dervish were defeated but the entrenchment of the British throughout the territory made a policy of limited engagement no longer possible. The conflict left the interior in ‘violent turmoil’, with ‘nothing more tangible than a few ramshackle Ford cars and no decent roads or other means of communication’ as the main legacy of the fighting.[228] The resources Britain committed to fighting the Dervish far exceed what the government in London had been willing to provide to the Protectorate, leaving no further funds for investment in the territory during the conflict. The twenty years of British neglect, however, did not mean that development of the territory did not take place as local economic, trade and development projects were initiated by Somalis in those areas not directly involved in the fighting.[229] The entrepreneurial Somalis in the western regions of the territory demonstrated the self-sufficiency of the Somaliland people, a trait that would again become apparent in the post-colonial era.
Following the defeat of the dervish the British moved their administrative center from the coastal port of Berbera to the interior city of Hargeisa, signaling their intention to shift their focus to establishing an authoritative presence throughout the entirety of the territory rather than only the coast. In the south, the heavily invested Italian colonizers ruled through both force and patronage, depending upon the Somali population for their plantation workforce. Through conscription, forced labor, displacement and financial incentives, the Italian administration disrupted pre-existing forms of social, economic and political control, especially that exercised by the clan. Infrastructural development deemed necessary for the economic benefit of the plantations was carried out, and rudimentary education enforced so as to ensure a trained pool of labor.[230] The British administration of the Protectorate, however, continued to resemble a form of ‘benign neglect’ that was modestly focused on maintaining law and order and little else.[231] The colonial administration gradually introduced rudimentary social programs in Somaliland, but little interest was shown in the development of the territory beyond building a few schools and clearing select roads between major population centers in the territory, all of which were paid for through a tax levied on livestock exports.[232] Haji Abdi Hussein recollects that under the British the clans were the primary social providers within the colony.[233] The minimalist policies in the area of development characterized the British colonization of Somaliland,
Earning it the label ‘the Cinderella of the British Empire’.[234]the administrative structure of Britain’s rule in Somaliland was based on similar structures found throughout British colonial possessions acquired during late colonialism in which traditional structures – in this instance the clan – were utilized in the administering of the territories, allowing for a minimalist British presence. At the beginning of colonial rule in the Somaliland Protectorate, only three British residents, each in charge of one district, were present in the territory. At the time of independence, five residents were responsible for the administration of six districts.[235] As the clan system was not ruled by chiefs, though, there was not a strong basis for a true system of indirect rule. Like their counterparts in the south who bought compliance through the creation of titles,[236] the British administrators also fabricated titles, empowering titular clan leaders and elders of lineages to function as ‘chiefs’, thereby creating a structure of hierarchical rule. in addition, paid elders appointed by the British (Akil) were granted limited judicial powers and thus furnished a rudimentary system of subordinate courts based on a combination of English common and statute law and customary Somali law. Separate courts run by Muslim magistrates (Kadis) were given authority over cases involving personal status or shari’a law.[237] In establishing these courts and in utilizing and strengthening the system of diya-groups as enforcement mechanisms, the British administration ruled through an elaborate and exaggerated interpretation of Somali traditional governance that offered more control to the British administrators. despite the intention of indirect rule and the utilization of indigenous structures, as Lewis notes, the system in Somaliland closely resembled a more direct style of rule, although ‘with lighter hand and more restricted purview’ than their contemporaries in the Italian colony of Somalia.[238] The system of direct-indirect rule administered in Somaliland was difficult to execute and maintain, largely due to the continued British attitude of ambivalence towards the Protectorate but also because of the social structure of the Somalis themselves. The pervasiveness of the clan system continued to dictate social organization through the clan system itself rather than through the British-created ‘traditional’ structure. Because of the continued practices of benign neglect and moderation, even with the newly created ‘traditional’ structures the clans were able to remain semi-autonomous throughout most of Somaliland provided they did not cause problems for the British. As a result, the clan continued to be the primary ‘insurance policy’ and agent of provision within British Somaliland, particularly in the areas outside of Hargeisa and the main port of Berbera.
Colonial rule in Somaliland was not consistent throughout the territory and an effective system of administration was difficult to establish. This was largely due to the minimalist British involvement and the nature of that involvement, but was also because of the nomadic lifestyle of the majority of Somalis in the territory. As they were not bound to permanent settlements and they were not forced or enticed away from their pastoral lifestyles as many Somalis were in the Italian colony, many Somalis had little or no contact with the British or those employed by the administration. As Lewis states, ‘any radical changes would have required a much more strongly established administrative machine’, which was something the British were not willing to provide to a territory that did not provide enough natural and commercial resources to cover the costs of the administration.[239] Because of the weak and inconsistent nature of British administration of the territory, the dominance of the clan governance system persisted in many areas, and many of the traditional practices continued relatively uninterrupted throughout the colonial rule.[240]
Despite Britain’s expressed policy of preparing possessions for eventual independence,[241] the British administrators in the Somaliland Protectorate practiced a relaxed and slow approach to decolonization up to the day of independence on 26 June 1960. in July 1947 the British administration established the Protectorate advisory council which was composed of ‘chiefs’ and other clan representatives, representatives of the religious community, members of the Arab and Indian populations in the territory and British colonial officials. This council was the ‘first step in the process of associating the Somalis with the government of the country’.[242] Somaliland political clubs were also formed, being parties in all but name.[243] In Somaliland, more autonomy was granted to the future Somali leaders than those under Italian rule experienced, where political association was closely guarded and controlled by the administrators. Despite relative freedom of political association and practice, though, executive and legislative power remained solely vested in the British governor of the Protectorate until 1957.
Although the British administration did not have a scheduled independence day for the Protectorate, a United Nations established independence date for the Italian colony, together with increasing nationalistic pressure for quick post-independence unification of the Somali colonies, led to increasing demands for independence for the British Protectorate.[244] in 1956 the British government agreed to an accelerated schedule for self-government to coordinate with that in the south, and in 1957 preparations for self-government in Somaliland increased and executive and legislative councils were formed. A finalized independence date for Italian Somalia of 1 July 1960 adopted by the UN in December 1959 created increased pressure and haste to complete preparations in the north.[245] although the British attempted to leave lasting democratic reforms in Somaliland during these rapid preparations, the short time frame and restricted resources, the legacy of neglect that had accumulated throughout the colonial period and the knowledge that Somaliland’s independence would be short lived as it would unify with Somalia under the banner of Somali nationalism upon the latter’s independence, led to few significant reforms.[246] Because of this and the general ambivalence characterizing the British rule of the territory, at the time of independence the traditional structures of governance in Somaliland, although certainly altered by the colonial experience, were not completely replaced by a foreign state structure. Thus there remained a level of autonomy between the small ‘imposed’ state and the traditional Somali structures and institutions of governance. This contrasted sharply with the experience of Italian Somalia, where a mixture of force and co-existence characterized colonial rule. The Italian administration relied much more heavily on bribery, enticements and patronage than the British did. Itself rooted in patronage based political and economic system, the Italian administration ruled through selective patronage backed by military force, and the administration on the whole was significantly disruptive to traditional Somali practices. This, coupled with a highly centralized and bureaucratic practice of governance typical of many settler colonies as well as Italy at the time, became a strong legacy of the Italian administration on southern Somalia.[247] The Italians also left southern Somalia with political, social, economic and physical infrastructures that were not consistent with those in the north.[248] Following the 1960 creation of Somalia, the physical, social, economic and political legacies of the Italians starkly contrasted to those of the British, and these divisions would arise as an obstacle to a successful and lasting unification of the two territories.
As early as 1943, calls for unification of the Somali people were being made within the Somali inhabited areas. The desire for unification was closely linked with the nationalist ideal of transcending ‘tribalism’ and abolishing ‘wasteful’ clan rivalries in order to allow for all the Somali populations to come together as a nation under one sovereign flag. Somali nationalists desired all the Somali inhabited territories to join together,[249] but British Somaliland and Italian Somalia were the only two to seek a union. The calls for Somali unification and the strengthening nationalist movements in both colonies were eventually supported by the colonizers and the United Nations.[250] Even with the knowledge that the differing colonial experiences and legacies would pose structural and logistical problems, a quick unification was pushed for by all parties involved with the expectation that the differences in the administrative traditions and experiences of the two territories would ‘sort themselves out afterwards’.[251] The British Somaliland Protectorate was granted independence on 26 June 1960. Following Italian Somalia’s independence on 1 July 1960 the two united to form the state of Somalia.[252] The nationalistic motivations behind the unification, however, recognized little more than the aspiration for a unified Somali nation. The union of two former colonies with varied histories proved to be unstable, despite the commonality of ethnicity, and within the first year exhibited signs of the eventual break-up of Somalia. The collapse of Somalia progressed through two distinct eras: the initial period of unification and democratic government; the rule of Siyad barre; and the 1991 coup. The subsequent collapse of the state will be discussed in the following chapter. Experiences during these eras not only impacted upon mechanisms and expectations of governance, including sub-state governance, in the state, but also laid the foundations for an emerging Somaliland identity.
The Acts of Union, Democracy and Clan Politics
Three weeks following the unification of the two former colonies a central state government was in place in Mogadishu in the new state of Somalia. The new state’s dual colonial heritage posed numerous problems, however. indeed, ‘the process of unification was anything but smooth … the former Italian colony and trust territory in the south and the former British protectorate in the north were, from an institutional standpoint, two separate countries’,[253] meaning the ‘mechanics of establishing a unitary administration were daunting’.[254] Leading up to 1 July, important logistical and technical questions pertaining to the unification of two vastly different territories were ‘suppressed rather than worked out openly’.[255] in addition to differing legacies resulting from the different colonial administrations, the unified state was also facing problems resulting from logistical and institutional variations such as unequal economic, social and political infrastructures; a lack of roads and communications links between Hargeisa and Mogadishu; and even different operating languages of English in the north and Italian in the south. The nationalist motivations for unification were consistent with post-independence Pan-African movements, but the consequences of the immediate unification of significantly differing territories had lasting impacts on the state as unification never fully occurred. The powerful drive of Somali nationalism was not enough to ensure the survival of the state, and problems soon became apparent.
Prior to independence, colonial and Somali leaders from the north and the south met in Mogadishu to formulate a plan for unification and to create the framework for a unified government and two separate Acts of Union – one specific to the north and one to the south to be ratified by respective parliaments – were drawn up. The result of these negotiations, a new democratic system of government, was considered to ‘represent a reasonable balance of northern and southern interests’.[256] For six months following unification, the two separate Acts of Union constituted the only legal binding between the two territories. Although both territories had agreed to the negotiated balance between north and south in the new government, what emerged after unification heavily favored the south in not only representation in the Somalia parliament, but also in terms of logistical infrastructure as the administrative and economic center of state was in the extreme southern city of Mogadishu.[257] Because of the different practices of the two colonial powers, few transportation and communications links existed between the north and south, making the new capital of Mogadishu distant and difficult to reach from the main northern city of Hargeisa.[258] It was difficult to overlook that politics was centralized in Mogadishu, and coupled with northern marginalization in allocation of government spending, the unparalleled economic and social opportunities created in the southern city led to a social and economic decline in the cities in the north, especially Hargeisa.[259] The former northern capital ‘had declined to a mere provincial headquarters remote from the center of things … northern pride found it hard to match this reduction in prestige’.[260] Whilst inequality of representation and participation, as well as the distance between north and south were not seen as problematic in the period immediately following unification, the significant benefits given to the south at the expense of the north would become a contentious issue in the future and would contribute to a sense of isolation in the former British Protectorate. With the majority of political seats being held by southern Italian trained politicians, coupled with economic and social marginalization, it was not surprising that the former Somaliland Protectorate – the only Somali territory that ‘heeded the nationalist call’ from the south to relinquish sovereign independence – was frustrated by the lack of benefits received compared to what many believed was their sacrifice.[261]
The two separate Acts of Union were significant in highlighting the division between north and south in the new state as the two separate Acts were just that – two separate Acts. Upon unification, the new Somalia parliament did not ratify an amalgamated act.[262] When this oversight was discovered in 1961, the legislature in Mogadishu repealed the previous two acts of Union and a new, single and retrospective act was created. However, its acceptance by the southern dominated legislature did not reflect the extreme opposition to it from the north. When a referendum was held on the new act in June 1961, despite a northern boycott of the vote 100,000 votes were cast in the former Protectorate, of which more than 60 per cent were against it. The ‘union between the two countries quickly lost its bloom’ as northern discontent over the unfair unification became increasingly apparent.[263] The referendum thus became a test of confidence in the new government and, by extension, in the union itself. as the initial euphoria created by Somali nationalism faded and the realities of the uneven distribution in the new state became more apparent, and codified in the new Act of Union, the population of the former Protectorate gained a ‘more sober appreciation of the true situation’ of southern dominance in the new state.[264] The vote in the north thus reflected ‘widespread discontent in the northern region over the economic decline there, and over the growing political influence in Mogadishu’.[265] This northern dissatisfaction was further emphasized in December 1961 when northern army officers, unhappy with the dominance of southern leaders in the Somalia military, attempted a coup aimed at ending the unification.[266] The dissatisfaction of the army officers who staged the coup mirrored the dissatisfaction of the people of Somaliland, and according to Lewis, the coup attempt was widely regarded as a signal of extreme disapproval of the union and as an attempt at secession.[267] As the uneven distribution of government power became more apparent, many in the north became more disenchanted and feelings of neglect and isolation grew.
Bringing together the two Somali territories had ‘at once a profound effect on Somali politics’.[268] Prior to unification, both territories had discussed the problem of ‘clannism’, and the new leaders of the state identified clan association as an obstacle to Somali unification as it was believed that a strong association with particular clans would prevent the creation of a unified Somali identity. The reaction to this was an attempt to separate clan politics from national politics. In trivializing and sometimes vilifying clan politics the new leaders attempted to remove the intrinsic method of identification for the Somali from the political arena. As the anti-clan movement intensified, the traditional nature of Somali politics and social control became increasingly targeted. Rather than eliminating the ‘clan problem’, though, this created a realization on an unofficial level that ‘there could be no doubt of their [clan associations] continuing importance in the political life of the new state’.[269] Politicians soon learned that they had to utilize bonds of kinship to achieve desired political aims and to maintain their positions, and as a result clan politics became inseparable from the running of the Somalia government. As Lewis notes, there was danger in enmeshing party politics in the contentious Somali clan system in that personal or clan gain would be put above the best interests of the state, resulting in a corrupt system with an abundance of clan dominated political parties dependent upon ancient clan allegiances for political gain.[270] Further, this changed the role of the clan from one of mostly social control over a limited population linked by kinship to that of state-level control over a vast and diverse population.
This new large-scale system of centralized clan association had a significant impact on the power balance between the clans, as the new democratic system politicized them in a way never previously experienced. As Lewis notes, ‘despite the patriotic fervor … the all-pervasive element in politics remained the loyalty of the individual to his kin and clan’. The unification of the two territories into one political entity ‘entailed significant, and in some cases quite drastic changes in the political status of the various clans and lineages within the state’.[271] Despite what were believed to be modernizing influences, such as the establishment of national political parties and the proliferation of education, identification with the clan remained the primary allegiance and the center of life for the majority of the population. In the north, a considerable majority belonged to the Isaaq clan, making it a powerful force in the former Protectorate. However, the Isaaq are a very small minority outside of the Protectorate, meaning that in a unified Somalia they were significantly overpowered by the southern clans. The reduction in political status of the Isaaq clan impacted upon the position of the north in the increasingly clan-based political realm.[272] Clan and regional animosities arose as certain clans were able to exert more control than others, creating instability within the new government, the state and society. As power centralized in Mogadishu and as politics and the government became increasingly nepotistic and inseparable from the clans, the north became increasingly isolated.
During the nine years of the democratic government in Somalia, unification of the two former colonies was never fully achieved and perceptions of northern inequality added to the mix of dissatisfaction throughout the state. in the attempt to rid Somalia of clan identities and to replace them with the idea of a Somali nation, what was instead created was a system of politics plagued by nepotistic clan-based party politics that left the new state with a ‘morass of poverty, insecurity and inefficiency’. Throughout Somalia the democratic government was viewed as a ‘sordid market-place’ where politicians openly engaged in bribery and embezzlement and who bolstered their own personal and clan coffers by funneling state funds and resources into personal accounts.[273] Disenchantment was no longer limited to the former British Protectorate, as people throughout Somalia grew increasingly frustrated by the corruption of the government.
Even though the democratic government in Somalia was short lived, the isolation of the north under this government would not soon be forgotten. Because of the fragmented and decentralized nature of the Somali population, the north and south were not a unified entity prior to colonization, and when the two territories came together following independence it was an artificial unification based on nationalistic motivations rather than a historical claim or political cohesiveness.[274] Combined with corruption, nepotism and divisive clan politics, post-independence Somalia was a volatile entity. Whilst the separation between north and south that became apparent in the early years of the new state was not enough to end the unification, it did lay the foundations for the eventual division of the state. This is not to say that the isolation of the north was a pre-requisite for the state’s collapse, but rather the continuation of these divisions was ‘sowing the seeds of growing Northern discontent with the union … leading, nearly three decades later, to its dissolution’.[275] The break-up of Somalia, whether inevitable or not, was certainly hastened by the rule of Siyad barre and the impacts of that on northern Somalia.
Siyad Barre and the Manipulation of the Clan
In October 1969 the Somalia army staged a coup, after which rule by a supreme revolutionary council headed by army commander general Mohammed Siyad barre was established. Rather than offering solutions to the problems that plagued Somalia, though, barre’s increasingly repressive rule, nationalistic motivations for conquest and unsound economic policies exacerbated the cracks already apparent in Somalia. In addition, barre’s twenty-two year rule had a lasting impact on the placement of the clans in society, and his practices also significantly widened the gap between the north and the south. As Dool states, under barre, ‘Somalis in the North were made second-class citizens in their own homeland’.[276]
Following the experience of corruption under the democratic government, barre swept into power vowing the cleanse Somalia’s political realm of corruption and nepotism and vowing to establish a ‘just and honorable society’ in which attention would be given to ‘real economic and social betterment for all’.[277] A major component of Barre’s rule was the revival of notions Somali nationalism, reiterating calls for a unification of all Somalis under a single flag free of clan and territorial divisions. Many Somalis welcomed the coup, but within a year barre had eliminated the democratic structures of government, turning Somalia into a one-party state based on his own style of Scientific Socialism.[278] It was through this that he established an environment of fear and repression, drawing on language and practices that were reminiscent of Stalin, Mao and Kim IL Sung.[279] Under Barre, Somalia quickly transformed from a state plagued by corruption in the democratic government to a state plagued by corruption and violence in the one-party regime. As much of the history of Somalia in current literature begins with a detailed account of the 1969 coup,[280] a detailed history of barre’s rule is not offered here. What needs to be examined, however, is the impact of his rule on the clan and governance structures within Somali society and within the north.
Barre’s solution to the destructive clannism plaguing the previous government was detribalization, or ridding Somalia of clans and clan associations.[281] The stated desired outcome of this policy was similar to that of the democratic government in its own attempt to remove the clan from politics: a united Somali society. Barre’s policy differed, though, in that he enforced detribalization with an iron-fist rather than through legislation. Barre viewed the Somali clans as a ‘perversely persistent force’,[282] and any mention of clan association or membership was outlawed as a political offence punishable by death. High levels of surveillance became prevalent throughout the state, monitoring the Somali people for treasonous acts such as clan loyalty or even mentioning clan names. Barre’s vision of a greater Somalia ‘demanded the dismantling of the traditional clan-based social order, economic networks and political institutions upon which the majority of Somalis still depended’ in order to change the object of loyalty in Somalia from the clan to the whole, and later to him alone.[283] By forcibly dismantling and outlawing clan association and identification, Barre further altered traditional systems of governance and control. The system of forced nationalistic loyalty did not erase divisions within society, but it did create a means through which barre could enforce his rule.
Even though barre publically and legally demonized the clan, personally he still heavily relied on the politicization of the clan as a means of social and political control. He increasingly elevated his own lineage and placed his own clan members into high positions, drawing on family allegiance and patronage politics to ensure loyalty from the top members of his regime. Those who were not loyal or were suspected of being subversive were killed or imprisoned and replaced with another member of barre’s lineage, or with a member of a clan that needed to be appeased.[284] In addition to using clan politics to maintain his regime, barre also used links through his maternal Ogadeni lineage to rally Somali nationalism in Ethiopia, eventually leading to Somalia’s involvement in the Ogaden War, and used his son-in-law’s northern lineage to contain friction between the north and south of Somalia.[285] Forcibly co-opted clan elders – renamed ‘peacemakers’ – were placed within the state bureaucracy to be used as a means of further societal control.[286] Whereas the clan was outlawed for ordinary Somalis, for barre manipulating its structures was a vital tool with which to sustain his regime. Rather than ridding Somalia of destructive clannism, barre’s manipulation, similar to that practiced by the Italian colonizers, depended on bribery, brute force and fear to control the population. Interestingly, though, as Barre became more brutal, the influence of kinship re-emerged in many areas as people turned to the clan for provision and protection. This was especially true in the north where the brutality of barre’s regime was disproportionately felt, but also where, because of geographical distance, the population was more isolated from the day-to-day activities of the regime than those living closer to Mogadishu.
Despite calling for a greater Somalia, barre did not aim to unite all the Somali territories but instead focused specifically on annexing the Ogaden region of Ethiopia.[287] In this quest barre involved Somalia in the separatist struggles of two Somali movements in the Ogaden: the Somali-Abo Liberation Front (SALF) and the Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF). With one of the largest and best equipped armies in Africa, barre exercised his nationalistic plans almost solely through force, and by 1977 a full-scale war had broken out between Ethiopia and Somalia.[288] Somalia lost the war, and the defeat ‘decisively buried the dream of a pan-Somali state’.[289] Devastating to the ethos of a single Somali state that had brought the former Protectorate into the union, the Ogaden War not only marked the beginning of the end for the barre regime and the Somali state, but it also aggravated those existent feelings of mistrust between the north and the south.[290]All of Somalia felt the impacts of the Ogaden War, but due to its geographical proximity to the fighting the northern region experienced the majority of the physical and human destruction. It also absorbed large numbers of Somali refugees fleeing Ethiopia, overwhelming the population of the region. Approximately a quarter of a million refugees were settled in the north by the United nations high commissioner for refugees with the approval of the Somalia government, and overflow from designated refugee camps spilled into the major cities creating chaotic conditions.[291] As international aid was funneled into the area, aid resources earmarked for the refugees became a source of envy and resentment for local residents as no compensation was given to them for bearing the burden of the war. To further problems and resentment, following the end of hostilities barre heavily favored the Ogaden refugees, most of whom were members of his lineage. In addition to government and aid resources, the refugees also enjoyed preferential access to social services, business licenses and even government posts.[292] As expressed animosity and discontent in the north grew, refugee militias were created and armed by the barre government to quell any rebellion and to protect the refugees, thereby creating a dangerous and hostile situation in the northwest.[293] in what was essentially buying off the Ogaden refugees through continued preferential treatment and protection, barre was ensuring their loyalty to his regime at the expense of the Isaaq who were not only bypassed for economic, social and political advancement, but in many cases were also forcefully suppressed by both the Somalia army and the refugee militias. This practice gave barre a power base in the northwest, a region of Somalia where he had never been able to fully exert his power. However, it also exacerbated the division between the north – primarily the Isaaq – and the southern regime and led the population in Somaliland to begin taking steps to fight back.
the increased militarization through the formation of refugee militias complemented barre’s already violent handling of the northwest region and the ‘rebellious’ Isaaq, as well as his increasingly centralized regime which depended largely on kinship and bought loyalties.[294] During and following the Ogaden War, barre had suspected the Isaaq of supporting and assisting Ethiopian forces, even though many in the northwest initially and enthusiastically backed Somalia’s war effort.[295] This suspicion was a key factor in Barre’s often violent treatment of the northwest, and after its defeat in the Ogaden the regime became ‘even more repressive’ as the primary method of exercising power in the northwest.[296] As such, ‘[t]ensions between the local inhabitants and the refugees were just a symptom of the government’s cynical manipulation of kinship divisions within Somali society for the purposes of divide and rule’.[297] In the case of the north, this tactic was characterized by brutality and violence targeting the Isaaq and carried out by those benefiting from Barre’s patronage practices.[298]By early 1978, the regime had concentrated Somalia’s economic resources, including large amounts of foreign aid, in its hands, ‘using selective redistribution to ensure loyalty to the regime’.[299] By the end of his rule barre had isolated himself in his small resource-rich inner circle, turning the one-party Somali state into a one-man state.[300] Increasing economic neglect and deprivation, stringent controls on trade, increasing centralization of administrative functions in Mogadishu, and the growing brutality of the barre regime, both from the army as well as from the barre-supported refugee militias, again exacerbated the widening gap between the north and the south. exacerbated by the political, social and economic isolation and maltreatment of the north, reliance on the clan increased in the former Protectorate, and as relations between the government in Mogadishu and the former British Protectorate worsened following the Ogaden War and during barre’s well-documented violent campaign in the territory prior to and during the civil war, clan identification became a vital tool in the struggle against the dictator. Amongst other factors, the resurgence of the clan system added to stability in the north creating a basis for a clan-based liberation movement as well as for the eventual establishment of governance and government. This re-emergence of the clan system will be examined in greater detail in the next chapter.
Conclusions
Almost immediately from unification the fragility of the state of Somalia was apparent. As Menkhaus simply states, ‘[t]he Somali state was a castle built on sand’.[301] Colonial legacies, nationalist aspirations, corrupt government and politicization of the clan system contributed to the rise of barre, which in turn led to increasingly militarized and violent government and a further demonization of the clan. However, despite attempts to repress it, the centrality of the clan in many areas persisted throughout the colonial and post-independence eras. As Luling identifies, politicians could not manipulate clan divisions if those ties were not a ‘reality in peoples’ minds and lives’.[302] It is interesting to note that in both the colonial and the post-colonial regimes, the clan was used as a component of social and political control. More so, in both pre-1991 post-colonial regimes, clannism was discouraged or outlawed, yet in both instances there was a heavy investment and entrenchment of the clan in politics and as a mechanism of governance, arguably out of necessity for the establishment and maintenance of political and social control. Attempts to divorce it from either politics or its larger embodiment, government, failed. As will be seen in the next chapter, this was especially the case in the former British Protectorate during the barre regime. indeed, coupled with a sense of persecution and an intense divide between north and south, the clan provided fertile ground for the establishment of armed reaction to barre; action which would eventually lead to the establishment of an independent Somaliland.
On 18 May 1991, the former British Protectorate of Somaliland declared its independence from the troubled state of Somalia and has since functioned as an unrecognized state, balancing the demands of international expectations of statehood with domestic necessities for stability. Although Somaliland officially declared its intention to separate from Somalia in 1991, the build-up to this action began almost from the outset of the unification that created the state. States and territories do not simply break-up often, and lasting claims of independence are rare. Whilst this chapter addressed the broad, overall problems with the union itself and the placement of the clan in society and governance leading up to the 1991 breakup of Somalia, the next chapter continues in focusing on the specifics pertaining to Somaliland in the context of its declaration of independence and its process of statebuilding. Whilst undeniably a historical offering, the following chapter also establishes the foundations upon which the state of Somaliland are laid; foundations that not only have supported the long statebuilding process, but that have also supported a stable and growing state out of the political chaos that characterizes the archetypal failed state: Somalia.
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