A new analysis argues that Washington’s diplomatic outreach to Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki is unlikely to deliver lasting peace in the Horn of Africa. It examines Eritrea’s alleged “Tsimdo” strategy, proxy conflicts in Ethiopia and Sudan, tensions over Somaliland, and the broader geopolitical contest shaping Red Sea security.
By Habtom Ghebrezghiabher
U.S. Senior Advisor for Arab and African Affairs Massad Boulos held separate meetings with the foreign ministers of Egypt, Somalia, and Eritrea as Washington intensified its diplomacy in the Horn of Africa. But Eritrea’s Isaias Afwerki depends on perpetual conflict for political survival. Peace threatens his rule more than war.
Decades of systemic conflict are threatening to engulf the Horn of Africa in active war, and Washington is trying to stop it with a strategy built on flawed assumptions. In its bid to foster peace, security, and long-term stability across the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, the U.S. has embarked on a diplomatic campaign to court Eritrea’s strongman, Isaias Afwerki, under the naive assumption that he can be coaxed into serving as a regional mediator.
For Isaias Afwerki, peace is not a goal; it is a threat. The dictator thrives on instability, weaponizing proxy conflicts, regional chaos, and perpetual crisis simply to hold onto power. This strategy finds its clearest expression in what Asmara frames as “Tsimdo” (ጽምዶ), a Tigrinya term denoting “engagement” or “yoking”, repurposed not to resolve disputes, but to manufacture and sustain them. Far from a grassroots diplomatic framework, Tsimdo functions at its core as a doctrine of sub-threshold proxy warfare engineered to entangle Ethiopia, destabilize Sudan, and box in Somaliland.
Unburdened by any obligation to his citizens’ welfare, Isaias Afwerki views regional chaos not as a risk, but as a governance strategy. Having abandoned the most fundamental duties of statehood—failing to deliver basic water, electricity, healthcare, or internet—he replaces public services with forced coercion, oppressing his people through mandatory conscription that amounts to indefinite modern-day slavery. For a dictator who accepts no responsibility for domestic prosperity, exporting instability becomes his primary instrument of political survival.
Under the banner of “Tsimdo”—a cynical alliance of convenience—Isaias Afwerki has engineered a permanent chaos engine along Ethiopia’s borders. By bankrolling dissident politicians, media proxies, and insurgent forces, Afwerki seeks to weaken the Ethiopian federal authority in Addis Ababa and restore the frozen “no-peace, no-war” dynamic that sustains his rule. After joining federal forces to crush the TPLF, Isaias rejected the Pretoria agreement and abandoned Addis Ababa. Today, he plays a dangerous double game—doubling down on his alliance with the Amhara Fano militia while bankrolling anti-Abiy TPLF factions to keep Ethiopia divided.
The reality on the ground highlights the dysfunction of current diplomatic efforts. Just recently, U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia Ervin Massinga traveled to Mekelle. His mission included engaging with Lt. Gen. Tadesse Werede, the agreed-upon president of the Tigray Interim Regional Administration under the Pretoria Agreement. Instead, security forces aligned with the hardline Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) faction, close ally of Asmara—which ousted Tadesse in a soft internal coup and reinstated Dr. Debretsion Gebremichael—placed Tadesse under house arrest and physically barred him from meeting the American envoy.
Ambassador Massinga was forced to settle for a 20-minute phone call with Tadesse, while being offered a meeting with TPLF Vice President Amanuel Assefa instead. Although accounts differ over whether TPLF chairman Debretsion Gebremichael declined to meet the ambassador or the ambassador declined to meet him, the diplomatic message appears consistent with Washington’s longstanding policy: honor the Pretoria Agreement, restore the legitimate interim administration, and halt dangerous overtures to Eritrea. The hardline TPLF leadership refused to engage with Washington’s core demands. Rather than standing firm, the U.S. finds itself locked out by a faction openly aligning with the region’s primary spoiler.
This obstruction is particularly egregious given that the Ethiopian federal government’s stated policy and observable diplomatic actions. Under Prime Minister Dr. Abiy Ahmed, Ethiopia sought a peaceful resolution with Eritrea by offering border demarcation, while persistently seeking peaceful, commercial port services on the Red Sea to deliver economic benefits and long-term stability to the region. Isaias broke with the federal government specifically over the Pretoria Agreement—the very peace framework the U.S. is striving to uphold—choosing instead to align with hardline TPLF factions to keep Ethiopia fractured and vulnerable.
In every international forum, Ethiopia has steadfastly affirmed its respect for Eritrea’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Yet at home, the rhetoric burns hot—and for good reason. Prime Minister Abiy’s government faces rising domestic fury over Isaias Afwerki’s blatant, unprovoked violations of Ethiopian sovereignty. While Addis Ababa plays by the rules of international diplomacy, the dictator in Asmara continues to use instability inside Ethiopia as an instrument of regional strategy.
Although Ethiopia’s government bears responsibility for addressing its internal conflicts and governance challenges, external interference has further complicated these efforts by undermining stabilization and reconciliation initiatives.
Isaias Afwerki’s disruptive playbook is equally clear in Sudan. Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, head of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), recently visited Eritrea to solidify an alliance with Isaias. Facing a brutal war against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), Burhan relies on Eritrea for critical logistical corridors, military backing, and access to proxy militias—including hardline TPLF factions and Amhara Fano insurgents destabilizing Ethiopia.
In Sudan, Isaias Afwerki’s “Tsimdo” strategy has evolved into a campaign of regional destabilization. By backing Islamist hardliners within the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and cultivating tribal militias along the eastern border, Asmara is effectively holding General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan hostage. The practical effect has been to prolong the conflict while reinforcing confrontation with Addis Ababa. Caught between Asmara’s cross-border leverage and pressure from internal extremists, Burhan has been boxed into a corner—left with little choice but to reject U.S.-led Quartet peace initiatives and keep the Horn of Africa ablaze.
On Somaliland, Isaias’s hostility runs deep. The dictator has long opposed even Somalia’s federal arrangement, let alone Somaliland’s independence—a statehood he has actively worked to thwart. Today, his opposition extends beyond Somaliland’s sovereignty to the Ethiopia-Somaliland Memorandum of Understanding and any footprint Israel might gain in the region through Hargeisa. Indeed, Asmara’s deepening alliance with Cairo is driven not merely by a shared urge to contain Ethiopia, but by a joint determination to block Israeli influence along the Red Sea. Their shared objective is to prevent the emergence of an Ethiopia-Somaliland-Israel strategic axis that could fundamentally reshape the regional balance of power in favor of peace, stability, and secure cooperation along the Red Sea.
The Egypt-Eritrea alliance reflects Cairo’s shift toward short-term, tactical maneuvering. Driven by a zero-sum stance against Addis Ababa over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has aligned with Isaias Afwerki to project leverage against Ethiopia. In an effort to secure Asmara’s partnership and construct a regional counterweight, Cairo has extended support to the Sudanese Armed Forces’ (SAF) Islamist-aligned faction—a high-risk strategy that directly threatens security along its own southern border.
The recent diplomatic initiative culminated in Cairo when Massad Boulos, President Trump’s Senior Advisor for Arab and African Affairs, held talks with Eritrean Foreign Minister Osman Saleh. That these high-level negotiations took place on neutral third-party territory speaks volumes about the true state of relations. Isaias systematically rejects direct engagement on home soil, maintaining entrenched hostility toward the United States.
Washington’s willingness to normalize relations with Asmara before securing meaningful changes in Eritrea’s regional behavior or domestic governance reflects the administration’s belief that engagement can moderate Isaias Afwerki’s conduct. The subsequent talks, however, yielded no meaningful shift in Eritrea’s regional posture. That outcome was predictable: Isaias shares no common values, strategic alignment, or long-term vision with Washington.
The absence of shared strategic values is evident even among the regime’s closest supporters. Amanuel Biedemariam, a prominent pro-government commentator based in the United States, recently described U.S.-Eritrea engagement as “a partnership of necessity, not shared values,” while applauding Egypt and Eritrea for building a Red Sea security framework that excludes Washington. His remarks reinforce the point that Asmara views engagement with the United States as tactical rather than strategic.
Washington’s engagement with Asmara is largely a mirage, brokered through President el-Sisi’s personal access to the Trump administration. Cairo manufactured these diplomatic channels to cement its own status as an indispensable regional powerbroker, knowing full well that the Eritrean regime never had any intention of making concessions or embracing real peace.
American foreign policy in the Horn of Africa is trapped in a dangerous feedback loop. The Trump administration’s rhetoric regarding the Nile has long suffered from a skewed narrative, often echoing Cairo’s position that Egypt is unfairly threatened, while ignoring Ethiopia’s legitimate energy and development needs. By indulging this perspective, Washington has encouraged Egypt to play a high-risk game—emboldening an Eritrean dictator who actively nurtures the Iranian-aligned resistance axis alongside the Houthis across the Red Sea.
Washington cannot negotiate effectively with an actor whose political survival is fundamentally tied to perpetual instability. Engaging President Isaias Afwerki will neither resolve the conflict in Sudan, secure long-term stability in Ethiopia, nor alleviate systemic repression within Eritrea. Until U.S. foreign policy shifts away from viewing Asmara as a potential diplomatic partner and confronts its role as a primary driver of instability, American engagement will remain ineffective—leaving the Horn of Africa highly vulnerable to a destructive interstate conflict.
Washington is trying to negotiate peace with a regime whose political economy depends on war. Rather than courting Asmara, the United States should focus on upholding the Pretoria Peace Agreement and helping prevent a new interstate war in the Horn of Africa. Crucially, U.S. diplomacy must stop treating Isaias Afwerki’s authoritarian survival strategy as a side note—it is the central driver of regional instability.
About Habtom Ghebrezghiabher
