The article “What might ‘SSC-Khaatumo State’ mean for Puntland?” from Sahan Research’s Somali Wire discusses the potential consequences for Puntland (a semi-autonomous region in Somalia) of the formation of a new “SSC-Khaatumo State.
Somalia’s Prime Minister’s visit to Las Anod, promising to integrate the “SSC-Khaatumo administration” as a 6th Federal Member State (FMS) within Somalia, has worsened Puntland’s relationships with both Somaliland and the federal government in Mogadishu.
The formation of the SSC-Khaatumo State poses several problems for Puntland:
Loss of Territory and Influence: Puntland has long claimed these areas based on clan ties (Harti solidarity), and losing them diminishes its territory and influence.
Accusations of “Majeerteeniya”: Without the Dhulbahante and Warsangeli clans (both Harti), Puntland could be seen as dominated solely by the Majeerteen sub-clan, which is seen as a negative.
Internal Political Instability: Clan power-sharing agreements within Puntland’s government and parliament could be disrupted, leading to internal conflicts and power struggles.
Undermining Puntland’s Stability: The Federal Government is attempting to use this situation to undermine the stability of Puntland.
Al-Shabaab Threats: The region is vulnerable to Al-Shabaab influence, which could be exacerbated by the political instability.
Puntland’s President, Deni, has a strong political position, but faces a difficult choice: resist the new state’s formation (potentially causing conflict with his own clan) or accept it (weakening Puntland).
Deni may seek alliances with Somaliland and with federal lawmakers discontent with the Federal Government’s actions, to counter the federal government’s influence.
The formation of SSC-Khaatumo is seen as a politically motivated move by the federal government in Mogadishu, lacking legitimacy and potentially destabilizing the region. Regardless of SSC-Khaatumo’s long-term viability, it will force Puntland to re-evaluate its Harti identity and its internal political structures. The situation is fluid and unpredictable.
The complete piece is as follows:
What might ‘SSC-Khaatumo State’ Mean for Puntland?
By The Somali Wire Team
During his visit to Las Anod in April, PM Hamza Abdi Barre pledged that the SSC-Khaatumo administration in Sool would be integrated into Somalia as its 6th ‘Federal Member State (FMS). Alongside inviting the Dhulbahante leader Abdikhadir Ahmed Aw-Ali ‘Firdhiye’ to the National Consultative Council (NCC), the visit was an extraordinary piece of political vandalism, shattering any possible reconciliation with Puntland as well as Somaliland.
Ties have since rapidly deepened, with Firdhiye co-opted into the new ‘Justice and Solidarity Party,’ while SSC-Khaatumo-administered territory is being drawn up as part of Villa Somalia’s gerrymandered electoral map. Though the constitutional legalities of unilaterally forming SSC-Khaatumo as a new and third Darood-majority FMS are highly dubious and still unfolding, it is worth considering the implications of another ‘Harti’ state for Puntland.
For decades, Somaliland and Puntland have intermittently grappled over the territory of Sool and Sanaag, a mixture of the Dhulbahante and Warsangeli sub-clans from the Darood/Harti, and the Isaaq. Their competing claims have radically different roots, not least because Somaliland– celebrating its 34th declaration of independence from Somalia yesterday– continues to lobby for international recognition.
In turn, Hargeisa has based its administrative borders on the boundaries of the British Somaliland Protectorate. Puntland is somewhat different, genealogically vesting its authority over the Darood/ Harti clan family but explicitly within a federated Somalia.
In the 1990s, Puntland politicians increasingly accessed the concept of Hartinimo or ‘Harti solidarity’ following the clan violence targeting the Darood in southern Somalia following the collapse of the Siad Barre regime. Article 1.2 of the Puntland charter, a precursor to its constitution, provides a genealogical justification of territory, including Sool, eastern Sanaag, the Buuhoodle district in South Toghdeer, and most of Mudug. It was not until the 2000s, however, when Somaliland and Puntland administrations achieved greater internal sovereignty and state-like capacities, that Sool and Sanaag became more critical for their legitimacy as well.
Some of these reasons mirrored one another, with Hargeisa seeking to avoid being cast as a clan enclave or ‘Isaaqland’ and Puntland similarly rejecting the label of ‘Majeerteeniya.’ But the intermittent but protracted military engagement between Puntland and Somaliland that followed had a number of desultory consequences for the contested Dhulbahante and Warsangeli areas.
Among them was the political and economic marginalization of these territories, while both Al-Shabaab and the Islamic State-Somalia (ISS) consequently sought to stoke and exploit discontent. Some disaffected young men from the Warsangeli communities in the Golis Mountains, in particular, joined Al-Shabaab.
Instead, over several years, successive Puntland administrations focused on consolidating the development of the region’s ‘center’ between Garowe, Bosaaso, and northern Galkacyo– predominantly Majerteen territory. And though there was plenty of rhetoric espoused about Puntland forces retaking Las Anod, from which Hargeisa had ousted the northern FMS in 2007, the status quo endured until 2023 and the ejection of Somaliland forces.
Since then, Puntland’s relationship with SSC-Khaatumo and affiliated Dhulbahante militias has vacillated. During the fighting for Las Anod in 2023, ties between the militias and Garowe grew, with Puntland accused of facilitating arms and fighters against Somaliland. But the relationship has also remained somewhat fraught, particularly regarding Firdhiye’s outreach to Mogadishu.
Today, the prospect of losing the Warsangeli and the Dhulbahante to the new ‘SSC-Khaatumo State’ presents a number of dilemmas for Puntland. Since April, Mogadishu has sought to capitalize on Barre’s visit to Las Anod, bringing Firdhiye into the NCC in a deliberate attempt to spike Deni’s attendance, and achieve some fig-leaf Darood representation.
Though Villa Somalia made no signals that it was ready to climb down from its unilateral political agenda, the invitation of Firdhiye cemented the exclusion of Deni– who would have to essentially acquiesce to the formal dismemberment of his region into two governments to attend.
Further, the proposed incorporation of SSC-Khaatumo into Villa Somalia’s gerrymandered electoral map could well re-ignite violence within the highly militarized borderlands if a vote were to be held, as could the prospect of hydrocarbon drilling or exploration in the region. And the influential elements of Al-Shabaab within SSC-Khaatumo, the most notable being commanded by Ali Hussein Abdi Kamiin, better known as ‘Abdi Madoobe,’ threaten to potentially destabilize the region further.
The loss of the two prominent Harti sub-clans further exposes Puntland to renewed accusations of ‘Majeerteeniya.’ While there are other marginalized Harti sub-clans that remain within the leaner Puntland, such as the Lelkaase, it necessarily restricts the region to an overwhelming Darood/Majerteen majority.
Since its formation, Puntland’s politics have been dominated by one particular Majerteen sub-clan known as the Mahmoud Salebaan, and the three prominent ‘brotherly’ sub-clans within it– the Omar Mahmoud from northern Mudug, the Osman Mahmoud from the Bari region, and the Issa Mahmoud in Nugaal.
An informal presidential rotation pact between these three sub-clans and areas is nominally still in place, with Deni hailing from Osman Mahmoud. But if Puntland’s administration accepts the departure of the Dhulbahante and Warsangeli, the complex clan-sharing agreements within the regional government could be upended. Clan-allocated ministerial positions and parliamentary seats will have to be adapted to the new demography, representing a return to some of the debates of the late 1990s concerning Puntland’s formation.
Historically, the Dhulbahante have been promised the vice-presidency, with the incumbent Ilyas Osman Lugator hailing from Sool, for instance, while the Warsangeli also receive prominent positions within the cabinet. Moreover, Dhulbahante and Warsangeli representatives further hold a significant number of seats in Puntland’s regional parliament, which could lead to a major shift within the clan blocs that re-elected Deni in January 2024.
Some marginalized sub-clans could expect to benefit from a reformulation of the ministerial and parliamentary positions, but in the zero-sum game that often defines Somalia’s clan dynamics, others may feel frustrated that they have not seen the same relative gains. This, too, could cause fresh opportunities for the Issa and Omar Mahmoud to reformulate their own alliances and wrest power back to their sub-clans.
Unlike the chaos in Mogadishu, Puntland’s internal politics have been unusually calm in recent months, with the polity largely united behind Deni and against the Hawiye-dominated federal government’s attempts to undermine the federation. Critically, Deni likely has some breathing room to negotiate Puntland’s relationship with SSC-Khaatumo, having built a cross-clan coalition in the counter-ISS ‘Operation Hilaac’ campaign in the Al-Miskaad mountains.
Towards the end of 2024, before launching operations, Deni’s government invested significant political capital in engaging with the peripheral communities from which ISS, as well as Al-Shabaab, has drawn its strength, such as the Ali Salebaan. The success of the operations– backed by the UAE, the US, and Ethiopia– has generated Deni significant political clout, and the Puntland president is in a strong position to resist any of Mogadishu’s various destabilizing machinations.
Some intermittent spats have continued to occur, including with the Diyaano family, which remains prominent among the Puntland Security Forces (PSF) in Bosaaso. But the Araan Jaan opposition faction within Garowe has remained subsided, as have the historically discontented communities in southern Puntland near Galkacyo, such as the Sa’ad.
These factions and jostling for power are likely to resurface during the next electoral cycle. But here arises another key question: will Deni still be Puntland President? Having comfortably won the traditional election last January, Deni has secured a mandate until 2029 with a second five-year term, though it is nevertheless anticipated that the Puntland leader may have another tilt at the federal presidency in May 2026. But while Deni may have proven himself an excellent coalition-builder within Puntland, his attention has been understandably focused on governing and anti-ISS operations rather than building a national support base to challenge for the presidency.
Tied into this, Deni has a thorny strategic decision to make- whether to bear SSC-Khaatumo’s formation into an FMS or to resist it, perhaps by allying Puntland with Somaliland. It is by no means straightforward, and if Deni chooses to publicly resist the creation of another Harti FMS, it may jar with those within his own Darood clan as well as even foment instability on his western border.
Instead, Puntland may seek to quietly prise elements of the Dhulbahante– which is by no means universally aligned with Mogadishu– back towards Garowe. But the co-opting of SSC-Khaatumo by Villa Somalia into the JSP may frustrate any effort by Deni to restore a broader Harti solidarity, which was already an ebbed prospect.
And with 26 parliamentarians in the federal parliament supposedly representing Sool and Sanaag and likely expected to swear fealty to the new party, this, too, could undermine Deni’s position if there is a return to a negotiated political transition in 2026. So far, it appears that Deni is leaning towards resisting the unconstitutional, gerrymandered attempts of Villa Somalia to undermine Puntland’s status and the federation, and is instead reaching across SSC-Khaatumo to Hargeisa.
Relations between Somaliland and Puntland have fluctuated for some time, but there have been some signs of an improving relationship in recent weeks, particularly in the wake of the PM’s visit to Las Anod. Prisoners captured during the fighting in 2023 for the town on either side have been exchanged, and in a speech in late April, Deni acknowledged Somaliland’s right to self-determination.
It was a significant step for a Puntland president to offer such language, and an apparent rebuke to the hyper-nationalist enclave within the federal government. It may also signal that Deni, aware he faces losing parts of the Harti parliamentary bloc, is seeking fresh alliances with Isaaq federal lawmakers discontented with Villa Somalia’s anti-federalist credentials and abrasive politics towards Somaliland.
The formation of Puntland emerged through a gradual and sensitive process that took place over several years, while the supposed ‘creation’ of the ‘SSC-Khaatumo State’ has been the precise opposite. The Dhulbahante and Warsangeli have plenty of legitimate grievances with both Garowe and Hargeisa, but the co-opting of SSC-Khaatumo by Mogadishu for myopic, self-interested reasons is deeply regrettable.
For the moment, SSC-Khaatumo serves several purposes for Villa Somalia, but it has also shown few qualms about violently unsettling former allies like Jubaland President Ahmed Islam ‘Madoobe.’ The sudden formalization of SSC-Khaatumo as a new FMS, absent the backing of the two Darood-majority states and constitutional legitimacy, is surely untenable in the longer term– even if Puntland’s government feels it cannot publicly oppose such a move.
And such is the degree of political tumult in Mogadishu in recent months, it is impossible to know what might endure or collapse from this extraordinarily unstable period– or if even the capital will still be held by the federal government in a few months’ time. Still, while the prospect of an ‘SSC-Khaatumo State’ and all that entails may prove short-lived, there may be no going back from an overdue reckoning in Puntland with its own Harti identity.
This article originally appeared in Sahan Research’s thrice-weekly bulletin “The Somali Wire,” Issue No. 824, on May 19, 2025.
