The Ankara Declaration, brokered by Türkiye, is poised to play a crucial role in stabilizing the increasingly volatile Horn of Africa while strengthening Türkiye’s influence in the region
Author: Samir Bhattacharya
The Ethiopia-Somalia dispute seemed to have gradually destabilized an already volatile region, sparking fears of proxy wars reminiscent of the Cold War. As regional countries began to take sides, one nation that managed to remain neutral and single-handedly shift the regional dynamics was Türkiye.
On 11 December, Türkiye announced that Ethiopia and Somalia had signed the Ankara Declaration, easing tensions between the two nations. The deal could serve as a safety valve, addressing two major issues in the region: the future of Ethiopia’s troops in Somalia and Somaliland’s push for international recognition as an independent country. The success of the agreement would also bolster Türkiye’s influence in the region.
Türkiye announced that Ethiopia and Somalia had signed the Ankara Declaration, easing tensions between the two nations.
It all started when Ethiopia announced its Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Somaliland on 1 January 2024. The repercussions of the deal sent shockwaves throughout the region and beyond. In this agreement, Ethiopia pledged to grant Somaliland its long-sought diplomatic recognition in exchange for commercial and military access to its port.
While the deal would provide landlocked Ethiopia access to the strategic Berbera port and the Red Sea, it also represented a direct challenge to Somalia’s sovereignty, as the Somali government considers Somaliland to be its integral part.
The Ethiopia-Somaliland deal and potential recognition of Somaliland would also benefit the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The UAE has invested US$300 million in expanding the Berbera port and its surrounding free trade zone, among other significant investments, and has provided aid to Somaliland. Additionally, the UAE is jointly developing the Berbera Corridor with Ethiopia, aiming to connect the landlocked Ethiopia to the port. In exchange for these contributions, Somaliland has agreed to allow the UAE to establish an air and naval base in Berbera.
The deal kept the region in a state of unease throughout the year, with numerous developments taking place, aimed at countering or overturning it. Immediately following the announcement, Somalia declared the deal null and void, threatening war if necessary to assert its sovereignty over Somaliland.
Meanwhile, Egypt, already in dispute with Ethiopia over the Nile water-sharing dispute and the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), decided to take action. It formed an anti-Ethiopia alliance with Somalia and Eritrea, which included a collective security framework. When the three countries met in Asmara on 10 October, it was clear that tensions were escalating, threatening to destabilize the entire region and potentially leading to a devastating war.
The UAE has invested US$300 million in expanding the Berbera port and its surrounding free trade zone, among other significant investments, and has provided aid to Somaliland.
News emerged in early December that Donald Trump’s incoming administration might recognize Somaliland, further intensifying the situation. For years, some Republican senators have been pushing for Somaliland’s independence from Somalia.
Notably, one of Trump’s final acts as president was to order the withdrawal of US troops from Somalia, a decision that was reversed by Biden in 2021. With Senate committee leaders also supporting the sovereignty of the breakaway region, the prospect of US recognition now seems increasingly likely.
With its historical ties to the United Kingdom as a former British protectorate, Somaliland could sense increased pressure on the UK if the Trump administration formally recognizes its independence. This move could open a Pandora’s Box, prompting other countries to follow suit. Somaliland recently held another free and fair election, followed by a peaceful transfer of power, strengthening its case for independence.
In response, China’s envoy to the Horn of Africa has pledged to support Somalia’s sovereign rights over Somaliland, serving as a countermeasure to growing possibilities of international recognition of Somaliland. Somaliland has a strong relationship with Taiwan.
The mutual de facto recognition between Taiwan and Somaliland irritates China, and China is thus promoting the cause of a united Somalia. The Chinese move, in turn, may eventually inspire India as a low-hanging fruit to counter China’s influence in the region. India may also consider following the US’ path to strengthen its existing ties with Somaliland.
The mutual de facto recognition between Taiwan and Somaliland irritates China, and China is thus promoting the cause of a united Somalia.
The success of the Ankara deal will go a long way in stabilizing the increasingly volatile Horn of Africa. Erdoğan has had long-standing relationships with both leaders and has made significant investments in Somalia since 2011. Türkiye has set up its largest overseas military base in the Somalian capital, Mogadishu, trained thousands of Somali soldiers, and managed Mogadishu’s airport and port while also providing substantial humanitarian and military assistance.
Meanwhile, Erdoğan’s decision to sell Turkish armed drones to Abiy in 2021 played a crucial role in tipping the balance of Ethiopia’s civil war in Abiy’s favor, shifting the momentum against the Tigray forces.
Although it’s still early, so far, the Ankara deal has managed to resolve two lurking disputes between the two countries. The agreement has created political space for Ethiopian troops to remain in Somalia and established a platform to negotiate for port access outside of the Somaliland MOU.
Under the Ankara Declaration, Somalia has agreed to lift its objection to Ethiopia’s participation in the upcoming African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). This peacekeeping mission will replace the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). Given its military experience in the region, Ethiopia’s military contribution would certainly bolster security efforts against jihadist groups in Somalia. This is significant also for Ethiopia, as its involvement in the mission will attract international support to subsidize its forces, helping it achieve its other strategic security objectives.
However, Ethiopia’s rapprochement with Somalia has raised questions about its previous agreement with Somaliland. Notwithstanding the exorbitant US$1.5 billion that Ethiopia pays Djibouti annually, it already has access to Djibouti’s commercial port. Therefore, Ethiopia may seek more from Somaliland, possibly a naval base. While a deal with Somalia could help Ethiopia secure access to the Red Sea, obtaining a naval base from the Somali government will be challenging.
The Biden administration has currently endorsed the Türkiye-brokered deal, asserting that it will reinforce cooperation based on mutual interests, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.
Additionally, if US President-elect Donald Trump recognizes Somaliland, given his history of transactional diplomacy, he is likely to seek a share of Somaliland’s 850-km coastline, in addition to its base in neighboring Djibouti. As a result, Ethiopia is strategically balancing its relationships with both Somalia and Somaliland, even if this approach appears precarious.
The Biden administration has currently endorsed the Türkiye-brokered deal, asserting that it will reinforce cooperation based on mutual interests, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. While it’s uncertain how Trump might respond, this agreement has already created a platform for two previously opposing leaders to discuss a mutually beneficial solution.
Given Türkiye’s strategic interests in both nations, Erdoğan will likely employ his diplomatic resources to ensure the deal’s success. For him, it’s more than Turkish investments; it’s a battle for influence over the Horn of Africa. At this point, it seems he has outmaneuvered all his rivals.
Samir Bhattacharya
