Seeking to replace Ethiopians with Egyptians is further evidence that politics, not security, currently comes first for the federal government of Somalia.
By the Somali Wire team
Exit stage left the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) and enter stage right the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). Last week, after successive delays, the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) met to agree on the structure of the new peacekeeping mission.
As widely anticipated, just under 12,000 personnel were approved, including a smaller civilian and policing component, to prevent a security vacuum from emerging following the ATMIS drawdown that will now be paused.
Significant questions remain, however, particularly surrounding the proposed introduction of Egyptian troops into the AU mission, whether less than 12,000 personnel will be sufficient to maintain territory against a strengthened Al-Shabaab, and who will fund AUSSOM.
The AUPSC has welcomed Egypt’s offer to deploy troops to Somalia for the first time in the 17-year AU deployment. Through bilateral security deals, Djibouti, Burundi, and Uganda have already pledged troops to the mission. Kenya will also likely continue its deployment in Jubaland, where it will enjoy a close relationship with the regional administration.
Rather than entirely withdrawing, the ATMIS draw-down is expected to be frozen in September, and troops will be rotated out or transferred into their new locales if applicable.
The approved Concept of Operations (CONOPS) stipulates that the mission will run until the end of 2029, with security responsibilities again being transferred to Somalia’s security forces.
In the meantime, AUSSOM troops are mandated to support offensive operations, protect civilians, and facilitate humanitarian access, among other tasks. In reality, it will likely be up to the respective troop-contributing countries to decide how far their forces will be exposed to risk.
Funding remains a concern, though, with the EU’s budget already approved for the coming months. It has been reported that Qatar and Turkey may step in to provide some financial support but are unlikely to cover the hefty price tag fully.
While it is unclear how many Egyptian soldiers will be deployed, it marks a considerable deepening of the Cairo-Mogadishu relationship, with the former having seized upon the deteriorated relations between Ethiopia and Somalia in 2024.
Senior Egyptian officials have taken repeat opportunities to reaffirm Cairo’s support for Somalia’s “sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity” and chastise Ethiopian ‘aggression.’ In January, it withdrew from another round of talks over the use of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), which Egypt perceives as a threat to its existence due to its use of the Nile waters.
Direct flights from Cairo to Mogadishu have been launched, and Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has traveled to Egypt to cement the new bilateral defense pact.
For Cairo and Mogadishu, deploying Egyptian troops to Somalia is a deliberate snub to Addis, albeit for different reasons. Amid the continuing fallout over the Ethiopia-Somaliland Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), Somalia’s federal government has insisted that Ethiopian troops play no part in AUSSOM and that all must withdraw from the country by year’s end– unless they withdraw from the sea access deal.
Seeking to replace Ethiopian troops with their geostrategic opponents will inevitably raise the diplomatic temperature between Addis and Mogadishu as Turkey attempts to soothe tensions between the neighbors.
It is not the case of replacing ‘like-for-like,’ however. Much of the lengthy Ethiopian border with Somalia is hostile terrain and awash with Al-Shabaab, particularly on its south-eastern side.
The difficulties of deploying troops to these areas are immense, as witnessed by the use of hundreds of Ethiopian troops to extract 500 of their comrades earlier this year. New gaps are expected to spring up with the ATMIS to AUSSOM transition with the reduction of sectors from five to four, particularly in Lower and Middle Shabelle.
In South West State, where Ethiopian troops play a particularly crucial role in securing, the years-long relationships with communities like the Leysan and with the regional administration cannot be easily replicated by the Egyptians or other troop-contributing countries.
The timing of President Hassan Sheikh’s visit to Cairo this week amid the two-day indirect Somalia-Ethiopia talks in Ankara was also conspicuous. Mixed messages continue to emerge about the Ankara talks, with some positive noises emerging from the Somali camp, including State Foreign Minister Ali Omar, who said that “positive strides” had been made in “overcoming the challenges stemming from the illegal Ethiopian MoU.”
Others, however, have insisted that Addis remains committed to achieving sea access and is unlikely to withdraw from the agreement without significant inducements offered by Somalia and Turkey. The sidelining of Somalia is generating significant alarm in Hargeisa, with President Muse Bihi questioning Turkey’s neutrality in recent days. Ethiopian and Somali officials are expected to meet again in early September.
While the AUSSOM force is, of course, a critical component of limiting the gains of an encroaching Al-Shabaab, it is not the most important. There is no clearer evidence that Somalia’s security forces remain woefully unable to secure the country that the AU has felt compelled to extend ATMIS by another name.
The Somali National Army remains beset by ineffective leadership and command-and-control, logistical problems, and corruption. And with coordinated and comprehensive military operations still nowhere on the horizon and Al-Shabaab consolidating its influence, the move from ATMIS to AUSSOM could generate further churn that the country can ill afford.
Security sector reform is essential, but this requires significant political capital that the federal government is burning through to pursue its dubious electoral agenda.
Rather than negotiating the necessary political and clan support for securing the country and investing in the federated security architecture, the federal government’s attention is trained on the MoU and electoral reform.
Seeking to replace Ethiopian troops with Egyptian troops is further evidence that politics, not security, currently comes first for the federal government.
Sahan Research, The Somali Wire, Issue No. 718 | August 14, 2024
