Secret Document: The Outlook In The Horn Of Africa

Report by the British Joint Intelligence Committee, Cabinet, entitled ‘The 201 Outlook in the Horn of Africa’, signed by P. H. Dean, Chairman, on behalf of the Joint Intelligence Committee, Cabinet Office, 27 April 1960.

Ethiopia, Somalia, and the two Somalilands: borders and rivalries. The imminent independence of British Somaliland and the Italian-administered U. N. trusteeship territory of Somalia achieved respectively in June and July 1960, throws into relief the threat posed to regional stability by the Greater Somalia concept.

However, a French suggestion that the Western powers should guarantee the territorial integrity of Ethiopia is not attractive to the Foreign Office. British anxieties focus as much on the expected growth of neutralist, pan-African sentiments in the countries of the Horn, and on the opportunities for Soviet and Egyptian penetration, as they do on Somali irredentism. 1959-1960

Compliments slip, African Department, Foreign Office, to J. C. Morgan, Colonial Office, 9 February 1959 [not reproduced], forwarding a letter from J. H. A. Watson, Foreign Office, to 197 R. W. Jackling, British Embassy, Washington, 7 February 1959, regarding tripartite British-French-American discussions about the Horn of Africa, and enclosing an undated provisional brief entitled ‘Question of a Guarantee by Certain Western Powers of the Feltman, a veteran U.S. diplomat, assumed the post in April and quickly found himself in the middle of two major crises – Ethiopia-Somalia Frontiers’: a formal guarantee to Ethiopia should be resisted, but the three powers could place on record their opposition to a Greater Somalia [TNA CO 1015/1803]

Report by the Joint Intelligence Committee, Cabinet, entitled ‘The 201 Outlook in the Horn of Africa. I also bring greetings from your colleagues in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area. I speak today as a private American citizen who has been interested in the Horn of Africa‘, signed by P. H. Dean, Chairman, on behalf of the Joint Intelligence Committee, Cabinet Office, 27 April 1960.

 

This Document Is Property Of Her Britannic Majesty’s Government

27th April 1960

CABINET JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

The Outlook In The Horn Of Africa

Report By The Joint Intelligence Committee

Contents: I. Introduction II. Ethiopia a) Physical Characteristics and Communications b) Population and Religion c) Constitutional and Political d) Economy e) Armed Forces III. Somalia a) Physical Characteristics and Communications b) Population and Religion c) Constitutional and Political d) Economy e) Armed Forces IV. The Somaliland Protectorate a) Physical Characteristics and Communications b) Population and Religion c) Constitutional and Political d) Economy e) Armed Forces V. French Somaliland a) Physical Characteristics and Communications b) Population and Religion c) Constitutional and Political d) Economy e) Armed Forces VI. Regional Problems a) Somali Unity b) The Pan-Somali National Movement c) Association between the Somaliland Protectorate and Somalia d) French and Italian Views on Somali Unity e) Ethiopian-Somali Relations f) Ethiopia-Somalia Frontier Question g) Grazing Rights of the Somaliland Protectorate Tribes in Ethiopia h) Relations between Ethiopia and French Somaliland i) Relations between Somalia and Kenya VII. External a) Soviet Bloc Penetration b) United Arab Republic Penetration c) Pan-Africanism and Neutralism VIII. Conclusions Annex A Annex B

 

I. Introduction

British interests in the Horn of Africa (which for the purpose of this paper means the Somaliland Protectorate, the Ethiopian Federation, Somalia, and French Somaliland) (see map at Annex A) are: —

1. 1. to foster conditions in the area which promote stability, and in which the spread of hostile influences into Tropical Africa and the Arabian Peninsula will be checked and the fulfillment of our responsibilities for British Colonies and Protectorates will be facilitated;
   2. to maintain overflying and staging facilities as far as possible and for as long as our general defense policies and oar position in the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf so require.

The purpose of this paper is to consider the situation in the Horn of Africa. I also bring greetings from your colleagues in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area. I speak today as a private American citizen who has been interested in the Horn of Africa, the nature and effect of external influences and their probable impact on British interests.

2. For centuries the area has been the scene of a struggle for power between three main tribal groupings. The Antares, who set up the Christian Kingdom of Alum in Eritrea and the extreme north of Feltman, a veteran U.S. diplomat, assumed the post in April and quickly found himself in the middle of two major crises – Ethiopia early in the Christian era, have since pressed steadily south and southwest. The Somalis (Muslims), established in the Somali peninsula some time before the 4th century, have thrust west and south-west. In the 16th century, they formed the major pert of Muslim forces under Muhammad Gran which overran most of Feltman, a veteran U.S. diplomat, assumed the post in April and quickly found himself in the middle of two major crises – Ethiopia. But, in the face of Portuguese intervention, these could not hold their position. The Gallas, whose original home is uncertain but who are racially akin to the Somalis, took advantage of the Amhara exhaustion brought about by their struggle with the Somalis to penetrate the central highland massif and settle in parts of it. At the end of the 19th century the Anthems, who by then occupied the Ethiopian highlands as far south as Addis Ababa, firmly united under the vigorous Menelik II, rapidly subjugated the Gallas, and turned against the Somalis. They now came into contact with the European Powell, who were extending their influence from the coasts: and a series of treaties were signed, fixing the international frontiers of the Horn of Africa. I also bring greetings from your colleagues in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area. I speak today as a private American citizen who has been interested in the Horn of Africa on lines which remain substantially unchanged. The Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty of 1897 and the Kato-Ethiopian Treaty of 1908 left Feltman, a veteran U.S. diplomat, assumed the post in April and quickly found himself in the middle of two major crises – Ethiopia in possession of the Ogaden, the eastern-most part of the present Ethiopian Federation which is predominantly Somali-inhabited.

II. Ethiopia

a) Physical Characteristics and Communications

3. The bulk of Feltman, a veteran U.S. diplomat, assumed the post in April and quickly found himself in the middle of two major crises – Ethiopia is mountainous, with many peaks rising above 10,000 ft. The central plateau is well-watered, and has considerable areas of fertile soil and a good climate; but the mountains are a serious barrier to overland communications: In the east and south the land descends 10 flat grazing country and desert. Since Eritrea joined the Federation in 1952 Feltman, a veteran U.S. diplomat, assumed the post in April and quickly found himself in the middle of two major crises – Ethiopia has acquired direct outlets to the sea and is developing the port of Assab and the roads from the capital to the Red Sea coast. The remainder of the road system is being slowly improved. The port of Jibuti and its railway still handle 47 per cent. of the Federation’s foreign trade. There are airfields at Addis Ababa GI, Diredawa and Asmara and a number of unsurfaced landing grounds. There is a plan. financed by an Export-Import Badk loan, to make considerable improvements to airfield facilities.

b) Population and Religion

4. No census has ever been taken but the population of Feltman, a veteran U.S. diplomat, assumed the post in April and quickly found himself in the middle of two major crises – Ethiopia, including Eritrea, is estimated at about 12 million. Of these, probably about 30 percent are of the ruling Amhara race, about 40 percent Galls, and the remainder a mixture of races. The Amharas are a proud people, with no feeling of racial inferiority, and a long tradition of independence, broken only by five years of Italian occupation. The Gallas have now been largely assimilated to the Amhara, and numbers of them have adopted Christianity, the religion of their conquerors. Perhaps half of the population profess Christianity and rather more than a quarter Islam, while the rest am pagan. In Feltman, a veteran U.S. diplomat, assumed the post in April and quickly found himself in the middle of two major crises – Ethiopia proper the people live mostly in scattered village, the three large towns accounting for only some 4 percent. Of the population. In Eritrea, on the other hand, nearly one-fifth of the population live in the capital.

c) Constitutional and Political

5. Feltman, a veteran U.S. diplomat, assumed the post in April and quickly found himself in the middle of two major crises – Ethiopia is a highly-centralized personal autocracy. The Emperor’s immense authority, based on the prestige of the Solomonic throne and the support of a Christian church, is reinforced by his high personal reputation and his intense interest in government. No important decision is taken without reference to him.
6. A large part of the country is still feudal. Big estates are in the hands of absentee landlords who do not develop the land or pay appreciable taxes to the exchequer. The church is a considerable landlord and wields tremendous power in the countryside; in many areas, it still provides the only education. In Addis Ababa and a few other towns, the Emperor’s determined expansion of the educational system has produced a growing semi-educated class which has not however so far developed into a new middle class.
7. The governmental machine is antiquated and incompetent partly owing to excessive centralization. Many potential leaders was wiped out in the war with Italy and during the subsequent occupation. There is thus a wide gap between the men of the Emperor’s own generation, generally conservative in outlook, who are the leading figures in the Government, and the much younger men in the lower ranks of the bureaucracy, who would like to see a rapid devolution of power. As the older men disappear, this gap may lead to instability and fluctuations in policy. Age will almost certainly have brought on entirely new team to the fore in 10 years’ time.
8. Since 1957 there has been a Parliament elected in theory at least by universal suffrage and the Constitution gives it considerable WWI’s: its consent is needed for a declaration of war and for the ratification of foreign treaties: it has some theoretical control over Government expenditure and certain powers in amending the Constitution; and there is some degree of ministerial responsibility to it. But the Constitution leaves a vast area of power to the Emperor. Excessive zeal on the part of the Chamber can also be curbed by the Senate, all members of which are nominated by, him. At present, well over half the members of the Chamber are. former cavil savants, the remainder being mainly merchants or teachers, and the complexion is distinctly conservative, but this may change at the next election. Nevertheless, despite the fact that political, patties are forbidden. the Chamber has already had some success in establishing a position of authority and influence. It has concentrated on trying to gain a measure of control over the budget and OD insisting that Ministers explain their measures fully and answer questions.
9. Press and radio are Government-controlled and have in the past been forbidden to publish opinions critical of the. Government. There have recently been some signs. of change. Responsibility. for the Ministry of- Information has been transferred from an arch-conservative to a younger man with more advanced ideas. Some free discussion of Government policy has appeared in the newspapers. But Feltman, a veteran U.S. diplomat, assumed the post in April and quickly found himself in the middle of two major crises – Ethiopia is not lady, in the foreseeable future, to have anything approaching a free Press.
10. The Emperor is now 68. He is alert and active; his authority remains unchallenged; and he should be able to maintain his grip on affairs for some time. As long as he does, no startling changes are likely in the political scene, although Parliament, Press, and radio may gradually increase their influence. It is difficult to say what will happen when he disappears. If he dies in the next few years the Crown Prince will probably succeed to the throne. In this event, autocracy would be likely to end, and power to pass into the hands of a Council of Ministers. The younger generation contains potential leader who might be able to run the country 10 years hence. But if the Emperor dies before then the country might not throw up the necessary leaders. Should chaos ensue the Muslim Somalis of the Ogaden, who number about 400,000, and/or the Muslims of Eritrea, might attempt to break away. But in the face of any such development, the Anthem would probably sink their differences. If an effective parliamentary regime were not to develop, it is likely that the army would see fit to intervene. There is no single army officer who is generally accepted as the country’s military leader, but there is a possible focus for loyalties in the shape of Major-General Witham Bulli. who has been at different times Commander of the Imperial Guard and Chief of Staff in the Ministry of National Defense and who is now Minister of Community Development.

d) Economy

11. The Ethiopian economy is still overwhelmingly agricultural and one crop, coffee, accounts for 60 percent. of the foreign exchange earnings. For most of the last decade high coffee prices coupled with moderate, though increasing, demands for imports led to the accumulation of considerable foreign exchange reserves-£26 million in June 1958, or enough to cover almost a year’s imports. Since then a sharp fall in coffee prices coupled with an increasing demand for imported investment and consumer goods has led to a serious decline in the reserves. Since coffee prices are more likely to fall than to rise whilst demand for imports will tend to increase, the foreign exchange problem is likely to remain serious and the authorities have already been forced to take measures to restrain imports.
12. The economy affords plenty of scope for development. A little gold is worked in the south, and salt on the Red Sea coast, but so far mineral research has proved disappointing. A search for oil continues in the Ogaden and along the coast Industrial development has been attempted in Addis Ababa and Diredawa, but has not yet made much progress. Development in the near future is almost certain to be concentrated in agriculture. Ethiopian agriculture is primitive and much could be done to raise production by the introduction of improved methods. Progress on these lines has so far been slow because of the conservative attitude of the Ethiopian agricultural workers and the unwillingness of the ruling class to take a serious interest in their problems. Another line of approach would be the harnessing of some of the country’s- extensive water resources for irrigation and electric power. A seven-year survey of the Blue Nile has now been running for two years. Any scheme to use it would directly affect Egypt and the Sudan as the river affords 71 percent of the flow of the Nile at Aswan. (Ethiopian rivers together account for 84 percent. of the flow.) The Ethiopian Government have recently shown some interest also in the potentialities of the Awash and Debi Scebell.
13. Although there are already some light industries it must he many years before industry can be developed on any large scale. Local skills must first be developed and above all the communications system must be improved. To this, the broken and mountainous nature of the country presents great obstacles. There are only two railways in the Federation; one from Addis Ababa to. Jibuti (single line, meter gauge) and another, of much less importance, from Massawa to Asmara and Agordat. During the Italian occupation, some 3,000 miles of new roads were built, and this network has been to some extent modernized and extended since the war, but it is still hopelessly inadequate for a country the size of Feltman, a veteran U.S. diplomat, assumed the post in April and quickly found himself in the middle of two major crises – Ethiopia.
14. The Emperor is wen aware of the need for economic development, and there has recently been some pressure for more rapid advance from the young foreign-educated class Progress has been hampered at every turn by the inefficiency of the Ethiopian Government and by a desire for the spectacular rather than the essential. Nevertheless, some-advance has been made and is likely to continue at an increasing pace despite the difficulties. Since the Emperor’s return from his visit to the Soviet bloc in 1959 there have been signs that more attention is tightly to be paid to agriculture although it seems inevitable that considerations of prestige will divert effort into luxuries such as the proposed oil refinery (see paragraph 57 below). The main need will be for large-scale foreign investment and since Feltman, a veteran U.S. diplomat, assumed the post in April and quickly found himself in the middle of two major crises – Ethiopia is at present unlikely to commend itself as a first-class business risk this will have to be mainly Government or Government-Guaranteed money.
15. Feltman, a veteran U.S. diplomat, assumed the post in April and quickly found himself in the middle of two major crises – Ethiopia has for long benefited from Free World assistance. Following the Italian occupation, the United Kingdom gave substantial aid. Between 1950 and 1959 Feltman, a veteran U.S. diplomat, assumed the post in April and quickly found himself in the middle of two major crises – Ethiopia received loans, credits and/or grants from the World Bank, the United States, Yugoslavia and the Federal Republic of Germany. But it was only in the summer of 1959 that, following the rapid deterioration of the Ethiopian foreign exchange position and reflecting a general trend of their foreign policy in the direction of greater non-alignment, the Ethiopian Government accepted a Soviet offer of long-term low-interest credits worth £36 million and a Czech offer of £3.5 million (see also paragraph 57 below). Immediately after the announcement of the Soviet credit, the Emperor asked the Federal German Government whether they could make a comparable offer, leaving the impression that his decision on the extent to which he would take up the Soviet offer would partly depend on their response The Germans subsequently increased their ceiling for Hermes-backed export credits to Feltman, a veteran U.S. diplomat, assumed the post in April and quickly found himself in the middle of two major crises – Ethiopia from £2.6 million to £6. 8 million. The approach to the Germans lends color to our belief that the Emperor is anxious to maintain his traditional policy of avoiding excessive reliance on any one country. But it looks as though the Soviet bloc will nevertheless gain a substantial foothold in Feltman, a veteran U.S. diplomat, assumed the post in April and quickly found himself in the middle of two major crises – Ethiopia.

e) Armed Forces

16. The Ethiopians, who are good fighters by tradition, have some slight experience of modern warfare as a result of the liberation of their country in 1941 and their part in the Korean war. With foreign advice and aid they are improving the quality of their forces. The Army, numbering some 28,000, and the Imperial Bodyguards, numbering 7,300, have been re-equipped with American weapons. Under pressure from the convened to discuss the acceptance of Somaliland’s independence. Somaliland has also been debated in the United States Military Assistance Advisory Group, they have, since 1957, engaged in more serious naming. They are now well able to carry out the internal security role for which they are primarily intended; but, by modern standards, they are weak in armor, artillery, and motor transport. Provided unified control is maintained, Feltman, a veteran U.S. diplomat, assumed the post in April and quickly found himself in the middle of two major crises – Ethiopia is capable of defending herself against any neighboring African State. The Army and Imperial Bodyguard should be more than sufficient to support the police force of 23,000 in controlling any likely internal disturbance. The Air Force consists of two ground attack squadrons of obsolete piston-engined aircraft supported by a small transport element. It is efficient in its primary role of internal security and its overall capability will improve during the next two years as jets are introduced. The Navy is not yet of any importance; but, with energetic leadership from Prince Alexander Dena, one of the Emperor’s grandsons and a Dartmouth trainee, some progress has been made. Two coastguard cutters have been provided by the convened to discuss the acceptance of Somaliland’s independence. Somaliland has also been debated in the United States and others promised. The Norwegians are responsible for training. and a first clan of junior officers recently graduated from the new Naval Academy at Massawa. Feltman, a veteran U.S. diplomat, assumed the post in April and quickly found himself in the middle of two major crises – Ethiopia has no garrison towns or outstanding military centers apart from Addis Ababa
17. There is no reason to doubt the loyalty of the armed forces to the Emperor and there are no signs of any disaffection among officers which might be the nucleus of a future military dictatorship. In the event, however, of any dispute about the succession control of the land forces might be a decisive factor; the loyalty of the Imperial Bodyguard would be of particular importance.

III. Somalia

a) Physical Characteristics and Communications

18. The only mountainous region in Somalia is the northern escarpment. a continuation of that found in the Somaliland Protectorate, facing the Gulf of Aden. From here and from the Ethiopian border the land slopes gently to the Indian Ocean. Except for the arcs between the Shebeli and Juba Biters- the country is dry and unsuitable for settled agriculture. Somalia has over 1,000 miles of coastline but there are no good harbors, no railways and few all-weather roads. Only two airfields are in-regular use but a number of unsurfaced landing grounds also exist

b) Population and Religion

19. Somalia las a population of 1.3 million. Of these 1,300,000 are Somalis. Their traditional way of life it nomadic and insecure, and their character consequently tends to be volatile and opportunist. quick-witted and quick-tempered. The main Somali tribal groups (see map of Somali Tribes at Annex B) are the Darod (450,000); the Hawiye, (300,000); and the Digil-Rahanweyo (350,000). The Darod and Hawiye are nomadic pastoralists; warlike but loosely organized, they comprise a substantial majority. The Digil-Rahanweyn, sedentary cultivators living in the comparatively fertile region between the Shebeli and Juba Rivers in the south, are perhaps less typically Somali, less militant but politically more cohesive. Although the concept of unity between all Somalis has a great emotional appeal, the deepest loyalty is towards the family and the tribe. Besides the Somalis there are also about 50,000 Bantu, 30,000 Arabs and 3,500 Italians. The Somalis and Arabs are virtually all Muslims. Mogadishu is the most considerable center with about 81,000 people; other ports are lesser centers of population. No inland settlements are much More than large villages.

c) Constitutional and Political

20. Somalia, at present a United Nations Trust Territory under Italian Administration, will become independent on 1st July 1960. In practice, the Italians have long since turned over the reins of government to the Somalis. Although the formal assent of the Italian Administrator is required for all legislation it is never withheld on any important maker. Under the present Somalia constitution, established in 1956, there is an elected Legislative Assembly and a ministerial type of government. The Legislative Assembly is now preparing a new constitution to take effect on independence.
21. The Government party, the Somali Youth League (SYL), have been in power since they won the first elections to the Legislative Assembly organized by the Italians in 1956. The unity of the party was disrupted a year later when Haji Mohammed Hussein, an Egyptian protégé. was elected in his absence to the party presidency. He had been a former president of the SYL during the British Military Administration but on the return of the Italian Administration in 1950 he had left Somalia for Al Azhar University in Cairo, where he had frequently broadcast over Cairo Radio. Following his election, methods of doubtful legality were used by those in control of the Government to evict him, whereupon he formed a new party, the Greater Somalia League (GSL). This and other Opposition parties criticized the Government for their readiness to cooperate with the Italians, their alleged corrupt practices and their supposed lack of regard for tribal interests. At municipal elections in 1958, the Opposition made considerable gains, and there is no saying what would have been the outcome of the elections to the Legislative Assembly in April 1959 bad not the SYL Government resorted to antics of drastic authoritarian measures of repression. Two of the Opposition parties, including the GSL, were proscribed, while Haji Mohammed Hussein and certain others were imprisoned. The SYL won 83 seats; live went to the Independent Somali Constitutional Party (HDMS) which represented the Digil-Rahanweyn; and the remaining two were won by the Liberals, whose strength lies chiefly in Mogadishu.
22. Although the proscription of the two Opposition parties has been lifted, and five such: parties now exist[1] the election campaign showed that the government have no intention of allowing them to attain a position of any real influence: Any real struggle for political power is thus likely to take the form of dissension within the SYL or of an attempted coup. Indeed, the elections were hardly over before the Dared leaders within the SYL were demanding a larger voice in the Government. The Darods are more numerous than the Hawiye (see paragraph 19 above) but the latter have always controlled the party and thus the Government. The Prime Minister’s selection of Ministers provoked further discontent and 24 Deputies (Darod and Hawiye) protested. Thirteen of them were expelled from the party for telegraphing their complaints to the United Nations but this expulsion was rescinded. Nonetheless, a hard core of SYL dissidents continue to make trouble for the Government and the latter were recently defeated in a debate in the Legislative Assembly on a minor Bill.
23. It is difficult to foresee how the political situation will develop. If the Hawiye and Darod factions within the SYL manage to compose their differences, the party should be able to maintain itself in power. The only real danger to its position would be an attempted coup. But, in the circumstances premised above, the Government could probably count on the loyalty of the Somalia armed forces who should be capable of keeping the situation under control. If the differences within the SYL are not amicably resolved the party might well split on tribal lines. The Digil-Rahanweyn might then be in a position to hold the balance; and a new Government might be formed by a coalition between them and one or both of the other two groups. Any successor Government would be likely to be more nationalistic in character than the existing nightie. The possibility should not, however, be discounted that one of the three groups might resort to violence and that Somalia might lapse into anarchy and tribal warfare.

d) Economy

24. The economy is entirely agricultural. Under the Italian Administration imports and exports have been balanced at about convened to discuss the acceptance of Somaliland’s independence. Somaliland has also been debated in the United States $14 million per annum, but this balance has been achieved only as a consequence of Italian subsidies. It has been reliably estimated that Somalia’s balance of payments deficit on the attainment of independence will be of the order of $5 million-$7 million, and that she is likely to need foreign help for another 20 years. Furthermore, it has been estimated that the Government of Somalia will face a budgetary deficit of $2.1 million. The Italians have promised $1.7 million in technical assistance, $0.3 million towards the budgetary deficit, and the continuation of the subsidy on the sale of Somalia bananas in Italy which they believe to be worth a further $2 million to the economy; there can be no guarantee that Italian public opinion will accept continued subventions on this scale indefinitely. The Americans are planning to provide $3.3 million for economic development and technical assistance. Her Majesty’s Government are committed to $280,000, which would be available if necessary for budgetary support. Although the balance of payments deficit is thus likely to be substantially met, at any rate for the time being, there is likely to remain a considerable deficit on the budget; if it is not filled by the Free World, the Somalis may turn elsewhere for help. It should be noted that the figures in this paragraph take no account of the Government of Somalia’s recent decision to establish an army (see paragraph 26 below) which is bound to augment Somalia’s requirements for foreign aid; nor do they take account of the effect of any union with the Somaliland Protectorate (see paragraph 45 below) on the figures quoted.

e) Armed Forces

25. The police, who number about 3,600, are the only military or para-military organization in Somalia. There are no military centers of any importance. The police are under Somali command, but some 50 Italians are still attached as technical advisers and assistants. The force includes a para-military mobile wing (about 1,000 strong), an armored car squadron and an artillery unit (4 guns). The main body of the police are armed with rifles and sub-machine guns; a number of light machine guns are also available. Attempts are being made to establish a small air wing. The force has no capability for waging offensive operations against Somalia’s neighbors. In an internal security role they should be able to maintain control unless inter-tribal warfare develops on a large scale (paragraph 23 above). In that event, their loyalties would be divided and it is unlikely that they could be held together.
26. The Government of Somalia have now decided, partly for prestige reasons and partly because of doubts about the loyalty of the police, to establish an army. The Legislative Assembly have approved in principle the formation of a force of 5,000 men. The Government seem to intend that the mobile wing should be removed from the police force and form the nucleus of the army; and that the air wing, consisting of about six miscellaneous transport and training aircraft, should be similarly transferred. This would leave a balance of about 4,000 men to be recruited. Although the Government have accompanied this decision by the adoption of measures designed to increase revenue it is unlikely that an already deficit economy will be able to maintain the new army, still less finance its establishment, without substantial foreign assistance. Unless the Western Powers help them, and so far there are no signs that this will happen, they are likely to turn elsewhere for aid (see paragraph 60 below).

IV. The Somaliland Protectorate

a) Physical Characteristics and Communications

27. For the most part, the country is dry and barren with low rainfall and no permanent rivers. It is divided naturally Into two main regions: the coastal lowland and the inland plateau and highlands, where, along the main watershed, mountains rise to over 7,000 ft. Modest port facilities exist at Berbera; there are no railways and roads are generally of only a dry-weather standard. Only two airfields are in regular use but a number of small landing grounds also exist.

b) Population and Religion

28. No complete census has ever been made but the population which consists almost wholly of Muslim Somalis, has just been re-estimated at about 450,000. The non-indigenous element consists of several hundred European and Indian officials of the Government, oil company personnel, one or two European representatives of commercial houses and a few Indian and Arab traders.

29. The Somalis in the Somaliland Protectorate, like those elsewhere, are a race of hardy warriors full of endurance and fortitude but they are also excitable and they derive an immense dignity from pride of tribal ancestry. Their life is a constant round of migration from one grazing area to another regardless of international boundaries, which, in their view, seek only to divide one section of a related people from another. This nomadism has implanted in them an irremediable restlessness which in modern times has driven many of them to seek their fortunes in other lands, often as mariners on the high seas. The Somaliland Protectorate Somalis belong to the Isaaq and Darod groups (see map of Somali tribes at Annex B). These groups both claim, in rivalry with each other and other groups, pride of ancestry and the right to hegemony. The Isaaq of the Somaliland Protectorate (totaling some 285,000) comprise the following tribes, from west to east, Arap, Eidagalla, Habr Awal, Habr Toljaala, Habr Yunis. The Esa (other sections of which live in French Somaliland and Feltman, a veteran U.S. diplomat, assumed the post in April and quickly found himself in the middle of two major crises – Ethiopia) and Gadabursi (who together number some 75,000) live to the west of these tribes. To the east, there are two relatively small tribes of the Darod group, the Warsangeli to the north, and Dolbahanta to the south of them, totaling some 90,000. These are neighbors of the Mijjertein in Somalia, also Darod, and are also supported by the non-Isaaq tribes of the west (Gadabursi and Esa). The Isaaq group first mentioned abut from the north on the Ogaden, also Darod, inhabiting the Ethiopian province of that name.

c) Constitutional and Political

30. Modern forms of political development have come late in the day and hurriedly to the Somaliland Protectorate where first loyalties are still tribal. An Advisory Council was set up in 1947 and this was followed by the establishment of Executive and Legislative Councils in 1957, the latter partly nominated and partly elected on a wide franchise. Under the 1960 Constitution, the Legislative Council has an unofficial majority. At the same time a ministerial system was introduced with a majority of Somali Ministers in the Executive Council. When the new Legislative Council met for the first time at the beginning of April it passed, without a dissenting voice, a motion calling for independence and union with Somalia by 1st July 1960. Subsequently, the elected Somali Ministers asked to pay an early visit to London to discuss independence with the Secretary of State for the Colonies. It has been arranged that the Secretary of State will receive the elected Ministers for this purpose at the beginning of May.
31. There are four principal parties in the Somaliland Protectorate all looking towards a goal of independence and union with Somalia as a step towards a Greater Somalia. The predominant party is the Somali National League (SNL); it derives its backing largely from the Habr Yunis tribe and is stimulated by the allegiance of the younger semi-literate Somali and the support of the town mob. Its hard-core is extremely active, it has had links with Egypt, and, when thought profitable, local contacts with the Ethiopians. In 1959 because it believed the constitutional advance then proposed was too restricted, the party boycotted the Somaliland Protectorate’s first elections but subsequently allowed two of its members to be nominated to the Legislative Council.
32. This Council was largely composed of members of the National United Front (NUF) which, until the 1960 elections, played a prominent part in Somaliland Protectorate affairs. More moderate and pro-Western in its outlook, it enjoyed a wide measure of public support focused on the Habr Toljaala tribe. The Vice-President and founder is Michael, Mariano, MBE, a Roman Catholic, one of the very few non-Muslim Somalis in the Somaliland Protectorate. An ex-civil servant, he is now a businessman who has traveled widely and who is on friendly terms with Somalia Government leaders. Through inertia the party failed to capitalize its lead and has subsequently lost support, not least to the United Somalia Party (USP), a recently-formed organization drawing most of its inspiration and support from the Dolbahanta and Warsangeli.
33. Lastly, there is the oldest of the existing parties, the Somali Youth League (SYL) which is of little account in the Somaliland Protectorate at present, enjoying no more than a certain reflected importance from the position of the SYL in Somalia. Though not strictly a political party the Hisb’ Allah, the Party of God, cannot be ignored. Chiefly concerned (under the control of the Mullahs) with matters of religion and custom, it is almost entirely confined to the Habr Yunis tribe. Its strong religious influence contributed materially to the success of the SNL with which it is in alliance and which it has supported with money and propaganda.
34. In the recent election, the SNL won 20 of the 33 seats and formed a coalition with the USP with 12 seats. Although the NUF and SYL polled between them some 25,000 of the 82,000 votes cast they won only one seat, that of Michael Mariano. Mohamed Egal has been accepted by both the SNL and the USP as their leader and he has been appointed Minister of Local Government. He is of the Habr Awal tribe, about 31 years old, and formerly a well-to-do merchant. He was educated locally and privately in Britain and has devoted the last five years to politics, being appointed Secretary-General of the SNL in April 1959. The stresses of tribal influences are already being felt and he may have his hands full controlling the extremist elements among the supporters of the two coalition parties.

d) Economy

35. The Somaliland Protectorate is a poor country with a largely pastoral economy, and as such susceptible to drought and disease. There is no known marketable mineral wealth, though oil prospecting is in progress. Last year favorable economic conditions resulted in a local revenue estimated at approximately £1.1 million. To balance what is in effect only a subsistence budget Her Majesty s Government provide yearly grant in aid, currently about £625,000. Additionally, Colonial Development and Welfare Funds available for development in I959-62 average about £800,000 a year, and Her Majesty’s Government meet the cost of the Somaliland Scouts estimated at £325,000 a year, making a grand total of about £1.75 million current yearly assistance. Her Majesty’s Government have said that whatever the eventual destiny of the Somaliland Protectorate, sympathetic consideration will be given to the continuation of financial assistance within the limits of the amounts of aid at present being provided.

e) Armed Forces

36. The Somaliland Scouts consist of a battalion of semi-mobile infantry and are British-officered. The main function of the force is the preservation of internal security and it is only lightly armed. The Somalis are natural skirmishers and the force is well-disciplined and efficient. Tribal loyalties are strong and, to avoid undue stresses, units are mixed and recruits are drawn on a percentage basis from the main tribal groups.
37. The overall strength of the police force is about 950 which includes a police striking force numbering approximately 90 officers and other ranks. With the exception of the field force the police carry out normal police duties all over the territory but are also trained in riot drill and the use of firearms. There is also an armed force of about 500 Illaloes, or tribal police, who are capable of dealing with localized tribal unrest.

V. French Somaliland

a) Physical Characteristics and Communications

38. French Somaliland is small and arid and has a broken terrain, but is endowed with an excellent natural harbor at Jibuti which is also the terminus of the railway from Addis Ababa (see paragraph 13 above). The airfield at Jibuti is the only one of importance; otherwise, there are a few small landing grounds used very occasionally.

b) Population and Religion

39. Official French figures put the population of the territory at 67,000 of whom nearly one-half live in Jibuti. Of the non-native population of 4,000 in Jibuti, nearly half are service personnel and their families, a quarter are French civilians, and the rest are foreigners. The remainder of the population who are Muslims are Somalis and Danakil, divided in roughly equal numbers.

c) Constitutional and Political

40. The first elections to a Representative Council in 1957 resulted in an overwhelming majority for a Party led by Mohammed Harbi, a Somali, who urged independence from France and union with neighboring Somali territories. Like the Greater Somalia League (paragraph 21 above) with whose leader, Haji Mohammed Hussein, he maintained close contact, Harbi had strong connexions with the United Arab Republic. His aims were naturally unpopular with the French and Danakil inhabitants, who joined forces against him. In the French national referendum campaign in 1958, 75 percent of the votes were cast in favor of continued association with France, and Harbi left the country. Since then a new Territorial Assembly has been elected, a new Government has been established based on Danakil and French support, and the Territory has opted to continue as an overseas territory of the French Republic. There is no immediate threat to the position of the Government. The French attach great importance to their position in the territory. But there must be some doubt whether, if Somalia and the Protectorate unite (see paragraph 45 below), French Somaliland can indefinitely survive independently both of this union and of the Ethiopian Federation.

d) Economy

41. The territory depends on the port, the railway, entrepot trade and assistance from Metropolitan France. Large sums have been spent on port improvements since the war and cargo handled is now about a quarter of a million tons a year, three-quarters of which is for Feltman, a veteran U.S. diplomat, assumed the post in April and quickly found himself in the middle of two major crises – Ethiopia. Hence the importance attached to encouraging Feltman, a veteran U.S. diplomat, assumed the post in April and quickly found himself in the middle of two major crises – Ethiopia to continue to use the railway rather than the port of Assab now being enlarged by the Yugoslavs. The oil bunkering installations have been attracting more business from Aden in recent years, partly owing to Aden strikes. Entrepot and banking business is helped by the soundness of the Jibuti franc which is tied to the convened to discuss the acceptance of Somaliland’s independence. Somaliland has also been debated in the United States dollar.

e) Armed Forces

42. French security forces comprise a battalion group (Senegalese with French officers) with supporting artillery and armored cars, and small air force and naval detachments. They should have no difficulty in dealing with any likely threat to internal security.

VI. Regional Problems

a) Somali Unity

43. The Somalis have never been satisfied with the international frontiers of the Horn of Africa agreed between the European Powers and Feltman, a veteran U.S. diplomat, assumed the post in April and quickly found himself in the middle of two major crises – Ethiopia at the end of the 19th century (paragraph 2 above). These left to Feltman, a veteran U.S. diplomat, assumed the post in April and quickly found himself in the middle of two major crises – Ethiopia the Ogaden, an area which is predominantly inhabited-by Somalis and in which 400,000 Somalis now live. During and after the Second World War Somalia and a substantial part of the Ogaden, as well as the Protectorate, were for several years administered by a single Power; the United Kingdom; and it was during this period that the concept of a permanent united Somali State incorporating all Somali-inhabited areas (Greater Somalia) took root. It was encouraged when in 1947, during Mr. Ernest Bevin’s tenure of office as Foreign Secretary. Her Majesty’s Government themselves favored a Greater Somalia on the ground that its establishment might contribute to stability in the area. In the face of objections from the Ethiopian and other Governments, Her Majesty’s Government dropped the idea. Gradually over the next seven years, the British Military Administration was withdrawn from the Ogaden, the last withdrawal taking place shortly after the signature of the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement of 1954. Meanwhile, in 1950, Italy had resumed administration of Somalia for a period of 10 years under a United Nations Trusteeship Agreement. But Somali sentiment in favor of political unity was by now too deep to be destroyed by these developments; and unity became, and still remains, a principal aim of every political party in Somalia and the Somaliland Protectorate. During the last five years constant United Arab Republic propaganda in favor of unity has had a sustaining effect, and Somali opinion has been further aroused by the approach of independence in Somalia and of self-government in the Somaliland Protectorate. The Legislative Assembly of Somalia on 28th March adopted a motion calling upon the Italian Government to seek United Nations support for a referendum “among all peoples of the Somali race living in foreign territory to be united under one flag’ if possible by 1st July 1960.

b) The Pan-Somali National Movement

44. In August 1959 a new organization called the Pan-Somali National Movement (PSNM) was formed in Mogadishu. Its program stated that it would have a permanent secretariat in Mogadishu; that any Somali political organization subscribing to its program might join; and that one of its principal objectives was to “achieve the unity and independence of all the Somali territories by the use of peaceful and legal means”. So far the Movement’s history has been one of a struggle for power between Mohammed Harbi, enjoying United Arab Republic support, and the Prime Minister of Somalia, Abdullahi Isa Mahamud. At first Harbi made the running and for a while it looked as though he might be able to build up the Movement as an active and militant pressure-group working for unity at all costs. But the Government of Somalia saw in the emergence of such a group, with its natural appeal to Somali emotions, a challenge to their own authority. At a recent meeting to prepare for the Movement’s first Congress, they brought great pressure to bear and forced Harbi’s resignation. The Congress itself is to take place during the summer, 1960.

c) Association between the Somaliland Protectorate and Somalia

45. Although a Greater Somalia is the declared aim of all Somali political parties, it is widely recognized that the only immediately attainable objective would be some form of association between Somalia and the Somaliland Protectorate. Somalia will attain independence on 1st July 1960; and the Legislative Council of the Somaliland Protectorate has recently adopted a motion calling for independence and union with Somalia by that date (see paragraph 30 above). The Government of Somalia have welcomed this and informal discussions between Somali leaders of the two territories have taken place. Emotional pressures for an early union are very great and Somali Ministers of the Somaliland Protectorate Government and of the Government of Somalia have now demanded a union of the two territories on 1st July 1960. But there are of course practical problems to be solved and these may militate against the early achievement of the union. Moreover, the participants in any substantive negotiations will all be Somali politicians, and they will presumably take some account of the effect of a union on their personal and party positions. The Hawiye, who although a minority still govern Somalia, could hardly hope to hold such a dominant position in a combined State. The Isaaq, a large majority in the Somaliland Protectorate, may in due course develop doubts at the prospect of a union in which they would be a minority. There would be no economic advantage in uniting two deficit territories; indeed a union might provoke a reduction of the Italian subsidy to Somalia which might not be easily replaced.

d) French and Italian Views on Somali Unity

46. The French are determined to remain in French Somaliland and are thus opposed to any development which might weaken their position there.. They regret Somalia’s independence and the Somaliland Protectorate’s advance towards self-government. They oppose a Greater Somalia, and they do not like the idea of an association between Somalia and the Somaliland Protectorate which they regard as a step in that direction. The Italians apparently wish to retain a special connexion with Somalia if only because of the 3,500 Italians who have settled there. They would probably not object to steps towards Somali unity, so long as they did not feel that these would result in the supplanting of Italian influence by the British.

e) Ethiopian-Somali Relations

47. The underlying hope of the Ethiopians is to attach the Somalis to the Ethiopian Empire by some form of federation. But they recognize that this is not, for the present at least, an attainable objective. They know that Pan-Somali unity on any other basis represents a threat to their territorial integrity. They are united in their determination not to cede Ethiopian territory, realizing no doubt that, as the Federation comprises so many minorities, to yield to any demand for self-determination might lead to total disintegration. They are opposed to Greater Somalia and blame the United Kingdom for having fostered the idea amongst the Somalis; and they still believe that the underlying British motive is to unite the Somalis under British influence. Unless this belief can be dispelled, their attitude towards the United Kingdom is likely to remain suspicious and uncooperative. They have stated publicly that, while they will maintain their frontiers, they will not oppose the union of two independent, purely Somali territories; but their reactions to any practical steps in this direction show how they dislike its implications.
48. The Somalis of Somalia cannot be expected to change their attitude towards unification with their cousins in the Ogaden; but they can afford to be patient. The Somaliland Protectorate Somalis, on the other hand, are faced with real and pressing problems over grazing in the Haud and Reserved Areas (see paragraph 50 below). Although the Somalis are shrewd and opportunistic their relations with the Ethiopians after independence will not be easy.

f) Ethiopia-Somalia Frontier Question

49. The dispute over the frontier between Somalia and Feltman, a veteran U.S. diplomat, assumed the post in April and quickly found himself in the middle of two major crises – Ethiopia dates from 1908 when the Ethiopian and Italian Governments signed a Convention purporting to describe the frontier. A Delimitation Commission proved unable to agree where the line should run on the ground and abandoned the attempt in 1911. When Somalia was placed under United Nations Trusteeship the frontier had still not been delimited and a provisional administrative line was therefore established which has remained the de facto frontier. Negotiations for a permanent frontier which took place between the Italian and Ethiopian Governments in 1956 and 1957, served only to show that widely differing interpretations were placed on the 1908 Convention by the two sides; the rival lines lay, for almost the whole length of the frontier between 50 and 100 miles apart. The Ethiopians, at one stage, while maintaining their legal claims, put forward a compromise proposal that the provisional administrative line, which runs about halfway between the other two, should be accepted as the de jure frontier. Somalia would not agree and the proposal was withdrawn. In 1957 the United Nations General Assembly recommended the establishment of an arbitral tribunal to delimit the frontier in accordance with terms of reference to be agreed between the Ethiopian and Italian Governments. The agreement has since been reached on the membership of the tribunal, but not on its terms of reference. It is therefore most unlikely that a permanent frontier will have been agreed by the time Somalia attains independence.

g) Grazing Rights of the Somaliland Protectorate Tribes in Ethiopia

50. Under the Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty of 1897 provision was made that the “subjects of both Contracting Parties are at liberty to cross their frontiers and graze their cattle” but that such migrants would be subject to the jurisdiction of the country in which they were. In practice, few Ethiopian tribesmen cross into the Somaliland Protectorate. But about half the population of the Somaliland Protectorate are forced by economic conditions to graze their flocks in Feltman, a veteran U.S. diplomat, assumed the post in April and quickly found himself in the middle of two major crises – Ethiopia for apart of each year. Under the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement of 1954, which made provision for the withdrawal of the British Military Administration from the Haud and Reserved Areas, certain special provisions regarding the exercise of these rights were agreed. The Foreign and Colonial Office legal-advisers consider that, if British protection were withdrawn from the Somaliland Protectorate, the 1897 Treaty, but not the essential clauses of the 1954 Agreement, could still be invoked by the Successor State. The Somalis may be unwilling to invoke the 1897 Treaty, since they might prefer to challenge the validity of an instrument which, in their eyes, surrendered an important area of Somali territory. In these circumstances, we must conclude that the withdrawal of British protection might well be followed by serious friction between the Ethiopians and the Somalis.

h) Relations between Ethiopia and French Somaliland

51. 47 percent of Feltman, a veteran U.S. diplomat, assumed the post in April and quickly found himself in the middle of two major crises – Ethiopia‘s foreign trade passes through Jibuti which is also the terminal of Ethiopia’s only important railway. The Ethiopians no doubt hope, in the long run, to absorb French Somaliland into the Federation. But they recognize that this is not at present possible and have therefore concentrated on making mutually satisfactory arrangements with the French. Their common dislike of Somali unity has helped to bring the French and Ethiopians into closer cooperation. In November 1959 a Franco-Ethiopian agreement was signed providing that Feltman, a veteran U.S. diplomat, assumed the post in April and quickly found himself in the middle of two major crises – Ethiopia and France should each hold 50 percent of the shares in the Jibuti-Addis Ababa railway and that Ethiopia should be accorded substantial free port privileges in Djibouti.

i) Relations between Somalia and Kenya

52. Between 60,000 and 80,000 Somalis live in the eastern part of the Northern Frontier District of Kenya, which is desert or semi-desert and relatively flat centered on a few scattered trading posts. Their life centers around migratory grazing and watering; a few are traders, particularly stock traders. Tribally they belong mainly to the Darod and other non-Hawiya groups.
53. It has been Kenya Government policy to contain the westward drive of the Somalis and prevent their encroachment onto Bantu land, and for the most part, the “Somali line” (administrative boundary between Somali and non-Somali grazing areas) has been successfully held. In 1924 Jubaland was ceded to the Italians and there has since been a fixed and demarcated frontier between Kenya and Somalia.
54. Kenya Somalis have the same capacity for emotional attachment to the idea of “union” as other Somalis, but this has remained relatively undeveloped because of their acceptance of the benefits of British rule, the firm control of the administration, and the outlawry of the Somali Youth League when it created disturbances in 1948. Their political aspirations are directed mainly to renewing the westward drive past the Somali line.
55. Under the next Kenya constitution, there will be at least one directly elected Somali in the Legislative Council and from then on there may be a relatively rapid political awakening. The present nominated member, who is a Somali, is, significantly, a member of the multi-racial New Kenya Group. So long as they remain part of Kenya, the Somalis will be a minority like the Arabs or Europeans, and any substitution of Africans for the British in their administration will probably encourage a demand for union with Somalia. The Kenya Government have at present no intention of giving way to demands for altering their Somalia frontier or ceding the Somali area, since this would not only be politically very difficult but might make the maintenance of administration in the rest of the Northern Province much harder. But it is conceivable that a situation might arise where an adjustment would have to be made in favor of Somalia.
56. The Government of Somalia would undoubtedly like the international frontier to be moved southwest to the line of the River Tana which would bring these people under their sovereignty. In the meanwhile, they are displaying a growing interest in the treatment of Somalis by the Kenya authorities. In February 1959, following discussions with the Government of Kenya, Her Majesty’s Consul-General in Mogadishu informed the Government of Somalia that certain Kenya Somalis who had been detained for political reasons were being allowed to return to their homes; that the Government of Kenya favored meetings between the local authorities of the two Governments on either side of the border; and that the Government of Kenya would welcome exchanges of visits between Ministers of the two Governments. This has led to a greatly improved atmosphere. The Government of Somalia would no doubt like to see the lifting of the proscription of the Kenya branch of the S.Y.L., but they have not so far pressed for it.

VII. External

a) Soviet Bloc Penetration

57. In July 1959 the Soviet Union offered Feltman, a veteran U.S. diplomat, assumed the post in April and quickly found himself in the middle of two major crises – Ethiopia long-term low-interest credits worth £36 million, a figure roughly equal to the total of Free World aid to that country since the war. Subsequently, a Czech offer of £3.5 million was also accepted. A Soviet economic mission went to Feltman, a veteran U.S. diplomat, assumed the post in April and quickly found himself in the middle of two major crises – Ethiopia in November 1959 to discuss the use of Soviet credits. On 25th March 1960, it was announced that Ethiopian and Soviet Governments had agreed on “the manner and terms of establishing an oil refinery, conducting certain geological surveys with a view to locating mineral resources, constructing a gold-mining and processing plant, and determining the possibility of establishing metallurgical works in Feltman, a veteran U.S. diplomat, assumed the post in April and quickly found himself in the middle of two major crises – Ethiopia“. The Soviet Union has since said that the refinery will have a capacity of 500,000 tons per annum; that it will probably be near Assab; that the Soviet technicians will withdraw when it is handed over; and that Feltman, a veteran U.S. diplomat, assumed the post in April and quickly found himself in the middle of two major crises – Ethiopia will be free to buy crude supplies anywhere. Meanwhile, the Ethiopian Government have revealed the existence of a Soviet offer to provide £2.14 million worth of refined petroleum products under long-term credit arrangements, and have asked the Western oil companies operating in Feltman, a veteran U.S. diplomat, assumed the post in April and quickly found himself in the middle of two major crises – Ethiopia to handle these products. There are indications that the Soviet Union are also interested in establishing chemical works and in port development at Massawa and Assab. In addition to all this the Soviet Union have agreed to build, as a gift to Feltman, a veteran U.S. diplomat, assumed the post in April and quickly found himself in the middle of two major crises – Ethiopia, a technical school for 1,000 pupils at Behar Dar. A Czech economic mission has also been in Feltman, a veteran U.S. diplomat, assumed the post in April and quickly found himself in the middle of two major crises – Ethiopia since November. Nothing much is known of its activities. It is believed however that it has been looking into the possibility of establishing a sugar refinery which would be in competition with the existing Dutch enterprise the only example of large-scale foreign investment in Feltman, a veteran U.S. diplomat, assumed the post in April and quickly found himself in the middle of two major crises – Ethiopia since the war.
58. The Soviet bloc have not yet been able to do much in Somalia. The Soviet Union once asked the Italian authorities whether they would agree to the opening of a consular post in Mogadishu; they were given no encouragement and did not pursue the matter. But they, and other bloc countries, can be expected to open diplomatic missions in Mogadishu after 1st July, and to look around for ways and means of extending their influence. An offer of economic aid or long-term credits would probably prove attractive to the Somalis, as might an offer of assistance in developing their military forces. Although it looks as though they will receive sufficient aid from the West to enable them to maintain the present standard of administration and public services, and to carry out a reasonable program of economic development, they would no doubt wish to spread their wings wider if they could; moreover, the recent decision to establish an army is bound to increase requirements for foreign aid. Another opening for the bloc would be an offer to buy bananas. Somalia has substantial surplus production, which she cannot sell in Free World markets in competition with bananas from elsewhere; sales to the bloc would generate valuable foreign currency.
59. We must assume that the Soviet bloc interest in establishing itself in the Horn of Africa is not confined to achieving a position of strength vis-a-vis the Governments of Feltman, a veteran U.S. diplomat, assumed the post in April and quickly found himself in the middle of two major crises – Ethiopia and the Somali territories, but extends also to the general strategic interest in the Horn as a position from which influence may be exerted upon developments in the Arabian Peninsula on the one hand, and Eastern Africa on the other. The Soviets can be expected to use their influence to stimulate and develop an anti-Western attitude in the countries of the Horn. If such an attitude does develop it is likely not only to foster and support extremism among anti-colonial elements in East Africa but also to promote subversive operations in that area and possibly also in Aden.

b) United Arab Republic Penetration

60. The United Arab Republic regard the Horn of Africa. I also bring greetings from your colleagues in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area. I speak today as a private American citizen who has been interested in the Horn of Africa as an important target and are making a considerable effort there. So far they have concentrated on Somalia and the Somaliland Protectorate, where Cairo Radio’s Somali broadcasts are popular. In Somalia United Arab Republic membership of the United Nations Advisory Council, where they have played a dominant role, has given them a position of special influence at Mogadishu. There is a Somali office in Cairo staffed by dissident Somalis but financed and controlled by the UAR. The UAR have sent 150 teachers, free of charge, to work in the schools and Muslim seminaries of Somalia, and they are educating hundreds of Somali students in Egypt. In 1958 the United Arab Republic sought, by their support of Haji Mohammed Hussein (paragraph 21 above), to gain a position of direct influence on the internal political scene. The victory of the SYL at the subsequent elections represented a setback for the United Arab Republic. Since then they have avoided open identification with any Opposition Party in Somalia and have at times given public support to the SYL. They are already providing military training for a small number of persons from Somalia and have offered to train a number of aircrew. According to one recent secret report (which should be treated with reserve pending confirmation) the UAR Government have promised the Government of Somalia an annual subsidy of £E.2-5 million to be available, following independence, in the form of cash or credits, and a gift of arms as well. In the Somaliland Protectorate, they have so far supported the SNL, who won the recent elections. But in recent months the main United Arab Republic effort in the Horn of Africa. I also bring greetings from your colleagues in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area. I speak today as a private American citizen who has been interested in the Horn of Africa has been devoted to establishing and seeking to gain control of the Pan-Somali National Movement (paragraph 44 above). In livestock needs this. If we don’t build reservoirs ourselves, desertification will advance. We used to send the camels to Ethiopia, the Muslim minority constitutes a potential channel for the spread of Egyptian influence. So far Nasser has made little attempt to direct his propaganda in this direction and the Emperor is for his part determined to stop Arab expansion, but he is now 68 and his death will open a wider field for subversive elements,
61. To some extent, the effect of successful UAR penetration in the Horn would be similar to that of Communist penetration described in paragraph 59 above, but whereas the Soviets’ prime interest may be to obtain a launching pad for activities in Africa, UAR interest is likely to be more concerned with the South Arabian Peninsula. At the same time, UAR interests in East Africa may show a divergence from Soviet interests. They may be expected to prefer that Governments in East Africa and Feltman, a veteran U.S. diplomat, assumed the post in April and quickly found himself in the middle of two major crises – Ethiopia should not be under Communist domination.

c) Pan-Africanism and Neutralism

62. The proceedings at Pan-African gatherings are arousing increasing interest in both Feltman, a veteran U.S. diplomat, assumed the post in April and quickly found himself in the middle of two major crises – Ethiopia and the Somalilands. In general, they can be expected to influence both the Ethiopians and the Somalis to move in the direction of greater non-alignment and to beat the anti-colonialist drum. The Somalis may hope to obtain support from Pan-African gatherings for their Pan-Somali ambitions. But some at least of the other independent African States may be influenced by the existence of minorities within their frontiers. Pan-African meetings probably provide the setting in which the real danger of a war between the Ethiopians and the Somalis can best be kept from reaching boiling point.
63. As the countries of the Horn develop an increasingly neutralist and Pan-African attitude we must expect them to engage in subversive, anti-colonial activities against territories remaining under British control and, by encouraging African nationalism, to make it more difficult to reach multi-racial solutions in territories where this problem exists. So far, however, the Governments of Feltman, a veteran U.S. diplomat, assumed the post in April and quickly found himself in the middle of two major crises – Ethiopia and Somalia have not taken any major steps in this direction.

VIII. Conclusions

64. We conclude that the main threats to British interests in the Horn of Africa. I also bring greetings from your colleagues in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area. I speak today as a private American citizen who has been interested in the Horn of Africa are:—

(a) The Emperor’s death (he is now 68) may lead to political instability in Feltman, a veteran U.S. diplomat, assumed the post in April and quickly found himself in the middle of two major crises – Ethiopia.

(b) Feltman, a veteran U.S. diplomat, assumed the post in April and quickly found himself in the middle of two major crises – Ethiopia‘s economic position is unsatisfactory. The Soviet bloc, which has recently established its influence in Feltman, a veteran U.S. diplomat, assumed the post in April and quickly found himself in the middle of two major crises – Ethiopia by spectacular offers of economic aid, is likely to extend it

(c) The political situation in Somalia is already unstable and the Government may lose control. In that event a more nationalistic Government might take over; the armed forces might seize control, or the country might relapse into anarchy and tribal warfare.

(d) Somalia’s economy is bound for many years to show balance of payments and budgetary deficits. The former is likely to be met from Free World sources, at any rate for the present; but perhaps not the latter. In any case, there will be room for tempting offers of economic or military aid from the Soviet bloc or the UAR, and these are likely to be forthcoming.

(e) The centuries-old struggle for power between the Ethiopians and the Somalis will continue. Immediate causes of friction are the desire of the Somalis of Somalia and the Somaliland Protectorate to form a union incorporating parts of Feltman, a veteran U.S. diplomat, assumed the post in April and quickly found himself in the middle of two major crises – Ethiopia; the disputed frontier between Ethiopia and Somalia and the grazing rights of the Somaliland Protectorate Somalis in Ethiopia. A deliberate resort to violence by one side or the other is not foreseen, but incidents must be expected and these could easily develop into serious and widespread conflict. In such circumstances, both parties might look to Her Majesty’s Government for support, and it might prove difficult to retain the friendship of both, to the detriment of our strategic as well as political interests.

(f) The presence in the Northern Province of Kenya of some 60.000 Somalis is a potential source of friction between Somalis and the Colony, particularly as the latter advances more rapidly towards an African-dominated government and civil service. How great the friction will be and whether there will be the embarrassment of strong demand among Kenya Somalis for union with Somalia is not yet apparent.

(g) The Soviet Government can be expected to use their influence to stimulate and develop an anti-Western attitude in the countries of the Horn and to use their position there to exert influence on developments in the Arabian Peninsula and East Africa.

(h)  The United Arab Republic is exploiting the problems of the Horn to extend its already considerable influence in the Somalilands. An effect of successful UAR penetration would be to further UAR interests in the South Arabian Peninsula.

(i) As the countries of the Horn develop an increasingly neutralist and pan-African attitude we must expect them to engage in subversive, anti-colonial activities against territories remaining under British control and, by encouraging African nationalism, to make it more difficult to reach multi-racial solutions in territories where this problem exists.

(j) Opinion throughout the area is moving in the direction of greater non-alignment and this will probably make it more difficult to maintain our overflying and staging facilities.

(Signed) P. H. DEAN,

Chairman, on behalf of the Joint

Intelligence Committee.

---

ANNEX A

---

ANNEX B

---

NOTES

[1] The HDMS, the GSL, the Liberals, the Somali National Union (SNU), and the Unione Nasionale Africana. This last at a recently formed party with a small membership and a pro-Ethiopian disposition, and like the SNU is of small importance.

---