State Department’s Model for Somaliland Should Be Taiwan, Not Kurdistan

This article, “State Department’s Model for Somaliland Should Be Taiwan, Not Kurdistan,” argues that the U.S. State Department should shift its approach to Somaliland, viewing it more like Taiwan than Kurdistan.

The author, Michael Rubin, contends that the current “One Somalia” policy, which prioritizes maintaining a unified Somalia, is ineffective and detrimental to U.S. interests, as it has led to wasted resources and allowed China to gain influence.

Here’s a breakdown of the key points:

• Somaliland’s Success: Somaliland is portrayed as a stable and developing democracy, far more successful than Somalia, even being called the region’s “Silicon Valley.”

• Flawed “One Somalia” Policy: The author criticizes the State Department’s adherence to the “One Somalia” policy, claiming it’s based on personal biases rather than sound strategy and that it has enriched corrupt officials in Somalia.

• Consulate Inadequacy: While opening a U.S. consulate in Hargeisa (Somaliland’s capital) is a step in the right direction, it’s deemed insufficient because it would still be influenced by the embassy in Mogadishu (Somalia) and the flawed “One Somalia” policy.

• Taiwan Model: The author advocates for the establishment of an “American Institute in Somaliland,” modeled after the American Institute in Taiwan. This would allow the U.S. to have a diplomatic presence in Somaliland without formally recognizing its independence, similar to the U.S.’s approach to Taiwan to avoid upsetting China.

• Protecting U.S. Interests: The author suggests this approach would better serve U.S. interests by allowing for improved intelligence gathering and preventing Somalia from siphoning off Somaliland’s resources.

In essence, the article urges the State Department to recognize the de facto independence and distinct success of Somaliland and to adopt a policy that reflects this reality, using the Taiwan model as a guide.

The complete piece is as follows:

State Department’s Model for Somaliland Should Be Taiwan, Not Kurdistan

Somaliland Has Functioned as an Independent State for Longer than It Was Part of Any Union with Somalia

By Michael Rubin

The Congressionally-mandated State Department policy review for Somaliland is well underway. It is long overdue. For decades, the State Department’s approach to Somalia was both ineffective and divorced from reality. As Somaliland grew its democracy, ambassadors like Donald Yamamoto and Larry André, Jr., undercut it by enforcing a “One Somalia” policy whose parameters represented more their personal biases than any written State Department directives. As a result, the United States dumped billions of dollars into the world’s most corrupt government. Rather than advance Washington’s interests, the State Department advanced China‘s.

The United States dumped billions of dollars into the world’s most corrupt government. Rather than advance Washington’s interests, the State Department advanced China’s.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s team seeks a holistic approach that takes into account the entire Horn of Africa. Fair enough, though allowing Ethiopia and Eritrea, let alone Chinese satrapies Djibouti and Somalia, too much sway over Somaliland’s freedom risks U.S. interests, especially given the State Department’s lack of imagination and penchant for the status quo.

Even as the State Department deliberates and various desk officers try to hash out consensus, there is one certainty: It is impossible to return to the status quo. Somaliland has functioned as an independent state for longer than it was part of any union with Somalia. Somaliland is also far more successful than Somalia; it is quickly becoming the region’s Silicon Valley while Somalia is, well, Somalia. Lawyers in Hargeisa, Somaliland’s capital, make convincing cases that the 1960 union that formed Somalia was neither legal nor binding.

From a practical point of view, there are no mortgages in Somalia and Somaliland; newlyweds and business owners must pool family resources to buy houses or open shops. None will subordinate themselves to Somalia to see their livelihoods siphoned off into Somalia’s unelected leaders’ offshore accounts or Dubai mansions.

At a minimum, the State Department will likely agree to open a consulate in Hargeisa. This makes sense on one level; Somaliland and Somalia are as different from each other as the United States and Honduras or Indonesia and New Guinea. Stationing diplomats in Hargeisa, a city so safe my nine-year-old daughter once accompanied me there without any security, will allow U.S. diplomats better intelligence and insight into the region than they have when locked inside Mogadishu’s international airport, where the State Department locates its embassy.

The problem with a consulate, however, is that it will neither improve U.S. policy nor protect U.S. interests. A consulate is an extension of an embassy and, as Yamamoto and André demonstrated, the desire to ingratiate themselves with Mogadishu overshadowed other policies. That André retired to lobby for Hormuud Telecom, the new iteration of a company the U.S. Treasury Department had designated for terror finance in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, but delisted under the Biden administration, highlights the lack of State Department focus on the bigger picture.

An ambassador thinking about a retirement golden parachute or smooth ties with Somalia’s appointed president could actually make things worse by forcing a consular official to carry out illogical demands to make life for American officers in Mogadishu easier.

Short of immediately recognizing Somaliland’s independence, the State Department’s best option is clear: The American Institute in Somaliland, modeled after its successful policy in Taiwan.

Rather, a better model for American diplomats in Hargeisa might be the American Institute in Taiwan, a structure created to assuage Chinese diplomatic sensitivities while still enabling the United States a diplomatic presence in Taipei. Diplomats theoretically retire from the State Department before their Taipei posting, and then rejoin with full advancement and seniority at its conclusion.

The State Department’s support for the American Institute model recognizes that Taiwan is both a democracy and distinct from the autocracy next door. Most importantly, running an Institute in Taipei rather than a consulate keeps Taiwan distinct from China and actually helps the U.S. Embassy in Beijing by tying their hands should Chinese officials make outrageous demands.

Short of immediately recognizing Somaliland’s independence, the State Department’s best option is clear: The American Institute in Somaliland, modeled after its successful policy in Taiwan.

Published originally on October 6, 2025.