Understanding Statebuilding: Traditional Governance And The Modern State In Somaliland

Chapter 8

Conclusions

In today’s increasingly interconnected world, states cannot function in isolation. Even those states or entities not in direct contact with international institutions or developmental organizations are still subject to being externally influenced by normative standards and policy precedents. Domestically-led statebuilding and indigenous development programs are not exempt from this; international norms of what it means to be an acceptable or successful state dictate domestic policy within developing states and, in particular, unrecognized states. For the latter, conforming to acceptable standards of statehood is perceived to be vital to attracting and maximizing investment and developmental assistance that can only be obtained following recognition of sovereignty. For some, therefore, the style and functions of the state becomes a tool for economic and political survival. Like many unrecognized states, Somaliland’s government outwardly exhibits compliance with many international norms of acceptable statehood. The reflection of the demands of acceptable statehood, coupled with statements made by political leaders and the government’s active and aggressive promotion of statehood, indicate that for Somaliland the style and structure of the state can be seen as a strategic tool in that they are key to attracting recognition of sovereignty. Whilst the steps taken to attract international recognition can be rationalized as such, the creation and evolution of functioning political structures, practices and societal investment are more entrenched than just an extraversionary strategy for the purposes of recognition.^[557] the state presented by Somaliland is not a facade or a pretense: the creation of an acceptable state and the continuing development of that state indicate a more subtle yet also more involved process; what may have been a strategy has become a tangible reality. in an international environment focused on an ideal style of statehood and demanding acceptable governance and government, with continuation of the statebuilding process dependent upon continuing support from the domestic population, and with the desired end result being increasing external political relationships, political structures and government actions become a vital component of a more deeply invested form of political extraversion. In the case of Somaliland, the lasting impacts on the social and political relationships resulting from this must also be recognized.

Pegg and King note that many de facto states benefit from the support of a strong patron state: Northern Cyprus is supported by Turkey, many Eastern European de facto states are backed by Russia, and Taiwan has friendly relations with the West.^[558] Somaliland, however, does not have this level of backing. Even though Ethiopia and Djibouti have fostered diplomatic ties with Somaliland, neither acts as a patron state for the territory. Whereas others are propped up by external support, for Somaliland support and legitimacy for the state must come from within if the project is to succeed. The need for the establishment of a modern acceptable state and the quest for recognition are therefore directing the relationship between Somaliland society and the forming state; a relationship that is being cultivated through a negotiated co-existence and co-dependence between the modern and traditional structures. What is emerging in response to both domestic demands and international desires is more ensconced than a superficial strategy for recognition. Rather, it is a form of political extraversion in which the strategies for international inclusion and interaction, together with domestic acceptance and support, encompass the political practices and structures of the territory. In many ways, this is where the external and the internal in Somaliland are most entwined; they cannot be separated as the external, through this strategy, has been woven into the internal. Institutions reflect primarily external demands, governance attends largely to internal necessities, and the narrative holding it together – the narrative feeding the Somaliland identity – propels the continuation of the balancing act between the two.

For more than two decades the process of statebuilding in Somaliland has been underpinned by the quest for recognition of sovereign statehood. It is such a central component of the Somaliland narrative that it has also become part of the Somaliland identity. The Somaliland process has in large part been able to continue as it has because there is societal investment in it,^[559] and that societal investment comes largely from the idea of this is necessary to achieve what we want, and we’re all in it together. The ‘want’ here is not necessarily a state that conforms to the external liberal model, but rather recognition of sovereignty that will bring tangible benefits such as increased trade and travel. This is perhaps best epitomized by a market trader in Hargeisa who, when asked what he wanted the state to be, stated that it should provide him with a passport. While modern democratic structures and practices are certainly becoming more of the ‘want’ for many Somalilanders, the expectation of recognition arguably continues to be predominant in the territory, and societal investment is rooted in that. The narrative of recognition is so entrenched in the Somaliland process that it has become part of Somaliland’s identity, both the externally portrayed and the internally adopted. The Somaliland identity is not necessarily centered on people saying ‘I am a Somalilander’. Instead, it is the identity of the political entity itself. From the beginning the Somaliland identity has highlighted its separateness from the south. It has invoked the brutality of the Barre regime and the genocidal campaign he waged in the north. Somalilanders have also been described as more refined than other Somalis based on the British colonial experience as opposed to the Italian experience in the south. This distinction of separateness helped define the Somaliland population. As the statebuilding process continued, the Somaliland identity evolved and strengthened. From the beginning, the people of Somaliland were ‘sold’ the idea that a democratic government was necessary for recognition of sovereignty, and much of what could be seen as acceptance by the population was the idea that the drastic changes taking place were necessary for recognition. The power of this identity rests with its legitimizing capacity; it serves to justify the state both inside and out. Externally, Somaliland is presented as a stable democratic state worthy of recognition. Internally, it is not a desire for recognition, but rather an expectation of recognition; an expectation that facilitates societal investment in political action deemed necessary to fulfilling that expectation. In the narrative and the identity of Somaliland, these two cannot be separated. In many ways, the external has become inextricably engrained in the internal, a factor that may place strain on the Somaliland process. However, although Somaliland is not a recognized state entity, the internal component of the narrative acts as a strong force reinforcing the bond between the people and the state; a bond which continues to serve in a legitimizing capacity. ‘Somaliland’ is not just an unrecognized state contently existing within the confines of Somalia. ‘Somaliland’ is a political project built on and actively seeking recognition of sovereign statehood, and within that ‘Somaliland’ is a modern democracy rooted in the clan system and with significant societal investment in doing what is necessary – maintaining peace and continuing with democratization – to achieve that desired recognition. Meeting expectations of external legitimacy while at the same time maintaining vital internal legitimacy is central to not only continuing the process, but also to the Somaliland identity. This is not to claim that all Somalilanders are fully invested in this identity and this process. There are regions in the territory that reject their inclusion in the Somaliland project, and there is dissatisfaction, largely amongst the minority clans. Certainly there are also Somalilanders who are apathetic to the process. Also, more than twenty years after its declaration of independence Somaliland’s unrecognized status may put strain on this identity. How long can the political leaders continue to justify their actions based on the promise of recognition? How long can the state be held together on the basis that peace and political change are necessary for the ultimate goal? Conversely, as the institutions and modern practices grow and ideas about the state change, one must ask whether that once vital cohesive and unifying force is still necessary. are the new way of governing, the peace, the stability and the growth that have been experienced in the past two decades rooted enough in the territory that the ‘state’ can exist without the enticement of recognition?

A ‘Model’ of Statebuilding?

Throughout the literature on Somaliland it is common to see reference to the territory as being a model for state development in Africa.^[560] Indeed, the project in Somaliland has been able to foster what many other development or statebuilding projects in Africa have not been able to achieve: peace, stability and growth. By all appearances Somaliland is a functioning modern democratic state that conforms to expectations of successful statehood and is separate from the rest of Somalia. However, the Somaliland state deviates from the normative blueprint as Somaliland is meeting the demands of modern statehood in its own way that bolsters domestic support and legitimacy for the unfamiliar modern practices. Somaliland, in the absence of direct international interference or involvement, created a government structure that reflects the best of both worlds that many Somalilanders, and the Somaliland state, live in.^[561]

Mohammed Said Gees contends that the ‘lack of recognition and the absence of international involvement and support have given the people an opportunity and freedom to craft an indigenous form of social and political organization with a democratic framework’. The freedom experienced by Somaliland in creating its state allowed for the hybrid creation that gees claims is the only form of state that could survive within the ‘dominant Somali clan culture’.^[562] Despite the success in Somaliland, however, gees also maintains that Somaliland is not a model of statehood; a sentiment shared by many. Indeed, the ‘imperfection of the Somaliland state’ and the unfinished statebuilding process are evidence that putting Somaliland on a pedestal would be a mistake.^[563] Much of what has held Somaliland together thus far and this long has not been a strong central state apparatus exerting its power and control throughout the territory. Indeed, the opposite is more accurate of the central government – although growing in strength, it is relatively weak and has little authoritative control over the population. Much of the day-to-day governance in Somaliland continues to derive from the clan system, with traditional codes of practice and traditional law and justice mechanisms more prevalent than codified ‘Western’ law and action. As the state continues to grow and develop, however, the hybridity of this system of governance as it currently stands is being tested on numerous fronts. With internal pressure for further modernization of the government increasing, tensions between the old Somali style of governance and the new democratic institutions in the government are becoming more apparent. However, creating a state is a lengthy and tumultuous process and encountering some obstacles must be expected as the process continues. Still, much can be gleaned from Somaliland’s statebuilding process. in spite of the hurdles, important lessons can be taken from the case of Somaliland in regards to the process of building a state as well as what a successful state can look like. Rather than debating whether or not Somaliland is a model, perhaps the more appropriate question to ask is what kind of model can Somaliland be?

Claiming that the Somaliland state can be a model for statebuilding is at the same time imprudent and meritorious. It is erroneous to say that the process Somaliland is going through in creating its state can be dissected and the resulting components and practices can be applied elsewhere. The Somaliland state cannot be a new blueprint for statebuilding; the state in Somaliland is tailored specifically to Somaliland’s society and the specific circumstances of the territory during its statebuilding process and therefore cannot be transposed onto another situation. What has worked in Somaliland, namely the inclusion of traditional authority in the central government and the utilization of clan governance, may not be appropriate for a territory with a contentious relationship with traditional governance or for a territory with an ethnically divided population. Somaliland’s existence as an unrecognized state seeking sovereign recognition also certainly factors into Somaliland’s success, as does a very active and financially supporting Diaspora community.^[564] Conversely, however, the experiences of Somaliland, particularly the deviance in the state, can offer valuable lessons. Specifically, Somaliland shows that the creation or development of a state can reflect the unique history, society, traditions, cultures and practices within the territory; a practice that is not a primary component of current externally-led policy. For some such as Ghani and Lockhart, statebuilding is about ‘closing the sovereignty gap’ between the juridical and the empirical, and the way to best do that is for external actors to ‘fix’ empirical weaknesses identified as inhibiting success.^[565] although they also maintain that within local capabilities and resources ‘[b]ackwardness can actually offer some advantages’, theirs is a technocratic guide offering a framework that does not venture beyond technical components of the state such as economic capacity or physical infrastructure.^[566] Indeed, what they offer is reflective of what Bendana’s ‘top down, externally guided, supply-driven, elitist and interventionist’ characterization of peacebuilding.^[567] This type of ‘fixing’ a state, however, does not guarantee the gap between the empirical and the juridical will be bridged. Reflective of much of the stance of those engaged in statebuilding literature and practice, Ghani and Lockhart do not acknowledge that valuable local capabilities and resources may also include indigenous or traditional systems of governance that will challenge the dominant accepted framework of modern government, but may also be key to creating stable governing structures within non-Western states. However, as a form of collective memory, tradition involves organizing the past in relation to the present: ‘[t]radition represents not only what “is” done in a society but what “should be” done’.^[568] The prominent placement of a ‘backwards’ traditional institution or structure, as Somaliland shows, can be a crucial piece of statebuilding or state strengthening projects. Away from the tradition-centric nature of this case, Somaliland also shows the value in those institutions and actors that may have been rejected by the international community. The state in Somaliland can be seen as progressing through the stages of legitimization, with the end result being the externally sought after Weberian bureaucratic authority. In many ways, Somaliland is following the ‘Weberian path’, something that is not characteristic of externally-led projects. Indeed, the Somaliland case raises important questions; amongst them are those about the role of locally valued and trusted actors in the success of statebuilding.

Within Ghani and Lockhart’s discussion on externally-led projects and closing the sovereignty gap, as is often the case in reform, statebuilding and development literature, there is another key omission: their offering does not take into account the sovereignty exercised by external actors and the power relationships that come with that. The involvement of international actors in a statebuilding project creates an element of competition over power and resources, with rewards going to those chosen by the external actors at the expense of others. Often the domestic winners are those who need to be quelled and brought on board a project, resulting in fragmentation and often further violence as competition increases. This can be identified in numerous projects, including those in Somaliland’s regional neighbors. This competition breeding violence has been identified in interventions in Ethiopia during the conflict with Eritrea,^[569] as well as in projects in Somalia and Sudan. In the former, both the empowerment and exclusion of warlords within statebuilding attempts have resulted in increased violence and fragmentation within the state.^[570] In Darfur, as Young notes, a flawed and narrow approach to intervention resulted in the concentration of power in the hands of ‘belligerents’ who did not discount continuing violence.^[571] In externally-led projects, inclusion occurs on the terms of the external actors involved and as such creates the potential for continuing instability once those external actors exit. Both Sudan and Somalia show how damaging this can be as political problems at the root of a conflict are often not addressed or resolved.^[572] Domestically led statebuilding projects, on the other hand, benefit from not being directly subjected to this complex and often damaging ‘external factor’, and local ownership is a component of the statebuilding process rather than a desired end result. Although exclusion from direct international intervention can create difficulties, removing the complexities of an agenda-driven international actor operating under set guidelines or expectations can prove highly beneficial for an emerging or rebuilding state. Somaliland is such a case.

D.I.Y. Statebuilding

Certainly, statebuilding in Somaliland has not been problem free, and the vision of how the state will function in relation to both domestic and international concerns has been altered from its original form to reflect the changing circumstances in and around Somaliland. Whilst democratic government has always been the stated goal of the leadership in the territory, the internal dynamics impacting upon how the democratic component can and will function have changed. The advantage of the Somaliland state, however, is that it can account for the flexibility needed to incorporate these necessary changes in a way that would not be assured if the statebuilding process had been externally guided or imposed. The Somaliland state has a significant amount of latitude in the exercise of sovereignty stemming not only from the indigenous and locally owned and invested process, but also from the presence of the traditional authority in the government. This inclusion creates a level of central governance that not only resides within the government but also exists despite it, ensuring that during periods of transition or in the event of a political crisis the government, or the powers of governance, could continue to exist through the traditional institution. In its place both within and above the government, sovereignty exercised by the traditional authority is extensible, creating a situation in which the Guurti is able to fill the gaps when the government is weak, absent or vulnerable. That sovereignty is also rooted in Somaliland rather than with an external actor. The inclusion of the clan institution also serves to ease fears about centralized rule; including the powerful and familiar clan elders in the government created a body tasked with guidance as well as restraint on potentially power hungry individuals. By including this Somali component of governance alongside modern institutions in the central government, the founders of Somaliland created a safeguard for the post-conflict forming state in which past experiences had made the population wary of strong centralized rule. By institutionalizing the traditional, the founders of the new Somaliland state created an internal safety net not only for central governance within the territory, but also for the continuum of government during the introduction of a democratic state. For Somaliland, the utilization of traditional authority was the best, and possibly only, option for the stabilization of a contentious and potentially volatile society during a period of extreme transition such as statebuilding. The vital role of this ‘deviant’ and ‘backwards’ inclusion on the path to today’s state must not be overlooked.

Somaliland was able to achieve its remarkable successes largely because it was able to create a government structure and practices that reflect Somaliland’s particular circumstances and demands. However, hesitancy surrounding the utilization of tribal or clan systems in a central government, particularly within Somalia, would have ensured that the institutionalization of the stabilizing traditional would have been difficult, if not impossible, if the international community had taken command over the creation of the state. Shil reflects Weber’s characterization of traditional legitimacy as the ‘eternal yesterday’ in noting that discourse and practice have long been at unease with empowering such structures as the dominant emphasis is on moving forward and improvement – modernizing – rather than existing in the past with tradition.^[573] Ironically, what is perceived of to be an unpredictable, uncontrollable or non-modern factor was a key to the stability of the modern in Somaliland. Whilst those in the government are adamant that the presence of the central Guurti is not hindering its campaign for recognition, they are equally certain that the inclusion of the body would not have been a reality if the UN had taken control of rebuilding Somaliland. Indeed, many in Somaliland view the numerous failed attempts at statebuilding in the south as evidence that international involvement would have been devastating for the north.[574] One of the most advantageous decisions made by the founders of the Somaliland state, therefore, was the rejection of UN assistance offered through the UNOSOM missions.

A remarkable facet of the Somaliland state is that its founders created a relatively stable democratic government virtually on their own. Undoubtedly, there are consequential detriments to the lack of foreign involvement, such as a lack of monetary investment and, according to some, a lack of guidance in introducing democracy. However, Somaliland was not entirely without those, as the Diaspora community provided much of the financial and ideological support that would otherwise have come from the international community. Sitting both within Somaliland society and external to it, the diaspora also operates in an internal-external capacity; it is a pipeline of sorts. In this case, however, the diaspora itself is invested in the outcome in a way that international interveners could not be. the diaspora could not provide to the scale that the international community could, but here the benefits far outweigh the costs: both political and traditional leaders in Somaliland were able to create what works for the territory and society and were able to undertake the process of introducing the new in their own way, at their own pace and without the conditionality that external involvement in the process of creating a state would entail.[575] this is not to say that the Somaliland state was created in an environment of isolation; the indirect influence of international norms of statehood certainly impacted upon the process and the decisions made in regards to the shape and functions of the government, and it was perceived of as vital to comply with these norms if Somaliland were to be taken seriously as a ‘state’. Rather than having this directly imposed on them through an externally led statebuilding project, though, Somaliland’s leaders were able to adapt these influences to suit the needs of the people and the territory and to work in conjunction with Somaliland’s traditional governance structures. In deviating from the pre-established path determined by the international community and implemented through statebuilding projects, the Somaliland state certainly challenges the people to accept a new way of governing, but it also challenges the dominant modern conception of what it takes to be an ‘acceptable’ or ‘successful’ state and the means through which to achieve that.

non-intervention in the statebuilding process in Somaliland not only allows for the state to reflect the unique history, society and circumstances of the territory, but the successes of this process permit comment to be made on the dominant practices of statebuilding and conditional governance reform within developing states. Without direct interference, leaders in Somaliland have created, or have made great strides in creating, a desirable end result and have managed to avoid the catastrophic attempts at imposing an externally created government that have characterized interactions with post-1991 Somalia. although Somaliland does have the significant political and economic motivation of recognition of sovereignty impacting upon the process, that does not negate the willingness demonstrated by not only the leaders of Somaliland but also the people to engage with the international community’s terms and yet still maintain autonomy over the process of creating a state. It cannot be said that all states or territories would show the same success if similarly left alone, but the case of Somaliland does warrant a reconsideration of dominant conceptions of what it takes to be successful and how to get there. The dominance of an ideal type of state and a framework for how to achieve this state, with numerous checklists indicating stipulations and conditions to be met, is prevalent within literature and practice. historically and globally, however, this ‘ideal’ state does not exist in practice; it exists only as a tool of liberal interventionism, creating a situation in which it is questionable as to whether or not the ‘ideal’ can actually be achieved. Statebuilding practice is wrought with failure and reform policies targeting the creation of an idealized acceptable state show varied and restricted success. With these limitations considered, the issue of what it means and takes to be acceptable deserves to be re-addressed.

Learning from Somaliland

Somaliland’s fate if it had accepted the UN’s initial offer of international assistance cannot be known. It can be assumed, however, that the territory would not now be lauded for its accomplishments or stability. In grounding the state in society and by utilizing its governing structure, those involved in the creation of Somaliland found their key to success. The lack of resources available to Somaliland ensured that political and traditional leaders would have to depend on domestic capabilities and support in order to create the state, and internalizing the statebuilding process entrenched the state in society and society in the state. Because of a lack of funds for security, traditional methods of reconciliation were used to demobilize the militias and prevent the fighting that raged through the south. Invoking the common memory of isolation and brutality created a sense of Somaliland identity around which the people could rally and which would create a link between the project and the people. As with any statebuilding process, elites alone cannot carry the state, and in Somaliland they do not. Finally, including the pervasive clans in the forming government ensured continuity and trust throughout the process. Lack of international involvement placed the statebuilding process in the hands of the people and leaders, meaning that not only could the state reflect Somaliland but also that the society was invested in the outcome. The fine balance in Somaliland was not achieved without sacrifice, but the stability and security in Somaliland throughout the process proves that the balance reached has been effective. The Somaliland state truly belongs to Somaliland.

Despite the centrality of the clan system in the formation of Somaliland, there is no guarantee that Somaliland will never eliminate or alter the place of the traditional within the government. Whilst the loss of the clan institution in the central government would mean losing what has been an integral component thus far and what characterizes the Somaliland project, it could also be determined by the leaders in Somaliland that the clan institution was a part of the process of statebuilding but not the resulting state. The path to democracy in Somaliland was dependent upon the Somaliland clans. Now that democracy is taking root, however, the government in Somaliland must decide what the future role for the clans is. It would be a worrying loss if the Guurti was ousted because of internal pressure stemming by interpretations of what is desired to become a modern state, as premature removal of a pivotal component of the balance could prove disastrous for the state. However, it is possible that leaders in Somaliland will determine that the stabilizing influence of the clan is no longer needed. Whatever the future, one thing Somaliland has shown thus far is that no decision will be made without lengthy debate and consensus from within the state. The future of the traditional institution may be under debate, but the lessons to be taken are immense. Even if the Guurti is removed or altered from its present form, the inclusion of and dependence on the traditional institution throughout the statebuilding process in Somaliland shows the value of this local dynamic and the vital role it played in creating a state.

Using the terminology of Finnemore, Somaliland is both ‘learning’ and being ‘taught’ statehood. At the same time, however, Somaliland is also contributing to the practice of ‘teaching’ statehood.^[576] in her comparative examination of Western and non-Western approaches to the study of international relations, Bilgin argues that there is an unwarranted distinction between ‘Western’ and ‘non-Western’ approaches as they are ‘almost the same but not quite’ and often produce similar outcomes.^[577] Whilst Bilgin is discussing analytical and theoretical approaches to the study of IR, the notion of ‘almost the same but not quite’ raises interesting considerations for practice, particularly in relation to statebuilding. As the case of Somaliland shows, the ‘almost the same but not quite’ state can produce similar functions and outcomes to those desired by the international community. Bilgin’s conclusion can be identified more broadly, however, particularly in her identification of a suffused or increasingly symbiotic relationship between the Western and non-Western. It has been argued that western demands dominate policy leading to the exclusion of the unknown or unfamiliar. At the same time, however, seemingly non-Western approaches have been incorporated into practice, albeit in a very limited capacity. Recent trends include the inclusion and utilization of traditional structures in local governance building and localized development projects.^[578] This acknowledgment of the benefits afforded by indigenous structures and practices shows a willingness to engage with these structures, although only on a level that is supportive of the agreed normative consensus of the acceptable modern state. the utilization of both Western and indigenous structures and practices, however, can be beneficial not only to local development projects, but also to both internationally and domestically led statebuilding projects.

Cramer and Goodhand argue that the state apparatus and functions cannot be treated in isolation to local and regional contexts and considerations. In reference to statebuilding policies in Afghanistan they note the exclusion of more localized considerations; an exclusion that they argue has significantly contributed to difficulties in the statebuilding project.^[579] Although this critique identifies a problem with the limited scope of current policy, it has also been noted that much of the widespread deficiencies, particularly in regards to statebuilding, are due to the ‘state of knowledge and practice regarding the establishment and/or reconstitution of effective governance in post-conflict and war-torn societies is still in its infancy’. As such, ‘[statebuilding] templates, particularly when they reflect particular ideological biases, risk oversimplification and conflation and tend to discount the impact of the situational and historical factors’.^[580] Governance reform in relatively stable states is an established practice that is promoted for continuing stability and economic growth and has shown a degree of success for the international community. Statebuilding, on the other hand, has a failing record. As Ottaway notes, this is largely due to overambitious policy, creating a situation in which an acceptable result becomes unattainable as the necessary resources are unavailable.^[581] In responses to state failure, collapse, weakness or fragility, as well as poor or weak governance, current international policy is often plagued by tunnel vision in regards to the best approach to the situation.^[582] There is an ardent focus on what is perceived to be necessary as guided by the conception of success and how to achieve or control this, thereby overlooking, disregarding or bypassing individual needs or desires. Overambitious, unattainable and sometimes damaging policies are implemented, pushed and maintained. Short time frames, external agendas, lack of local ownership and failure to legitimize the process and the state contribute to these failures. As such, within policy there is a need to reconsider not only global and regional political and security contexts, as Cramer and Goodhand as well as Ottaway and Mair argue, but also to intricately involve the complexities and domestic capabilities of individual cases when addressing statebuilding projects.^[583] the current predominant guidance for creating governments in the ideal or the familiar conception of the modern state falls short of establishing an international environment conducive to accepting and integrating the distinctiveness of individual states and societies within practice; conditions that are necessary for legitimacy and ownership. This is a failure of policy, but that is secondary to failures stemming from the inflexibility of the liberal normative framework of statehood. Where some actors are viewed as acceptable and empowered in these projects, others are excluded in what can be described as a means of governance. With statebuilding practices bounded by comfort in the known and the familiar state reflecting normative ideals and practices, uncertainty in going beyond that can inhibit a more specialized approach to statebuilding or reform projects in contentious or turbulent territories; an approach that considers not only regional factors, but also domestic circumstances, characteristics, structures societies, cultures and traditions.

Therefore, one of the key criticisms to be made to the current conception of acceptable statehood is its rigidity. but within that and in relation to policy there is also a lack of trust in actors, structures or practices that cannot be found in or that contravene what is perceived to be right for a state. However, these perceptions are based on what is known in the world that is imposing the norms. As such, those supposed backwards, unpredictable, uncontrollable or even powerless factors are often seen as posing a threat to the expected stability of what is perceived to be successful. Somaliland, though, has shown that the inclusion of one of these factors in a central government is not a weakness but rather a strength, and that autonomous compliance with normative values can occur in a government structure that is inclusive of a ‘backwards’ institution. The demonstration of trust in and of willingness to engage with international norms, however, has not been reciprocated by the international community. Even though the stability of Somaliland is broadly recognized, the value to be found in Somaliland’s hybrid system has yet to be widely acknowledged. Instead, the clan’s place within the government is often discussed in historical context or is avoided because of fears of romanticizing or glorifying its role. This discounts political actors and processes within the statebuilding process, leading to an oversimplification or a misrepresentation of what has taken place. At this point, the quest for Somaliland’s international engagement has gone beyond instrumentality and has moved into questions of trust and partnership. Until the international community is willing to look outside the narrow vision of what is acceptable, though, formal engagement is unlikely as there will be hesitancy to form a partnership with the uncertainty and the unknown that Somaliland’s government presents. Somaliland’s success, however, shows that the traditional is not something to instinctively reject, and more importantly it opens the possibility for an element of trust in local capabilities and capacities that does not exist within the current dominant framework.

Approaches to creating states would benefit from a less restricted approach that facilitates the ownership and legitimacy required for success, as well as allowing for a less rigid process rather than blueprinted project. Othieno argues as much, stating that donors need to address the needs and desires of society rather than becoming involved in a situation or crisis with the narrow focus of the ‘traditional response to crisis’.^[584] Whereas the international community should recognize that alternatives to the current model of acceptable statehood would increase stability in areas, such as many states in Africa where the Western model has not shown much success, the international community has yet to establish an environment in which alternative conceptions of successful statehood could be attained. Instead, the current perception of success continues to dominate policy, thereby sustaining a narrow conception of how a successful state can look and function. This narrowness leads to a lack of flexibility, a detriment not only to the resulting state, but also to the process as there is less room to negotiate, and indeed re-negotiate, the state throughout the process. There is reluctance on the part of international organizations and donors to relinquish control of internationally funded projects or to invest in what is perceived to be a risky or unknown situation; control of the process is a form of tutelage in the scheme of liberal intervention. But stepping outside these confines by incorporating regional or domestic factors and concerns into statebuilding is necessary if such projects are to be effective. This is not to suggest that the international community adopt a hands-off approach, as international security concerns and agendas ensure that this is unlikely and impractical. However, a reconsidered approach must not be dictated by a blueprint, a template or an idealized and unattainable model, but rather should reflect the individual desires, needs and demands of the state or territory in question. It must also be flexible so as to facilitate evolution and growth that takes place throughout the process. As evidenced by failed statebuilding projects, the supposedly modern state is not the curative it is expected to be and can instead prove to be dysfunctional or destructive. Ghani and Lockhart, as well as Brinkerhoff, are correct in arguing that there needs to be a re-examination of a statebuilding policy and that reconsideration should include local and regional considerations in addition to international desires and demands. They are also correct in identifying that there is no state without inclusion of the public or society and all that goes with it. Externally imposed statebuilding or reform projects in a contentious or post-conflict territory will always be prone to failure as long as they do not engage with or account for the local population, the local history and specific local circumstances.

However, these reconsiderations must go beyond the frequently espoused technocratic components of policy. in being more inclusive of those factors outside the scope of the acceptable framework, in reflecting society and in taking into account the specific context and history of the territory, statebuilding policies can begin to increase domestic investment in the project and therefore increase the chances of ‘success’. Interventionist policies must move beyond the template and the established steps and restrictions in order to be conducive to policies that allow for a more open posture. They must be aware of their own power effects and try to minimize them in order to overcome the power-blind approach espoused by those such as Ghani and Lockhart. They must work to support an inclusive process and avoid rewarding violence, and like the elders in Somaliland, interveners must also work on establishing a consensual means to curb unrestricted power. Finally, international policies must be grounded in trust rather than looking for specific outcomes. Although these desires and demands admittedly are utopian in nature, they indicate a way in which international actors should consider their actions and policies. Perhaps the emphasis, therefore, should be less on statebuilding and more on state-formation, with the process being assisted by the international community but the state being created from within. Broadening the conception of what is acceptable for the state and how to obtain this will allow for an acceptance of the indigenous, local or traditional as an important component of fostering – not imposing – success. Statebuilding is a socio-political process, not a technocratic project, and it must be treated as such.

The Road Less Travelled

In Somaliland, governance came before formal institutions, reversing the established pattern of the technocratic state. The unrecognized state allows for, and in many ways demands, the development of ideas of governance prior to their attachment to institutions of government. This creates a space whereby an idea of state emerges; a model of what could be for the territory and a foundation for the creation of the state. This idea will ultimately have two audiences; an internal and an external. The internal audience needs to be convinced of the project for a new state as acceptance of the idea and the resulting state move to establish internal legitimacy. However, to move from unrecognized to recognized the state needs external legitimacy and this will shape how it presents itself to the outside world. The need for external recognition will create pressures to conform to certain international norms, but because this is done after governance has been established the state avoids some of the dangers of the Potemkin village statehood. The structures of the state can better withstand challenges because it has internal legitimacy that brings with it support. The desire to be recognized will also create a cohesion that should counter against the evolution, or even potential fracturing, of the idea. Neither the idea of the state nor the technocratic state can exist in isolation: a relationship must exist between internal imaginings and external expectations. Closing the gap of expectations of legitimacy is a necessity not only for stability within unrecognized states, but also within statebuilding.

In discussions on statebuilding, focus is almost exclusively on how the demands of external legitimacy are met. But a state is not a state based purely on the legal recognition of territorial boundaries or on how well it complies with an empirical checklist. In unrecognized states there are remarkable cases of modern day state formation that re-politicize state making and allow for a recognition of ‘notions of … social contract-based state-society relations’ that are most commonly linked with the evolution of modern Western states.^[585] Yet unrecognized states are also faced with unprecedented external empirical demands. There must be a recognition that balancing these demands is particularly prevalent not only in entities seeking to become states, but also in those undergoing the statebuilding process.

When a researcher first arrives in Somaliland it is likely that they will not know what to expect. They will probably not expect the openness of political debate that is common not only in the government and civil society but also on the streets. They may not expect the stability encountered. Knowing Somaliland’s quest for recognition, they may expect to find a ‘storefront’ state – a state putting up the pretenses of acceptable statehood as a component of a broader strategy of recognition. However, that is not what they will find. As a non-Somali in Somaliland, and certainly as a researcher, it is common to be frequently asked to comment on how Somaliland ‘is doing’. A researcher attempting to maintain impartiality will refrain from a definitive assessment or comment. As a researcher in Somaliland during the self-extension crisis, I was asked this frequently. Every time, though, I could not help thinking that what I would say is how what was taking place was not the end of the road but merely a speed bump; that Somaliland is undergoing a self-led statebuilding process, and it is a remarkable thing to watch. And that is the best way to summarize overall what is taking place in Somaliland – it is not a perfect process but it is a process that continues even when obstacles are encountered. It is a form of statebuilding that one does not encounter every day. The statebuilding process in Somaliland has not been perfect or problem free, but it is a process and it is one that belongs to the Somaliland actors. Power was not granted from the outside, but rather comes from within. For Somaliland, the internally driven statebuilding process has been successful and has created relative stability for the territory and its population. As the state grows, important decisions will have to be made concerning the future composition and function of the government, and this must be achieved without losing what works for the territory. For the international community, Somaliland has proven that a beneficial compromise can be reached between the known and the unknown: one does not have to be marginalized or excluded for the sake of the other. It has also proven the benefit of balancing the needs of those within with the expectations of those outside. Somaliland can be a model for statebuilding, but it cannot and should not be new blueprint or template. The created state is an indication of the realities of what is possible in statebuilding but is also both an anathema to and a reflection of the path to the frequently espoused yet unattainable ideal. It serves as an example that going off plan can work. Somaliland did not follow the prescribed path to success, but instead took an alternative but parallel route. As Mohammed Gees reflects, Somaliland could be a model, but it needs to keep moving forward. And only Somalilanders can do that.^[586]

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FOOTNOTES

[1] R. Dowden, ‘An Alien Inheritance’, Prospect (September 2008), pp. 42–45: p. 43.

[2] See J. Herbst, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); A. Morton, ‘The Age of Absolutism: capitalism, the Modern state system and international relations’, Review of International Studies 31.3 (2005), pp. 495–517.

[3] See M. Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (1947), ed. Talcott Parsons (New York: Free Press, 1964); M. Weber, ‘Politics as Vocation (1948)’, in H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (ends), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (London: Routledge, 1967), pp. 77–128.

[4] M. Weber, ‘Politics as Vocation’, op. cit.; M. Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, op. cit., pp. 154–6.

[5] I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 5th edition (Oxford: clarendon Press, 1998): pp. 70–72, Emphasis added; International Conference of American States, ‘convention on rights and duties of states’, seventh international conference of American States, Montevideo, Uruguay (26 December 1933), available at http://avalon.law.yale. edu/20th_century/intam03.asp.

[6] R. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 21.

[7] See B. Jessop, State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in its Place (Oxford: Polity, 1990).

[8] For the evolution of the conception of the state, see, for example, I.W. Zartman (ed.), Collapsed States: the disintegration and restoration of legitimate authority (boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995); R. Jackson, Quasi-states: Sovereignty, op. cit.; R. Jackson, ‘Quasistates, dual regimes, and neoclassical theory’, International Organization 41.4 (1987), pp. 519–49; R. Jackson, ‘Surrogate Sovereignty? Great Power Responsibility and “Failed States”’, University of British Columbia Institute of International Relations Working Paper 25 (1998); M. Weber, ‘Politics as Vocation’, op. cit.; M. Weber, The Theory Social and Economic Organization, op. cit.; D. Carment, ‘assessing state Failure: implications for theory and Policy’, Third World Quarterly 24.3 (2003), pp. 407–27; J. Milliken (ed.), State Failure, Collapse and Reconstruction (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003); R. Rotberg, ‘Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States’, in R. Rotberg (ed.), State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), pp. 1–28; R. Rotberg, When States Fail: Causes and Consequences (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); B. Jessop, State Theory, op. cit.; A. Morton, op. cit.; State Failure Task Force, ‘State Failure Task Force Reports: Phases II-III Findings’, College Park, MD: Centre for International Development and Conflict Management (31 July 1998; 4 August 2003).

[9] R. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, op. cit., p. 21.

[10] B. Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping (New York: United Nations, 1992); G.H.W. Bush, ‘Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and the Federal Budget Deficit’, Washington dc, 11 September 1990; G.H.W. Bush, ‘address before a Joint session of Congress on the Cessation of the Persian Gulf Conflict’, Washington DC, 6 March 1991. See also International Commission for Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), The Responsibility to Protect (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001), appendix a, ‘elements of the debate’, p. 10.

[11] R. Rotberg, ‘The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States: Breakdown, Prevention and Repair’, in R. Rotberg (ed.), When States Fail: Causes and Consequences (Princeton:

Princeton University Press, 2004), pp. 2–3.

[12] R. Rotberg, ‘Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States’, op. cit., p. 3.

[13] See A. Ghani and C. Lockhart, ‘Closing the Sovereignty Gap: An Approach to State-Building’, Overseas Development Institute Working Paper 253 (London: ODI, 2005); A. Ghani and C. Lockhart, Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

[14] Whilst the United Nations entered Somalia under the guise of a peacekeeping mission in 1992 (UNOSOM I), the statebuilding project began in March 1993 with the start of the highly ambitious UNOSOM ii mission. United Nations, ‘resolution 814 (26 March 1993)’, Security Council Resolution.

[15] See S. Chesterman, M. Ignatieff and R. Thakur, ‘Introduction: Making States Work’, in S. Chesterman, M. Ignatieff and R. Thakur (ends), Making States Work: State Failure and the Crisis of Governance (Washington DC: Brookings Institute Press, 2005), pp. 1–10: p. 4.

[16] M. Berger, ‘States of Nature and the Nature of States: the fate of nations, the collapse of states and the future of the world’, Third World Quarterly 28.6 (2007), pp. 1203–14: p. 1203.

[17] A. Ghani and C. Lockhart, Fixing Failed States, op. cit.

[18] M. Weiner, ‘Bad Neighbors, Bad Neighborhoods: An Inquiry into the Causes of refugee Flows’, International Security 21.1 (1996), pp. 5–42.

[19] M. Berger, op. cit., pp. 1203–4.

[20] J. Williamson, ‘In Search of a Manual for Technopols’, in J. Williamson (ed.), The Political Economy of Policy Reform (Washington dc: institute for international Economics, 1994), pp. 9–28; A. Yannis, ‘State Collapse and its Implications for PeaceBuilding and Reconstruction’, in J. Milliken (ed.), State Failure, Collapse and Reconstruction (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), pp. 63–82; T. Carothers, Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004). See also, United Nations, ‘report of the international conference on Financing for development (Monterrey Convention)’, Monterrey, Mexico, 18–22 March 2002.

[21] R. Jackson, Quasi-States, op. cit.; R. Jackson, ‘Surrogate Sovereignty?’, op. cit.; R. Jackson, ‘Quasi-States, Dual Regimes’, op. cit.; R. Rotberg, ‘Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States’, op. cit.; R. Rotberg, ‘The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States’, op. cit.; R. Rotberg, ‘Strengthening Governance: Ranking Countries Would Help’, The Washington Quarterly 28.1 (2004–2005), pp. 71–81; R. Rotberg, ‘The New Nature of nation-state Failure’, The Washington Quarterly 25.3 (2002), pp. 85–96.

[22] A. Ghani and C. Lockhart, Fixing Failed States, op. cit., pp. 30–31.

[23] See J-F. Bayart, ‘Africa in the World: A History of Extraversion’, African Affairs 99.395 (2000), pp. 217–67; J-F. Bayart, The State in Africa: Politics of the Belly (London: Longman, 1993).

[24] M. Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War (Cambridge: Polity, 2007), pp. 172–9.

[25] M. Bryden, ‘The Banana Test: Is Somaliland Ready for Recognition?’ Annales d’Éthiopie 19 (2003), pp. 341–64.

[26] A. Hashi, ‘The Implication of Traditional Leadership, “Guurti” and Other Nonstate actors in local governance in Somaliland’, study report for the community Empowerment and Social Inclusion Program of the World Bank Institute (June 2005).

[27] It must be noted here that using the terms ‘traditional’ and ‘customary’ is done without connotation, normative judgments or any comment on the often contentious use of the terms. The terms were chosen for purposes of distinction and analysis, and should not be read as more than that.

[28] Although there is an international presence within Somaliland, much of this is under the guise of the wider Somalia projects. Most international involvement or intervention also targets humanitarian rather than political concerns. The primary external actor in Somaliland – the diaspora – is in interesting one as it is both an internal and an external actor. So as not to reduce the role of the diaspora in the statebuilding process in Somaliland, here it is treated separately from considerations of non-Somaliland international involvement; the diaspora is considered an external domestic actor, but not an international actor. Wherever possible, involvement by the international community is referred to as ‘external’ intervention or ‘international’ intervention. As the diaspora arguably is not an interventionist actor, and to distinguish its unique role, it is referred to as ‘the diaspora’.

[29] Interviews with author, August-September 2006, Hargeisa. It is very common to be told that the traditional inclusion in Somaliland’s government, the Upper house of Parliament, is comparable to the United States senate.

[30] G. Prunier, ‘Somaliland Goes it Alone’, Current History 97.619 (1998), pp. 225–8.

[31] See, for example, M. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland (Oxford: James Currey, 2008).

[32] See, for example, the works of I.M. Lewis.

[33] C. Clapham, ‘The Global-Local Politics of State Decay’, in R. Rotberg (ed.), When States Fail: Causes and Consequences (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), pp. 77–93: p. 77.

[34] R. Rotberg, ‘The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States: Breakdown, Prevention, and Repair’, in R. Rotberg (ed.), When States Fail: Causes and Consequences (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), pp. 1–50: p. 1.

[35] See J. Herbst, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

[36] R. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 17.

[37] Ibid.

[38] M. Bøås and K. Jennings, ‘Insecurity and Development: The Rhetoric of the “Failed State”’, The European Journal of Development Research 17.3 (2005), pp. 385–95: p. 387.

[39] Ibid.

[40] A. Morton and P. Bilgin, ‘Historicizing Representations of “Failed States:” beyond the cold War annexation of the social sciences?’ Third World Quarterly 23.1 (2002), pp. 55–80.

[41] J. Gros, ‘Towards a Taxonomy of Failed States in the New World Order: decaying Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda and Haiti’, Third World Quarterly 17.3 (1996), pp. 448–61: p. 455.

[42] A. Yannis, ‘State Collapse and its Implications for Peace-Building and Reconstruction’, in J. Milliken (ed.), State Failure, Collapse and Reconstruction (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), pp. 63–80: p. 64, footnote 1.

[43] D. Carment, ‘Assessing State Failure: Implications for Theory and Policy’, Third World Quarterly 24.3 (2003), pp. 407–27: p. 409.

[44] In particular, this is evident in works by Robert Rotberg and the Harvard Failed States Project. See also Bøås and Jennings, op. cit., for more discussion on the relationship between the state and human security in the context of the failed state.

[45] State Failure Task Force, ‘State Failure Task Force Findings I (30 November 1995), II (31 July 1998), III (20 September 2000), IV (18 November 2003), V (3 September 2005)’, College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management; Fund for Peace, ‘2013 Failed states index scores’, available at http://www.fundforpeace.org/.

[46] D. Thürer, ‘The “failed state” and international law’, International Review of the Red Cross No. 836 (December 1999), pp. 731–61: p. 731; R. Rotberg, op. cit., pp. 5–7.

[47] D. Thürer, op. cit., p. 731; State Failure Task Force, ‘Phase I Findings’, op. cit., p. vii.

[48] D. Brinkerhoff, ‘Rebuilding Governance in Failed States and Post-Conflict societies: core concepts and cross-cutting themes’, Public Administration and Development 25.1 (2005), pp. 3–14: p. 4. A similar definition is given by the Fund for Peace in the explanation of their annual Failed States Index.

[49] In addition to the Failed States Index and the State Failure Task Force, op. cit., see for example USAID, ‘US Foreign Aid: Meeting the Challenges of the Twenty-first Century’, US Agency for International Development (2004); USAID, ‘Proposed Typology in Order to classify countries based on Performance and state capacity’, Us agency for International Development (2003); Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit, ‘Countries at Risk of Instability Reports’ (February 2005); J. Gros, op. cit.

[50] R. Rotberg, ‘The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States’, op. cit., p. 6. Emphasis added.

[51] D. Thürer, op. cit., p. 731; State Failure Task Force, ‘Phase I Findings’, op. cit., p. 1; M. Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War (Cambridge: Polity, 2007), p. 170.

[52] R. Rotberg, ‘Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators’, in R. Rotberg (ed.), State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror (Washington DC: Brookings Institute Press, 2003), pp. 1–28: p. 9. See also, S. Chesterman, M. Ignatieff and R. Thakur, ‘Introduction: Making States Work’, in S. Chesterman, et al. (ends), Making States Work: State Failure and the Crisis of Governance (New York: United Nations University Press, 2005), pp. 1–10.

[53] A. Yannis, op. cit., p. 64, footnote 1. Emphasis added.

[54] M. Ayoob, ‘State Making, State Breaking, and State Failure’, in C. Crocker, et al. (ends), Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict (Washington DC: United States Institute for Peace, 2001), pp. 127–42: p. 133.

[55] R. Jackson, Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 295–6.

[56] A. Gourevitch, ‘The Unfailing of the State’, Journal of International Affairs 58.1 (2004), pp. 255–60: p. 257.

[57] S. Chesterman, M. Ignatieff and R. Thakur, op. cit., p. 4.

[58] The argument can be made that provision made by the Zapatistas in Mexico or Hamas in Palestine and Lebanon and their challenge to the central state indicates an abandonment of the state. The same can be said of some militant groups in Somalia, particularly al-Shabaab, an extremist militarized faction of the Union of Islamic courts. The question of abandoning the state is also raised by Berger in his discussion of state building. M. Berger, ‘states of nature and the nature of states: the fate of nations, the collapse of states and the future of the world’, Third World Quarterly 28.6 (2007), pp. 1203–14.

[59] W. Robinson, The Theory of Global Capitalism: Production, Class and State in a Transnational World (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007), pp. 86–7.

[60] For more discussion on this, see M. Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War (Cambridge: Polity, 2007), Chapter 7.

[61] M. Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (London: Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 22.

[62] Ibid., p. 2. Emphasis in original.

[63] Ibid., pp. 11–13.

[64] Ibid.

[65] See M.P. Cowen and R.W. Shenton, Doctrines of Development (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 11.

[66] M. Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars (London: Zed, 2001), p. 11.

[67] See G. Harrison, The World Bank and Africa: The Construction of Governance States (London: Routledge, 2004); G. Harrison, ‘The World Bank, Governance and theories of Political action in Africa’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations 7.2 (2005), pp. 240–60; The World Bank, Governance: The World Bank’s Experience (Washington DC: The World Bank, 1994). For an examination of inclusion of social policy and indicators as a component of assessing governance, see G. Davis, ‘a History of the Social Development Network in The World Bank, 1973 – 2002’, World Bank Social Development Papers Number 56 (2004).

[68] The World Bank, op. cit.; G. Harrison, ‘The World Bank, Governance and Theories of Public action’, op. cit., p. 240.

[69] United Nations, ‘Resolution 814 (26 March 1993)’, Security Council Resolution.

[70] B. Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace (New York: United Nations, 1992), 1.15.

[71] T. Sisk, Statebuilding (Cambridge: Polity, 2013), p. 1.

[72] Ibid.

[73] Ibid.

[74] Ibid. p. x.

[75] A. Ghani and C. Lockhart, ‘Closing the Sovereignty Gap: An Approach to State-Building’. London, Overseas Development Institute Report (2005); A. Ghani and C. Lockhart, Fixing Failed States; A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 23.

[76] See UK Government, ‘A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy’, (London: HM Government, 2010); UK Government, ‘Building Security Overseas Strategy’, (London: DfID, MOD and FCO, 2011); US Government, ‘The National Security Strategy of the United States’, (Washington DC: The White House, 2002); S. Woodward, ‘state-building and Peace-building: What theory and Whose role?’ in R. Kozul-Wright and P. Fortunato (ends), Securing Peace: State-Building and Economic Development in Post-Conflict Countries (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2011), pp. 87–112: p. 93.

[77] See also, UK Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit Papers (2005), op. cit.; DfID, ‘Country Engagement Plan for Somalia’, (London, 2005); DfID, ‘Making Government Work for Poor People: Building State Capability’, (London: 2001); DfID, ‘Why We Need to Work More Effectively in Fragile States’, (London, 2005).

[78] USAID, What We Do: Democracy, Human Rights and Governance. [Online] available at www.usaid.gov.

[79] T. Sisk, op. cit. 163.

[80] D. Chandler, International Statebuilding: The Rise of Post-Liberal Governance (London: Routledge, 2010), p. 1.

[81] M. Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War, op. cit., p. 159.

[82] D. Chandler, op. cit., p. 5.

[83] D. Chandler, Ibid.

[84] D. Chandler, Ibid., p. 6.

[85] S. Woodward, op. cit., p. 88.

[86] T. Sisk, op. cit., p. 168.

[87] M. Cox, ‘Wilsonian Resurgent? The Clinton Administration and the Promotion of Democracy’, in M. Cox, G.J. Ikenberry, T. Inoguchi (ends) American Democracy Promotion: Impulses, Strategies and Impacts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 200, p. 226.

[88] B. Boutros-Ghali,op. cit., pp. 8–9.

[89] R. Richards and R.G. Smith, ‘Imagining the State: Legitimizing Kurdistan and Somaliland’, EWIS Workshops, Tartu, 2013.

[90] C. Call, ‘Ending Wars, Building States’, in C. Call and V. Wyeth (ends), Building States to Build Peace (London: Lynne Rienner, 2008), pp. 1–22: p. 8.

[91] Field of Dreams. [Film] directed by P.A. Robinson (United States: Gordon Company, 1989).

[92] See The World Bank, op. cit., p. xiv.

[93] B. Bliesemann de Guevara, ‘Statebuilding and State Formation’, in B. Bliesemann de Guevara (ed.) Statebuilding and State-Formation: The political sociology of intervention (London: Routledge, 2012), pp. 1–20: p. 2.

[94] T. Sisk, op. cit., p. 64.

[95] Ibid., p. 9.

[96] D. Chandler, op. cit., p. 71.

[97] T. Sisk, op. cit., p. 76.

[98] C. Call, op. cit., p. 13.

[99] D. Chandler, op. cit.

[100] T. Sisk, op. cit., p. 10.

[101] See C. Call, op. cit. p. 3.

[102] D. Chandler, International Statebuilding: The Rise of Post-Liberal Governance (London: Routledge, 2010), p. 1.

[103] Ibid.

[104] A. Bendana, ‘What Kind of Peace is Being Built? Critical Assessments from the South’, International Development Research Centre Discussion Paper (Ottawa, 2003).

[105] See, for example, M. Ottaway, ‘Rebuilding State Institutions in Collapsed States’, in J. Milliken (ed.) State Failure, Collapse and Reconstruction (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), pp. 254–66; M. Ottaway, ‘Promoting Democracy After Conflict: The Difficult Choices’, International Studies Perspectives 4.3 (2003), pp. 314–22; R. Paris and T. Sisk (ends), The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the contradictions of postwar peace operations (London: Routledge, 2008); D. Chandler, op. cit.; B. Bliesemann de Guevara (ed.), Statebuilding and State-Formation: The Political Sociology of Intervention (London:

Routledge, 2012).

[106] M. Ottaway, ‘Rebuilding State Institutions’, op. cit., p. 248.

[107] See T. Donais, ‘Empowerment or Imposition? Dilemmas of local ownership in post-conflict peacebuilding processes’, Peace and Change 34.1 (2009), pp. 3–26; R. Paris and T. Sisk, op. cit.

[108] R. Paris and T. Sisk, op. cit.

[109] L. Diamond, Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq (New York: Times Books, 2005), pp. 32–3.

[110] See, for example, R. MacGinty and O. Richmond, ‘The Local Turn in Peace building: a critical agenda for peace’, Third World Quarterly 34.5 (2013), pp. 763–83. R. MacGinty, ‘Indigenous Peace-Making Versus the Liberal Peace’, Cooperation and Conflict 43.3 (2008), pp. 139–63; R. MacGinty, ‘Routine Peace: Technocracy and peacebuilding’, Cooperation and Conflict 47.3 (2012), pp. 287–308; R. MacGinty, ‘Hybrid Peace: the interaction between top-down and bottom-Up Peace’, Security Dialogue 41.4 (2010), pp. 391–412. See also, D. Roberts, ‘Hybrid Polities and Indigenous Pluralities: advanced lessons in statebuilding from Cambodia’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 1.3 (2007), pp. 379–402.

[111] Somaliland Academy for Peace and Development (APD) and the War-torn Societies Project, From Plunder to Prosperity: Resolving Resource-Based Conflict in Somaliland (Nairobi/Hargeisa: Dialogue for Peace Somali Programme Report, 2006).

[112] Quoting Fortna. S. Woodward, ‘State-Building and Peace-Building: What Theory and Whose Roles?’ in R. Kozul-Wright and P. Fortunato (ends), Securing Peace: State-Building and Economic Development in Post-Conflict Countries (London: Bloomsbury, 2011), pp. 87–122: p. 88.

[113] Ibid., pp. 88–9.

[114] C. Call, ‘Ending Wars, Building States’, in C. Call and V. Wyeth (ends), Building States to Build Peace (London: Lynne Rienner, 2008), pp. 1–22: p. 9.

[115] T. Sisk, Statebuilding (Cambridge: Polity, 2013), p. 2.

[116] Ibid., p. 67.

[117] F. Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), p. 134.

[118] Ibid.

[119] C. Call, op. cit., p. 10.

[120] Ibid.

[121] See R. Paris, Building Peace After Civil Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); M. Ottaway, ‘Rebuilding State Institutions’, op. cit.; M. Barnett, ‘Building a Republican Peace: Stabilizing States after War’, International Security 30.4 (2006), pp. 87–112.

[122] C. Call, op. cit., p. 7.

[123] S. Woodward, op. cit., p. 107.

[124] Ibid.

[125] I. Hurd, ‘Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics’, International Organization 53.2 (1999), pp. 379–408: p. 381.

[126] K. Papagianni, ‘Participation and State Legitimacy’, in C. Call and V. Wyeth (ends), Building States to Build Peace (London: Lynne Rienner, 2008), pp. 49–71: p. 49.

[127] Ibid.

[128] Ibid., p. 54.

[129] S. Woodward, op. cit., p. 108.

[130] D. Chandler, op. cit.

[131] A. Ghani and C. Lockhart, ‘Closing the Sovereignty Gap: An Approach to StateBuilding’, Overseas Development Institute Working Paper 253 (London: ODI, 2005).

[132] D. Chandler, ‘Editor’s Introduction: Peace Without Politics’, International Peacekeeping 12.3 (2005), pp. 307–21: p. 309.

[133] T. Sisk, op. cit., p. 10.

[134] See C. Call, op. cit., p. 3.

[135] See B. Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, 2nd edn (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester, 1993), Chapter 2.

[136] This goes back to basic Westphalian notion of statehood, as well as more recent understandings such as those expressed in the 1933 Montevideo convention and the widely-used Weberian definition.

[137] B. Buzan, op. cit., p. 38.

[138] B. Anderson, Imagined Communities rev. edn (London: Verso Books, 1991), p. 6.

[139] Ibid., p. 224.

[140] B. Buzan, op. cit., p. 39.

[141] Ibid.

[142] T. Sisk, op. cit., p. 8; see also C. Call (ed.), Building States to Build Peace (London: Lynne Rienner, 2008).

[143] For example, see Jackson’s work on quasi-states.

[144] For more on the contestation between the two, see D. Chandler, op. cit.

[145] C. King, ‘The Benefits of Ethnic War: Understanding Eurasia’s unrecognized states’, World Politics 53.4 (2001), pp. 524–52: p. 525.

[146] N. Caspersen and G. Stansfield (ends), Unrecognized States in the International System (London: Routledge, 2011): pp 1–2.

[147] S. Pegg, International Society and the De Facto State (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998): p. 4.

[148] P. Kölsto, ‘The Sustainability and Future of Unrecognized Quasi-States’, Journal of Peace Research 43.6 (2006), pp. 723–40: pp. 725–6; N. Caspersen, Unrecognized States: The Struggle for Sovereignty in the Modern International System (Cambridge: Polity, 2012): p. 6.

[149] S. Pegg, ‘From De Facto States to States-Within-States: Progress, Problems and Prospects’, in P. Kingston and I. Spears (ends), States-Within-States: Incipient Political Entities in the Post-Cold War Era (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 35–46: p. 38.; S. Pegg, International Society and the De Facto State, op. cit.; c. King, ‘the Benefits of Ethnic War’, op. cit. Pegg and King both note that alternative motivations for maintaining de facto statehood may be political or regional stability or economic benefits from the ‘illegal’ status of de facto states. The difficulty of determining motivations is also apparent when discussing the criteria of actively seeking recognition. One such territorial entity, Kurdistan, is considered by some to be an unrecognized state but not so by others. The primary point of impasse here is Kurdistan’s seeking of recognition is a latent rather than an overt action.

[150] P. Kingston and I. Spears (ends), States-Within-States: Incipient Political Entities in the Post-Cold War Era (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

[151] See C. Tilly, ‘War Making and State Making as Organized Crime’, in D. Evans, et al. (ends), Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 169–91.

[152] See W. Reno, Warlord Politics and African States (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999); I. spears, ‘states-Within-states: an introduction to their empirical attributes’, in P. Kingston and I. Spears (ends), States-Within-States: Incipient Political Entities in the Post-Cold War Era (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 15–34. See also, J-F. Bayart, S. Ellis and B. Hibou, The Criminalization of the State in Africa (Oxford: James Currey, 1999); P. Chabal and J-P. Daloz, Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument (Oxford: James Currey, 1999); K. Holsti, The State, War and the State of War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

[153] See P. Collier and A. Hoeffler, ‘Greed and Grievance in Civil War’, Oxford Economic Papers No. 56 (Oxford, 2004), pp. 563–95; P. Collier, A. Hoeffler, D. Rohner, ‘beyond greed and grievance: Feasibility and civil War’, the center for the study of African Economies Working Paper Series Paper 254 (Oxford: Centre for African Economies, 2006); P. Collier, ‘Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and their Implications for Policy’, World Bank Working Paper 28134 (June 2000).

[154] R. Bates, Prosperity and Violence: The Political Economy of Development (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001): p. 51.

[155] See M. Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (1947), ed. Talcott Parsons (New York: Free Press, 1964); M. Weber, ‘Politics as Vocation (1948)’, in H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (ends), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (London: Routledge, 1967), pp. 77–128.

[156] The obvious recent exceptions to this are Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka and South Ossetia in Georgia, although the violence in the latter was instigated and prolonged primarily by Georgia and Russia rather than South Ossetia.

[157] I. Spears, ‘States-Within-States’, op. cit., p. 18.

[158] In his work on the state in Africa, Herbst notes what he terms ‘survival strategies’, or dependence on decentralized governance provided by sub-state actors. As a means of survival within a pre-determined centralized government structure, these strategies are not negative or undermining of the state, but are rather necessary to accommodate the necessities and circumstances of the states in which they take place. Similarly, in an international system that places primacy on modern liberal state structures and practices, finding ways to exist within that, and borrowing from Herbst, can be seen as survival strategies themselves. J. Herbst, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

[159] C. King, ‘The Benefits of Ethnic War’, op. cit.; N. Caspersen, ‘Unrecognized States: shadow economies, democratization and hopes for independence’, Lancaster University Seminar Series (24 January 2006); N. Caspersen, ‘Self-Determination vs. Democracy? Democratization in De Facto States’, Paper delivered at the 49th annual Isa convention, San Francisco (March 2008).

[160] N. Caspersen, ‘Unrecognized States: Shadow Economies’, op. cit.

[161] N. Caspersen, ‘Unrecognized States: Shadow Economies’, op. cit.; S. Pegg, De Facto States, op. cit.

[162] A. Ghani and C. Lockhart, ‘Closing the Sovereignty Gap’, op. cit.; A. Ghani and C. Lockhart, Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); A. Ghani, C. Lockhart and M. Carnahan, ‘An Agenda for state-building in the twenty-First century’, The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 30.1 (2006), pp. 101–23. Interestingly, within this there is recognition that a failure of legitimacy is a commonality in fragile states that either descend into conflict or fail, the discussion of legitimacy is confined to the very Weberian realm of ‘legitimate monopolization of force’.

[163] R.G. Smith, ‘Kurdistan: The Road to Independence’, unpublished manuscript (2013). Kurdistan is a grey area when it comes to identifying unrecognized states. With no official declaration of independence, it does not strictly fit the criteria as laid out by Caspersen and Kölsto. However, others, such as Smith, recognize the negative impact a declaration of independence would have on Kurdistan’s economy, among other areas. Rather than viewing a lack of declaration as non-intent for independence, it is rather viewed as a strategic move beneficial to the Kurdistan state until recognition by at least one external state is certain. This ‘latent intent’ does not eliminate Kurdistan from consideration as an unrecognized state.

[164] T. Sisk, op. cit., p. 76.

[165] F. Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution (London: Profile Books, 2011): pp. 478–9.

[166] T. Sisk, op. cit., p. 167.

[167] S. Woodward, op. cit., p. 107.

[168] J. Migdal, ‘Introduction’, in J. Migdal, A. Kohli and V. Shue (ends), State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 1–7: p. 2.

[169] See, S. Woodward, op. cit.; C. Call, ‘Ending Wars’, op. cit.; K. Papagianni, op. cit.; T. Sisk, op. cit.; T. Donais, op. cit.; R. Paris and T. Sisk, op. cit.

[170] M. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland (Oxford: James Currey, 2008), p. 14.

[171] Saadia Touval defines the Horn of Africa as an indefinite territorial jurisdiction, but as a region ‘inhabited mainly by Somalis’. S. Touval, Somali Nationalism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963): p. 5.

[172] Mohammed Hassan Ibrahim ‘Gani’, Mohammed Said Mohammed Gees, Abdi Aw Rabak, and Bobe Duale Yusuf. Conversations with author. (Hargeisa: August September 2006).

[173] I.M. Lewis, Understanding Somalia (London: HAAN Associates, 1993); J. Drysdale, Stoics Without Pillows: A Way Forward for the Somalilands (London: Haan Associates, 2000).

[174] I.M. Lewis, A Pastoral Democracy, op. cit., pp. 1–2.

[175] See A. Samatar, The State and Rural Transformation in Northern

Somalia, 1884–1986 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989).

[176] M. Bradbury, op. cit., p. 18; interviews conducted by author (Hargeisa, August September 2006).

[177] M. Bradbury, op. cit.

[178] J. Drysdale, op. cit., pp. 139–40.

[179] I.M. Lewis, A Pastoral Democracy, op. cit.

[180] S. Touval, op. cit., p. 13; I.M. Lewis, A Modern History of the Somali (Oxford: James Currey, 2002), pp. 1–2,7.

[181] M. Bradbury, op. cit., p. 18.

[182] M. Bradbury, ‘The Case of the Yellow Settee: Experiences of Doing Development in Post-War Somaliland’, ActionAid Draft Report (London: ActionAid, 1993); I.M. Lewis, A Pastoral Democracy, op. cit., pp. 4–7. Lewis labels the largest grouping within the structure as the ‘clan-family’, although common usage refers to it as the ‘clan’. For purposes here, the common usage will from this point be used, with the largest grouping being the ‘clan’, the first level of sub-lineages as the ‘sub-clan’ and so on.

[183] Historical studies of the pre-colonial Arab settlements found on the Somali coasts shows that an urban culture and civic identity rather than genealogy formed the basis of individual and communal identity. See L. Kapteijins, ‘Woman and the Crisis of Communal identity: the cultural construction of gender in Somali history’, in A. Samatar, ed., The Somali Challenge: From Catastrophe to Renewal (London: Lynne Rienner, 1994), pp. 211–31.

[184] M. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, op. cit., p. 16; I.M. Lewis, A Pastoral Democracy, op. cit.

[185] I.M. Lewis, A Pastoral Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 1.

[186] Amongst the Isaaq the titled elders are known as suldaan or sultan. For the other clans, titled elders are called: garaad, islaan and boqor amongst the Darood; ugaas amongst the Hawiye and Gadabuursi; and malaaq amongst the Rahanweyn. M. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, op. cit., p. 17; I.M. Lewis, Blood and Bone: The Call of Kinship in Somali Society (Lawrenceville, NJ: The Red Sea Press, 1994).

[187] I.M. Lewis, A Pastoral Democracy, op. cit., p. 196.

[188] M. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, op. cit., p. 16.

[189] I.M. Lewis, A Pastoral Democracy, op. cit., p. 5.

[190] I.M. Lewis, A Modern History, op. cit., p. 9. The age of adulthood for males in Somali culture is generally accepted to be fifteen years old.

[191] I.M. Lewis and A. Farah, ‘Somalia: The Roots of Reconciliation: Peace Making Endeavors of Contemporary Lineage Leaders in “Somaliland”’, Report for ActionAid (London: ActionAid, 1993), p. 17.

[192] M. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, op. cit., p. 15.

[193] I.M. Lewis, A Modern History, op. cit., p. 15.

[194] M. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, op. cit., p. 16.

[195] I.M. Lewis, A Modern History, op. cit., pp. 4–5.

[196] J. Drysdale, op. cit., p. 142; M. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, op. cit., p. 17. For more on the different types of xeer, see also I.M. Lewis, Blood and Bone, op. cit.; I.M. Lewis, A Pastoral Democracy, op. cit.; I.M. Lewis, A Modern History, op. cit.; A. Samatar, The Somali Challenge: From Catastrophe to Renewal? (London: Lynne Rienner, 1994).

[197] K. Menkhaus, ‘Kenya-Somalia Border Conflict Analysis’, USAID Conflict Prevention, Mitigation and response Program for east and southern Africa report (August 2005).

[198] Firsthand experience of the functions of the customary legal system was gained during fieldwork conducted in Hargeisa. During my stay, there were thefts of money and

[199] I.M. Lewis, ‘Clanship and Contract in Northern Somaliland’, Africa 29 (1959), pp. 274–93: pp. 281–2.

[200] M. Bradbury, ‘Peace-enforcement, Peace-making and Peace-building: Options for Resolving the Somali Conflict’, Exploratory Report for Oxfam (1993), p. 23; M. Bradbury, The Somali Conflict: Prospects for Peace (London: Oxfam Publishers, 1993), p. 23.

[201] I.M. Lewis, ‘Clanship and Contract’, op. cit., pp. 282, 286.

[202] J. Drysdale, op. cit., p. 141.

[203] Ibid., p. 282.

[204] M. Bradbury, ‘Peace-enforcement, Peace-making and Peace-Building’, op. cit., p. 78.

[205] I.M. Lewis, A Modern History, op. cit., p. 11; M. Bradbury, ‘Peace-enforcement, Peace-making and Peace Building’, op. cit., p. 32.

[206] J. Drysdale, op. cit., p. 12, Chapters 9 and 10.

[207] M. Bradbury, ‘Peace-enforcement, Peace-making and Peace-Building’, op. cit., p. 6.

[208] J. Drysdale, op. cit., pp. 141–2.

[209] Somaliland Academy for Peace and Development (APD), Rebuilding Somaliland:

Issues and Possibilities (Lawrenceville, NJ: The Red Sea Press, 2005), p. 63.

[210] M. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, op. cit., p. 19.

[211] Somaliland Upper House of Parliament, ‘Somaliland: A Model, Indigenous Owned Peace and Democratic Governance Building in the Horn’, Background report produced by the Upper House of Parliament (April 2006). This report also lists clairvoyance and telepathy as tools at the disposal of some elders, saying that some people believe that not obeying or going against the decisions of the elders will bring the wrath of Allah upon them.

[212] J. Drysdale, op. cit., p. 13.

[213] M. Bradbury, ‘Peace-enforcement, Peace-making and Peace-Building’, op. cit., pp. 81–2.

[214] One of the most respected peace makers in Somaliland today, Haji Abdi Hussein, is reported to be over 100 years old, although his exact age is not known. Respect for him comes from his age and his experiences.

[215] M. Bradbury, ‘Peace-enforcement, Peace-making and Peace-Building’, op. cit., p. 81.

[216] Ibid. See also I.M. Lewis, Blood and Bone, op. cit.; I.M. Lewis, A Pastoral Democracy, op. cit.; M. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, op. cit.

[217] Even after the introduction of central government in the Somali territories, guurti continued to be recognized as the highest authority, particularly during periods of violent or absent government. When the state was weak, the guurti assumed higher authority.

[218] I.M. Lewis, The Modern History of Somaliland: From Nation to State (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1965), p. 17.

[219] S. Touval, op. cit., p. 9. The first known Arabian settlement was an Arab sultanate established at Zeila on the Red Sea coast. By the thirteenth century it had developed into the Adal Empire. Numerous Arabian sultanates were established in southern Somalia at Mogadishu and Brava in the fifteenth century.

[220] S. Touval, op. cit., pp. 40, 90–97; I.M. Lewis, A Modern History, op. cit., p. 52.

[221] I.M. Lewis, A Modern History, op. cit., pp. 40–41.

[222] APD, op. cit., p. 11; S. Touval, op. cit., pp. 35–7. See also, I.M. Lewis, A Modern History, op. cit.; M. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, op. cit.; A. Samatar, The

State and Rural Transformation, op. cit. in order for British possession of the Somaliland Protectorate to be recognized by other colonizing powers in the colonization of Africa in the late nineteenth century, Britain had to formally declare its intentions for colonization of the territory. On 20 July 1887, Britain officially notified the European powers under the general act of the berlin conference that the British Protectorate had been established.

[223] APD, op. cit., p. 11; see also I.M. Lewis, A Modern History, op. cit., pp. 40–50.

[224] I.M. Lewis, A Modern History, op. cit., p. 47.

[225] S. Touval, op. cit., p. 47.

[226] International Crisis Group (ICG), ‘Somaliland: Democratization and its Discontents’, Africa Report No. 66 (Nairobi: ICG, 2003), pp. 2, 3. For more information on the dervish War, see S. Touval, op. cit., pp. 56–7, 58–9; I.M. Lewis, A Modern History, op. cit., Chapter 3; E.S. Pankhurst, Ex-Italian Somaliland (London: Watts and Co., 1951), chapter 3; APD, op. cit., pp. 11–12.

[227] I.M. Lewis, A Modern History, op. cit., p. 85.

[228] Douglas Jardine, Chief Secretary of the British Administration in the Somaliland Protectorate during the dervish War, as quoted in I.M. Lewis, A Modern History, op. cit., p. 101; APD, op. cit., p. 11.

[229] I.M. Lewis, A Modern History, op. cit., p. 102.

[230] W. Reno, ‘Somalia and Survival in the Shadow of the Global Economy’, QEH Working Paper No. 100 (February 2003). I.M. Lewis, A Modern History, op. cit.; E.S. Pankhurst, op. cit.

[231] ICG, op. cit., p. 3; I.M. Lewis, A Modern History, op. cit., p. 105.

[232] APD, op. cit., p. 12; ICG, op. cit., p. 3; I.M. Lewis, A Modern History, op. cit., pp. 101–3.

[233] Haji Abdi Hussein, Member of Somaliland House of Elders. Interview with author (Hargeisa, September 2006).

[234] I.M. Lewis, Blood and Bone, op. cit.; J. Drysdale, op. cit.

[235] I.M. Lewis, A Modern History, op. cit., pp. 49, 133.

[236] W. Reno, ‘Somalia and Survival’, op. cit.; I.M. Lewis, A Modern History, op. cit., pp. 98, 100. In the seven provinces and thirty-three districts, Italian resident commissioners were assisted by Somali ‘chiefs’. The men who held this invented title were appointed by the Italians but did not necessarily hold positions of authority or influence in their clan. These men were highly paid by the Italians to be tools of the Italian administrators, and they were rewarded with financial incentives for cooperation and loyalty.

[237] I.M. Lewis, A Modern History, pp. 105, 133–4, 170. These courts were replaced in 1945 by a new system of Subordinate Courts which consisted of a judge and assessors expert in Islamic and customary law as the previous system was seen as inefficient for the non-hierarchical Somali society.

[238] Ibid., p. 105. See also M. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, op. cit., chapters 1 and 2; APD, op. cit., chapter 1.

[239] I.M. Lewis, A Modern History, op. cit.

[240] Colonial newsletters from Somaliland indicate that amongst other things, in many cases peacemaking was still under the purview of clan elders rather than the British administration. For example, the October 1957 Protectorate report discusses the ongoing work of local elders in resolving a conflict between the Habr Toljaala and the Habr Yunis near Burco. According to the report the negotiations also included elders from Berbera and were funded by local merchants. Although one British representative appears to have been present, the report shows that negotiating a peaceful settlement was left to the clans. UK Government, ‘Peace Talks at Burao: No Agreement Reached but Discussions Continue’, Protectorate Report No. 125 (19 October 1957).

[241] R. Johnson, British Imperialism (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp. 1–5.

[242] UK Secretary of State for the Colonies, ‘Report of the Somaliland Protectorate

Constitutional Conference Held in London’, Report presented to Parliament (May 1960), p. 3.

[243] I.M. Lewis, A Modern History, op. cit.

[244] I.M. Lewis, A Modern History, op. cit., p. 163; ICG, op. cit., p. 3. See also, G. Reece, ‘Despatch to the right honorable Oliver Lyttelton, secretary of state for the Colonies’, Despatch No. 161/52 (9 March 1952).

[245] UK Secretary of State for the Colonies, op. cit., pp. 3–4.

[246] There was a small increase in educational provisions in Somaliland, primarily to educate future leaders in the ways of democracy, and there were some improvements to physical infrastructure. The British also created a legislative body that governed Somaliland for its five days of independence. Aside from this, however, impacts made in the sprint to independence were minimal. For details of specific programs, including the creation of a Protectorate advisory council that acted as a pre-independence legislative body, see I.M. Lewis, A Modern History, op. cit., chapter 6. See also ICG, op. cit.; APD, op. cit.

[247] S. Touval, op. cit.; W. Reno, ‘Somalia and Survival’, op. cit.; I.M. Lewis, A Modern History, op. cit.; E.S. Pankhurst, op. cit.

[248] I.M. Lewis, A Modern History, p. 148. Although the two colonies had experienced different styles of rule, and both colonial powers had knowledge of the intentions for unification, there was little cooperation between British and Italian authorities prior to independence and unification.

[249] On the flag of Somalia, each of the five points of the star represent a Somali inhabited territory: northern Kenya, the Ogaden in Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia and Somaliland.

[250] The British were initially hesitant about unifying the Somali territories. As late as January 1960 British administrators continued to express concern over extreme nationalist calls, particularly in regards to inclusion of the Somali in Ethiopia and French Somaliland (Djibouti), where the British believed very little interest in a unified Somalia existed. They were also hesitant about the Somali inhabited areas of Kenya being absorbed into Somalia. The British administrators did, however, agree to the union between Somaliland and Italian Somalia. P. carrel, ‘Ministry of Defense and external affairs internal Memo Hargeisa to London’, Memo SD/EA/18/8/6 (3 March 1960); D. Hall, ‘Inward Telegram to the secretary of state for the colonies from Somaliland Protectorate’, telegram no. 34 (16–17 January 1960); D. Hall, ‘Inward Telegram to the Secretary of State for the Colonies From Somaliland Protectorate’, Telegram No. 50 (25 January 1960); W. Luce, ‘Colonial Office Internal Memo Aden to London’, Memo GH/8/21/2/54 (23 January 1960); J. Selwyn Lloyd, ‘British consulate general Mogadishu Despatch to London’, Despatch no. 6 (21 January 1960).

[251] I.M. Lewis, A Modern History, op. cit., p. 162.

[252] The Somali nationalist cause aspired for a unification of all the Somali inhabited territories in the Horn of Africa. Following the independence of Kenya and Djibouti, and the defeat of Somali forces in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, it was apparent that the Somali state would consist only of the former British and Italian colonies.

[253] ICG, op. cit., p. 4.

[254] J. Drysdale, op. cit., p. 76.

[255] M. Brons, Society, Security, Sovereignty and the State in Somalia (Utrecht:

International Books, 2001), p. 161.

[256] I.M. Lewis, A Modern History, op. cit., p. 165.

[257] The immediate post-independence government was a unitary republic based on parliamentary democracy. Of the 123 members of the new unicameral Somalia parliament, only thirty-three represented the former British Protectorate. Of the initial fourteen ministerial posts, only four were held from men from the ‘northern regions’. I. Kaplan, et al. (ends), Area Handbook for Somalia (Washington DC: Foreign Affairs Studies, 1969); APD, op. cit., p. 9; I.M. Lewis, A Modern History (2002), op. cit., p. 164. Lewis notes that in the newly unified state, the former British Protectorate was referred to as the ‘Northern regions’, whilst the former Italian colony was the ‘southern regions’.

[258] APD, op. cit., p. 12; ICG, op. cit., p. 4; I.M. Lewis, A Modern History, op. cit., pp. 165, 170–72; M. Mukhtar, ‘Somalia: Between Self-Determination and Chaos’, in H. Adam and R. Ford (ends), Mending the Rips in the Sky: Options for Somali Communities in the 21st Century (Lawrenceville, NJ: The Red Sea Press, 1997), pp. 49–64: pp. 51–3.

[259] Haji Abdi Hussein, Member of the Somaliland House of Elders. Interview with author (Hargeisa, September 2006); Mohammed Said Mohammed Gees, Executive Director, Somaliland academy for Peace and development/Former Somaliland government Minister (various posts). Interview with author (Hargeisa, September 2006); APD, op. cit., pp. 9–11.

[260] J. Drysdale, op. cit., p. 78; I.M. Lewis, The Modern History, op. cit.; APD, op. cit., p. 9. Distance measured on a map between Hargeisa and Mogadishu equates to roughly 1500 kilometers through Somali territory (shorter if travelling through Ethiopia). The distance, according to Drysdale, is roughly equivalent to the distance between Berlin and Rome.

[261] Haji Abdi Hussein, Interview with author (Hargeisa, September 2006); I.M. Lewis, The Modern History, op. cit., p. 172.

[262] ICG, op. cit., p. 4.

[263] APD, op. cit., p. 14; D. Laitin and S. Samatar, Somalia: Nation in Search of a State (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987), pp. 70–71; J. Drysdale, op. cit., p. 77.

[264] APD, op. cit., p. 14.

[265] S. Touval, op. cit., p. 121.

[266] I.M. Lewis, A Modern History, op. cit., p. 172.

[267] Ibid., p. 174; J. Drysdale, op. cit., p. 77. The eighteen officers who led the coup were arrested shortly afterwards and put on trial for treason. The British judge presiding over the trial dismissed the case on the grounds that there was no legitimate act of Union at that point in time, thereby raising questions as to the legality of the southern presence in the north. Although this ruling was not regarded as significantly important at the time, contemporary calls for recognition of independence in Somaliland refer back to this early decision.

[268] Ibid., p. 166.

[269] Ibid., p. 167.

[270] I.M. Lewis, A Modern History, op. cit., p. 166; I.M. Lewis, ‘the recent Political History of Somalia’, in K. Barcik and S. Normark (ends), Somalia: A Historical, Culture and Political Analysis (Uppsala: Life and Peace Institute, 1991), pp. 5–15: p. 5. See also, M. Mukhtar, op. cit., pp. 52–3.

[271] I.M. Lewis, A Modern History, op. cit., p. 166.

[272] Ibid.; M. Brons, op. cit.; M. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, op. cit.; M. Bradbury, ‘Somaliland Country Report’, Report for CIIR (1997); A. Samatar, Socialist Somalia: Rhetoric and Reality (London: Zed Books, 1988); A. Samatar and A. Samatar, ‘international crisis group report on Somaliland: an alternative response’, Bildhaan 5.1 (2005), pp. 107–24.

[273] I.M. Lewis, A Modern History, op. cit., pp. 205–6.

[274] See H. Adam and R. Ford (ends), op. cit.; H. Adam, et al. (ends), War Destroys, Peace Nurtures: Somali Reconciliation and Development (Lawrenceville, NJ: the Red Sea Press, 2004); I.M. Lewis, Blood and Bone, op. cit.; M. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, op. cit.; P. Gilkes, ‘Descent into Chaos: Somalia, January 1991–December 1992’, in C. Gurden (ed.), The Horn of Africa (London: UCL Press, 1994), pp. 47–60 ; G. Prunier, ‘Somaliland: birth of a new country?’ in C. Gurden (ed.), The Horn of Africa (London: UCL Press, 1994), pp. 61–75; J. Drysdale, op. cit.

[275] APD, op. cit., p. 10.

[276] A. Dool, ‘Good Governance: Self-Administering Regions within a Democratic Union’, Somalia No. 4 (June 2001), pp. 5–36: p. 9.

[277] I.M. Lewis, A Modern History, op. cit., p. 207.

[278] ICG, op. cit., p. 4.

[279] APD, op. cit., p. 15; I.M. Lewis, A Modern History, op. cit., pp. 210–11. the population of Somalia was issued blue and white pocket manuals similar to the Little Red Book of Maoist China, Barre’s sayings were prominently displayed and spread, and Barre portrayed himself as the ‘Father’ of Somalia. His public appearances were full of pomp and circumstance, adoration, and the sense of fatherly love. Barre even went as far as creating a new ‘holy trinity’, placing himself in the ranks with Marx and Lenin.

[280] See I.M. Lewis, A Modern History, op. cit., chapter 9; ICG, op. cit., pp. 5–6; APD, op. cit., pp. 15–16.

[281] The exception to this was for those lineages associated with Barre’s close family.

[282] I.M. Lewis, A Modern History, op. cit., p. 220.

[283] APD, op. cit., p. 15.

[284] I.M. Lewis, A Modern History, op. cit., pp. 207–8; W. Reno, ‘Somalia and survival’, op. cit., pp. 18–20.

[285] W. Reno, ‘Somalia and Survival’, op. cit., p. 22.

[286] M. Bradbury, ‘Peace-enforcement, Peace-making, Peace-building’, op. cit., p. 10.

[287] I.M. Lewis, A Modern History, op. cit., p. 221. Desire to place this region under Somali control can be traced back to 1886, and was once again brought into contention during the 1960s at the height of Somali nationalism. Lewis speculates that barre’s focus on the Ogaden was largely due to his kinship link to the region through his maternal lineage.

[288] W. Reno, ‘Somalia and Survival’, op. cit.; Haji Abdi Hussein, Interview with Author (Hargeisa, September 2006), op. cit.; Abdirahman Aw Ali Farah, Former Somaliland Vice President (SNM Administration)/Former SNM Commander, Interview with author (Hargeisa, September 2006). By the time of the military coup that brought Barre to power, the Somali state was already heavily dependent on foreign financial assistance. Barre’s regime further entrenched this need for aid and from the beginning was heavily dependent on support from the Soviet Union. With soviet assistance, barre was able to build a very large and well-equipped army, making it one of the largest military forces in Africa.

[289] APD, op. cit., p. 11.

[290] G. Prunier, ‘A Candid View of the Somali National Movement’, Horn of Africa 14.1–2 (1991), pp. 107–20; G. Prunier, ‘Somaliland Goes It Alone’ Current History 97.619 (1998), pp. 107–20; APD, op. cit., p. 11.

[291] ICG, op. cit., p. 12.

[292] Ibid., p. 5; For a more complete explanation of the impact of the Ogaden War, see I.M. Lewis, A Modern History, op. cit.; A.M. Issa-Salwe, The Collapse of the Somali State: The Impact of the Colonial Legacy (London: HAAN Associates, 1996).

[293] APD, op. cit., p. 12.

[294] Somaliland Academy for Peace and Development (APD), A Self-Portrait of Somaliland: Rebuilding from the Ruins, Centre Report (December 1999), p. 17; W. Reno, ‘Somalia and survival’, op. cit., p. 17.

[295] ICG, op. cit., p. 2; APD, Rebuilding Somaliland, op. cit., p. 11.

[296] G. Prunier, ‘Somaliland Goes it Alone’, op. cit., p. 226.

[297] APD, ‘A Self-Portrait’, op. cit., p. 17.

[298] Many Somalilanders, as well as some scholars, claim that between the end of the Ogaden War and the end of the Somali civil war, barre engaged in a genocidal campaign against the Isaaq in the northwest. Although this has never been officially labelled genocide, physical evidence of torture and mass killings of Isaaq have been found in Somaliland, particularly in and around Hargeisa.

[299] APD, ‘A Self-Portrait of Somaliland’, op. cit., p. 17.

[300] I.M. Lewis, A Modern History, op. cit., p. 248.

[301] K. Menkhaus, op. cit., p. 220.

[302] V. Luling, ‘Come Back Somalia? Questioning a Collapsed State’, Third World Quarterly 18.2 (1997), pp. 287–302: pp. 289–90.

[303] K. Menkhaus, ‘Somalia: Political Order in a Stateless Society’, Current History 97.619 (1998), pp. 220–24: p. 223.

[304] K. Menkhaus, op. cit.

[305] See P. Little, Somalia: Economy Without a State (Oxford: James Currey, 2003), quote at p. xv.

[306] ICG, op. cit., p. 7; APD, op. cit., Chapter 3; K. Menkhaus, op. cit., p. 223.

[307] Mohammed Said Mohammed Gees, Executive Director, Somaliland Academy for Peace and Development/Former Somaliland Government Minister (various posts). Interview with author (Hargeisa, September 2006).

[308] Somaliland Academy for Peace and Development (APD), Rebuilding Somaliland:

Issues and Possibilities (Lawrenceville, NJ: The Red Sea Press, 2005), p. 59.

[309] I.M. Lewis, A Modern History of the Somali (Oxford: James Currey, 2002), p. 252.

[310] I.M. Lewis, Blood and Bone: The Call of Kinship in Somali Society (Lawrenceville, NJ: The Red Sea Press, 1994), pp. 191–3.

[311] Hassan Issa, Somaliland Vice President (SNM Administration)/ Former Vice chairman of the Somali National Movement. Interview with author (Hargeisa, September 2006); Abdirahman Aw Ali Farah, Interview with author (Hargeisa, September 2006).

[312] M. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland (Oxford: James Currey, 2008), p. 60.

[313] For purposes here, to distinguish between the institutionalized body and the traditionally ad hoc clan council, the institutionalized body will be referred to as Guurti whereas guurti should be read to mean the traditional non-centralized and ad hoc council of elders.

[314] In late 1981 the arrest of the members of an action group determined to improve social services in the northwest sparked open retaliation in Hargeisa. Following this, senior Isaaq military officers in the Somalia army defected to the SNM, providing the political movement with military leadership and signaling its start as a militarized liberation group. The rebellion in Hargeisa also marked the start of the war between the north and Barre, causing barre to attempt to tighten control in the north through force. The result of this was increasing support for the SNM within Somaliland. The movement began operating in Ethiopia shortly after. Dr Aden Abokor, Progressio Country Representative. Interview with author (Hargeisa, September 2006). Dr Abokor was a member of this group, which he refers to as the ‘Hargeisa group’; I.M. Lewis, Blood and Bone, op. cit., p. 206; Somaliland government, ‘Policy document for the government of Somaliland: demand for International Recognition’, (Hargeisa: Somaliland Ministry of Information, 2001), p. 23.

[315] M. Bryden, ‘State-Within-a-Failed State: Somaliland and the Challenge of International Recognition’, in P. Kingston and I. Spears (ends), States Within States: Incipient Political Entities in the Post-Cold War Era (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 167–88: p. 170.

[316] Africa Watch, A Government at War With Its Own People (New York: Africa Watch, 1990), pp. 8–9.

[317] Dr Aden Abokor, Interview with author, op. cit.

[318] Major General Mohammed Said Hirsi ‘Morgan’, ‘The Somali Democratic Republic Ministry of Defense Report (‘The Morgan Report’)’, Report to the President of Somalia, Siyad Barre (23 January 1987). Translated by Mohamoud Sheikh Ahmed Musa. Potential problems with the Isaaq were identified early by the Barre regime, and in 1987 initial actions to address the ‘Isaaq problem’ were outlined by General Morgan.

[319] ICG, op. cit., p. 6.

[320] Somalilanders and many human rights groups claim that Barre’s targeting of the Isaaq clan and his systematic massacres account to genocide.

[321] For a more detailed and complete history of the SNM, see D. Compagnon, ‘The Somali Opposition Fronts: Some Comments and Questions’, Horn of Africa 13.1–2 (1991), pp. 29–54; D. Compagnon, ‘Somali Armed Movements: The Interplay of Political Entrepreneurship and Clan-Based Factions’, in C. Clapham (ed.), African Guerrillas

(Oxford: James Currey, 1998), pp. 73–90; I. Samatar, ‘Light at the End of the Tunnel: Some Reflections on the Struggle of the Somali National Movement’, in H. Adam and R. Ford (ends), Mending the Rips in the Sky: Options for Somali Communities in the 21st Century (Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1997), pp 21–38; I.M. Lewis, Blood and Bone, op. cit.; g. Prunier, ‘a candid View of the Somali national Movement’, Horn of Africa 14.1–2 (1991), pp. 107–20; M. Bradbury, op. cit.

[322] Hassan Issa, Interview with author, op. cit.

[323] APD, op. cit., p. 14.

[324] M. Bradbury, op. cit., p. 79.

[325] APD, op. cit., pp. 14–15; APD, ‘The Somaliland Parliament: A Case Study’, Report for UNDP (2004), p. 2.

[326] M. Bradbury, ‘Somaliland Country Report’, Report for CIIR (1997); APD, ‘The Somaliland Parliament’, op. cit., p. 2.

[327] M. Bradbury, ‘Somaliland’, op. cit., p. 18. Somaliland’s quest to be treated separately from the south in regards to aid or international assistance became apparent almost immediately when the leaders rejected UN assistance through the UN Operations in Somalia II (UNOSOM II). As the aid would be received as part of the UN’s nation-building project for a united Somalia, this assistance was refused.

[328] M. Bradbury, ‘Somaliland’, op. cit., p. 21.

[329] J. Drysdale, Stoics Without Pillows: A Way Forward for the Somalilands (London:

HAAN Associates, 2000), p. 160.

[330] Abdirahman Aw Ali Farah, Interview with author, op. cit.

[331] I.M. Lewis, A Modern History, op. cit., p. 283; APD, ‘the Somaliland Parliament’, op. cit., p. 2.

[332] APD, Rebuilding Somaliland, op. cit., p. 15.

[333] M. Bradbury, ‘Somaliland’, op. cit., p. 21.

[334] G. Prunier, ‘Somaliland Goes it Alone’, Current History 97.619 (1998), pp. 225–8.

[335] Abdullahi M. Duale, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs. Interview with author (Hargeisa, September 2006).

[336] These conferences will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6.

[337] APD, Rebuilding Somaliland, op. cit., pp. 15–16.

[338] Dr Aden Abokor, Interview with author, op. cit. Although, as with any leader, Egal is not considered to be faultless, he remains highly regarded by the people and politicians of Somaliland.

[339] I.M. Lewis, A Modern History, op. cit., p. 283; APD, ‘the Somaliland Parliament’, op. cit., p. 3.

[340] APD, ‘The Somaliland Parliament’, op. cit., p. 3.

[341] Ibid.

[342] M. Bradbury, ‘Somaliland’, op. cit., p. 22.

[343] I.M. Lewis, A Modern History, op. cit., p. 283.

[344] Interviews by author. Hargeisa. August-September 2006.

[345] Dr Aden Abokor, Interview with author, op. cit.

[346] M. Bradbury, ‘Somaliland’, op. cit., p. 23. Many of the former militia members were integrated into the policy and customs forces, and later into the national army.

[347] Ulf Terlinden, Researcher for Somaliland Academy for Peace and Development/ Institute for Development and Peace (INEF). Conversations with author (Hargeisa, August September 2006); Mohammed Hassan Ibrahim ‘Gani’, Lead Researcher for Academy for Peace and Development. Conversations with author (Hargeisa, August-September 2006). It is widely acknowledged that Egal’s clan associations are to credit for the reclaiming of the port of Berbera, as Egal’s clan dominates the area in and around the city.

[348] M. Bradbury, ‘Somaliland’, op. cit., p. 24.

[349] APD, Rebuilding Somaliland, op. cit.; I. Ahmed, ‘remittances and their economic impact in Post-War Somaliland’, Disasters 24.4 (2000), pp. 380–89.

[350] M. Bradbury, ‘Somaliland’, op. cit., p. 22.

[351] C. Call, ‘Ending Wars, Building States’, in C. Call and V. Wyeth (ends), Building States to Build Peace (London: Lynne Rienner, 2008), pp. 1–22: p. 11. See also C. Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992).

[352] M. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, op. cit., pp. 109–10.

[353] Ahmed Yusuf Yassin, Vice President of Somaliland. Interview with author (Hargeisa, September 2006).

[354] APD, ‘The Somaliland Parliament’, op. cit., p. 3; M. Bradbury, ‘Somaliland’, op. cit.

[355] M. Bradbury, ‘Somaliland’, op. cit., p. 24.

[356] I.M. Lewis, A Modern History, op. cit., p. 285.

[357] Mohammed Hassan Ibrahim ‘Gani’. Interview with author (Hargeisa, August 2006).

[358] See M. Bradbury, ‘Somaliland’, op. cit., p. 25; APD, ‘A Self-Portrait of Somaliland: rebuilding from the ruins’, Hargeisa, APD and Interpeace/War-torn societies Project Report (1999), p. 15; APD ‘The Somaliland Parliament’, op. cit., p. 3; I.M. Lewis, A Modern History, op. cit., p. 286.

[359] M. Bradbury, ‘Somaliland’, op. cit., p. 25; APD, Rebuilding Somaliland, op. cit., p. 15.

[360] M. Bradbury, ‘Somaliland’, op. cit., p. 25.

[361] APD, Rebuilding Somaliland, op. cit., p. 16.

[362] Abdullahi M. Duale. Interview with author, op. cit.

[363] APD, Rebuilding Somaliland, op. cit., p. 16.

[364] Abdirahman Aw Ali Farah. Interview with author, op. cit.

[365] Abdullahi M. Duale. Interview with author, op. cit.

[366] Ibid.; Mohammed Said Mohammed Gees. Interview with author, op. cit.

[367] APD, Rebuilding Somaliland, op. cit., p. 17; Somaliland government, ‘Somaliland Constitution (2001)’. Copies of English translation obtained from Somaliland House of elders and Somaliland Ministry of information, Hargeisa. Article 89 of the Somaliland constitution stipulates that the vice president shall act as temporary president upon the death of the president, with elections for the president to follow within six months. Rayale, as Vice President, filled the vacancy and although more than six months elapsed before an election was held, the extension of this period was sanctioned by the Guurti.

[368] The judicial branch of the government is called both the Supreme Court and the constitutional court. Similar to the supreme court of the US, it has appellate power in criminal cases, and is also responsible for interpreting the constitution.

[369] The Constitution also allows for the appointment of honorary non-voting members to the Guurti. These honorary members are: up to five members selected by the president based on their significance to the nation; any person who has served as the Speaker of either house of Parliament; and any person who has served as president or vice-president of Somaliland. At the time of writing there were six honorary members. Source: ‘Somaliland Constitution (2001)’, Article 60.2.2; Abdullahi Habane, General Secretary Somaliland House of Elders. Interview with author (Hargeisa, August 2006).

[370] Interviews conducted by authors with members of Somaliland House of Elders (Hargeisa, August and September 2006).

[371] ‘Somaliland Constitution (2001)’, Article 38.1.1; Article 39.

[372] Abdullahi Habane. Interview with author, op. cit.

[373] The Guurti has extended the mandate of the National Charter, the term of office for Egal, the term of office for the current president, the term of office for the House of Representatives (prior to the 2005 elections), and the term of office for the Guurti itself.

[374] See ‘Somaliland Constitution (2001)’, Articles 90–92. The label ‘Egal’s suit’ was widely used during interviews conducted in Hargeisa (August-September 2006).

[375] M. Bryden, ‘The Banana Test: Is Somaliland Ready for Recognition?’ Annales d’Éthiopie 19 (2003), pp. 341–64. For more information on Egal’s role in the early formation of the government see also I.M. Lewis, A Modern History, op. cit.; M. Bradbury, ‘Somaliland’, op. cit.; H. Adam and R. Ford (eds.), Mending the Rips in the Sky, op. cit.; APD, ‘a self-Portrait’, op. cit.; APD, Rebuilding Somaliland, op. cit.

[376] Mohammed Said Mohammed Gees. Conversation with author (Hargeisa, September 2006); Mohammed Hassan Ibrahim ‘Gani’. Conversations with author (Hargeisa, August-September 2006).

[377] Dr Aden Abokor. Interview with author, op. cit.

[378] UDUB, translated into English, is the United Peoples’ Democratic Party. Kulmiye is the Peace, Unity and development Party. UCID is the Party for Justice and development.

[379] Mohammed Hassan Ibrahim ‘Gani’. Interview with author (Hargeisa, September 2006). Each vote cast in the election acts as one ‘cast twice’, with the same vote being for the candidate and the party at the same time rather than just the party. This system theoretically prevents stacking the top positions on the party lists with members from a single clan, as the candidates are ranked in order of number of votes received. Allocation of seats is then proportional to the percentage of votes the party received. As Gani explains, ‘[e]ach clan has to vote for their man rather than getting a free ride’ through a clan controlled candidates list.

[380] Somaliland National Election Commission, ‘Voters Manual: Parliamentary Elections 29 September 2005’, Hargeisa, Voter Education Manual (2005). These pamphlets utilize a mixture of words and pictures to tell the ‘story’ of democratic elections. The pictures are an important component as illiteracy rates are high, especially amongst the rural and nomadic populations.

[381] Progressio cites this number to be 217 votes, which is the final figure approved by the supreme court after the original 80 vote announcement by the Somaliland national Electoral Commission. A. Abokor, S. Kibble, H. Yusuf, and G. Barrett, ‘Further Steps to democracy: the Somaliland Parliamentary elections, September 2005’, Progressio report (London, January 2006), p. 8.

[382] Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR), ‘Somaliland Elections to house of representatives, 29th September 2005’, international election Observation team Interim Report (7 October 2005); A. Abokor, et al., op. cit.; R. Hollekim, S. Hansen and G.M. Sorensen, ‘Somaliland: elections for the lower house of Parliament September 2005’, NORDEM Report (March 2006); ICG, op. cit.; International Republican Institute, ‘Somaliland September 29, 2005 Parliamentary Election Assessment Report’, (Washington DC: IRI, 2006); APD, ‘a Vote for Peace: how Somaliland successfully hosted its First Parliamentary Elections in 35 Years’, Dialogue for Peace Somali Programme Report (September 2006); Somaliland NAGAAD and COSONGO, ‘Parliamentary elections: domestic election Observers’ Report’, (Hargeisa, November 2005); Somaliland National Electoral Commission, ‘Report of the Parliamentary Election’, Hargeisa (December 2005); IRIN News, ‘Somaliland Elections Peaceful Say Observers’, Somalia News Report (3 October 2005); Freedom House, ‘Somaliland country report’, 2007 edition, http://www.freedomhouse.org.

[383] Mohammed Hassan Ibrahim ‘Gani’. Interview with author (Hargeisa, August 2006).

[384] Conversations with author (via email, 2008–2009).

[385] See, for example, editorials and reports in The Somaliland Times 2008–2011, available at www.Somalilandtimes.net.

[386] M. Bryden, ‘The Banana Test’, op. cit. Bryden is basing this assessment on the principles of statehood found in the 1933 Montevideo convention. These principles are reflected in the conceptions of empirical statehood found in Chapter 2, as well as the definition of statehood provided by Brownlie.

[387] Interviews conducted in Hargeisa (August-September 2006); M. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, op. cit., p. 63. This intention is also apparent in a 1981 political manifesto published by the SNM in which the leadership calls for a return to a representative form of democracy that would guarantee human rights and freedom of speech.

[388] Egal as quoted in APD, Rebuilding Somaliland, op. cit., p. 16.

[389] Ahmed Yusuf. Interview with author, op. cit. Yusuf was vice president under President Rayale.

[390] Abdullahi Duale. Interview with author, op. cit. Duale held this office under President Rayale.

[391] Interviews conducted in Hargeisa (August-September 2006).

[392] M. Bryden, ‘The Banana Test’, op. cit.

[393] Abdullahi Duale. Interview with author, op. cit.

[394] Abdikadir Mohammed Hassan ‘Indho’, Member of Somaliland House of Elders. Interview with author (Hargeisa, September 2006). An example of this comes from Indho, a ranking member of the House of Elders, who notes that the most important role the Guurti has had since the end of fighting in 1996 was reassuring the people about the democracy process and keeping the peace during elections.

[395] Bobe Yusuf Duale, Former member of the SNM Central Committee and current Programme Coordinator for APD. Interview with author (Hargeisa, September 2006).

[396] Mohammed Said Mohammed Gees. Interview with author, op. cit.

[397] Interview with author (Hargeisa, September 2006).

[398] Interview with author (Hargeisa, September 2006).

[399] This is not to be confused with hybrid governance, a term often associated with amongst others the work of Beatrice Hibou, where there is a blurring between the public, the private and the voluntary in the economy or the provision of public services. Hybrid governance in this regard is most often exhibited in the economic sector and is often a consideration within studies of political economy. See, for example, B. Hibou, (ed), Privatizing the State (London: Hurst and Co., 2004).

[400] See D. Roberts, ‘Hybrid Polities and Indigenous Pluralities: Advanced Lessons in statebuilding from Cambodia’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 1.3 (2007), pp. 379–402.

[401] R. Lamb, ‘Political Governance and Strategy in Afghanistan’, Center for Strategic and International Studies Report (April 2012).

[402] A. Hashi, ‘The Implication of Traditional Leadership, “Guurti”, and Other Non-State actors in local governance in Somaliland’, study report for the traditional structures and Local Governance Project of the Community Empowerment and Social Inclusion Program of the World Bank (June 2005).

[403] M. Jama, ‘Somalia and Somaliland: Strategies for dialogue and consensus on governance and democratic transition’, Paper prepared for the UNDP Oslo governance Centre (January 2003).

[404] T. Sisk, Statebuilding (Cambridge: Polity, 2013), p. 67.

[405] A. Ghani and C. Lockhart, ‘Closing the Sovereignty Gap: An Approach to StateBuilding’, Overseas Development Institute Working Paper 253 (London: ODI, 2005).

[406] S. Woodward, ‘State-Building and Peace-Building: What Theory and Whose Role?’ in R. Kozul-Wright and P. Fortunato (ends), Securing Peace: State-Building and Economic Development in Post-Conflict Countries (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2011), pp. 87–112: p. 107.

[407] J. Drysdale, Stoics Without Pillows: A Way Forward for the Somalilands (London: HAAN Associates, 2000).

[408] R. Richards, ‘The Road Less Traveled: Self-led statebuilding and non-intervention in Somaliland’, in B. Bliesemann de Guevara (ed.), Statebuilding and State Formation: The political sociology of intervention (London: Routledge, 2012), pp. 149–64: p. 154.

[409] Abdullahi Duale, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Interview with author (Hargeisa, September 2006).

[410] For more on technical details about the statebuilding process, see, in particular, M. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland (Oxford: James Currey, 2008); Somaliland Academy for Peace and Development (APD), Rebuilding Somaliland: Issues and Possibilities (Lawrenceville, NJ: The Red Sea Press, 2005); I.M. Lewis, A Modern History of the Somali (Oxford: James Currey, 2002).

[411] Dr Abdirahman Yusuf Artan, Member of House of Representatives (Kulmiye). Interview with Author (Hargeisa, August 2006).

[412] M. Bradbury, ‘Somaliland Country Report’, CIIR Country Report (1997), p. 4; I.M. Lewis and A. Farah, ‘Somalia: The Roots of Reconciliation: Peace Making Endeavors of Contemporary Lineage Leaders in “Somaliland”’, Report for ActionAid (1993).

[413] I.M. Lewis, A Modern History, op. cit., p. 215.

[414] SNM press release as cited in Ibid., p. 199.

[415] J. Drysdale, op. cit., p. 160.

[416] I.M. Lewis, Blood and Bone: The Call of Kinship in Somali Society (Lawrenceville, NJ: The Red Sea Press, 1994), p. 200.

[417] Ibid., p. 202.

[418] Hassan Issa, Former Vice President of Somaliland. Interview with Author (Hargeisa, September 2006). Hassan Issa was a leading figure in the formation of the SNM in London, and also served as Vice Chairman of the SNM political wing as well as the first Vice President of Somaliland during the two-year SNM administration.

[419] As previously, Guurti will be used to identify the modern utilization of the traditional body, specifically the use of the council of elders by the SNM as well as within the government. As before, Guurti will signify the non-central, traditional notion of the council of elders.

[420] Hassan Issa. Interview with author, op. cit.

[421] Ibid.

[422] Ibid.

[423] Ibid.

[424] Dr Aden Abokor. Interview with author, op. cit.; I.M. Lewis, Blood and Bone, op. cit., p. 215.

[425] Bobe Duale Yusuf, former member of SNM Central Committee and Programme coordinator for academy for Peace and development. Interviews with author (Hargeisa, August-September 2006).

[426] Dr Aden Abokor. Interview with author, op. cit.

[427] I.M. Lewis, Blood and Bone, op. cit., p. 214.

[428] Ibid.

[429] G. Prunier, ‘Somaliland: Birth of a New Country?’ in C. Gurdon (ed.), The Horn of Africa (London: UCL Press Limited, 1994), pp. 61–75: p. 65.

[430] Hassan Issa. Interview with author, op. cit.

[431] Ibid.; Bobe Duale Yusuf. Interview with author, op. cit.

[432] Mohammed Said Mohammed Gees, former SNM and government minister and current Executive Director of APD. Interview with author (Hargeisa, September 2006). Mohammed said gees is a leading scholar and member of civil society in Somaliland, and was a long-serving governmental minister under Egal.

[433] F. Battera, ‘State and Democracy Building in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Case of Somaliland- a comparative Perspective’, Global Jurist Frontiers 4.1 (2004), pp. 1–21: p. 8.

[434] I.M. Lewis, Blood and Bone, op. cit., p. 192.

[435] APD, op. cit., p. 60.

[436] G. Prunier, op. cit., p. 62.

[437] M. Höhne, ‘Traditional Authorities in Northern Somalia: Transformation of Positions and Power’, Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology Working Paper 82 (Halle: Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, 2006), p. 14.

[438] Hassan Issa. Interview with author, op. cit.

[439] G. Prunier, op. cit., p. 62.

[440] Abdirahman Aw Ali Farah, former SNM Commander and former Vice President of Somaliland. Interview with author (Hargeisa, September 2006).

[441] R. Richards, op. cit., p. 155

[442] I. Samatar, ‘Light at the End of the Tunnel: Some Reflections on the Struggle of the Somali National Movement’, in H. Adam and R. Ford (ends), Mending the Rips in the Sky: Options for Somali Communities in the 21st Century (Lawrenceville, NJ: the red sea Press, 1997), pp. 21–48: p. 31.

[443] I.M. Lewis, A Pastoral Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 242–3; M. Bradbury, ‘Peace-Enforcement, Peace-Making and Peace-Building: Options for Resolving the Somali Conflict’, Exploratory Report for Oxfam (1993), p. 79.

[444] Dr Aden Abokor. Interview with author, op. cit.

[445] Abdirahman Aw Ali Farah, Interview with author, op. cit.

[446] For more on the nature of these community meetings, see Chapter 4.

[447] M. Bradbury, ‘Somaliland’, op. cit., p. 19.

[448] G. Prunier, op. cit., p. 62; APD, op. cit., pp. 60, 64; Haji Abdi Hussein, Member of the House of Elders. Interview with author (Hargeisa, September 2006).

[449] J. Sweden, ‘Somaliland’s Quest for Recognition: A Challenge for the International Community’, in H. Adam, et al. (ends), War Destroys, Peace Nurtures: Somali Reconciliation and Development (Lawrenceville, NJ: The Red Sea Press, 2004), pp. 169–78: p. 176.

[450] APD, op. cit., p. 60.

[451] I.M. Lewis, Blood and Bone, op. cit., p. 229.

[452] J. Sweden, op. cit., p. 176; M. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, op. cit., p. 79.

[453] APD, op. cit., pp. 15–16; G. Prunier, op. cit., p. 64.

[454] M. Höhne, op. cit., p. 14.

[455] Haji Abdi Hussein. Interview with author, op. cit.

[456] APD, op. cit., p. 64. For detailed accounts of local level initiatives, see I.M. Lewis and A. Farah, ‘Somalia: Roots of Reconciliation’, op. cit. Agreements reached at the Sheikh Conference put an end to fighting over Berbera port, the largest threat of instability in post-conflict Somaliland.

[457] Bobe Duale Yusuf. Interview with author, op. cit.

[458] G. Prunier, op. cit., p. 66. The Gadabuursi had been a main actor in the fight over control of Berbera port, a conflict that was settled at the Sheikh Conference in 1992.

[459] Dr Aden Abokor. Interview with author, op. cit.; G. Prunier, op. cit.; G. Prunier, ‘Somaliland goes it alone’, Current History 97.619 (1998), pp. 225–8.

[460] G. Prunier, ‘Somaliland: Birth?’ op. cit., p. 6.

[461] Abdikadir Mohammed Hassan ‘Indho’, Member of Somaliland House of Elders.

Interview with author (Hargeisa, September 2006).

[462] Bobe Duale Yusuf. Interview with author, op. cit.

[463] Dr Abdirahman Yusuf Artan. Interview with author, op. cit.

[464] Abdirahman Aw Ali Farah. Interview with author, op. cit.; Dr Aden Abokor interview with author, op. cit.

[465] Awil Hussein Ahmed, Member of Somaliland House of Elders. Interview with author (Hargeisa, September 2006); Dini Abdullahi Hande, Member of Somaliland House of Elders. Interview with author (Hargeisa, September 2006).

[466] Mohammed Said Mohammed Gees. Interview with author, op. cit.

[467] APD, op. cit.; M. Bradbury, ‘Somaliland’, op. cit., p. 22.

[468] M. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, op. cit., pp. 124–5.

[469] Mohammed Said Mohammed Gees. Interview with author, op. cit.; Bobe Yusuf Duale. Interview with author, op. cit.; Dr Aden Abokor. Interview with author, op. cit.

[470] M. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, op. cit., p. 126.

[471] APD, op. cit., p. 16.

[472] Somaliland Government, ‘Somaliland Constitution (2001)’, Article 59. According to article 41, members of the House of Representatives must be educated to a secondary school level or equivalent. Copies of English translation obtained from Somaliland house of elders and Somaliland Ministry of information, Hargeisa.

[473] F. Battera, op. cit., p. 7, footnote 14.

[474] Interviews with author (Hargeisa, August-September 2006).

[475] Interviews with author (Hargeisa, August-September 2006).

[476] Abdullahi Habane, General Secretary for Somaliland House of Elders. Interviews with author (Hargeisa, August-September 2006); Shi Ahmed Muse Obsiye, Security and defense committee chairman of the house of elders. Interview with author (Hargeisa, August 2006).

[477] Interviews with author. (Hargeisa, August-September 2006).

[478] S. Shivakumar, ‘The Place of Indigenous Institutions in Constitutional Order’, Constitutional Political Economy 14.1 (2003), pp. 3–21: p. 15; Mohammed Hassan Ibrahim ‘Gani’, Lead Researcher for APD. Interview with author (Hargeisa, August 2006).

[479] Hassan Issa. Interview with author, op. cit.

[480] Abdikadir Mohammed Hassan ‘Indho’. Interview with author, op. cit.

[481] Interview with author, op. cit.

[482] J. Sweden, op. cit., p. 175.

[483] Hassan Issa. Interview with author, op. cit.

[484] Mohammed Hassan Ibrahim ‘Gani’. Interview with author, op. cit.

[485] M. Höhne, op. cit., p. 17.

[486] Ibid., p. 3.

[487] R. van Dijk and A. van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, ‘The Domestication of Chieftaincy in Africa: From the Imposed to the Imagined’, in R. van Dijk and A. van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal (ends), African Chieftaincy in a New Socio-Political Landscape (Hamburg: LIT-Verlag, 1999), pp 1–20: p. 4.

[488] S. Shivakumar, op. cit., p. 4.

[489] M. Höhne, op. cit., p. 3.

[490] Abdikadir Mohammed Hassan ‘Indho’. Interview with author, op. cit.

[491] Ahmed Yusuf Yassin, Vice President of Somaliland. Interview with Author (Hargeisa, August 2006).

[492] Awil Hussein Ahmed. Interview with author, op. cit.

[493] Abdikadir Mohammed Hassan ‘Indho’. Interview with author, op. cit.

[494] Somaliland Constitution (2001), Article 61.

[495] Mohammed Said Mohammed Gees. Interview with author, op. cit.

[496] S. Shivakumar, op. cit., p. 3.

[497] Abdullahi Dini Hande. Interview with autor, op. cit.

[498] M. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, op. cit., pp. 226–9.

[499] L. Moe, ‘Somaliland Report: Addressing legitimacy issues in fragile post-conflict situations to advance conflict transformation and peace-building’, Berghof Foundation/ University of Queensland (2013).

[500] APD/Interpeace, ‘A Vote for Peace II: A Report on the 2010 Somaliland Presidential Election Process’, (APD/Interpeace, 2012); M. Walls, ‘The Emergence of a Somali state: building peace from civil war in Somaliland’, African Affairs 108.432 (2009), pp. 371–89.

[501] Interviews with author with members of the Guurti, august-September 2006.

[502] Somaliland House of Elders, ‘Somaliland Guurti: About Us’, Report compiled by Somaliland Guurti (Date Unknown).

[503] I.M. Lewis, Blood and Bone, op. cit., p. 216.

[504] See S. Closson’, What Do Unrecognized States Tell Us About Sovereignty?’ in N. Caspersen and G. Stansfield (ends) Unrecognized States in the International System (London: Routledge, 2011), pp. 58–70.

[505] M. Walls, op. cit.

[506] Abdirahman Aw Ali Farah, op. cit.

[507] L. Moe, ‘Somaliland Report: Addressing legitimacy issues in fragile post-conflict situations to advance conflict transformation and peace-building’, Berghof Foundation/ University of Queensland (2013).

[508] Mohammed Said Mohammed Gees, former leading member of the SNM Central committee, former government minister and current executive director of APD. Interview with author (Hargeisa, September 2006).

[509] See M. Höhne, ‘Limits of hybrid political orders: the case of Somaliland’, Journal of Eastern African Studies 7.2 (2013), pp. 199–217.

[510] Abdirahman Aw Ali Farah, former Vice president of Somaliland. Interview with author. (Hargeisa, September 2006).

[511] Abdirahman Aw Ali Farah. Interview with author, op. cit.; Mohammed Hassan Ibrahim ‘Gani’, lead researcher for APD. Conversation with author (Hargeisa, September 2006).

[512] Somaliland Government, ‘Somaliland Constitution (2001)’, emphasis added. To avoid concerns over mistranslation of these articles into English, the Somali language version of the constitution must be cited. In the Somali version the word doorasho appears in article 57, whilst xulashadiisa is used in article 62. Whilst both can be directly translated into ‘choice’, the former carries the primary connotation of election; indeed, the plural form of doorasho directly translates as ‘elections’ rather than ‘choices’. Xulashadiisa, on the other hand, carries the primary meaning of selecting. Translation and explanation provided by Mohammed Hassan Ibrahim ‘Gani’ (Hargeisa, September 2006). Also, Ifiye Somali-English Dictionary (Nairobi: Somali Partner Academicians, 2000).

[513] Somaliland Government, ‘Somaliland Constitution (2001)’, emphasis added. Copies of English translation obtained from Somaliland house of elders and Somaliland Ministry of information, Hargeisa.

[514] To avoid concerns over mistranslation of these articles into English, the Somali language version of the constitution must be cited. In the Somali version the word doorasho appears in article 57, whilst xulashadiisa is used in article 62. Whilst both can be directly translated into ‘choice’, the former carries the primary connotation of election; indeed, the plural form of doorasho directly translates as ‘elections’ rather than ‘choices’. Xulashadiisa, on the other hand, carries the primary meaning of selecting. Translation and explanation provided by Mohammed Hassan Ibrahim ‘Gani’, September 2006. Also, Ifiye Somali-English Dictionary (Nairobi: Somali Partner Academicians, 2000).

[515] Somaliland House of Representatives, ‘Go’aanka Ansixinta Qodobka 19aad Ee Mashruuc-Sharciga Doorashada Dadban Ee Golaha Guurtida & Hakinta Intiisa Kale, (Bill for Indirect Election of The House of Elders)’, 25 March 2003. Translated by Mohammed Hassan Ibrahim ‘Gani’.

[516] Interviews by author with members of the Executive and the Guurti (Hargeisa, August-September 2006).

[517] President Dahir Rayale Kahin, ‘Letter to Somaliland Guurti’, 24 April 2006.

[518] Mohamoud Garad Mohammed, Commissioner Somaliland National Electoral Commission (NEC). Interview with author (Hargeisa, September 2006); Mustafa Rashad, Consultant with Somaliland NEC. Interview with author (Hargeisa, September 2006); Ahmed Yusuf Yassin, Vice President of Somaliland. Interview with author. (Hargeisa, September 2006).

[519] Somaliland Supreme Court, ‘Soo jeedin Tallo-bixin Sharci (Response to President’s Request for Legal Advice)’, 24 April 2006; Dahir Rayale Kahin, ‘Degreeto Madaxweyne No. 117/052006: Soo jeedinta kordhinta muddada Golaha Guurtida (President’s Request to the House of Elders)’, 2 May 2006; Somaliland House of Elders, ‘Ujeeddo: Go’aanka Korodhsiimada Mudada Xilka Golaha Guurtida JSL (House of Elder’s Extension of House of Elders)’, 6 May 2006. All translated by Mohammed Hassan Ibrahim ‘Gani’.

[520] Mohamoud Hirsi Farah. Interview with author, op. cit.

[521] Ibid.

[522] Copies of the bill produced for the researcher by the leadership of the House of Representatives show Rayale’s signature, but the executive and the Supreme Court maintain that the bill was never signed by the president. They do not go as far as accusing forgery, but they insist that the bill and the signature are not legitimate. Interviews conducted by author (Hargeisa, August-September 2006).

[523] Mohamoud Hirsi Farah, Justice of the Somaliland Supreme Court. Interview with author (Hargeisa, September 2006).

[524] Interviews conducted by author (Hargeisa, August-September 2006); Dr Aden Abokor, Progressio Country Representative. Interview with author (Hargeisa, September 2006).

[525] Abdirahman Osman Alin Shirwac, Member of Somaliland House of Representatives (UCID) and Chair of the House Judiciary Committee. Interviews with author (Hargeisa, September 2006).

[526] Somaliland Times, ‘Somaliland Elections to be Held in December 2008 and March 2009’, Somaliland Times Issue 331 (24 May 2008).

[527] Mohammed Hassan Ibrahim ‘Gani’. Email correspondence with author (June 2008).

[528] With the Guurti mandate set to expire in October 2006, the House of Representatives passed the bill on 16 September 2006. It went before the house of elders on 17 September 2006 where it failed to pass the house’s vote.

[529] The assessment of this debate is based on interviews conducted with members of the government, political leaders and civic leaders, as well as observation of government meetings and sessions, participation in community meetings, and informal conversations with political and civic leaders in Hargeisa.

[530] Wording from Dini Abdillahi Hande, Member of Somaliland House of Elders. Interview with author (Hargeisa, September 2006).

[531] Abdikadir Mohammed Hassan ‘Indho’, Member of the House of Elders and chairman of human rights and social affairs committee. Interview with author (Hargeisa, August 2006).

[532] Ahmed Yusuf Yassin. Interview with author, op. cit.

[533] Ibid.

[534] Abdullahi Mohammed Duale, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Interview with author (Hargeisa, September 2006).

[535] Abdikadir Mohammed Hassan ‘Indho’, Member of House of Elders and Chairman of the human rights and social affairs committee. Interviews with author (Hargeisa, August and September 2006).

[536] Haji Abdi Hussein, Member House of Elders and Chairman of the Standing Committee. Interview with author (Hargeisa, August 2006).

[537] Much of this argument was also expressed or articulated at a special session of the Guurti held in part to discuss legislation pertaining to the selection procedure for the upper house that had been proposed in the lower house. Proceedings of Guurti special session (Hargeisa, 30 August 2006). Translated by Mohammed Ali Kahin.

[538] Abdirahman Osman Alin Shirwac. Interview with author, op. cit.

[539] Ibrahim Jama Ali ‘Reyte’, Member of Somaliland House of Representatives (Kulmiye). Interview with author (Hargeisa, September 2006).

[540] Advocates of this position widely argue that the upper house is easily manipulated by the executive.

[541] Ibrahim Jama Ali ‘Reyte’. Interview with author, op. cit. This attitude was also expressed in numerous interviews and discussions undertaken in Hargeisa.

[542] Abdulrahman Mohammed Abdullah, Speaker of the House, Somaliland House of Representatives (UCID). Interviews with author (Hargeisa, August and September 2006). The significance of the number of Diaspora returnees can be identified by acknowledging where the majority of the members returned from: the United States, the United Kingdom, Denmark and the Netherlands. Arguably, these men and women bring with them experience of Western democracies and, increasingly, become involved in politics, business and civil society in Somaliland.

[543] Bashe Mohammed Farah, Deputy Speaker of Somaliland House of Representatives (Kulmiye). Interview with author (Hargeisa, September 2006).

[544] Ibrahim Jama Ali ‘Reyte’. Interview with author, op. cit.; Abdulrahman Mohammed Abdullah. Interview with author, op. cit.

[545] Abdirahman Aw Ali Farah. Interview with author, op. cit.

[546] Ibid.

[547] Ibrahim Jama Ali ‘Reyte’. Interview with author, op. cit.

[548] Abdirahman Aw Ali Farah. Interview with author, op. cit.

[549] Mohammed Said Mohammed Gees. Interview with author, op. cit.

[550] Bobe Yusuf Duale, former SNM commander and current Programme Director for APD. Interview with author (Hargeisa, September 2006).

[551] Ibid. Duale was referring to the president’s actions regarding the self-extension, but in particular he cites disagreement and instability in the eastern regions of Sanaag and Sool which are long-term concerns of Somaliland. He also includes constitutional ambiguity, institutional immaturity and financial weakness as areas where reconciliation continues.

[552] Mohamoud Garad Mohammed. Interview with author, op. cit.; Mustafa Rashad.

Interview with author, op. cit.

[553] Bobe Yusuf Duale. Interview with author, op. cit.

[554] Hassan Issa, former Vice President of Somaliland. Interview with author (Hargeisa, September 2006).

[555] Amongst others, Mohammed Hassan Ibrahim ‘Gani’. Conversations with author (Hargeisa, August and September 2006); Dr Aden Abokor. Interview with author, op. cit.; Dr Abdirahman Yusuf Artan, Member of Somaliland House of Representatives (Kulmiye). Interview with author (Hargeisa, September 2006); Dr Abdirahman Yusuf Artan. Conversations with author (Hargeisa, September 2006); Bobe Duale Yusuf. Interview with author, op. cit.; Ibrahim Jama Ali ‘Reyte’. Interview with author, op. cit.; Mohammed said Mohammed Gees. Conversations with author (Hargeisa, August and September 2006); Saeed Ahmed, Commissioner for NEC. Conversations with author (Hargeisa, September 2006); Saeed Ahmed. Interview with author (Hargeisa, September 2006); ‘Somaliland Forum for Civic Dialogue’, Participation by author (Hargeisa, September 2006).

[556] Bashe Mohammed Farah. Interview with author, op. cit.

[557] See J-F. Bayart, ‘Africa in the World: A History of Extraversion’, African Affairs 99.395 (2000), pp. 217–67; J-F. Bayart, The State in Africa: Politics of the Belly (London: Longman, 1993).

[558] S. Pegg, International Society and De Facto States (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998); C. King, ‘The Benefits of Ethnic War: Understanding Eurasia’s Unrecognized States’, World Politics 53.4 (2001), pp. 524–52. See also, D. Lynch, Engaging Eurasia’s Separatist States (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2004).

[559] See Somaliland Academy for Peace and Development (ADP) and WSP-International (2003) ‘Facilitating Somaliland’s Democratic Transition’. Nairobi/Hargeisa: Dialogue for Peace Somali Programme report, p. 4.

[560] See, for example, M. Bradbury, A. Abokor and H. Yusuf, ‘Somaliland: Choosing Politics Over Violence’, Review of African Political Economy 30.97 (2003), pp. 455–78; M. Bryden, ‘state-Within-a-Failed state: Somaliland and the challenge of international Recognition’, In P. Kingston and I. Spears (ends), States-Within-States: Incipient Political Entities in the Post-Cold War Era (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 167–88; K. Evans, ‘a Somali Journey’, The Courier 162 (March-April 1997), pp. 55–7; S. Horner, ‘Somalia: can the Jigsaw be Pieced together?’ The Courier 162 (March–April 1997), pp. 46–53; J. Drysdale, Stoics Without Pillows: A Way Forward for the Somalilands (London: HAAN Associates, 2000); Somaliland Government, ‘Somaliland: Demand for international recognition’, Policy document for the government of Somaliland (Hargeisa: Somaliland Ministry of Information, 2001); M. Gees, ‘Is Somaliland a Model?’ Unpublished manuscript (2006); T. Othieno, ‘A New Donor Approach to Fragile Societies: The Case of Somaliland’, ODI Opinion 103 (2008).

[561] This is referencing Bobe Duale Yusuf’s observation that Somaliland exists in two worlds: the Western and the Somali. Bobe Duale Yusuf, former SNM commander and current Programme Director for APD. Interview with author (Hargeisa, September 2006).

[562] M. Gees, ‘Is Somaliland a Model?’ op. cit.

[563] Conversations with Mohammed Said Mohammed Gees and Mohammed Hassan Ibrahim ‘Gani’ (Hargeisa, August-September 2006); M. Gees, ‘Is Somaliland a Model?’ op. cit.

[564] See I. Ahmed, Remittances and their Economic Impact in Post-War Somaliland. Disasters 24.4 (2000): 380–89; A. Lindley, Somalia Country Study. Commissioned for a report on Informal Remittance Systems in African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries. Compas (Oxford: DFID, EC, Deloitte and Touche, 2005).

[565] A. Ghani and C. Lockhart, ‘Closing the Sovereignty Gap: An Approach to Statebuilding’, Overseas Development Institute Working Paper 253 (London: ODI, 2005).

[566] A. Ghani and C. Lockhart, Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 225, 226.

[567] A. Bendana, ‘What Kind of Peace is Being Built? Critical Assessments from the south’, International Development Research Center Discussion Paper (Ottawa, Canada, January 2003), p. 4.

[568] U. Beck, A. Giddens and S. Lash, Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition, and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1994), pp. 63, 65.

[569] C. Kahn, ‘Conflict, Arms, and Militarization: The Dynamics of Darfur’s IDP Camps’, Report No. 15 (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2008). Kahn argues that competition introduced by the presence of the international community in the Darfur conflict fragments the various rebel movements involved. See also, M. Duffield and J. Prendergast, Without Troops and Tanks: Humanitarian Intervention in Eritrea and Ethiopia (Trenton, NJ: red Sea Press/Africa World Press, Inc., 1994).

[570] S. Hansen, ‘Warlords and Peace Strategies: The Case of Somalia’, The Journal of Conflict Studies (Fall 2003), pp. 57–78: pp. 63–8. Hansen notes that the inclusion of warlords in the government often resulted in the fragmentation of warlord groups as other powerful actors within those groups broke away in attempts to earn a seat at the table.

[571] J. Young, ‘Sudan: A Flawed Peace Process Leading to a Flawed Peace’, Review of African Political Economy 32.103 (2005), pp. 99–113: p. 100.

[572] R. Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (London: Penguin, 2007). In his analysis of the use of force, Smith claims that the interventionist means of addressing instability and conflict never address the complex underlying political and social problems and therefore will never result in a conclusive end to a conflict. Although discussing the use of force in peacekeeping or other forceful interventions, the conclusion made can also be applied to non-forceful interventions: going through a standard operating procedure without addressing the underlying problems fueling a conflict or a ‘dysfunctional’ state only result in a continuation of the instability.

[573] E. Shils, Tradition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006). See also, E. Shils, ‘nation, nationality, nationalism and civil society’, Nations and Nationalism 1.1 (1995), pp. 93–118; M. Weber, ‘Politics as Vocation (1948)’, in H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (ends), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (London: Routledge, 1967), pp. 77–128.

[574] On 16 November 2008, the president of Somalia, Abdullahi Yusuf warned that the Somalia’s government was again on the verge of collapse. The weak and highly detested internationally created government has only operated within Somalia since February 2006 when it moved to the city of Baidoa and made it the provisional seat of government. Prior to this, the government was in exile in Kenya. IRIN News, ‘Somalia: TFG on Brink of Collapse’, IRIN News Online (16 November 2008).

[575] It is important to note that there has been a minimal, predominantly non-invasive international presence or involvement in Somaliland since its declaration of independence, but this presence is almost exclusively through wider Somalia projects rather than Somaliland specific endeavors and they rarely involve the process of creating an independent state. One example of this is that approximately 70 percent of the costs for the 2005 parliamentary elections were covered by the European Union. The EU funding for the parliamentary elections was under the guise of promoting democracy in Somalia rather than specifically Somaliland. Also, the UN and many international NGOs operate within Somaliland. However, this involvement, as with most involvement in Somaliland, has not included direct involvement in the state formation process. that is to say, those involved in Somaliland have had minimal, if any, involvement in directing the state formation process in Somaliland, instead focusing more on physical infrastructure or social concerns.

[576] M. Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996).

[577] Bilgin quoting Bhabha. P. Bilgin, ‘Thinking Past “Western” IR?’ Third World Quarterly 29.1 (2008), pp. 5–23: p. 6.

[578] See for example, M. Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World of Peoples (Cambridge: Polity, 2007); United Nations Economic commission for Africa, ‘relevance of African traditional institutions of governance’, UNECA Report (2007); United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, ‘ADF IV traditional governance Focus group issues Paper’, Africa development Forum, Addis Ababa, 11–15 October 2004; G. Lutz and W. Linder, ‘Traditional Structures in Local Governance for Local Development’, World Bank Institute Desk Study (Berne: University of Berne, 2004).

[579] C. Cramer and J. Goodhand, ‘Try Again, Fail Again, Fail Better? War, the State, and the “Post-Conflict” Challenge in Afghanistan’, Development and Change 33.5 (2002), pp. 885–909.

[580] D. Brinkerhoff, ‘Rebuilding Governance in Failed States and Post-Conflict societies: core concepts and cross-cutting themes’, Public Administration and Development 25.1 (2005), pp. 3–14: pp. 3, 13.

[581] M. Ottaway, ‘Promoting Democracy After Conflict: The Difficult Choices’, International Studies Perspectives 4.3 (2003), pp. 314–22.

[582] Coyne refers to this as the ‘nirvana fallacy’, claiming that the assumption that reconstruction efforts will always produce a positive outcome is a failure of current policy. C. Coyne, ‘Reconstructing Weak and Failed States: Foreign Intervention and the Nirvana Fallacy’, Foreign Policy Analysis 2.4 (2006), pp. 343–60.

[583] M. Ottaway and S. Mair, ‘States at Risk and Failed States: Putting Security First’, Policy Outlook for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the German Institute for International and Security Affairs Democracy and Rule of Law Project (September 2004).

[584] T. Othieno, ‘A New Donor Approach to Fragile Societies: The Case of Somaliland’, ODI Opinion 103 (London: ODI, July 2008).

[585] B. Bliesemann de Guevara, (2012) ‘Statebuilding and State Formation’, in B. Bliesemann de Guevara (ed.) Statebuilding and State-Formation: The political sociology of intervention. (London: Routledge, 2012), pp. 1–20: p. 3.

[586]  Mohammed Hassan Ibrahim ‘Gani’, Lead Researcher for APD. Interview with author (Hargeisa, August 2006).