“Why the U.S. Is Weighing Somaliland Recognition” is an editorial piece from Oilprice.com, focusing on the potential for the U.S. to engage with Somaliland without formally recognizing it as an independent country.
Here’s a breakdown:
Main Point: The U.S. can achieve its strategic goals in Somaliland (access to Berbera port/airfield, logistics, and maritime security) without official recognition, which avoids disrupting regional politics.
Senator Ted Cruz’s Call: The editorial references Senator Cruz advocating for U.S. recognition of Somaliland.
Transactional President: The editorial suggests that the current U.S. president (as of 2025) would favor a practical, deal-based approach.
DP World’s Role: DP World’s operations at Berbera Port and the Berbera Economic Zone provide a ready-made infrastructure for U.S. commercial and governmental activities without needing formal diplomatic ties.
Security Concerns: Heightened risks in the Red Sea (due to Houthi activity) make U.S. access to Somaliland a security imperative for both the U.S. and Somaliland. This access facilitates surveillance, patrol coordination, and contingency planning.
Ethiopia Corridor: The Berbera corridor offers Ethiopia an alternative trade route, reducing its dependence on Djibouti.
In short, the editorial argues that the U.S. can strategically benefit from Somaliland through practical arrangements rather than formal recognition, primarily focusing on security and trade access.
The complete editorial piece is as follows:
Why the U.S. Is Weighing Somaliland Recognition
By Editorial Dept.
As we digest U.S. Senator Ted Cruz’s call for the U.S. to recognize Somaliland as an independent country, the fact is, Washington can get what it needs in Somaliland without recognition and without disrupting a fragile geopolitical ecosystem.
For a transactional president, which is what we have right now, the pathway is clear. What Washington could gain, one way or another, is episodic access to Berbera’s port and airfield, logistics pre-positioning through the DP World–run economic zone, and tighter maritime domain awareness tied to Red Sea security.
The infrastructure and commercial platform already exist under DP World’s Berbera Port and Berbera Economic Zone, which provide a ready channel for U.S. commercial prepositioning and quiet government-to-government arrangements that fall short of diplomatic recognition.
The security case does not hinge on recognition. Red Sea risk remains elevated, with Houthi activity continuing to reshape routing, insurance, and naval posture across Bab al-Mandab and the Gulf of Aden. That drives demand for contingency nodes, surveillance, and patrol coordination above all. U.S. access, then, becomes a security necessity for both Washington and Somaliland.
A second access track is the Ethiopia corridor. The Berbera corridor aligns with Ethiopia’s push to diversify away from sole reliance on Djibouti. Ethiopia moves more than 90% of its trade through Djibouti, and the Berbera corridor is the only near-term alternative. By backing upgrades (roads, customs, and logistics), the U.S. makes that outlet viable, giving Ethiopia leverage over Djibouti.
For Somaliland, U.S. support (instead of recognition) validates economic autonomy and builds political capital without breaching the “One Somalia” commitment. The result is leverage in both capitals: Ethiopia gets options, Somaliland gets stature, and Washington secures influence without recognition.
Recognition is a geopolitical problem with limited operational upside. The U.S. has publicly reaffirmed support for Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity; a recognition move would undercut that position and complicate counterterrorism and security cooperation with Mogadishu at a sensitive moment.
It would also put Washington at odds with the African Union and IGAD, both of which reacted to the Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU (2024) by restating core principles on unity and territorial integrity and warning of regional destabilization.
Regionally, recognition risks widening fault lines: it would inflame the Ethiopia-Somalia dispute over sea access, harden Somalia’s stance against external partners seen as enabling secession, and drag in outside actors (Turkey, Egypt, and Gulf states) whose positions and security equities run through Mogadishu and the Red Sea. Corridor politics already intersect with interstate tensions.
The endgame here should be to pursue access by locking in logistics at Berbera without causing more security concerns in the region.
