As China has ties with Ethiopia and Somalia, which has already repealed Somaliland’s deal, analysts expect Beijing to stay on neutral ground in the row
By Jevans Nyabiage
China is unlikely to take sides in the diplomatic storm that is brewing between Ethiopia and Somalia over a controversial Red Sea port deal, according to analysts.
Landlocked Ethiopia made the deal at the start of the year with the self-declared state of Somaliland, giving the East African nation access to its ports in return for officially recognizing it as an independent country.
Somaliland proclaimed its independence in 1991, but since then it has not been recognized by any other country. The Somali capital, Mogadishu, continues to consider the region part of northern Somalia.
This deal would make Ethiopia the first nation to recognize the breakaway state.
China views Somaliland as part of Somalia’s territory and an internal matter. However, Beijing has been apprehensive of growing ties between Somaliland and Taiwan since 2020, when they set up representative offices.
“China supports the federal government of Somalia in safeguarding national unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity,” Chinese foreign ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning said on Thursday.
“Meanwhile, we hope that regional countries will handle regional affairs well through dialogue and achieve common development by having friendly cooperation.”
But China also has close ties with Ethiopia – and analysts have said Beijing is unlikely to criticize it over the controversy.
The row began on January 1, when Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Somaliland President Muse Bihi Abdi announced in Ethiopia’s capital, Addis Ababa, that they had signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) granting naval and commercial access to ports along Somaliland’s coast, on lease to Ethiopia for 50 years. In return, the deal “includes provisions which state that the Ethiopian government will recognize Somaliland.”
Mogadishu called the deal an “illegal infringement of Ethiopia into our national sovereignty and territorial integrity”. Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has since signed a law repealing the MOU.
Ethiopia is one of Beijing’s major allies in the Horn of Africa region – an area where China has vast economic interests.
China funded and built the US$4.5 billion Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway, which is part of the Belt and Road Initiative, as well as the Addis Ababa light rail.
In neighboring Djibouti, China opened its first overseas military base in 2017 and has invested heavily in the country’s maritime industry.
Chinese companies have fishing interests in Somalia, and Beijing has also been at the forefront of fighting piracy, with two frigates and a supply ship permanently stationed there on duty in Somali waters.
Guled Ahmed, a non-resident scholar at the Middle East Institute (MEI) who is from Mogadishu, said China was being cautious about the deal between Ethiopia and Somaliland, and it was possible it would not respond to the matter at all.
“It has huge investments and stronger ties with Ethiopia than Somalia,” Ahmed said.
He noted that nobody knows if the Somaliland government will continue its diplomatic relationship with Taiwan or not, “while the Biden administration has given a cold shoulder to a Somaliland and Taiwan alliance”.
“The future of the Somaliland and Taiwan relationship is uncertain,” Ahmed said.
David Shinn, a professor at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs in Washington and former US ambassador to Addis Ababa, agreed Beijing was unlikely to censure its African ally.
“China has close ties with Ethiopia and will be reluctant to criticize Addis Ababa over this deal with Somaliland,” he said.
China had minimal economic and political interests in Somalia, Shinn said, though it did have an embassy in Mogadishu, supported Somalia unity, and wanted to prevent the resurgence of Somali piracy.
He also said it was important to watch what happened with the relationship between Taiwan and Somaliland.
“China opposed the exchange of offices between Taiwan and Somaliland and will become more critical if these ties take on greater political significance,” Shinn said.
In 2020, when Taiwan opened a representative office in Somaliland’s capital, Hargeisa, while Somaliland opened a similar office in Taipei, Beijing “condemned Taiwan for undermining Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity”.
Beijing views Taiwan as part of China which must be reunited, by force if necessary. Most countries, including the United States, do not recognize Taiwan as an independent state, but Washington is opposed to any attempt to take the self-governed island by force and is committed to arm Taiwan.
In Africa, only eSwatini – previously Swaziland – recognizes Taipei.
According to Seifudein Adem, an Ethiopian global affairs professor at Doshisha University in Japan, China will seek to avoid overtly backing either side.
However, he said China would prefer it if Somaliland joined the community of nations, it was finally recognized as a legitimate state by the international community, and it cut off its diplomatic relations with Taiwan in due course.
“Otherwise, for the time being, China will seek to avoid the matter altogether,” Adem said.
This is largely because China would not want to jeopardize its interests by taking sides. Beijing’s stakes in the Indian Ocean run deep. According to Joshua Meservey, a senior fellow at Washington’s Hudson Institute who focuses on great power competition in Africa, Beijing is keen to project power there in keeping with its image as a major global power, to pressure its perennial adversary India, and to protect the sea lines of communication which are vital maritime trading routes.
“China has strengthened ties with Somalia recently, but the latter is so dysfunctional that it limits what Beijing can accomplish there,” Meservey said.
He added that China had already tried to induce Somaliland away from its ties with Taiwan, “though I think the Somalilanders understand that China will never recognize its independence because of the Taiwan issue”.
He said he believed that China would strongly support Mogadishu diplomatically in the current row.
“It’s not implausible that Beijing might also surreptitiously lend what support it can to any mischief that Mogadishu may try to stir in Somaliland in retaliation,” he said.
While there is little likelihood of Beijing recognizing Somaliland, in the US there has been a growing push by some in Congress and the Senate to do so in return for access to the port at Berbera as an alternative to America’s military base in Djibouti.
The US military has a naval base in Djibouti called Camp Lemonnier, but is eyeing more port facilities to counter China’s influence in the region as well as to protect trade routes.
Shinn from George Washington University said there were several members of the US Congress, a few American think tanks, and probably some officials in the Pentagon who supported the recognition of Somaliland.
“But the position of the Biden administration remains in support of the territorial integrity of Somalia,” Shinn said. “There is no indication that the Biden administration plans to change its policy.”
According to Ahmed from MEI, based on the US State Department’s daily briefings, it raised concerns about the Ethiopia-Somaliland deal and still recognized the sovereignty of Somalia and the territorial integrity based on the 1960 borders. Ahmed explained the wording was confusing as to whether the US was referring to borders post-merger or pre-merger because both happened in 1960. But, he said, the US was not against the deal and urged all stakeholders to engage in diplomatic dialogue to resolve the issue.
The deal with Somaliland comes shortly after Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy said in October that the landlocked country would assert its rights, a declaration that raised concern among its neighbors. According to Abiy, the country’s lack of access to the sea had “prevented Ethiopia from holding the place it ought to have” by affecting its ability to trade.
Until 1993, Ethiopia had access to the Red Sea when it was one country with Eritrea. But since Eritrea became an independent nation, Addis Ababa now must rely heavily on Djibouti ports for its maritime trade.
Kenyan journalist Jevans Nyabiage is the South China Morning Post’s first Africa correspondent. Based in Nairobi, Jevans keeps an eye on China-Africa relations and also Chinese investments, ranging from infrastructure to energy and metal, on the continent.
