The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Ethiopia and Somaliland, signed on January 1, 2024, has significantly impacted geopolitical dynamics in the Horn of Africa and raised a fresh conflict without achieving its primary goals of facilitating Ethiopian access to the port of Berbera and recognizing Somaliland’s independence.
By Mathieu Gotteland
As the yet unimplemented MoU has upended geopolitics in the Horn since it was signed on 1 January, no actual progress has been made on its stated aims: Ethiopia’s access to the port of Berbera and recognition of Somaliland’s independence.
It has, however, had several unintended but perfectly foreseeable consequences, including putting an end to the Ethiopian-Somali alliance, threatening war between Ethiopia and Somalia, dooming Somalia-Somaliland talks, strengthening Al Shabaab, isolating Ethiopia on the global stage, and further weakening Somaliland.
A “secondary” provision of the MoU, entirely unnecessary to those stated aims except as an item of power and prestige — that is to say, vainglory has now set the spark for yet another proxy war.
The setting up of an Ethiopian naval base in Zeila, Awdal, has been the main focus of Somali outcry against Ethiopia’s encroachment on her sovereignty. It has also brought into question whether Turkey would be obliged to intervene against it, after the naval MoU signed with Somalia over the training of a Somali maritime force, the protection and exploitation of the Somali EEZ.
An immediate consequence has been for former Somaliland ally Djibouti to support Awdal’s Gadabuursi clan against Hargeisa. The site of the Ethiopian naval base, on Gadabuursi territory, is located at barely 25 km from Djibouti’s border.
Somaliland’s president, Muse Bihi Abdi, has demanded that Djibouti’s interference to end and threatened to arm opponents to the 35-year rule of dictator Ismail Omar Guelleh.
Last year, Djibouti had supported Somaliland against the Puntland-supported Dhulbahante clan. The latter, which fought to escape state repression and possible genocide, has since routed Somaliland’s army, founded the region of SSC-Khatumo, and officially rejoined Somalia.
The only upside of this looming conflict is the reinforcement of Djiboutian-Somali solidarity in the face of Ethiopia, Somaliland, and Al-Shabaab. Djibouti will be a key player in Somalia’s post-ATMIS future, despite its limited size. Elders of the Gadabuursi clan had first seeked support in Mogadishu before turning to their immediate neighbor.
Despite Ethiopian and Somaliland rhetoric, this MoU has made peace and security an ever more elusive aim for both countries and the wider region. This also spells trouble for the current Turkish mediation talks in Ankara between Ethiopia and Somalia. It can only be hoped this development weakens Ethiopian interest in a naval base on Somaliland’s coast.
