Juncture between Africa and the Middle East
Relations between the Horn of Africa and Arab nations east of the Red Sea date back over millennia, spurred by a mixture of trade and the spread of Islam. This is what gives the Horn its hybrid character – a mix of African and Middle Eastern traditions and cultures.
The connection came to the fore following the 1973 Oil Crisis, triggered when oil-producing Arab countries cut down production to punish Western countries that supported Israel in the Yom Kippur War. Horn countries suddenly faced soaring inflation in the aftermath of the crisis.
“To overcome economic devastation and soaring debt, they began to court oil-rich Gulf States, offering political loyalty and natural resources in return for aid,” Awol says.
“Countries such as Somalia, Djibouti, Egypt, and Sudan invoked their cultural and religious connections with the Gulf in a bid to gain help in dealing with their balance of payment crisis and political instability. Arab nations seized the opportunity, using their wealth and newfound geostrategic importance to expand their influence in the Horn and secure key loyalties.”
But the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s caused a shift in relations as the Horn of Africa underwent several changes, Awol explains.
“The Marxist-Leninist regime in Ethiopia collapsed. Somalia imploded into protracted civil war. Eritrea gained independence. And Sudan experienced an Islamic Revolution.”
With revenue from oil also declining, he says, Gulf nations decided to retreat, which is how things stood for the following two decades. But now those nations are back, thanks to profound geopolitical shifts.
The Gulf’s Cold War
| THE DJIBOUTI CONUNDRUM The opening of the border between Ethiopia and Eritrea could appear bad news for Djibouti, which has handled 90% of Ethiopia’s foreign trade since the border war with Eritrea was triggered in 1998. Furthermore, on a visit to Sudan, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and President Omar al-Bashir presented plans to modernize Port Sudan together; and then while visiting Somalia, Abiy announced that Ethiopia would work with Mogadishu to upgrade four Somali ports.But while land-locked Ethiopia is clearly looking to break its heavy dependence on Djibouti, its government is primarily seeking to diversify its access to the sea – and drive-down freight costs via increased competition – rather than reduce its use of Djibouti. After all, on a visit to Djibouti, Abiy also called for joint investment in the tiny nation’s ports that serve so much of Ethiopia’s cargo.“These trade volumes will continue to grow as Ethiopian, Chinese and Djiboutian authorities have invested heavily in upgrading and enhancing infrastructure capacity along the Djibouti corridor,” says David Styan, a professor at the University of London’s department of politics.Earlier this year, Styan notes, the centerpiece of this strategy – the 728-kilometer railway linking Addis Ababa to Djibouti, began full operations. The $4bn project – financed, constructed and managed by China – has drastically cut the time and cost of shuttling containers by truck between Ethiopia’s capital, its expanding manufacturing export zones and Djibouti’s ports.Furthermore, the development of prospective oil and gas projects in Ethiopia’s eastern Somali region, which would also be exported via Djibouti as the nearest port, reaffirms the port nation’s relevance to Ethiopia, despite the UAE deal at Berbera.“They are not competitive yet, maybe in 10 years’ time, but we have everything working now,” says Youssouf Jamar, transport manager for the Djiboutian branch of the Ethiopian Djibouti Railway Company, working alongside the Chinese company operating the four daily cargo trains going between the two cities.“And once they are up and running, we will compete with them.”And Djibouti is already looking and planning ahead. Its ambitious Vision 2035 blueprint for national development sees its harbors as a hub for Asian transhipments, servicing the entire region.“As it develops ports and extensive Free Trade Zones with its Chinese partners, the entrepôt nation will remain critical for Ethiopia and prospects of regional economic integration, irrespective of developments in Eritrea or Somalia,” Styan says.He adds that Djibouti hopes its competitiveness will be emboldened by Kenya’s LAPSSET corridor, which aims to link its coast at Lamu to South Sudan and Ethiopia.Despite all the fluidity, continued cooperation between Djibouti and Ethiopia over the ports and the railway line, and the freedom of movement and economic commerce that comes with them remains an important generator of a peace and prosperity dividend for the whole region.“The Horn needs improved ports and infrastructure to handle the current pace of Ethiopia’s economic growth, on which broader regional integration and prosperity relies,” Styan says. |
What some are calling the Gulf’s Cold War escalated in 2017 when Saudi Arabia initiated an Arab blockade of Qatar over its alleged support for terrorism and its cozy relations with Iran, with whom Qatar shares the world’s largest gas field. Iran, the Shia Muslim power, has become the main regional rival to the Sunni Muslim-ruled Saudi Arabia.
As the Cold War developed, the adversaries, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, and their respective allies, all descended on the Horn, building military bases, signing defense pacts and taking over commercial ports in a bid to gain advantages. e potential of this latest scramble to sow both good and ill is well illustrated by Somaliland’s port of Berbera, which the UAE company DP World has taken over. It paid around $400m for the privilege. This is a vast amount for Somaliland’s tiny economy, added to which, the expansion will lead to a lucrative tenfold increase in the number of containers Berbera handles.
Furthermore, UAE is planning to upgrade the dilapidated road from Berbera to Ethiopia, all of which could help generate previously unimagined revenues for Somaliland, which economically remains utterly hamstrung by not being recognized internationally as a country, and is thereby unable to access international Financial organizations and systems. e deal holds undoubted commercial benefits for UAE, too, with Berbera granting access to Ethiopia’s large and promising market, which was recently jeopardized when DP World was evicted from Djibouti, Somaliland’s neighbor, due to a dispute over control of the city’s Doraleh container terminal.
Yet Berbera’s commercial potential for UAE pales in comparison to its strategic and military benefits, lying as it does, 140 nautical miles south of Aden, historically the most important port in Yemen, where Saudi and Emirati forces are engaged in a vicious war with Iranian-backed Houthi rebels.
The UAE is already using its naval base at Assab, on Eritrea’s Red Sea coast, to bombard Houthi positions in Yemen. Berbera will provide more military options, analysts say, and leave it in a position to dominate Yemen after the war.
But more is at stake than just the war in Yemen. Berbera, like Djibouti and Assab, lies close to the ‘Gate of Tears’, the narrow Bab al-Mandeb Strait running between the Horn of Africa as it juts out toward the Arabian Peninsula, a chokepoint separating the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, through which millions of barrels of Europe-bound and China-bound crude oil pass every day.
“For over 25 years, maritime strategy and port development in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden appeared relatively static,” says David Styan, a professor at the University of London’s department of politics. Eritrea looked inwards, he explains, neglecting its coast, while Djibouti flourished, lucratively embracing Ethiopia’s trade, overseas investors and foreign military bases. Meanwhile, Somalia’s shores became synonymous with piracy, prompting Western and Asian naval maneuvers, quietly ensuring free passage to the Suez Canal. But now that status quo has been entirely shaken up. “Ports in the Horn of Africa and Gulf of Aden are suddenly in the spotlight,” Styan says.
“They are proving to be of increasing interest to rival Arab and Chinese investors, and [so] the politics of ports have become central in shaping political alliances and enmities across the region.”
