In “India’s Somalia Error Will Backfire in Bangladesh,” Michael Rubin criticizes India’s decision not to recognize Somaliland, saying it could be a serious strategic mistake with effects far beyond the Horn of Africa.
He argues that Somaliland’s situation is similar to Bangladesh, since both emerged after periods of major violence. According to him, India’s focus on respecting Somalia’s territorial integrity may weaken its own long-standing position supporting Bangladesh’s independence from Pakistan.
The article also warns that India’s stance could unintentionally support arguments from Pakistan that question Bangladesh’s 1971 independence, while also harming India’s diplomatic relationships and economic interests in the region.
Rubin adds that closer ties with Somaliland could help India strengthen its influence along important shipping routes. He ends by urging Indian leaders to reconsider their position, saying that continuing on the current path could benefit rival countries and hurt India’s long-term strategy.
The full article is as follows:
India’s Somalia Error Will Backfire in Bangladesh
Somaliland is analogous to Bangladesh. Both states emerged from the tragedy of genocide. If East Pakistan had a right to free itself from West Pakistan’s extremists and genocidaires, why should Somaliland not have the same right?
By Michael Rubin
On December 26, 2025, Israel formally recognized Somaliland, the first country to extend formal invitations to the Horn of Africa country since it dissolved its union with Somalia and re-asserted its independence. After two weeks of speculation, India’s Ministry of External Affairs announced it would not follow suit.
“India has longstanding ties with Somalia. We continue to underline the importance of respecting sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country,” a Ministry spokesman announced. India is not alone; its statement falls in lockstep with Pakistan, Turkey, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.
While Indian officials worry about setting a precedent that might embolden Kashmiri separatists, India is nonetheless making a strategic blunder. Not only does the Ministry get history wrong, but it puts India’s own interests at risk in Bangladesh. India also disappoints Israel and undermines both India and Israel’s shipping security at a time when freedom of navigation remains under threat.
India gets history wrong by viewing Somaliland as a secessionist state rather than one half of a failed confederation. Both the United Arab Republic—a merger of Egypt and Syria—and Senegambia—the combination of Senegal and Gambia—failed and reverted to their constituent parts. The same holds true with Somaliland and Somalia.
After all, Somaliland was already independent in 1960, before entering a voluntary but never ratified union with Somalia. In fact, the African Union affiliated India recognizes Syria and Gambia and so, by the same logic, it should also recognize Somaliland. To support a government in Mogadishu beholden to Turkey and Being over a democracy actively seeking ties with Israel, the United States, and India, suggests a lack of strategic imagination at a minimum, if not self-destructive promotion of the status quo over democracy, precedent, and its own interests.
Even if Pakistani-backed forces argue India’s support for Somaliland opens the door to reconsideration of Indian sovereignty over Kashmir or normalization of Pakistan’s occupation over 35% of its territory, the proper Indian response is to call it nonsense. The United Nations has been clear on India and the illegality of Pakistani military occupation in the territory. Nor did the United Nations Security Council ever recognize Kashmir in the way it did Somaliland in 1960. Indeed, a strict reading of international law and UN resolutions would require Pakistan alone to withdraw from Occupied Kashmir prior to any referendum.
If there is any deleterious precedent from India’s rejection of Somaliland, it will be in Bangladesh. Since August 2024, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency and Jamaat-e-Islami have sought to relitigate if not reverse the circumstances of Bangladesh’s separation and 1971 independence from Pakistan.
Jamaat-e-Islami, responsible for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Bengalis now outlaws the Awami League, responsible for defending the people against genocide. It represented a complete inversion of reality as Muhammad Yunus, a Nobel Peace Laurate, lent his name to launder the legacy of war criminals.
To support Jamaat-e-Islami after the Bangladeshi genocide is no different than supporting the Nazi Party following the Holocaust or Somali dictator Siad Barre’s now-defunct but equally murderous Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party. While Tarique Rahman’s ascension amidst the Bangladesh Nationalist Party stymies the ISI’s ambitions in the short-term, the Pakistanis will not give up their efforts to reverse 1971.
By denying Somaliland’s right to independence on the logic of respecting for and preservation of Somalia’s sovereignty, India’s Ministry of External Affairs is essentially giving fodder to those in Pakistan who argue that such logic means Bangladesh’s secession from Pakistan was illegal.
Indeed, Somaliland is analogous to Bangladesh. Both states emerged from the tragedy of genocide. If East Pakistan had a right to free itself from West Pakistan’s extremists and genocidaires, why should Somaliland not have the same right?
New Delhi prides itself on a consistent approach to international law, but it is inconsistent in its application. In Somaliland, India undermines allies and a destination for Indian investors, while in Bangladesh, Indian diplomats by analogy now undermine those who seek to reinforce an identity distinct from Pakistan’s unique brand of religious intolerance.
It is not too late for S. Jaishankar to change his mind and to recognize not only the legal foundation upon which Somaliland bases its independence, but also that the logic of both Somaliland and Bangladesh’s independence are intertwined. To betray one is to undercut the other. To embrace Somaliland would be to help secure the Indian Ocean basin and deepen ties between Indian shipping and one of the region’s fastest growing deep-water ports in Berbera, Somaliland. When Pakistan’s ISI and China’s Communist Party silently cheer India’s foreign policy, it is clear that the Ministry of External Affairs has gotten something very, very wrong.
Published originally at The Sunday Guardian on April 26, 2026
About the Author:
Dr. Michael Rubin
Michael Rubin is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and director of policy analysis at the Middle East Forum. A former Pentagon official, Dr. Rubin has lived in post-revolution Iran, Yemen, and both pre-and postwar Iraq. He also spent time with the Taliban before 9/11. For more than a decade, he taught classes at sea about the Horn of Africa and Middle East conflicts, culture, and terrorism, to deployed US Navy and Marine units. Dr. Rubin is the author, coauthor, and coeditor of several books exploring diplomacy, Iranian history, Arab culture, Kurdish studies, and Shi’ite politics. He can be reached at X (formerly Twitter) @mrubin1971
