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3.3 The Practice of the OAU

Legally, the OAU has been constant in adopting the principle of territorial integrity except in a few situations and therefore blocked any claim to self-determination after the independence. As indicated above, the 1963 Charter of the OAU expressly recognized this principle and made it the foundation of resolving all disputes pertaining to the frontiers of the new African states. The Cairo Resolution followed the Charter, in which the OAU solemnly (reaffirmed] the strict respect by all member states of the Organization for the principle laid down in paragraph 3 of article III of the Charter…

Accordingly, African leaders appeared to have prioritized territorial integrity than self-determination. However, the question arises around what justified the OAU support of the Western-Sahara case and its silence with regard to the secession of Eritrea. In addition, the AU agreed to the secession of South Sudan from the North. Let us now consider these cases briefly.

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3.3.1 Western Sahara

Western Sahara was historically a region of Morocco colonized by Spain. During the colonization of the region, there was a dispute between Spain and Morocco as to the future of the region. While Spain advocated for the independence of Western Sahara after its departure. Morocco had argued that the region formed an integral part of its territory. Consequently, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) referred the dispute to the ICJ for an advisory opinion. The finding of the Court was simple and straightforward. It first found that the people of Western Sahara had the right to self-determination and therefore their free will has to be respected. Secondly, that there was legal ties between Morocco and Western Sahara before the arrival of the Spanish colonial to the territory. Following the advisory opinion of the ICJ, Morocco declared what became known as the ‘Green March’ in which it liberated the Western-Saharan from the colonization of Spain annexing the region to its territory. This act of Morocco created a new conflict between Morocco and the Polisario Front, which was the main political actor in the region. The response of the Polisario was to announce Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) declaring an independent stale. The finding of the 1CJ tells us that Morocco had sovereignty over the region before the colonization and therefore the call for separate statehood of the Saharawi people amounts to violation of Morocco’s territorial integrity.

Accordingly, the OAU was expected to stand against any attempt of this kind as it did with the previous cases. Surprisingly, the OAU did the opposite. At the beginning, the OAU pretended to be neutral to the dispute and called the two parties to resolve their dispute amicably. However, it started to take more progressive steps towards the recognition of SADR as the legitimate representative of the Saharawi people. This was by issuing a number of resolutions regarding this matter. The most notable of these resolutions is the 92 (XV) in which the OAU appointed an adhoc Committee to give a final say about the matter. The recommendation of the committee resulted in the OAU resolution No. 114, which recommended that Morocco withdraws from Western Sahara and the inhabitants of the region exercise their right to Self-determination. As the above resolution failed to bring a considerable solution, the OAU took a more radical step; this is by accepting the SADR to membership of the OAU in 1984. Thus, the OAU treated Western Sahara as an independent state. Consequently. Morocco withdrew from the membership of the OAU.

The OAU finally expressed its full support of Western Sahara in resolution 104 which recalled upon that the parties undertake direct negotiations and secondly, the UN in conjunction with the OAU will provide a peacekeeping force. The Western Sahara case does illustrate the OAU contradictions. Perhaps the only reason that forced the OAU to treat this case uniquely was that Western Sahara had a different colonizer from that of Morocco. If such justification legitimizes self-determination in international law, Somaliland can argue on the same ground.

3.3.2 Eritrea

This is another case, which reverses the OAU principle that colonial borders should be maintained. As mentioned before, the OAU opposed any attempt of secession from the existing borders in the Cairo resolution of 1964. At that time. Eritrea was an integral part of Ethiopia though the signs of the Eritrean struggle had already begun. Since then, Eritrean movements intensified their armed struggle, which resulted in the full independence of Eritrea from Ethiopia. There are two arguments regarding the legality of Eritrea’s secession. One argument is as asserted above to assume that Eritrea was an integral part of Ethiopia and consequently the 1949 UN decision, which federated Eritrea to Ethiopia, and Ethiopia’s subsequent full annexation of Eritrea were both legal. Therefore, it was questionable whether Eritrea had the right to secede from Ethiopia. Contrary to the OAU sanctioned principle of territorial integrity. Eritrea used war as a primary means to achieve its secession.

Having said this, do not ignore the UN referendum that finally led to the complete independence of Eritrea, because it is obvious that the referendum itself was a direct result of the armed struggle. Surprisingly, as Ruth Iyob explains though ‘the Eritrean case went against the grain of Africa’s post-colonial order and its attendant philosophical, ideological and political premises…’, the OAU did not express a single objection to the Eritrea’s unlawful use of force. Instead, the OAU did not only recognize Eritrea as an independent state but also witnessed its secession as an observer during the UN referendum for the Eritrea’s independence,

A second argument that might justify the OAU position is that Eritrean struggle was against colonialism and foreign domination. In this, Ethiopia is regarded as a colonial state and therefore Eritrea’s use of force was legitimate because it was fighting for its freedom. Again, this does not serve the OAU for two reasons. First, the OAU did not assist the people of Eritrea while one of its purposes was ‘to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa.’ Accordingly, the OAU was under obligation to assist Eritrea in its fight against colonialism.

The OAU reluctance to support the African struggle shows its belief that this case was not in fact about colonialism. Secondly, the African people themselves could not win their case under this argument. After noticing the international community’s objection this argument, the African struggle movement shifted its focus to the principle of self-determination and argued that they were denied this right internally by their own state; Ethiopia. Another factor that accelerated the success of the Eritrean secession was the argument that Eritrean people did not exercise their right to self-determination since the Italian colonialism.

3.3.3 South Sudan

The African Union was instrumental in making the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Sudanese People Liberation Army (SPLA) and the government of Sudan in 2005. This case clearly violates the spirit of the AU constitutive Act with regard to the question of borders, the AU did not seem to object this move of Southern Sudan. This shows the African Union implicit support of the South Sudan secession. Probably, the only justification that the AU has for its support is that there was an agreement between the two parties. This justification ignores the fact that this agreement was the result of bloody conflict in which the SPLA waged a guerrilla war against the government of the Sudan for at least 27 years. This argument further suggests that if any group wishes to secede from a given country, that group should firstly start fighting and finally sign a peace agreement as in the case at hand. In contrast, in the ease of Somaliland, it is the will of the people, which led to a peaceful separation from Somalia and not the gun.

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