The Politics Of The 1969 Somali Coup

In the present situation, the disposition of relevant forces seems to be as follows. The extreme fragmentation of lineage ties which obtained at the time of the coup is further encouraged by the absence of external pressures from Ethiopia or Kenya, by the inclusion in the Council of members belonging to all the major clan-families (most major groups thus have officers in power in the S.R.C. and other civilian politicians in detention), and by the regime’s evident concern to distribute its punitive measures as evenly as possible amongst the various groups. If enemies are to be made, it is best that they are made on all sides.

But if this balance of forces seems to add up to a recipe for stability, it does not take the regime very far in the direction of its declared reformist aims. Here the problem is to retain stability and, if possible, to secure a greater measure of independent legitimacy in order to draw more effectively and constructively on the state’s unique endowment of traditional cul­tural nationalism.

This, however, requires a great delicacy of judgment and skillful manipulation, because an excess of nationalist fervor might stimulate ungovernable pressures thrusting the Republic into a militant campaign to retrieve the missing territories in Ethiopia and Kenya.

This leads us back to the issues raised at the beginning of this article on the political implications of Somalia’s unusual position as a state-based upon traditional national identity and culture. I continue to regard this as a particular instance of J. S. Mill’s general principle that such circumstances permit if they do not actually encourage, a demo­cratic political system which, because of its cultural stability, can tole­rate the open expression of dissent.

Of course, the same factors could be employed to sustain and reinforce an oppressive tyranny. It seems to me significant, however, that Somalia’s shift from multi-party democracy to one-party rule and finally to military control coincides wills a general movement from wide-ranging national solidarity to extreme lineage particularism.

At the same time the failure, at least up to the present, of the military to overcome lineage divisions, again reveals how deeply entrenched these traditional imperatives are, and poignantly high­lights the ambivalence of a cultural heritage which promises unity only at the price of division. Democracy is also a deeply rooted Somali political principle which, I suspect, continues much as usual in the more remote parts of the nomadic interior. How long it will be before it reasserts itself in the central political life of the state remains to be seen.

Finally, there is the question of the extent to which, in common with its predecessors, the present Somali Government depends upon foreign assistance, and how this influences its policies or abridges its autonomy. It is not the purpose of this article to attempt any assessment of the Soviet Union’s interests in Somalia. However, it will not have escaped the attention of shrewd Somali nationalists that if future political un­certainties favor an expansion of Russian involvement in Ethiopia, a serious conflict of interest may develop. Here the pattern of American policies in the Horn of Africa provides food for thought.

* Professor of Anthropology, London School of Economics and Political Science, University of London.

The Journal of Modern African Studies

Vol. 10, No. 3 (Oct 1972), pp. 383-408 (26 pages)

Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 November 2008

Published by: Cambridge University Press

[su_button url=”https://saxafimedia.com/politics-1969-somali-coup/20/” style=”soft” size=”12″ wide=”yes” center=”yes” text_shadow=”0px 0px 0px #FFFFFF” rel=”lightbox”]CONTINUE READING ON THE NEXT PAGE >[/su_button]