This article, “Regional Power Implications for the Red Sea and Gulf of Berbera,” written by Eng. Abdi Ali Barkhad discusses the complex regional power dynamics in the Horn of Africa, focusing on the Red Sea and Gulf of Berbera.
Key Players and Their Interests:
Ethiopia: Seeks access to the Red Sea (especially the Berbera port in Somaliland) for trade and economic development, aiming for regional dominance.
Somalia: Aims to preserve its territorial integrity and opposes any agreements between Ethiopia and Somaliland.
Somaliland: Seeks international recognition of its independence and economic development, leveraging its strategic location and the Berbera port.
Djibouti: Holds a strategic position due to its control over port services for Ethiopia, but is concerned about the Ethiopia-Somaliland agreement potentially undermining its economic and strategic importance.
External Actors and Their Interests:
UAE: Expands its economic and military influence in the region, investing in the Berbera Port and monitoring Iranian and Turkish activities.
Turkey: Supports Somalia, challenges Gulf rivals (like the UAE), and expands its influence through military cooperation and infrastructure development.
Qatar: Funds and politically backs the Somalian government, opposing the Ethiopia-Somaliland agreement, and funding Al-Shabaab.
United States: Focuses on counterterrorism (specifically against al-Shabaab) and maintaining geopolitical influence.
China: Invests in Djibouti’s infrastructure to secure access to critical trade routes.
Geopolitical Flashpoints:
-
The Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU could shift regional power dynamics, potentially increasing tensions with Somalia and diminishing Djibouti’s dominance.
-
The militarization of the Red Sea increases the risk of conflicts.
-
The Horn of Africa is a battleground for US-China rivalry and intra-Muslim rivalries (Turkey/Qatar vs. UAE/Saudi Arabia).
Implications for the Region:
-
Increased military presence and a potential arms race.
-
The risk of proxy wars.
-
Somaliland has the opportunity to strengthen international ties.
-
External actors’ aggressive influence could destabilize the region.
The complete piece is as follows:
Regional Power Implications for the Red Sea and Gulf of Berbera
Eng. Abdi Ali Barkhad
An Independent Political Analyst
Hargeisa, Somaliland
The Horn of Africa has emerged as a critical theater for regional power dynamics, shaped by its geopolitical significance, access to vital maritime routes, and various resource interests. Below is a detailed breakdown of the major players and the complex dynamics influencing this ongoing competition:
Key Regional Players
1. Ethiopia
Following its landlocked status since 1993, Ethiopia’s primary national interest has shifted towards securing access to the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. This access is essential for trade and economic development, giving Ethiopia a vital lifeline to global markets.
The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed with Somaliland on January 1, 2024, represents a significant advancement in Ethiopia’s efforts to secure shipping routes through the Berbera port and naval base. This development has caused tensions with Somalia, which does not have any jurisdiction over the territory of the Republic of Somaliland.
Ethiopia positions itself as a regional hegemon, historically intervening in Somalia to influence its political landscape and asserting its authority in neighboring South Sudan and Djibouti, seeking to enhance its status as a dominant power in the Horn of Africa.
2. Somalia
Somalia is focused on preserving its territorial integrity and maintaining federal unity amid various internal and external pressures. The political stability of Somalia is essential for its national identity.
Supported by Qatar, Egypt, and Turkey, Somalia staunchly opposes any agreements between Ethiopia and Somaliland, interpreting them as encroachments on its sovereignty and raising alarm about the potential loss of control over its regional interests.
Somalia has stepped up its lobbying efforts within key international organizations like the African Union (AU), the Arab League, and the United Nations (UN) to oppose the agreement between Ethiopia and Somaliland. This move highlights Somalia’s commitment to protecting its unfounded claim to sovereignty and regional influence.
3. Republic of Somaliland
Somaliland seeks formal recognition of its de jure independence, having restated independence from Somalia in 1991, and aims to empower its economic development through enhanced international engagement.
With its location near the entrance of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, a relatively stable political environment, Somaliland offers the strategically important Berbera port as a critical asset for maritime trade routes.
Somaliland is actively leveraging Ethiopia’s quest for sea access to gain political recognition and support on the international stage, aiming to solidify its claims of independence and attract foreign investment.
4. Djibouti
Djibouti plays a crucial role as a military and logistical hub, hosting military bases for the United States, China, France, and other countries, thus enhancing its strategic importance in the region.
Djibouti currently maintains monopoly control over port services for Ethiopia, making its economy significantly reliant on trade through its ports.
The Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU raises concerns for Djibouti, as it could potentially undermine Djibouti’s port revenues and diminish its strategic value as the principal gateway for Ethiopian trade.
External Actors
1. United Arab Emirates (UAE)
The UAE aims to expand its influence in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, establishing a foothold for economic and military dominance in the region.
The UAE’s investment in Berbera Port, managed by DP World, highlights its commitment to shaping the maritime landscape, alongside growing diplomatic ties with both Somaliland and Ethiopia.
The UAE is vigilant about Iranian and Turkish activities in the Horn of Africa, viewing them as challenges to its geopolitical interests and regional security.
2. Turkey
Turkey has developed strong ties with Somalia, establishing a military base in Mogadishu as part of its strategy to expand influence in the region.
By supporting Somalia through military cooperation and infrastructure development, Turkey seeks to challenge Gulf rivals such as the UAE, leveraging its soft power through diplomatic channels and humanitarian aid.
3. Qatar
Qatar plays a pivotal role in providing funding and political backing to the Somalian government, reinforcing its position in the region.
Qatar strongly opposes the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between Ethiopia and Somaliland, supporting Somalia’s claims of sovereignty and territorial integrity. This stance further complicates the dynamics of regional alliances. Additionally, Qatar is a key source of funding and military support for the Al-Shabaab terrorist group in Somalia and beyond.
This intricate tapestry of interests reflects the Horn of Africa’s status as a focal point of regional power competition, influenced by both local actors and external powers vying for influence.
4. United States & China
The US is concentrating its efforts on counterterrorism initiatives, particularly focused on the al-Shabaab extremist group in the Horn of Africa. Additionally, it aims to maintain and expand its geopolitical influence in the region by promoting relationships with key nations and engaging in aid and military cooperation.
China has made significant investments in Djibouti, establishing a strategic foothold through infrastructure projects, including ports and logistical capabilities. This investment underpins China’s long-term strategy to secure access to critical trade routes, particularly those that facilitate commerce between China and Europe, as well as the Middle East.
Geopolitical Flashpoints
- The recently signed MOU between Ethiopia and Somaliland has the potential to be a transformative agreement in the region. If effectively implemented, it could enhance Ethiopia’s geopolitical stance while diminishing Djibouti’s long-standing dominance as the primary port. This shift may provoke increased tensions with Somalia, as it could escalate territorial disputes or exacerbate existing conflicts.
- The militarization of the Red Sea, particularly around the strategically significant Bab el-Mandeb Strait, is marked by the establishment of competing military bases from various nations. This situation heightens the risks of direct conflict as well as proxy confrontations among regional powers, with capabilities for swift maritime movements and naval engagements.
- The Horn of Africa has become an intricate battleground for the intensifying rivalry between the US and China, characterized by deepening military and economic competition. Additionally, intra-Muslim rivalries are surfacing, notably between Turkey and Qatar on one side and the UAE and Saudi Arabia on the other, which further complicates the regional dynamics.
Implications for the Region
The establishment of more naval bases and an uptick in arms deals across the region will likely lead to heightened military presence and potentially provoke an arms race among neighboring countries.
The increased involvement of external powers raises the possibility of proxy wars, particularly between Egypt, Somalia, and Ethiopia, as all nations seek to assert their influence in an increasingly volatile context.
If the Republic of Somaliland navigates the changing geopolitical landscape deftly, it can capitalize on its strategic geographical position. This could enable it to forge stronger international ties and attain greater recognition on the global stage.
A significant risk lies in the potential for external actors to exert their influence aggressively, which could disrupt the already fragile stability of the region. Such a scenario may lead to escalated conflicts, further undermining peace and security.
Engineer Abdi Ali Barkhad is a Consultant Somalilander, electrical engineer, political analyst, and writer known for his comprehensive commentary on the politics of the Horn of Africa and international relations. He has published numerous articles analyzing current policies in the region and is a staunch advocate for the cause of the Republic of Somaliland. He can be reached at:
