Somaliland reinforced its reputation as one of the Horn of Africa’s stronger democracies by staging a successful presidential election and ushering in a peaceful power transfer. In this Q&A, Crisis Group expert Omar Mahmood explains the challenges facing the new administration.
By Omar Mahmood
Senior Analyst, Eastern Africa
What happened?
Somaliland held its long-awaited presidential election in mid-November, ending in victory for the opposition and a swift concession by the incumbent. The vote and its aftermath underlined Somaliland’s standing as a consolidating democracy with a reputation for political stability while the peaceful transfer of power marked a welcome outcome in the Horn of Africa, where such handovers are a rare occurrence. That said, the run-up to the vote was far from smooth, due to rising internal tensions and an unresolved conflict in the east. The harassment of government critics and the concentration of political power in the hands of a single clan also fuel concerns as to the degree of openness in Somaliland’s political system.
Somaliland unilaterally declared independence from Somalia in 1991. Over the last three decades, it has developed many of the trappings of a state, including its own currency, security forces, and civilian administration in the capital, Hargeisa. Even so, Mogadishu rejects Somaliland’s independence and no country has recognized it. At the same time, its reputation for orderly polls and relatively consensual politics has come under strain recently, and disputes among politicians caused a two-year delay of the presidential vote.
In the end, Somaliland’s institutions and political establishment largely withstood the stress test. The results saw Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi “Cirro”, leader of the Waddani party, secure the presidency with 64 percent of the vote, defeating incumbent Muse Bihi of the Kulmiye party. Approximately 53 percent of registered voters turned out – lower than the previous presidential election in 2017 when 64 percent of those registered voted. This was partly because polls did not take place in most of conflict-hit Sool and parts of Sanaag, both of which lie in the east.
What are the main political divides in Somaliland?
Voters largely cast their ballots along clan lines, revealing the continuing dominance of these loyalties in Somaliland while also raising doubts as to the diversity and fairness of political representation.
Politics in Somaliland is dominated by members of the Isaaq clan family. A number of clans exist within the Isaaq, but three main ones – the Garhajis, Haber Jeclo, and Haber Awal – have the greatest political prominence. Other, non-Isaaq clans reside in Somaliland’s western and eastern regions. In the western region of Awdal, members of the Dir clan family have long complained of marginalization by the Isaaq.
In the east, members of the Darod clan family, comprising Dhulbahante and Warsengeli clans, have mostly rejected inclusion in Somaliland, favoring instead a closer relationship with Mogadishu or neighboring Puntland, a semi-autonomous state in northern Somalia with which they share close clan ties. These frictions were at the heart of the conflict that erupted between the Somaliland administration and the Dhulbahante in Sool in 2023 (for more on this, see below).
The past two Somaliland presidents … were swept to victory by a Haber Awal-Haber Jeclo clan alliance, under the Kulmiye party.
The past two Somaliland presidents – Bihi and his predecessor Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud, or “Sillanyo” – were swept to victory by a Haber Awal-Haber Jeclo clan alliance, under the Kulmiye party. This fractured in 2024, with many Haber Jeclo turning against the incumbent. Instead, they voted for Waddani and its candidate Cirro, complaining that Bihi favored his Haber Awal clan when in power. Prominent members of the Haber Jeclo clan also argued they had suffered most from the conflict in Sool which erupted during Bihi’s presidency, given that their homelands are on the front lines and many prisoners of war captured by Dhulbahante militias hail from their clan.
Alongside the presidential polls, Somaliland’s political organizations also contested elections to determine which of them would be permitted to compete as parties in future polls, with Somaliland’s political system licensing only three parties for up to ten years each. This system, in which political associations that want to become parties are subjected to a popular vote, is designed to avoid the proliferation of parties representing specific clans. Kulmiye and Waddani retained their official standing for the third and second time respectively. They are joined by a new party, Kaah, led by veteran politician Mohamoud Hashi Abdi, previously a member of Kulmiye. All three of these parties are headed by leaders from the Haber Jeclo – a first in Somaliland politics.
What were the challenges leading up to the polls?
The last few years have been difficult for Somaliland, sullying its reputation as a relative beacon of stability and democratic progress in the Horn of Africa.
First, presidential and local council elections had been delayed for several years due to domestic political tensions. When the licenses for Somaliland’s three permitted parties expired in late 2022, there was also little clarity on how or when the next slate of parties would be chosen. Presidential polls were due in November 2022, but confusion over the elections for licensed parties delayed the timetable: the government insisted on holding the party polls before the presidential contest, while the opposition argued the reverse should be the case.
A compromise was hammered out in August 2023, paving the way for a joint presidential and party election in November 2024 after a two-year delay. The agreement came after violent clashes between government forces and protesters in major cities in August 2022 as well as a short-lived clan-based rebellion near the town of Burco, the region’s second-largest city, in mid-2023.
Secondly, the conflict in Sool between the Somaliland government and Dhulbahante clan militias dented Somaliland’s reputation for internal stability. Members of Somaliland’s Isaaq clan led the agitation for independence from Somalia following years of insurgency against the country’s strongman ruler Siad Barre, who held power in Mogadishu from 1969 to 1991. But the majority of Sool’s population is Dhulbahante, a community that belongs to a non-Isaaq family, the Darod.
The desire for independence is not shared by all communities in the territory claimed by Somaliland, and the outbreak of violence demonstrated this. In early 2023, Dhulbahante elders and elites formed the Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn-Khatumo (SSC-K) administration in the Sool region, representing the clan, along with Fiqishine and Madiban clans in the area. The administration led the campaign to expel Somaliland forces in August 2023 and has since declared itself part of Somalia rather than Somaliland.
The immediate inception of the conflict in Sool can be traced to the assassination of a Dhulbahante opposition member in Las Anod, the region’s administrative capital, in December 2022. Protesters gathered in the town after the assassination, complaining that the Somaliland authorities had not made enough effort to stop the repeated killings of civic leaders. Police moved in to disperse the demonstrators, using excessive force.
A full-fledged insurgency ensued. The Somaliland military and Dhulbahante clan militias, backed up by other related clans, fought a fierce war between February and August 2023 in which more than 150,000 civilians were displaced, many of them fleeing to Ethiopia. Somaliland forces fell back to the town of Oog in August 2023, where they remain. Fighting has not restarted since, although troops remain deployed on the front lines. Coupled with the lack of engagement between Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn-Khatumo, and the Somaliland government, the risk of the conflict reigniting remains.
Outgoing President Bihi’s moves to achieve the first-ever foreign recognition of Somaliland helped shape the outcome of the election.
Thirdly, outgoing President Bihi’s moves to achieve the first-ever foreign recognition of Somaliland also helped shape the outcome of the election. In January 2024, he hastily signed a memorandum of understanding with Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed which reportedly stated that Ethiopia could lease land on the Somaliland coast to build a naval base, in exchange for Addis Ababa providing official recognition of the administration as a sovereign state.
The agreement sparked a regional uproar: Somalia condemned it as a violation of its sovereignty and subsequently demanded that all Ethiopian forces deployed in the country depart. (Ethiopia has troops there as part of the African Union mission and on a bilateral basis in support of Mogadishu’s fight against Al-Shabaab militants.)
The reactions within Somaliland were more equivocal. Some hailed it as a bold step towards securing independence. Others, however, criticized the lack of transparency, as well as the prospect of Ethiopia establishing a military installation on soil inhabited by ethnic Somalis, many of whom regard the country as a regional rival. Others viewed the agreement as no more than a ploy by Bihi to strengthen his flagging political prospects through an appeal to Somaliland nationalism.
With Ethiopia facing concerted diplomatic pushback, the deal has as of yet had no meaningful effect in practice. But it remains a source of contention – particularly in the Horn of Africa – and the mere existence of the memorandum of understanding contributed to a tense pre-electoral environment.
None of these controversies, however, managed to override the smooth conduct of elections, demonstrating Somaliland leaders’ commitment to the ballot box and sustaining the progress that the region has made toward developing democratic institutions. The National Electoral Commission and Supreme Court in particular showed leadership and independence during the electoral process. Bihi’s administration, meanwhile, successfully oversaw logistical challenges and refrained from manipulating the vote.
What should be the incoming administration’s domestic priorities?
The conclusion of the elections is an opportunity for Somaliland to move on from an electoral process that concluded peacefully while also exposing the extent of its divisions. Somaliland’s new leadership faces a clutch of major challenges. Its domestic politics are increasingly fractious; the relationship with the Dhulbahante clan (and the frozen conflict in Sool) remains tense; and the memorandum of understanding with Ethiopia continues to stir diplomatic bickering.
Meanwhile, electoral democracy itself could face a new threat as the benefits of holding political power and the costs of losing it rise due to mounting foreign investment in Somaliland, giving top government officials far greater economic sway and access to financial resources. Important economic developments include the 2016 arrangement for the DP World logistics company, based in the United Arab Emirates, to manage and expand Somaliland’s main port of Berbera. This will allow Somaliland to profit from an important trade route linking states in the Horn of Africa to the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea shipping lanes.
But for now, successful polls, and a smooth transfer of power, will go some way to cooling domestic political tensions and redressing the reputational damage Somaliland suffered as a result of the delayed polls and conflict in Sool. Incoming President Cirro – a long-time opposition leader who was speaker of Somaliland’s lower house from 2005 to 2017 – should take the opportunity to prioritize dialogue and de-escalation, moving on from the aggressive and antagonistic approaches that have prevailed over the last few years in Somaliland.
To minimize post-election tensions, the incoming administration should demonstrate its commitment to governing on behalf of all Somalilanders, rather than just the communities that form its clan-based coalition. A first step would be to ensure that ministerial appointments in the new administration reflect a wide range of clans, not simply those that are most politically dominant, while also including more women’s voices to counter the marked gender bias in Somaliland’s political establishment. The new administration should also work to respect civil liberties and reverse recent efforts to curb these, a trend that has been manifested in the rising number of arrests of journalists and opposition politicians, including the detention of a member of parliament during the pre-electoral period.
Long overdue reforms to the political system should be another priority.
Long overdue reforms to the political system should be another priority. One important step would be to devise a new way to select representatives to the Guurti, the parliament’s upper house. Its current members were picked in the late 1990s and have long since exceeded their original six-year mandate.
Many clan elders who were initially chosen have died and their successors, who mostly inherited the roles, often lack a similar level of public influence or interest in reaching a compromise with political rivals. Not unlike the Guurti, mandate extensions are common across Somaliland – all branches of elected government (presidency, parliament, local councils) have previously seen terms of office extended. The new administration could beef up its democratic credentials by sticking to constitutionally-mandated term limits.
More broadly, the new administration should also seek ways to boost the inclusiveness of Somaliland’s political system. This will not be easy. Dialogue with communities that feel underrepresented, particularly non-Isaaq communities like the Gadabursi and Issa in the west and the Dhulbahante and Warsengeli in the east, is critically important. The Dhulbahante have effectively abandoned the Somaliland project, and prefer to see themselves as part of Somalia.
Talks between both sides on the subject of releasing prisoners of war would be a sensible first step to avoid a resumption of conflict between the Dhulbahante and the Somaliland government and could pave the way to more substantive discussions on their future relationship. In recent weeks, clan conflict has also flared in Erigavo, the capital of the Sanaag region, which had been a model of civic tranquillity despite the city’s diverse population. Dialogue sponsored by the new government could help calm tensions before they escalate further.
How should the government approach its foreign relations?
Two key issues are set to dominate Somaliland’s foreign relations: the status of the memorandum of understanding with Ethiopia, and Somaliland’s ties with Mogadishu. Relations between Somaliland and the Somali government had been improving prior to the signing of the memorandum. Toning down bellicose rhetoric deployed by both sides since the deal with Ethiopia was announced in January 2024 could help the two governments get back on the road to dialogue. There is a potential window of opportunity ahead of Somalia’s next elections in May 2026, in part because Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud may want to demonstrate progress on the Somaliland issue before his mandate expires.
The memorandum of understanding will be tricky to navigate. If implemented, it would represent a breakthrough for foreign recognition of Somaliland, but could also spark a backlash in the region, particularly from Mogadishu. One approach could be for Somaliland and Ethiopia to focus on commercial aspects of the agreement – which are easier to put into effect immediately and less controversial. This would mean linking the revamped infrastructure around Berbera port to the Ethiopian market by improving the transport network connecting Ethiopia and Somaliland, while also finalizing a bilateral trade agreement that had been under discussion prior to the memorandum of understanding.
Somalia has noted it has no objection to Ethiopia and Somaliland deepening their commercial ties. At the same time, wider discussion between states in the Horn of Africa is needed to address the unresolved questions that the memorandum highlighted: namely, Ethiopia’s limited sea access and Somaliland’s legal status.
Another potential flashpoint surfaced in the aftermath of the U.S. election. Although not an official publication of incoming U.S. President Donald Trump’s campaign, the Project 2025 conservative manifesto issued by some of his allies makes the case for official recognition of Somaliland. It argues that such a step would reward the entity for its relative stability, while also countering what the document’s authors describe as neighboring Djibouti’s pro-Beijing orientation. (Djibouti hosts a major Chinese naval base located a stone’s throw away from a large U.S. base; its decision to grant China basing rights in 2016 irritated Washington.)
On paper, Somaliland would welcome official recognition by a great power. But if this is done unilaterally and with no major diplomatic spadework in advance, it would also supercharge tensions between Somaliland and Somalia, particularly along the contested boundary with Puntland. It would likewise prompt furious objections from Mogadishu’s allies in the region, such as Djibouti and Eritrea, as well as their friends farther afield, including Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, and Egypt – further dividing the wider region.
Navigating the issue of recognition will be an especially nettlesome challenge for Cirro. All parties – particularly the incoming U.S. administration – should avoid rushing into decisions that could create new fault-lines in the Horn of Africa. Washington should rather prioritize the resumption of dialogue between Mogadishu and Hargeisa, with regional backing, through sustained diplomacy and diplomatic pressure, in order to move toward a lasting solution.
Omar Mahmood is a Senior Analyst for Eastern Africa at Crisis Group. He is responsible for conducting field research, writing analyses, suggesting policy recommendations, and participating in advocacy efforts.
