Explore Somaliland’s quiet strength and how it maintains peace, democracy, and security while Somalia struggles with al-Shabaab’s growing insurgency
HARGEISA, Somaliland — While southern Somalia teeters on the brink of what some analysts describe as an inevitable al-Shabaab takeover, Somaliland stands out as a beacon of stability in the Horn of Africa.
Nearly 35 years after declaring independence from the collapsing Somali state in 1991, the territory has maintained peace, governance, and economic growth largely absent from Mogadishu and much of central and southern Somalia. Its experience highlights not only the fragility of Somalia’s federal government but also the geopolitical significance of Hargeisa’s resilience.
“Somaliland has proven that peace and economic opportunity are possible where Mogadishu struggles.”
According to Matt Bryden, a strategic adviser and founding partner of the Sahan policy center, “Somaliland, Puntland, and to a lesser extent some other FMS administrations, have proven that they are capable of providing not only peace and security, but also economic opportunities and personal freedoms that al-Shabaab would never countenance.” This contrast is stark in a country where the Somali National Army (SNA) has struggled for years against a growing jihadist insurgency.
The Southern Crisis
Southern Somalia’s predicament has worsened in 2025. Al-Shabaab, the al Qaeda-affiliated terror group, has advanced toward Mogadishu, seizing towns with alarming speed. By July, militants had encircled the capital, “advancing to less than 50 kilometers from Mogadishu and setting up checkpoints on its outskirts,” Bryden reports. Though the offensive temporarily paused, foreign embassies had already evacuated nonessential staff, signaling the gravity of the threat.
The federal government, confined largely to Mogadishu and a few satellite towns, has struggled to sustain operations, relying heavily on the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). Yet even the African Union’s mission has been hamstrung by political interference from Villa Somalia. Chief of Defense Forces General Odowaa Yusuf Raage revealed that between 10,000 and 15,000 troops had been killed or wounded in action over three years, a testament to systemic failures in leadership, training, and coordination.
Bryden underscores that “Al_Shabaab’s strength has always been a reflection of the Somali government’s weakness,” noting that decades of investment in the SNA and foreign military support have done little to change the dynamics on the ground.
Somaliland’s Divergence
In sharp contrast, Somaliland has carved out a functional state apparatus independent of Mogadishu. The territory declared independence soon after the fall of Siad Barre, dissolving its brief union with Italian Somalia. “Despite its lack of international recognition, Somaliland’s de facto independence from Somalia already exceeds the brief period during which the two states were united,” Bryden writes. He notes that most Somalilanders have no memory of a united Somali Republic, and those who do recall only marginalization and brutal repression at the hands of the Somali government.
Somaliland has managed to establish its own constitution, democratic elections, security forces, currency, and passports, largely without bilateral donor support. The territory also conducts an independent foreign policy, fostering relations with Ethiopia, the United Arab Emirates, and Taiwan, while resisting repeated overtures from Mogadishu, which continues to deny Somaliland’s claims to sovereignty.
Bryden highlights that Somaliland’s stability is not accidental. Its governance model emphasizes local accountability, decentralization, and a commitment to democratic norms. In a region plagued by jihadist expansion, these features provide a stark counterexample. “Somaliland’s case for recognition…should not be linked to the notion of ‘opening a Pandora’s box,’” he cites, referencing a 2005 AU fact-finding mission.
Geopolitical Calculus
Somaliland’s position in the Horn of Africa has increasingly drawn international attention, particularly in the context of competing Gulf interests. Qatar and Türkiye back Villa Somalia and its allied Islamist factions, whereas the UAE favors decentralized federalism and has cultivated strong relations with Somaliland, Puntland, and Jubaland. Abu Dhabi’s support for Somaliland includes $500 million in infrastructure investments, security assistance, and a military presence at Berbera airport, illustrating the strategic significance of the port and corridor linking Hargeisa to Ethiopia.
Bryden observes that Somaliland’s alliances have real implications for regional security: “More pragmatic, inclusive leadership from Villa Somalia, aimed at reunifying the country’s fraying federation and addressing Somaliland’s aspirations through meaningful dialogue, would go a long way toward harmonizing regional powers behind these same goals.”
Ethiopia, Somaliland’s largest neighbor and closest security partner, has reinforced these dynamics. A Memorandum of Understanding signed in January 2024 proposed a 20-kilometer Ethiopian naval presence along Somaliland’s coast in exchange for recognition, though implementation has stalled amid diplomatic pushback from Mogadishu. Nonetheless, the episode signaled Somaliland’s rising geopolitical prominence.
Lessons from Federal Failures
While Somaliland consolidates its governance, the federal government in Mogadishu struggles with internal divisions, contested elections, and a fragile military. Bryden notes that President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s attempts to centralize power and extend his term beyond May 2026 have aggravated tensions with regional states like Puntland and Jubaland, both of which have resisted federal overreach. “The power struggle has plunged the federation into political chaos and a constitutional void, paralyzing the war effort against al-Shabaab,” he writes.
The federal government’s instability has allowed al-Shabaab to consolidate territorial gains, especially in central and southern Somalia, with militants stepping up attacks even within Mogadishu. Meanwhile, the SNA has been diverted to political conflicts rather than counterterrorism, further undermining security operations.
The contrast with Somaliland is instructive. Where Mogadishu’s centralization has fostered inefficiency and vulnerability, Somaliland’s localized governance has maintained security and encouraged economic activity. Its de facto independence has enabled it to resist the radical Islamist agenda that is reshaping southern Somalia, offering a potential model for stability in a fractured state.
The Threat of Islamist Centralization
Bryden warns that Somalia’s drift toward a centralized Islamist state is accelerating. The 2012 Provisional Constitution enshrines Shari’a law as a foundation for governance, creating pathways for Salafi-aligned groups like al I’tisaam to influence politics. “All major Somali Islamist movements aspire to a centralized, unitary Somali state, but most have struggled to gain traction beyond Mogadishu and the central regions,” Bryden observes. Somaliland, however, has resisted these incursions, preserving secular governance practices and resisting Salafi infiltration in politics.
The federal government’s attempts to suborn federal member states are unlikely to succeed in Somaliland, where the political culture, civil society, and security apparatus are resilient. “Somaliland’s aspirations have long been subject to Mogadishu’s de facto veto—regardless of whether a viable Somali government existed or not,” Bryden notes, adding that the territory’s relative peace and democratic credentials strengthen its argument for recognition.
“Villa Somalia’s rejection of a unity government need not obstruct concerted action against al-Shabaab.”
Strategic Implications
As Somalia edges closer to a potential collapse in the south, Somaliland’s model carries strategic significance. It offers a functioning administration capable of cooperation with neighboring Ethiopia and international partners like the UAE and the United States. In contrast, Mogadishu’s failure to stabilize its territory leaves al-Shabaab poised to dominate and export instability.
Bryden emphasizes that in a worst-case scenario, “Villa Somalia’s rejection of a national unity government need not obstruct concerted action against al-Shabaab, since FMS and other Somali political forces could, independently of the FGS, join forces against this common threat.” Somaliland, alongside Puntland, is well-positioned to serve as a base for regional coordination against jihadist expansion.
The AU mission, AUSSOM, continues to play a critical role, but donor fatigue and funding shortfalls threaten its capacity. Bryden warns that “absent a new, bilateral military deployment by one of Somalia’s close allies, the FGS’s prospects of survival beyond that point would dramatically recede.”
“Somaliland’s sovereign status should be determined by its intrinsic legal, moral, and political merits.”
The Promise of Stability
Somaliland’s continued success underscores a simple yet crucial truth: stability and governance matter. Bryden writes, “The greatest asset of the anti-al-Shabaab forces, however, is not their combined military might—it is the promise of a better life than under al-Shabaab.” By providing security, economic opportunities, and personal freedoms, Somaliland has insulated itself from the jihadist threat while offering a living example of federal member state resilience in a fractured Somalia.
In a region where Mogadishu’s federal ambitions are faltering, Somaliland stands as both a counterpoint and a potential partner. Recognition of its sovereignty, Bryden argues, should be considered not merely through the lens of Somali politics but on its intrinsic merits: “In principle, Somaliland’s sovereign status should be determined by its intrinsic legal, moral, and political merits, and not only as a function of Somalia’s dysfunction.”
For now, Somaliland’s experience offers lessons in governance, security, and regional diplomacy. As Somalia struggles under the weight of jihadist insurgency, regional rivalries, and political dysfunction, Hargeisa continues to demonstrate that peace and prosperity are possible even amid chaos.
