With a fractured army and political deadlock, Somalia slow march toward a jihadist state, leaving Mogadishu and the Horn of Africa in peril
MOGADISHU — In the spring heat of April 2025, as al-Shabaab fighters swept across central Somalia faster than government forces could retreat, diplomats inside Mogadishu’s sea-sprayed compounds began quietly gaming out scenarios they once dismissed as unthinkable.
Would the fall of Somalia’s capital look more like the Taliban’s lightning takeover of Kabul in 2021 — or the slow strangulation of Damascus under jihadist coalitions a decade earlier?
The fear was not theoretical. Within three months, the al-Qaeda-affiliated insurgency had taken town after town with almost unsettling ease, pushing to within 50 kilometers of Mogadishu. Checkpoints appeared on key arteries leading toward the capital. Foreign missions began evacuating nonessential staff to Nairobi. Then, just as abruptly, the militant advance paused.
Somali officials declared it a victory. Few believed it.
“Al Shabaab poses a serious threat of taking Mogadishu — largely due to a breakdown in political cooperation between federal and state authorities,” warns Matt Bryden, a veteran Horn of Africa analyst, in a new Africa Security Brief that has ricocheted through Western governments. “Such an outcome would empower a militant Islamist alliance with global ties, profoundly reshaping the international fight against terrorist groups.”
Matt Bryden is a Strategic Adviser and Founding Partner of Sahan, a policy and research center focused on security dynamics, threats, and responses across the Horn of Africa.
Somalia today sits at the intersection of four grinding crises: an ascendant jihadist movement, a failing army, an imploding federal system, and a fierce geopolitical contest among Gulf and regional powers. With the federal government’s effective control reduced to Mogadishu and a handful of satellite towns, Bryden concludes, Somalia is “a metropolis with a diplomatic corps and a demoralized, ineffectual army.”
The question now consuming African Union planners, neighboring governments and Western intelligence agencies is no longer whether Somalia could collapse, but whether anything can still prevent it.
“Despite billions in aid and two decades of training, the Somali National Army is still incapable of sustained operations.”
An Army Hollowed Out
Somalia’s battlefield defeats are not simply the result of al-Shabaab’s resilience. They are also a stark measure of state fragility.
More than two decades and billions of dollars in Western assistance have failed to produce a functioning national army capable of defending the country it nominally serves. In a stunning admission before Parliament in November, Somalia’s chief of defense forces, Gen. Odowaa Yusuf Raage, revealed that between 10,000 and 15,000 Somali troops had been killed or wounded in the past three years alone.
Even with American Special Forces training elite commandos, Turkish instructors producing entire infantry battalions, and the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) securing major cities, the Somali National Army (SNA) remains deeply fractured.
Bryden is blunt: “Despite more than two decades of investment and billions of dollars in training and equipment, the Somali National Army is still incapable of sustained clearing and holding operations.”
The problems are systemic — corruption, clan favoritism, uneven training and chronic leadership failures. The result is a force that often collapses under pressure, surrenders bases without a fight, or is simply absent from nominally government-controlled areas.
In October, al-Shabaab fighters stormed the Mogadishu branch of Somalia’s intelligence service and freed dozens of detainees — just blocks from Villa Somalia, the presidential palace.
Inside Mogadishu, residents say the insurgents’ presence within the city has grown bolder and more pervasive. “They can reach anywhere they want,” said a civil society activist who requested anonymity for security reasons. “They know who comes and goes. Sometimes they know more than the government.”
A Federation Fracturing Under Its Own Weight
Somalia’s political crisis may be even more dangerous than its military one.
The 2012 Provisional Constitution was meant to anchor a federal political system designed to prevent the return of dictatorship — a widespread fear rooted in the bloody legacy of former president Siad Barre. Instead, the federal framework has become an arena of bitter contestation between Mogadishu and powerful regional states.
Bryden writes that Somalia is caught in “the unravelling of its federal political settlement and cyclical constitutional and electoral crises.”
“Al-Shabaab is content to watch and wait while its enemies quarrel.” – Bryden
Central to the turmoil are President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s attempts to modify the constitution, impose a controversial new electoral system, and redraw the federal map before his term ends in May 2026. His critics — including Puntland and Jubaland, two of the most powerful federal member states — say the moves are a ploy to extend his time in office and centralize authority.
Two states have already suspended cooperation with the federal government and withdrawn recognition of Mogadishu’s constitutional powers.
The Provisional Constitution leaves vast areas of responsibility “to be negotiated” between the federal center and regional authorities. Instead of negotiating, Bryden says, “successive federal presidents have sought to concentrate power in their own hands.”
The result is political paralysis — and an open door for al-Shabaab.
“Al Shabaab is content to watch and wait while its enemies quarrel,” Bryden notes. For the militants, a fragmented Somalia is a strategic gift.
The Federal Government’s Lifeline: Foreign Cash
Somalia’s federal government survives largely because the world has chosen to recognize it — and fund it.
International assistance now totals $5 to $7 billion annually, Bryden reports, with nearly one-third allocated to security and roughly $1 billion in direct budget support. In the 2025–26 fiscal year, donor funds make up about 70 percent of the federal budget.
Without these resources, the central government would struggle to maintain control of Mogadishu, let alone assert authority over states like Puntland, Jubaland or South West.
International recognition, Bryden argues, gives Villa Somalia “externally conferred sovereign status” that it uses to “dictate terms to the FMS” — leverage rooted more in donor money than constitutional power.
The Election That Could Break the Country
At the heart of current tensions is the push for a “one person, one vote” electoral system — a radical departure from Somalia’s clan-based power-sharing model.
Some foreign partners see universal suffrage as a democratic milestone. But Somalia’s insecurity means voting would only occur in Mogadishu and a handful of government-held towns. That could allow urban enclaves under federal control to elect an entire parliament — including MPs representing regions where no ballots were cast.
The resulting parliament, Bryden warns, would “dangerously magnify regional and clan cleavages.”
Given the tight timeline, few experts believe the electoral process can be completed before May 2026. According to diplomatic sources, Villa Somalia has begun laying groundwork for a two-year term extension — a precedent that triggered armed clashes in Mogadishu in 2021.
A repeat could be catastrophic.
“Violent clashes in the streets of Mogadishu would serve only to delegitimize the FGS even further,” Bryden writes, “while handing another propaganda victory to al Shabaab.”
Somalia’s Islamist Drift
Even if the government survives the current political crisis, the ideological direction of the state is shifting.
The 2012 constitution explicitly enshrines Islamic law as the foundation of governance. But the country’s most influential political actors today belong to competing Islamist movements — including factions of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafi-jihadist-linked Al-I’tisaam.
Since 2009, Bryden notes, “Somali Islamist movements have enjoyed uninterrupted alternations of power in Mogadishu.” The two dominant camps — Damul Jadiid (aligned with Qatar and Turkey) and Al-I’tisaam — each wield significant influence in government, the religious sector and business networks.
Al-I’tisaam in particular controls vast parts of the telecommunications, petroleum and financial sectors.
Most significantly, it shares ideological lineage with al-Shabaab: both emerged from the 1990s jihadist movement al-Itixaad al-Islaami. Only the method divides them — political maneuvering versus armed insurgency.
“They are ideological twins — two faces of the same Salafi-jihadist coin,” Bryden writes.
If al-Shabaab entered negotiations or even formed part of a future government — an option increasingly whispered about by foreign diplomats — the boundary between political Islamism and militant extremism could blur further.
Foreign Powers at War Through Somali Proxies
Somalia’s internal divisions mirror a broader regional power struggle.
Turkey and Qatar back Mogadishu’s centralizing project and maintain close ties with Somalia’s ruling Islamist factions. Turkey runs the country’s largest overseas military base in Mogadishu, trains elite battalions of the Somali army, and has secured lucrative port, airport and infrastructure contracts. Qatar funds political networks, humanitarian aid and social programs in both government- and al-Shabaab-controlled areas.
Doha’s quiet push for talks with al-Shabaab — contingent on the militants dropping their allegiance to al-Qaeda — alarms neighboring states.
“Doha appears to believe that if al Shabaab were to renounce its affiliation with al Qaeda… international reservations about the group could be overcome,” Bryden writes.
On the opposite side sits the United Arab Emirates, a fierce opponent of political Islam. Abu Dhabi has forged deep ties with Somaliland, Puntland and Jubaland, invested hundreds of millions in the ports of Berbera and Bosaso, and maintains a military logistics hub in Puntland. Emirati support, though less publicized than Turkish involvement, rivals it in scale and strategic ambition.
Ethiopia and Kenya align more closely with the UAE-backed northern states, viewing them as critical buffers against al-Shabaab and terrorism spillover.
Meanwhile, Mogadishu has turned to Egypt and Sudan — both locked in bitter disputes with Ethiopia — for intelligence training and promised troop deployments.
Somalia, Bryden warns, is “increasingly entangled in a regional conflict vortex.”
“Somaliland’s stability and foreign partnerships make it a pivotal actor in the region.”
Somaliland: The Most Stable Actor, and the Most Contested
Nowhere are these rivalries sharper than in Somaliland — the self-declared republic that has functioned independently since 1991 but remains unrecognized internationally.
Somaliland maintains its own constitution, army, currency, elections and foreign policy. Close to 75 percent of its population has no memory of union with Somalia. Many of the older generation remember the Barre regime’s brutal military campaign in the 1980s, which Bryden describes as “near-genocidal.”
After 12 fruitless rounds of dialogue with Mogadishu, and repeated instances in which Somalia reneged on commitments, Somaliland has effectively abandoned hopes of an “amicable divorce.”
Ethiopia is now its closest partner, with deep cooperation across security, trade and infrastructure. The UAE has invested more than $500 million in the Berbera corridor linking Somaliland to Ethiopia. Taiwan maintains full diplomatic relations with Hargeisa — drawing Beijing into the mix.
Somaliland’s stability and foreign partnerships make it a pivotal actor, but also a stage for proxy competition. Mogadishu and its allies reject any talk of Somaliland sovereignty. Ethiopia and the UAE increasingly treat Somaliland as an essential security and economic partner.
“More pragmatic, inclusive leadership from Villa Somalia… would go a long way toward harmonizing regional powers behind these same goals,” Bryden writes. But few believe such leadership will emerge before the 2026 crisis fully unfolds.
“Only urgent, decisive, and concerted intervention can prevent Somalia from becoming a jihadist state.” – Matt Bryden
The Coming Storm
As Western donors quietly discuss exit strategies, AUSSOM contemplates reductions, and neighboring states fortify their borders, Somalia’s fate hangs in a narrowing window of time.
Bryden’s conclusion is stark: “Only urgent, decisive, and concerted intervention can prevent Somalia from becoming a jihadist state.”
The alternatives — a militant takeover of Mogadishu, a fragmented civil war between regions, an Islamist-dominated authoritarian state, or a negotiated settlement that co-opts al-Shabaab into governance — each carry profound implications for the Horn of Africa and beyond.
For now, many in Mogadishu wait uneasily for the militants’ next move. Some diplomats fear the pause in al-Shabaab’s advance is not a retreat, but a strategic lull.
“They are setting the conditions,” one senior Western official said. “They are waiting for the house to collapse on its own.”
