A new International Crisis Group report warns Somalia’s war against Al-Shabaab has returned to a dangerous deadlock after the militants recaptured much of the territory lost in 2022–2023. The report urges military reform, political unity and eventual negotiations to end the conflict
HARGEISA — Somalia’s years-long campaign against the Al-Qaeda-linked militant group Al-Shabaab has entered a dangerous new phase after the insurgency erased most of the government’s territorial gains from its landmark 2022-2023 offensive, according to a sweeping new report by the International Crisis Group (ICG).
The report, New Chapter, Same Stalemate: Somalia’s War with Al-Shabaab, concludes that neither the Somali government nor Al-Shabaab is capable of securing a decisive military victory. Instead, the conflict has settled back into the familiar pattern that has defined much of the past two decades: temporary battlefield gains followed by reversals, leaving both sides locked in a costly stalemate.
The findings present one of the most comprehensive assessments yet of Somalia’s deteriorating security situation and warn that mounting political divisions in Mogadishu, combined with declining international support, risk undermining the government’s ability to contain the insurgency.
“The Somali government’s war with Al-Shabaab… is at an impasse,” the report states. “Only a political solution can put an end to this war for good.”
A Campaign That Lost Momentum
The report traces the origins of the government’s recent military campaign to August 2022, when President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud declared “all-out war” against Al-Shabaab shortly after returning to office.
Capitalizing on a local uprising by Hawadle clan militias in the Hiraan region, Somali government forces—supported by locally organized macawisley fighters—rapidly expelled Al-Shabaab from significant parts of central Somalia.
Government officials became increasingly optimistic, with some predicting the insurgency would lose all remaining Somali territory by mid-2024.
Instead, the offensive exposed deep structural weaknesses within Somalia’s security institutions.
While government troops successfully captured territory, they lacked sufficient manpower and logistical capacity to secure and administer newly liberated areas. Many newly trained soldiers deserted, corruption remained widespread, and state security institutions struggled to transition from offensive operations to long-term stabilization.
“The government’s gains rested on shaky foundations,” the report concludes.
By late 2023, the military offensive had largely stalled.
Al-Shabaab’s Strategic Comeback
While Somali officials celebrated early victories, Al-Shabaab quietly regrouped.
According to the report, the insurgent movement spent much of 2023 and 2024 rebuilding its command structure, recruiting new fighters, strengthening intelligence networks and reassessing its governance strategy.
In February 2025, the militants launched a coordinated counteroffensive.
Within months, they recaptured much of Middle Shabelle and Hiraan, effectively reversing most of the government’s earlier battlefield successes.
The report says Al-Shabaab also modified its tactics.
Rather than relying exclusively on coercion, the group sought to improve relations with local communities, negotiated non-aggression understandings with some clan militias and avoided retaliatory attacks against civilians in areas it reoccupied.
The organization also became more pragmatic in some aspects of governance, easing restrictions on humanitarian aid and appointing more locally connected administrators.
These adaptations helped consolidate the group’s authority across much of central Somalia.
Mogadishu Holds the Line
Despite Al-Shabaab’s advances, the report stresses that fears the militants might overrun Mogadishu have not materialized.
Government forces, backed by African Union troops, U.S. air support and Turkish assistance, successfully halted Al-Shabaab’s advance south of the capital, particularly in Lower Shabelle.
The report concludes that while Al-Shabaab lacks the military capability to seize and hold Mogadishu, the Somali government similarly lacks the capacity to eliminate the insurgency.
“There are good reasons to conclude that neither side is likely to establish a decisive advantage in the near term,” the report says.
Instead, Somalia has returned to what analysts describe as a familiar military equilibrium.
Political Divisions Compound Security Challenges
Beyond military shortcomings, the report identifies Somalia’s political fragmentation as one of the government’s greatest vulnerabilities.
Attention shifted away from counterinsurgency efforts during 2024 as Mogadishu became consumed by constitutional reforms, electoral disputes and tensions surrounding Ethiopia’s memorandum of understanding with the Republic of Somaliland over access to the Port of Berbera.
The Crisis Group argues that these domestic political disputes weakened national unity at a critical moment.
Relations between the federal government and several federal member states also deteriorated, reducing cooperation against Al-Shabaab and limiting joint security operations.
The report warns that Somalia’s approaching 2026 electoral cycle could further distract political leaders from the security threat.
Declining International Support Raises New Risks
Another major concern highlighted by the report is the gradual reduction in foreign assistance.
The African Union’s security mission continues to provide the backbone of Somalia’s defense architecture, but international funding has steadily declined as donor fatigue grows.
Although Türkiye has expanded its security partnership with Somalia and continues to play an increasingly important role, the report argues that newer partners are unlikely to fully replace the level of military and financial support previously provided by Western governments.
Without sustained external backing, the report warns, Somalia’s security institutions may struggle to maintain current operations.
Reform Before Another Offensive
Rather than launching another ambitious military campaign, the Crisis Group recommends fundamental reforms.
Among its principal recommendations are:
- Strengthening military recruitment, training and retention.
- Expanding state-level security forces capable of holding liberated territory.
- Improving cooperation between the federal government and regional administrations.
- Reducing corruption within the security sector.
- Ensuring regular salaries and adequate equipment for troops.
- Encouraging greater humanitarian access to civilians living in Al-Shabaab-controlled areas.
The report argues that future military operations should focus on sustainable territorial control rather than rapid advances designed for political effect.
Dialogue Seen as the Only Long-Term Solution
Perhaps the report’s most controversial conclusion is its argument that military operations alone cannot end Somalia’s conflict.
Although acknowledging that negotiations with Al-Shabaab remain politically sensitive, the Crisis Group maintains that dialogue represents the only realistic long-term path toward ending the insurgency.
The organization suggests the Somali government begin laying the groundwork now through confidence-building measures, expanded humanitarian engagement and continued military pressure designed to bring Al-Shabaab to eventual negotiations.
“Only a political solution can put an end to this war for good,” the report concludes.
With neither side capable of achieving outright victory, the Crisis Group warns that Somalia risks remaining trapped in an exhausting cycle of conflict unless political and military strategies evolve beyond the current stalemate.
