Analysts warn Somali terror groups like Al-Shabaab could escalate attacks in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, compounding disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz and threatening global trade routes. The Bab el-Mandeb Strait, which connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, is already considered a significant vulnerability due to the presence of Yemen’s Houthi terrorists
By Danielle Greyman-Kennard
Somali terror groups may seek to acquire legitimacy and join the Islamic regime’s axis through attacking American and Israeli interests along the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, experts warned The Jerusalem Post.
While international organizations have alerted to the potential devastation that could stem from a prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz, which has already seen the price of oil and fertilizer skyrocket, the situation could significantly worsen should terror groups located near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait decide to involve themselves in the conflict.
The Bab el-Mandeb Strait, which connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, is already considered a significant vulnerability. The Houthis, an autonomous proxy of the Islamic regime, carried out a number of attacks from Yemen’s territory in support of Hamas.
Yemen expert Inbal Nissim-Louvton previously told the Jerusalem Post that fears the Houthis could close or seriously disrupt the strait have likely led to Gulf nations electing to absorb Iranian attacks without responding in kind. Though the Houthis have yet to carry out the threat, Dr. Habtom Ghebrezghiabher, an expert on geopolitical and security dynamics in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region, told the Jerusalem Post that its own proxies would be willing to disrupt the strait and parts of the Indian Ocean.
While Mogadishu cut ties in 2016 in response to Tehran’s interference with its domestic affairs and violation of the Vienna Convention, Iran has been able to maintain a type of steady covert connection with terror groups within through its own proxies, Ghebrezghiabher explained.
“Al-Shabaab became prominent between 2006 and 2009 because they were against the American backing and the International Community backing of the transitional government,” he recounted, detailing how the Eritrean dictator at the time began backing Al-Shabaab and reduced Somalia into a proxy war against Ethiopia. “There were always countries backing these terrorist groups.
Al-Shabaab backed by Houthis
Today, Al-Shabaab is backed by the Houthis, and there are many reports that show cooperation between the Houthis and Al- Shabaab,” he added. “Iran and the Eritrean dictator also have a long relationship; they’re on the same axis of opposition. So, of course, Iran is not openly backing Al-Shabaab, but Iran does not need to involve itself directly with Al-Shabaab. Iran can do it through the Houthis, and can also do it through the Eritrean dictator.”
Nissim-Louvton shared that the Houthis have spent years creating their own alliances with groups like Al-Shabaab and Al Qaeda, creating new routes to traffic weapons and intelligence-sharing networks outside of their relationship with Iran.
With weapons selling for four to five times the price in Somalia, the Houthis have been particularly keen to maintain connections with Al-Shabaab as a means to generate an income, an income which helps the group maintain its position in one of the world’s poorest countries. In return, Al-Shabaab received advanced weapons, including drones and missiles, as well as training.
In addition to support from the Houthis, Ghebrezghiabher noted that regional developments have helped Al-Shabaab recruit new members and helped Iran fortify anti-Western sentiments in the Horn of Africa. These major developments include Israel’s recognition of Somaliland in December.
Dr. Irit Back, from the Middle Eastern & African Department at Tel Aviv University, told the Jerusalem Post that the recognition had been largely unpopular among African nations and wouldn’t help Israel’s popularity in a region largely touched by Iranian, Qatari, and Turkish influence. With only 12 resident embassies in Africa, Back said Jerusalem was already in a precarious diplomatic position and shouldn’t have taken the “drastic move.”
Unlike Back, Ghebrezghiabher stressed recognizing Somaliland was the right move, but affirmed that it did create some complications. It gave Al-Shabaab “a lot of legitimacy to oppose Israel” with acts of piracy or attacks on Somaliland, a legitimacy which would serve Iranian interests.
“Iran has got a very effective, easy and cheap ways to challenge these powerful countries, the US, Israel or other countries and the way to do that is having these terrorist groups become anti-America or anti-Israel,” he outlined. “Somalis will perhaps attack or disrupt the Bab el-Mandeb for their own legitimacy. They will get more legitimacy if they attack trade ships or American ships.”
Through attacking these vessels and making a public statement that it is in support of Iran or support for Palestinians, the attacks build support from their Islamic constituents, he said, predicting “it’s a matter of time” before such attacks start.
However, Al-Shabaab is a Sunni organization and so is not entirely aligned with Iran on an ideological level, which may further complicate the group joining the Iranian axis in a formal and meaningful way, Back noted.
Hanad Darwish, a former advisor to the Foreign Ministry of Somaliland and now the director of the UK-based organization Labor Friends of Somaliland, took a more moderate stance, explaining to the Jerusalem Post that while the recognition had caused some shockwaves in the region, it was not as drastic a move as has been claimed.
In 2024, Ethiopia and Somaliland signed a memorandum of understanding, granting Addis Ababa a 50-year lease on a 20-kilometer coastal strip to establish a naval base in exchange for the potential for full recognition of Somaliland, Darwish noted. At the time, there was the same “narrative” around regional destabilization, but nothing came of the inflamed rhetoric.
The spotlight created by Israel’s embrace of Somaliland caught the Houthis’ attention, and the Yemeni terror group has warned that any Israeli presence in the country would lead it to be considered a legitimate target. Without an Iron Dome, the country could be vulnerable if threats transform into action. For both Darwish and Ghebrezghiabher, security would take the form of recognition and alliances with more powerful players such as the US.
More concerning, Darwish said, was the rhetoric employed by government and police officials in Somalia “legitimizing” al-Shabaab’s early foundational identity as fighters of a foreign occupier.
“It’s bizarre, because on one end, the government in Somalia sort of sells to the world that it’s got this massive fight against Al-Shabaab,” Darwish commented. “On the other end, they are aligned on narrative, particularly as it relates to Israel vis-à-vis Somaliland. So, I think that’s, that’s where it becomes a little scarier in terms of Al-Shabaab having a recruitment tool, it’s actually being backed up by the Somali state in some way.”
Referring to Somalia’s ambassador to Ethiopia and the African Union, Abdullahi Mohamed Warfa, who threatened to restrict access to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait for Israeli-linked vessels in April, Darwish commented that Somalia doesn’t control that stretch of water. On some level, he said the threat was “laughable,” but on a deeper level, he said it was a “signal of intent” that should be taken seriously.
If Somalia attempts to restrict the water channel, Darwish noted it would significantly disrupt Somaliland’s economy, which is heavily reliant on the port, and prevent essential humanitarian aid from reaching the country.
Back also noted that it was unclear how much of a challenge Al-Shabaab would pose to local authorities. While in control of significantly less land than the Houthis, Back said that Somalia is a weak government and one that has never recognized Israel. Western powers cannot gamble on their being the will or the means to tackle Al-Shabaab even if Somali forces have fought against the militias in other circumstances, she hinted.
While Ghebrezghiabher said he couldn’t predict when Al-Shabaab would choose to enter the conflict, Back noted that the group was likely hindered by its lack of an organized framework and power structure. Unlike the Houthis, Al-Shabaab lacks clear leadership and policies, and statements issued by its various branches often clash, she noted.
“Is not like one government that gives a statement,” she said, referencing the administrative side to terror groups like the Houthis, Hamas, and Hezbollah. “It’s really warlords, so it’s very complicated to know what will be. I don’t know if they have some kind of vision for the future, a united one, for all the different fragments of the organization.”
