References
[1] This report is the result of a combination of field-based and desk research. The research agenda shifted significantly as a result of limits on travel and face-to-face meetings created by the COVID-19 pandemic. The team included researchers based in Khartoum, Addis Ababa, Mogadishu, and Istanbul, as well as UK-based researchers. Interviews were conducted between August and October 2020, with some additional research carried out in early 2021 as a result of fast-moving developments in the region.
[2] Simeon Kerr, ‘Dubai pays price for festive parties as coronavirus cases surge’, Financial Times, 29 January 2021, https://www.ft.com/content/7b6f448f-18d4-4331-986e-439dd76596be; Ruth Maclean, ‘Has Africa been spared? Researchers say the numbers of cases and deaths are probably undercounted’, The New York Times, 2 January 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/02/world/has-africa-been-spared-researcherssay-the-numbers-of-cases-and-deaths-are-probably-undercounted.html.
[3] WTI benchmark price history, https://www.hl.co.uk/shares/trading-commodities/wti-crude-oil.
[4] Interview with senior Saudi government official, November 2020.
[5] Duncan Miriri, ‘Impact of Ethiopia’s debt plan on private creditors not yet clear, says adviser’, Reuters, 2 February 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-ethiopia-debt-idUSKBN2A222X.
[6] US removes Sudan from ‘state sponsors of terror’ list: Embassy’, Al-Jazeera, 14 December 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/12/14/us-officially-removes-sudan-from-state-sponsors-of-terrorism-list.
[7] Jason Mosley, ‘Ethiopia’s Transition: Implications for the Horn of Africa and Red Sea region’, SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security No. 2020/5, March 2020.
[8] UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, ‘Sudan Situation Report’, 5 January 2021, https://reports.unocha.org/en/country/sudan/.
[9] ‘Ethiopian forces killed scores in June-July unrest, report says’, DW, 1 January 2021, https://www.dw.com/en/ethiopian-forces-killed-scores-in-june-july-unrest-report-says/a-56110962.
[10] Wim Zwijnenberg, ‘Are Emirati Armed Drones Supporting Ethiopia from an Eritrean Air Base?’, Bellingcat, 19 November 2020, https://www.bellingcat.com/news/rest-of-world/2020/11/19/are-emirati-armeddrones-supporting-ethiopia-from-an-eritrean-air-base/.
[11] ‘Ethiopia Foils Terrorist Attack Plot On UAE Embassy In Addis Ababa’, Fana Broadcast Corporation, 3 February 2021, https://www.fanabc.com/english/ethiopia-foils-terrorist-attack-plot-on-uae-embassy-in-addis-ababa/.
[12] For a video recording of the relevant portion of the conference call, see: https://twitter.com/i/ status/1319764568164454400 (accessed 15 March 2021).
[13] Jonathan Miran, Red Sea Citizens: Cosmopolitan Society and Cultural Change in Massawa, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2009.
[14] Harry Verhoeven, ‘The Gulf and the Horn: Changing Geographies of Security Interdependence and Competing Visions of Regional Order’, Civil Wars 20/3 (2018).
[15] Miran, Red Sea Citizens.
[16] Joseph Venosa, ‘Adapting to the new path: Khatmiyya Sufi authority, the al-Mirghani family, and Eritrean nationalism during British Occupation, 1941–1949’, Journal of Eastern African Studies 7/3(2013), 413-431.
[17] For example, see: International Crisis Group, ‘Intra-Gulf Competition in Africa’s Horn: Lessening the Impact’, Middle East Report No 206, Brussels/Nairobi: International Crisis Group, 2019; International Crisis Group, ‘Somalia and the Gulf Crisis’, Africa Report No 260, Brussels/Nairobi: International Crisis Group, 2018a; International Crisis Group, ‘The United Arab Emirates in the Horn of Africa’, Middle East Briefing No 65, Brussels/Nairobi: International Crisis Group, 2018b; Mahmood, Omar S. ‘Competition, cooperation and security in the Red Sea’. East Africa Report 24. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, August 2019; N. Melvin, ‘The new external security politics of the Horn of Africa region’, SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security, April 2019; Zach Vertin, ‘Red Sea Rivalries: The Gulf states are Playing a Dangerous Game in the Horn of Africa’, Snapshot, ForeignAffairs.com blog, 15 January, 2019, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ articles/east-africa/2019-01-15/red-sea-rivalries; Zach Vertin, ‘Red Sea Geopolitics: Six Plotlines to Watch’, Lawfare Institute, 2019b, https://www.lawfareblog.com/red-sea-geopolitics-six-plotlines-watch; Awol Allo, ‘Ethiopia: Exploiting the Gulf’s scramble for the Horn of Africa’, African Arguments, 13 August 2018, http://africanarguments.org/2018/08/13/ethiopia-exploiting-gulf-scramble-horn-africa/; Berouk Mesfin, ‘Qatar’s diplomatic incursions into the Horn of Africa’, East Africa Report, Issue 8, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, November 2016; Lidet Shiferaw, ‘The role of Gulf states in peace and security and development in Sub-Saharan Africa’, IAI Working Papers 16, Rome: Instituto Afari Internazionali, 2016; Federico Donelli and Giuseppe Dentice, ‘Fluctuating Saudi and Emirati Alignment Behaviours in the Horn of Africa’, The International Spectator 55/1 (2020): 126–142; Federico Donelli, ‘Determinants of Middle East states involvement in the Horn of Africa’, in Africa and the Middle East: Beyond the Divides, POMEPS Studies 40, 50–53, Washington, DC and New York: Project on Middle East Political Science, George Washington University and School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University, June 2020. Neil Melvin, ‘The foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa region’, SIPRI Background Paper, Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, April 2019b; David Styan, ‘The politics of ports in the Horn: War, peace and Red Sea rivalries’, African Arguments, 18 July 2018, http://africanarguments. org/2018/07/18/politics-ports-horn-war-peace-red-sea-rivalries/. Nisar Majid and Khalif Abdurahman, ‘Mobility, Trust and Exchange: Somalia and Yemen’s Cross-border Maritime Economy’, London: Rift Valley Institute, 2019; Jatin Dua, Abdideeq Warsame and Ahmed Shire, ‘Bosaso and the Gulf of Aden: Changing dynamics of a land-sea network’, London: Rift Valley Institute, 2020, http://riftvalley.net/publication/bosasoand-gulf-aden-changing-dynamics-land-sea-network.
[18] Barack Obama, ‘A New Beginning’, speech delivered in Cairo, Egypt, 4 June 2009, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/issues/foreign-policy/presidents-speech-cairo-a-new beginning
[19] Kristian Ulrichsen, ‘Perceptions and Divisions in Security and Defense Structures in Arab Gulf States’, in Divided Gulf: Anatomy of a Crisis, ed. A Kreig (ed), Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019.
[20] Christopher Davidson, ‘The UAE, Qatar, and the Question of Political Islam’, in Divided Gulf: Anatomy of a Crisis, ed. A Kreig, Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019.
[21] Indeed, the formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1981 was in large part a response to the Iranian Revolution and subsequent conflict between Iran and Iraq. For example, see Ulrichsen, ‘Perceptions and Divisions’. 22 Ulrichsen, Perceptions and Divisions’.
[22] Federico Donelli, Turkey in Africa: Turkey’s Strategic Involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa, London: IB Tauris, 2021:
[23] -84.
[24] Federico Donelli, ‘The Ankara consensus: the significance of Turkey’s engagement in sub-Saharan Africa’, Global Change, Peace & Security 30/1 (2018); Willem van den Berg and Joseph Meester, ‘Turkey in the Horn of Africa: Between the Ankara Consensus and the Gulf Crisis’, CRU Policy Brief, The Hague: Clingendael Institute, May 2019, https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2019-05/PB_Turkey_in_the_Horn_of_ Africa_May_2019.pdf.
[25] M Özkan and S Orakçi, ‘Viewpoint: Turkey as a “political” actor in Africa – an assessment of Turkish involvement in Somalia’, Journal of Eastern African Studies 9/2 (2015).
[26] The hereditary monarchies of the Gulf States have long been sceptical of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and its international affiliates, although this stance has hardened significantly since the Arab Uprisings and in particular the Egyptian revolution. For example, see: Davidson, ‘Question of Political Islam’.
[27] Educational projects in Africa connected to the global charitable network of Fetullah Gülen date back to the mid-1990s. There is a proselytizing dynamic to network projects, although Gülen’s name does not normally appear on them. An early ally of Erdogan’s AKP government, the Gülenist movement publicly broke with the AKP in 2013. Gülen, who has lived in the United States since 1999, was stripped of his Turkish citizenship in 2017, following the 2016 coup attempt in Turkey. For example, see: Federico Donelli, ‘The Gülen Movement in Africa: From Turkish Transnational Asset to Anti-State Lobby’, Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs 13/1 (2019).
[28] Jonathan Fulton, ‘China-UAE Relations in the Belt and Road Era’, Journal of Arabian Studies 9/2(2019).
[29] Zach Vertin, ‘Great Power Rivalry in the Red Sea: China’s Experiment in Djibouti and Implications for the United States’, Brookings Doha Center/Global China, Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, June 2020. https://www.brookings.edu/research/great-power-rivalry-in-the-red-sea/
[30] Nonetheless, the initiative has earlier roots. Before 2018, it was mainly driven by Egypt but with limited progress due to tensions with upstream neighbours in the Nile basin.
[31] Saleh Al-Zayed, ‘Kattan: ‘Council of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden’ Is Strategic Necessity’, Asharq Al-Awsat, 9 January 2020, https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/2074231/kattan-council-red-sea-andgulf-aden-strategic-necessity.
[32] Abdelaziz Aluwaisheg, ‘Council of Red Sea and Gulf of Aden to Play Critical Role’, Arab News, 13 January 2020, https://arab.news/6uzf2; ‘ندع جيلخو رمحألا رحبلا ىلع ةلُطُمُلا ةيقيرفإلاو ةيبرعلا لودلا سلجم قاثيم عيقوت ..ةيدوعسلا’, [Saudi Arabia: Signing the Charter of the Arab and African States Bordering the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden]’, CNN Arabic, 6 January 2020, https://arabic.cnn.com/middle-east/article/2020/01/06/saudi-arabic-arab-and-africancouncil-red-sea-and-gulf-aden; Ahmed Ahtef, ‘رمحألارحبلا نيمأتل »يديدح عرد« .»ةئطاشملا 8ـلا لودلا فلاحت’, [The Alliance of the Eight Littoral States…An Iron Shield to Secure the Red Sea]’, Al-Etihad, 11 January 2020, https://www. alittihad.ae/article/1901/2020/«رمحألا–رحبلا–نيمأتل–»يديدح–عرد«-»ةئطاشملا–8ـلا–لودلا–فلاحت.
[33] Interview with Saudi diplomat, 31 August 2020.
[34] Interview with Gulf expert, 14 August 2020.
[35] Gerald M Feierstein, ‘The Impact of Middle East Regional Competition on Security and Stability in the Horn of Africa’, policy paper, Washington: Middle East Institute, 18 August 2020, 2.
[36] Interview with Camille Lons, 26 August 2020.
[37] ‘Saudi Naval Forces Prepare for Red Wave 1’, Arab News, 27 December 2018, 1, https://www.arabnews.com/node/1426781/saudi-arabia; Dorian Archus, ‘Seven Red Sea Countries Attend Red Wave-2 Exercise Hosted by Saudi Arabia’, Naval News (blog), 22 September 2019, https://navalnews.net/seven-red-seacountries-attend-red-wave-2-exercise-hosted-by-saudi-arabia/.
[38] Interview with Gulf expert, 12 August 2020
[39] Interview with two Gulf experts, 23 August 2020.
[40] Interview with a Saudi commercial attaché, 2 September 2020.
[41] Interview with Kristian Ulrichsen, academic, 11 August 2020.
[42] Mosley, ‘Ethiopia’s Transition’, 25-28.
[43] Interview with Eritrean official, January 2021; interview with Eritrean foreign policy expert, January 2021.
[44] Anonymous sources of the Sudan researcher.
[45] Interview with a security adviser to the UAE government, 25 August 2020.
[46] Interview with Camille Lons, 26 August 2020.
[47] Eleonora Ardemagni, ‘Rebuilding Yemen’s Maritime Forces Hobbled by Internal and External Rivalries’, Washington: Arab Gulf States Institute, 6 August 2020, https://agsiw.org/rebuilding-yemens-maritimeforces-hobbled-by-internal-and-external-rivalries/.
[48] Interview with Kristin Diwan, 14 August 2020.
[49] Some media outlets have accused the UAE and Israel of developing plans to install joint intelligence and military facilities on Socotra. For example, see: Lukman Abdullah, ‘يتارامإلا عيبطتلا »رامث« ىلوأ …ىرطقس’, [Socotra: First Fruit of Emirati Normalisation]’, Al-Akhbar, 5 September 2020, https://al-akhbar.com/ Yemen/293477; Zain Khalil, ‘رمحألا رحبلاب يركسع نواعتل دهمي تارامإلا عيبطت :ةيليئارسإ ةقيثو’, [Israeli Document: Emirati Normalisation Paves Way for Military Cooperation in the Red Sea]’, Anadolu Arabic, 18 August 2020, https://www.aa.com.tr/ar/رمحألا–رحبلاب–يركسع–نواعتل–دهمي–تارامإلا–عيبطت–ةيليئارسإ–ةقيثو/ةيبرعلا–لودلا/1945000.
[50] Interview with John Jenkins, 24 August 2020.
[51] Brookings Institution, Red Sea Rivalries: The Gulf, the Horn, and the New Geopolitics of the Red Sea, Youtube, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uDADZxk8Xd8&t=2852s.
[52] The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, Competition or Cooperation: The Horn of Africa and Broader Red Sea Basin at a Crossroads, 2020. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B74wfTmyLHs
[53] Mehmet Özkan, ‘A New Actor or Passer-By? The Political Economy of Turkey’s Engagement with Africa’, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 14/1 (2012); Numan Hazar, ‘Turkey’s Policy of Outreach to Africa: An Assessment’, Journal of Business Economics and Political Science 4/7 (2015); Brendon J Cannon, ‘Turkey in Africa: Lessons in Political Economy’, Florya Chronicles of Political Economy 3/1 (2017); Abdulkadir Wahab Aman and Zeynep Kaplan, ‘The distribution and determinants of Turkey’s FDI positions in Africa’, Turkish Economic Review 4/4 (2017); Emel Parlar Dal, Ali Murat Kursun and Hakan Mehmetclk, ‘Assessing the Role of Trade in the Formation of Turkey’s Civilian Power in Africa’, Perceptions—Journal of International Affairs 23/1 (2018); Emel Parlar Dal and Samiratou Dipama, ‘Assessing the Turkish ‘Trading State’ in Sub-Saharan Africa’, Turkey’s Political Economy in the 21st Century, ed. Emel Parlar Dal, Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018.
[54] Pınar Akpınar, ‘Turkey’s Peacebuilding in Somalia: The Limits of Humanitarian Diplomacy’, Turkish Studies 14.4 (2014); Ali Abdirahman, ‘Turkey’s Foray into Africa: A New Humanitarian Power?’, Insight Turkey 13/4 (2013); Senem Cevik, The African Frontier in Humanitarian and Development Work (Los Angeles: USC Center on Public Diplomacy, 2014); Federico Donelli, ‘Turkey’s presence in Somalia a humanitarian approach’, in The Depth of Turkish geopolitics in the AKP’s foreign policy: From Europe to an extended neighborhood, ed. Bahri Yilmaz et al., Perugia: Università per Stranieri Press, 2015; Theodore Baird, ‘The geopolitics of Turkey’s ‘humanitarian diplomacy’ in Somalia: a critique’, Review of African Political Economy 43/149 (2016).
[55] Özkan and Orakçı, ‘Viewpoint: Turkey as a “political” actor’; Aslan Davut Han and Selcuk Bahadir, ‘Africa in Turkey’s Foreign Policy Agenda: Trade, Economic and Military Cooperation’, Kwartalnik Naukowy Uczelni Vistula 4/50 (2016); Abdurrahim Sıradağ, ‘Turkey–Africa alliance: Evolving patterns in security relations’, African Security Review 27/3-4 (2018).
[56] Interview with Turkish foreign policy expert, 19 August 2020.
[57] Interview with former Turkish diplomat, 23 August 2020.
[58] Interview with Turkish scholar on Africa and MENA region, 31 August 2020.
[59] Interview with foreign policy adviser who served within the Turkish minister of foreign affairs, 19 August 2020.
[60] Also known as Atatürkism or the Six Arrows, Kemalism is the founding ideology of modern Turkey. It defines large-scale political, social, cultural and religious reforms that were designed to separate the new Turkish state from its Ottoman predecessor.
[61] Interview with staff member, Africa Foundation, 24 August 2020.
[62] Interview with Turkish scholar on Africa and MENA region, 31 August 2020.
[63] Erdogan’s visit to Mogadishu was the first by a foreign head of government since the early 1990s. Much has been written on the subject. For example, see: Pınar Akpınar, ‘Turkey’s Peacebuilding in Somalia: The Limits of Humanitarian Diplomacy’, Turkish Studies 14/4 (2013); Brendon J Cannon, ‘Deconstructing Turkey’s Efforts in Somalia’, Bildhaan: An International Journal of Somali Studies 16/14 (2016); Gizem Sucuoglu and Jason Stearns, Turkey in Somalia: Shifting Paradigms of Aid (Research Report South African Institute of International Affairs, 2016); Chuck Thiessen and Alpaslan Özerdem, ‘Turkey in Somalia: challenging North/ Western interventionism?’, Third World Quarterly 40/11 (2019).
[64] Interview with Turkish scholar on Africa and MENA region, 31 August 2020.
[65] Federico Donelli, ‘A hybrid actor in the Horn of Africa. An analysis of Turkey’s involvement in Somalia’, The Horn of Africa since the 1960s. Local and International Politics Intertwined, edited by Aleksi Ylönen and Jan Záhořík (London: Routledge, 2017: 158-170).
[66] Interview with foreign policy adviser who served within the Turkish minister of foreign affairs, 19 August 2020.
[67] Interview with think tank expert on Turkish security, 29 August 2020.
[68] Brendon J Cannon and Federico Donelli, ‘Asymmetric alliances and high polarity: evaluating regional security complexes in the Middle East and the Horn of Africa’, Third World Quarterly 41/3 (2020):505-524.
[69] Ash Rossiter and Brendon J Cannon, ‘Re-examining the “Base”: The Political and Security Dimensions of Turkey’s Military Presence in Somalia’, Insight Turkey 21/1 (2019): 167-188.
[70] On the security dimension, see: Sıradağ, ‘Turkey–-Africa alliance’.
[71] Michael M Gunter and Hakan Yavuz, ‘The October 2019 Turkish Incursion into Kurdish Syria: Its Background & Broader Implications’, Middle East Policy 27/1 (2020).
[72] Interview with think tank expert on Turkish security, 29 August 2020.
[73] Interview with TRT analyst, Africa desk, 22 August 2020.
[74] Of all the countries in the Greater Horn region, Qatari officials stress that Somalia and Sudan hold the highest status. Interview with senior diplomat, Qatar ministry of foreign affairs, 25 September 2020; interview with Qatari official, 27 September 2020.
[75] Qatar became the largest LNG (liquified natural gas) exporter by 2006–2007.
[76] Interview with independent consultant and board member at Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, 21 September 2020; interview with Gulf expert, 21 September 2020.
[77] Interview with Qatari official, 27 September 2020.
[78] Rory Miller and Harry Verhoeven, ‘Overcoming Smallness: Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Strategic Realignment in the Gulf’, International Politics 57, no. 1 (1 February 2020): 10.
[79] Mehran Kamrava, Qatar: Small State, Big Politics, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013.
[80] Sultan Barakat, ‘Qatari Mediation: Between Ambition and Achievements’, Doha: Brookings Doha Centre, 12 November 2014, 40.
[81] Barakat, ‘Qatari Mediation’, 11.
[82] Interview with independent consultant and board member at Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, 21 September 2020.
[83] Interview with Gulf specialist, 22 September 2020.
[84] Interview with senior diplomat, Qatar ministry of foreign affairs, 25 September 2020.
[85] Interview with expert on the Muslim Brotherhood, 26 September 2020. 86
[86] Interview with Gulf/Qatar expert, 26 September 2020.
[87] For example, see: Life & Peace Institute, ‘Alternatives for Conflict Transformation in Somalia’, Nairobi: Life & Peace Institute, 2014, https://life-peace.org/resource/alternatives-for-conflict-transformation-in-somalia/
[88] Interview with Gulf specialist, 22 September 2020.
[89] Interview with expert on the Muslim Brotherhood, 26 September 2020.
[90] Interview with independent consultant and board member at Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, 21 September 2020.
[91] Interview with Gulf expert, 16 August 2020.
[92] Federico Donelli, ‘Strategy, Opportunity and Requirement: Qatar in the Horn of Africa before and after the GCC Crisis’
[93] Sultan Barakat and Sansom Milton, ‘Why Did Qatar Leave the Djibouti–Eritrea Border?’, Al-Jazeera, 18 June 2017, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/06/qatar-army-djibouti-eritreaborder-170618100118290.html.
[94] Ministry of Information (Eritrea), ‘Press Statement’, Asmara: Ministry of Information, 12 June 2017, https://shabait.com/2017/06/12/press-statement-47/.
[95] ‘Eritrea accuses Sudan, Turkey and Qatar of supporting opposition Islamist groups’, Sudan Tribune, 3 April 2019, https://sudantribune.com/spip.php?article67316.
[96] Interview with Eritrean official, January 2021.
[97] The Suakin port is to be managed by Mwani (Qatar Ports Management Company); see: ‘Sudan, Qatar to Sign $4 Billion Deal to Manage Red Sea Port -Ministry’, Reuters, 26 March 2018, https://www.reuters.com/ article/us-sudan-qatar-idUSKBN1H22WH.
[98] Laura Angela Bagnetto, ‘New Port Projects in Red Sea Corridor for Sudan, Somaliland as Arab Backers Jostle for Position’, RFI, April 6, 2018, https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20180406-new-port-projects-red-seacorridor-sudan-somaliland-arab-backers-jostle-position.
[99] Despite this, both Ankara and Khartoum denied what some called a ‘military base’; Merve Şebnem Oruç, ‘Who is Disturbed by Turkey’s Presence on Sudan’s Suakin Island?’, Daily Sabah, 10 May 2019, https:// www.dailysabah.com/columns/merve-sebnem-oruc/2019/05/10/who-is-disturbed-by-turkeys-presence-onsudans-suakin-island.
[100] Interview with AK, 18 July 2020; interview with anonymous source, Khartoum, 13 August 2020; interview with anonymous source, Khartoum ,15 August 2020.
[101] Micha‘el Tanchum, ‘Turkey‘s String of Pearls: Turkey‘s Overseas Naval Installations Reconfigure the Security Architecture of Mediterranean-Red Sea Corridor’, Fokus, Vienna: Austria Institut für Europa und Sicherheitspolitik, 2019, 2.
[102] Interview with Gulf expert, 21 September 2020.
[103] Interview with author and journalist in Khartoum, 22 August 2020.
[104] Analysis of our Sudan field researcher.
[105] Interview with anonymous source, Khartoum, 18 July 2020.
[106] Interview with researcher on MENA region, 20 August 2020.
[107] Interview with foreign policy adviser who served within the Turkish minister of foreign affairs, 19 August 2020.
[108] Interview with staff member, Africa Foundation, 24 August 2020.
[109] Interview with project coordinator of a Qatari organization in Mogadishu, 14 September 2020.
[110] Brendon J Cannon and Federico Donelli, ‘Turkey’s Involvement in the Release of Silvia Romano in Somalia’, ISPI Commentary, Milan: Italian Institute for International Political Studies, 26 May 2020.
[111] Interview with TRT analyst, Africa desk, 22 August 2020.
[112] Federico Donelli, ‘Determinants of Middle East States Involvement in the Horn of Africa’, in Africa and the Middle East: Beyond the Divides, POMEPS Studies 40, 50–53, Washington, DC and New York: Project on Middle East Political Science, George Washington University and School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University, June 2020, https://pomeps.org/determinants-of-middle-east-states-involvement-inthe-horn-of-africa.
[113] For more details, see: Khalid S Al-Mezaini and Jean-Marc Rickli, The Small Gulf States: Foreign and Security Policies before and after the Arab Spring, London: Routledge, 2017.
[114] Alex de Waal, The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa, Cambridge: Polity, 2015.
[115] Karen Young, ‘Gulf Financial Aid and Direct Investment’, Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 13 August 2020, 7.
[116] J Meester, W van den Berg and H Verhoeven, ‘Riyal Politik: The Political Economy of Gulf Investments in the Horn of Africa’, The Hague: Clingendael, April 2018.
[117] Interview with David Roberts, 12 August 2020; interview with Karen Young, 11 August 2020.
[118] Meester, van den Berg and Verhoeven, ‘Riyal Politik’.
[119] Meester, van den Berg and Verhoeven, ‘Riyal Politik’, 5.
[120] Data collected from: Karen Young, ‘Gulf Financial Aid and Intervention Tracker by Source Country (2003 to June 2020)’, Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, August 2020. Eritrea and Somalia are considered later in the report.
[121] Interview with Karen Young, 11 August 2020.
[122] Interview with Gulf expert, 20 August 2020.
[123] Interview with adviser, Saudi ministry of investment, 14 August 2020.
[124] Meester, van den Berg and Verhoeven, ‘Riyal Politik’, 40.
[125] Meester, van den Berg and Verhoeven, ‘Riyal Politik’, 45–46.
[126] Interview with a Saudi commercial attaché, 2 September 2020. Al-Amoudi’s company, Mohammed International Development Research and Organization Companies (MIDROC), has paved the way for many other companies to invest in the agricultural, manufacturing, mining and real estate sectors. For a few relevant figures, see ‘Mohammed Al Amoudi: Ethiopia’s Richest Man Spots Opportunities At Home’, Ventures Africa, 8 September 2013.
[127] Interview with UAE-based business person, 6 September 2020. This interviewee describes that there are, ‘plenty of opportunities in the agriculture space in the Horn. It is not just Dubai and Abu Dhabi but companies from the northern Emirates, too.’
[128] Young, ‘Gulf Financial Aid and Direct Investment’, 20.
[129] Aaron Maasho, ‘UPDATE 2-UAE to Give Ethiopia $3 Billion in Aid and Investments’, Reuters, 15 June 2018, https://af.reuters.com/article/ethiopiaNews/idAFL8N1TH4GJ. Accordingly, it is not fully correct to consider the USD 3 billion as only being ODA.
[130] By October 2019, Sudan had received half of the package (USD 500 million deposited in the central bank; and USD 1 billion worth of diverse products and wheat).
[131] See William Wallis, ‘Sudan’s economy reels from loss of south’, Financial Times, 17 October 2011. https://www.ft.com/content/ce7f675a-f8c9-11e0-ad8f-00144feab49a
[132] Giorgio Cafiero, ‘Sudan gets $2.2B for joining Saudi Arabia, Qatar in Yemen war’, Al-Monitor, 23 November 2015, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/11/sudan-saudi-arabia-war-yemenhouthi-economy.html
[133] Interview with anonymous source, Khartoum, 18 July, 2020.
[134] Interview with anonymous source, Khartoum, 1 August 2020.
[135] Interview with anonymous source, Khartoum, 18 July 2020.
[136] Interview with anonymous source, Khartoum, 4 August 2020.
[137] Interview with anonymous source, Khartoum, 4 August 2020.
[138] Interview with anonymous source, Khartoum, 4 August 2020.
[139] ‘Sudan Offers UAE’s Companies $59 Billion Investment Opportunities’, Sudan Tribune, 15 May 2015, https://sudantribune.com/spip.php?article54996.
[140] ‘UAE Plays Key Role in Sudan Economy with Investments Exceeding AED28 Billion’, WAM, 13 March 2018, http://wam.ae/en/details/1395302674291.
[141] ‘Advisory Council Outlines Plans for UAE Investors in Ethiopia’, Khaleej Times, 9 February 2020, https:// www.khaleejtimes.com/business/local/advisory-council-outlines-plans-for-uae-investors-in-ethiopia.
[142] It should be noted that many of these projects may have not materialized.
[143] ‘UAE Plays Key Role in Sudan Economy with Investments Exceeding AED28 Billion’, WAM, 13 March 2018, http://wam.ae/en/details/1395302674291.
[144] ‘Abu Dhabi’s Efforts to Boost Local Agricultural Production’, farmlandgrab.org, 28 February 2018, https://farmlandgrab.org/post/view/27920.
[145] ‘Julphar Manufacturing Facility, Addis Ababa’, Pharmaceutical Technology, February 2013, https://www. pharmaceutical-technology.com/projects/julphar-manufacturing-facility-addis-ababa/
[146] ‘Ethiopia: $50 Million Aluminium Plant’, Aluminium International Today, September 24, 2014, https:// aluminiumtoday.com/news/ethiopia-50-million-aluminium-plant.
[147] Sultan bin Sulayem, chair of DP World, is also a board member of Nakheel and one of the founding members of the property development organization.
[148] Shakir Husain, ‘Nakheel to Open Djibouti Palace Hotel next Month’, Gulf News, 4 October 2006, https:// gulfnews.com/business/tourism/nakheel-to-open-djibouti-palace-hotel-next-month-1.259252.
[149] Ibrahim Saeed Ahmad Lootah, head of the Lootah Group of Companies, was reportedly in great difficulty in 2016. See ‘Lootah Group of Companies Still in Difficulty’, Africa Intelligence, 2 September 2016, https://www.africaintelligence.com/eastern-and-southern-africa_business/2016/09/02/lootah-group-ofcompanies-still-in-difficulty,108179463-bre.
[150] Somaliland (USD 442 million being invested); Puntland (USD 336 million [presumably] being invested); Djibouti (USD 1,700 invested). Sudanese ports are also attractive to Emirati businesses. DP World is recently reported to be lobbying for Port Sudan control. For example, see: ‘KHARTOUM Denies Reports about UAE’s Control of Port Sudan’, Sudan Tribune, 27 April 2020, https://sudantribune.com/spip.php?article69263; Aaron Schaffer, ‘Dubai Ports Giant Hires Ex-Israeli Intelligence Official to Land US Support for Sudan Bid’, Al-Monitor, 7 January 2020, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/01/dubai-ports-hire-exmossad-us-support-sudan-bid.html.
[151] It should be noticed that this data does not take account of funds allocated by multilateral institutions such as the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development and the Islamic Development Bank, from which Djibouti has benefited.
[152] Jon Gambrell, ‘Djibouti seizes control of DP World’s container terminal’, AP News, 22 February 2018, https://www.seattletimes.com/business/djibouti-seizes-control-of-dp-worlds-container-terminal/.
[153] ‘Eagle Hills Unveils First Tower at Ethiopia’s $1.5bn La Gare Scheme’, Global Construction Review, 24 January 2020, http://www.globalconstructionreview.com/news/eagle-hills-unveils-first-tower-ethiopias15bn-la-/. For a detailed examination of the project, see: B Terrefe, ‘Urban layers of political rupture: the “new” politics of Addis Ababa’s megaprojects’, Journal of Eastern African Studies 14/3 (2020).
[154] DP World, ‘We Have Just Completed a 400m Quay and a New Extension at Berbera Port, Somaliland. Once Operational, It Will Increase the Terminal’s Capacity by 500,000 TEUs per Year, and Will Further Strengthen Berbera as a Major Regional Trade Hub Servicing the Horn of Africa’, Twitter, 10 August 2020, https://twitter.com/DP_World/status/1292855504268664832. Dubai-based company Shafa Al-Wahda Contracting Company is in charge of the Berbera extension work. The same company was in charge of the modernization of Dakar and Maputo ports.
[155] ‘Somalia: Puntland Ports Minister Grilled in Parliament over Bosaso Seaport Deal’, Garowe Online, 30 July 2020, https://www.garoweonline.com/en/news/puntland/somalia-puntland-ports-minister-grilled-inparliament-over-bosaso-port-deal.
[156] ‘Saudi Company to Invest in Sudan Agriculture’, Al Arabiya English, 5 January 2014, https://english. alarabiya.net/en/business/economy/2014/01/05/Saudi-company-to-invest-in-Sudan-agriculture.
[157] Pratap Chatterjee, ‘Middle Eastern Investors “Grab” Sudan Farmland’, Corpwatch, 30 April 2012, https:// corpwatch.org/article/middle-eastern-investors-grab-sudan-farmland.
[158] ‘Ethiopia, Saudi Fund Sign $140mln Loan Deal’, Ethiopian Monitor, 19 December 2019, https:// ethiopianmonitor.com/2019/12/19/ethiopia-saudi-fund-sign-150-loan-deal/.
[159] Samuel Gelila, ‘City Municipality to Get Major Facelift’, Addis Fortune, 22 August 2020,
[160] Terrefe, ‘Urban layers of political rupture’.
[161] Donelli, ‘Strategy, Opportunity and Requirement’.
[162] Jonathan Fenton-Harvey, ‘Qatar Seeks Increasing Development Projects in Africa’, Al-Monitor, 6 September 2019, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/09/qatar-support-projects-africa-somalia.html.
[163] Interview with Qatari official, 27 September 2020.
[164] Meester, van den Berg and Verhoeven, ‘Riyal Politik’.
[165] Ethiopian Chamber of Commerce, ‘A Brief Overview of the Bilateral Trade Relationship between Ethiopia & the State of Qatar’, Addis Ababa: Ethiopian Chamber of Commerce, no date, http:// ethiopianchamber.com/Data/Sites/1/downloadables/b2b-files/New/Qatar%20Coutry%20Profile.docx.
[166] Daniel Mumbere, ‘Ethiopia PM Seeks Qatari Investment’, Africanews, 20 March 2019, https://www.africanews.com/2019/03/20/ethiopia-pm-seeks-qatari-investment/.
[167] Interview with independent consultant and board member at Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, 21 September 2020.
[168] ‘Hassad to Invest $500 Million in Sudanese Agricultural Sector’, QNA, 28 June 2018, http://news.qna. org.qa/lang/en/w/article/1530201750109997500.
[169] Interview with QNB agent, Khartoum, November 2017.
[170] John Calabrese, ‘China’s Maritime Silk Road and the Middle East: Tacking Against the Wind’, Washington: Middle East Institute, 19 May 2020, https://www.mei.edu/publications/chinas-maritime-silkroad-and-middle-east-tacking-against-wind.
[171] Camille Lons, Jonathan Fulton, Degang Sun and Naser Al-Tamimi, ‘China’s great game in the Middle East’, Policy Brief, London: European Council on Foreign Relations, 21 October 2019, https://ecfr.eu/ publication/china_great_game_middle_east/.
[172] Interview with Gulf expert, 20 August 2020.
[173] Interview with Gulf expert, 25 August 2020.
[174] ‘UAE Signs Deals with China under Belt and Road Initiative’, The Economist Intelligence Unit, 8 May 2019, http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=1857968369&Country=United%20Arab%20 Emirates&topic=P_7.
[175] ‘HH Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid on Twitter’, Twitter, 26 April 2019, https://twitter.com/HHShkMohd/ status/1121785842588995585.
[176] Interview with Gulf expert, 11 August 2020.
[177] Young, ‘Gulf Financial Aid and Direct Investment’, 7.
[178] Interview with Camille Lons, 11 August 2020.
[179] See Media Saxafi, ‘DP World Eyes Dire Dawa For Logistics Development’, 15 October 2018. https:// saxafimedia.com/dp-world-eyes-dire-dawa-logistics-development/
[180] Maggie Fick and George Obulutsa, ‘UAE Plans Oil Pipeline from Ethiopia to Eritrea in Latest Horn of Africa Move’, Reuters, 10 August 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-eritra-pipelineidUSKBN1KV0VS.
[181] ‘ضارتقالا ىلع انتردقب ًاررض قحلي يتوبيج عم عازنلا :يبد ئناوم’, [Dubai Ports: The Dispute with Djibouti is Damaging Our Ability to Borrow]’, Al-Arabiya, 20 May 2020, https://www.alarabiya.net/ar/aswaq/ companies/2019/10/22/ضارتقالا–ىلع–انتردقب–اررض–قحلي–يتوبيج–عم–عازنلا–يبد–ئناوم.
[182] Interview with a security adviser to UAE government, 25 August 2020.
[183] Interview with Gulf expert, 20 August 2020.
[184] Interview with Gulf expert, 25 August 2020.
[185] Elisabeth Dickinson, comment during event, ‘Red Sea Rivalries: Middle East Competition in the Horn of Africa’, United States Institute of Peace, 20 September 2019. https://www.usip.org/events/red-sea-rivalriesmiddle-east-competition-horn-africa
[186] The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, Competition or Cooperation: The Horn of Africa and Broader Red Sea Basin at a Crossroads, 2020. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B74wfTmyLHs
[187] Interview with Maarif Foundation employee, 3 September 2020.
[188] Federico Donelli, Turkey in Africa. Turkey’s Strategic Involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa, London: I.B. Tauris. (forthcoming)
[189] Interview with think tank expert on Turkish security, 29 August 2020; interview with Turkish scholar on Africa and MENA region, 31 August 2020.
[190] Interview with former Turkish diplomat, 23 August 2020.
[191] Haşimi Cemalettin, ‘Turkey’s Humanitarian Diplomacy and Development Cooperation’, Insight Turkey 16/1 (2014); Federico Donelli, ‘Features, Aims and Limits of Turkey’s Humanitarian Diplomacy’, Central European Journal of International and Security Studies 11/3 (2017); Bülent Aras, ‘Medical Humanitarianism of Turkey’s NGOS: A “Turkish Way”?, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 42/4 (2017); Meliha Benli Altunısık, ‘Turkey’s Humanitarian Diplomacy: The AKP Model’, CMI Brief, Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2019.
[192] Interview with researcher on MENA region, 20 August 2020. Interview with researcher on MENA region, 20 August 2020.
[193] Interview with researcher on Turkey and Africa region, 23 August 2020.
[194] Interview with scholar of African Studies, 22 August 2020.
[195] Interview with NGO worker, 21 August 2020.
[196] Mark Langan, ‘Virtuous power Turkey in sub-Saharan Africa: the ‘Neo-Ottoman’ challenge to the European Union’, Third World Quarterly 38/6 (2019).
[197] Interview with researcher on Turkey and Africa region, August 2020.
[198] Alpaslan Özerdem, ‘İnsaniyetçilik ve Türk Dış Politikası’, Uluslararası İlişkiler 13/52 (2016).
[199] Interview with Turkish scholar on Africa and MENA region, 31 August 2020.
[200] Interview with TRT analyst, Africa desk, 22 August 2020.
[201] On the nexus between AKP government and conservative Turkish NGOs, see: Nihat Çelik and Emre İşeri, ‘Islamically oriented humanitarian NGOs in Turkey: AKP foreign policy parallelism’, Turkish Studies 17/3 (2016).
[202] Federico Donelli, ‘The Ankara Consensus’.
[203] Interview with TRT analyst, Africa desk, 22 August 2020.
[204] Interview with researcher on Turkey and Africa region, 23 August 2020.
[205] Interview with staff member, Africa Foundation, 24 August 2020.
[206] Debra Shushan and Christopher Marcoux, ‘The Rise (and Decline?) of Arab Aid: Generosity and Allocation in the Oil Era’, World Development 39/11 (2011).
[207] Deniz Gökalp, ‘The UAE’s Humanitarian Diplomacy: Claiming State Sovereignty, Regional Leverage and International Recognition’, CMI Working Paper, Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2020. https://www.cmi.no/ publications/7169-the-uaes-humanitarian-diplomacy-claiming-state-sovereignty.
[208] In 2015, the DIHC was consolidated under Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum Global Initiatives, which constituted a new umbrella organization to coordinate broader efforts to improve the Arab world through humanitarian, community and development work.
[209] Gökalp, ‘The UAE’s Humanitarian Diplomacy’.
[210] Karen Young, ‘A New Politics of GCC Economic Statecraft: The Case of UAE Aid and Financial Intervention in Egypt’, Journal of Arabian Studies 7/1 (2017).
[211] Sutan Barakat, ‘Priorities and challenges of Qatar’s Humanitarian Diplomacy’, CMI Brief no. 2019: 07, Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2019, https://www.cmi.no/publications/6906-priorities-and-challenges-ofqatars-humanitarian-diplomacy
[212] Rafeef Ziadah, ‘Circulating Power: Humanitarian Logistics, Militarism, and the United Arab Emirates’, Antipode 51/5 (2019): 1684–1702.
[213] Ziadah, ‘Circulating Power’.
[214] Barakat, ‘Priorities and challenges of Qatar’s Humanitarian Diplomacy’.
[215] Barakat, ‘Priorities and challenges of Qatar’s Humanitarian Diplomacy’.
[216] Qatar Charity, ‘Qatar Charity, UNHCR launch ‘QC4HCR’ initiative to coordinate cooperation’, Press Release, 12 April 2018, https://www.qcharity.org/en/qa/news/details/15032-qatar-charity%2c-unhcr-launch
[217] UNICEF, ‘UNICEF and Qatar Charity Announce new partnership on World Refugee Day’, Press Release, 20 June 2020, https://www.unicef.org/turkey/en/press-releases/unicef-and-qatar-charity-announce-newpartnership-world-refugee-day.
[218] The package includes: the construction of the 30 km Mogadishu–Afgoi road and the 90 km Mogadishu– Jowhar road, the building of the prime minister, the rebuilding of the premises of the ministry of planning, investment and economic development, the rehabilitation of the Mogadishu municipality building and the rehabilitation of the diplomatic institute building. See: ‘Qatar Fund for Development Supports Somali Economy’, Qatar Fund for Development, 29 November 2017, https://qatarfund.org.qa/en/qffd-supportssomali-economy/.
[219] Homi Kharas, ‘Trends and Issues in Qatari Foreign Aid’, working paper, Doha, Qatar: Silatech, November 2015, 9.
[220] ‘The Politics of Gulf Aid to Sudan’, Arab Gulf States Institute, 22 September 2020, https://agsiw.org/ the-politics-of-gulf-aid-to-sudan/.
[221] Qatar Fund for Development, ‘Qatar Fund for Development Annual Report 2016’ (QFFD, 2016), Doha: Qatar Fund for Development, 2016, 22–23, https://qatarfund.org.qa/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/QFFDReport-English.pdf.
[222] The first set of projects stretched from 2012 to 2017.
[223] ‘Intelligence Brief: Qatari Aid, Finance and Foreign Policy in Sudan’, Open Briefing, 21 February 2014, https://www.openbriefing.org/docs/Qatari-aid-finance-and-foreign-policy-in-Sudan.pdf.
[224] Abdi A Tawane, ‘What the Gulf Crisis Means for Somalia’, International Policy Digest, 18 April 2018, https://intpolicydigest.org/2018/04/19/what-the-gulf-crisis-means-for-somalia/.
[225] ‘Djibouti Country Statement: Addressing Migrant Smuggling and Human Trafficking in East Africa’, Expertise France, September 2017, 11.
[226] Will Todman, ‘The Gulf Scramble for Africa: GCC States’ Foreign Policy Laboratory’, CSIS Briefs, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 20 November 2018, https://www.csis.org/ analysis/gulf-scramble-africa-gcc-states-foreign-policy-laboratory.
[227] Some observers estimate the Sudanese diaspora to be as large as 900,000 individuals; see, Asteris Huliaras and Sophia Kalantzakos, ‘The Gulf States and the Horn of Africa: A New Hinterland?, Middle East Policy 24/4 (2017), 69.
[228] Dianna Shandy and Shobha Das, ‘Diaspora Engagement and the Global Initiative on Somali Refugees-Emerging Possibilities’, Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee, 2016.
[229] Todman, ‘The Gulf Scramble for Africa’.
[230] Antony Otieno Ong’ayo, ‘Diaspora Transnational Activities and Home Country Regime Conditions: Obstacles to Eritrean Diaspora Contribution to Local Development in Eritrea’, Utrecht: International Development Studies, Utrecht University, 2015.
[231] Except where otherwise noted, figures for Qatar are drawn from Jure Snoj, ‘Population of Qatar by Nationality in 2019’, Priya DSouza Communications, 15 August 2019, https://priyadsouza.com/population-ofqatar-by-nationality-in-2017/.
[232] ‘Ethio-Qatar Business Forum Held in Doha’, Ethiopian News Agency, 4 February 2020, https://www.ena. et/en/?p=12305.
[233] Interview with Gulf expert, 21 September 2020.
[234] Abbebe Kifleyesus, ‘Women Who Migrate, Men Who Wait: Eritrean Labor Migration to the Arab Near East’, Northeast African Studies 12/1 (2012), 104.
[235] Otieno Ong’ayo, ‘Diaspora Transnational Activities’.
[236] Nicole Hirt and Abdulkader Saleh Mohammad, ‘The Lack of Political Space of the Eritrean Diaspora in the Arab Gulf and Sudan: Torn Between an Autocratic Home and Authoritarian Hosts’, Mashriq & Mahjar Journal of Middle East and North African Migration Studies 5/1 (2018): 106.
[237] Hirt and Mohammad, ‘The Lack of Political Space’.
[238] Huliaras and Kalantzakos, ‘The Gulf States and the Horn of Africa’.
[239] ‘UAE: Estimates of Population Residing in the UAE by Country of Citizenship (Selected Countries, 2014)’, GLMM (blog), 17 December 2015, https://gulfmigration.org/uae-estimates-of-population-residing-in-theuae-by-country-of-citizenship-selected-countries-2014/.
[240] Donelli and Dentice, ‘Fluctuating Saudi and Emirati Alignment’, 135.
[241] Interview with a security adviser to UAE government, 25 August 2020.
[242] Interview with Gulf expert, 20 August 2020; interview with Gulf expert, 11 August 2020.
[243] The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, Competition or Cooperation: The Horn of Africa and Broader Red Sea Basin at a Crossroads, 2020. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B74wfTmyLHs
[244] Interview with a strategic marketing manager at Hilti in Qatar (construction industry), 28 September 2020.
[245] ‘Doha to Host Qatari-Sudanese Economic Forum next Month’, Qatar Tribune, 7 December 2017, http:// www.qatar-tribune.com/news-details/id/100118.
[246] Interview with a strategic marketing manager at Hilti in Qatar (construction industry), 28 September 2020. In most cases, a local Gulf national is required to serve as a partner if a non-national wishes to set up a company in the Gulf region. The local national typically has a minimum 51 per cent share of the business. In many cases, however, Gulf nationals have no operational involvement or share per se but are paid an agreed fee to serve as the majority partner. The quoted material in the remainder of this section of the report is derived from this source.
[247] Rashid Abdi, ‘A Dangerous Gulf in the Horn: How the Inter-Arab Crisis is Fuelling Regional Tensions’, Commentary, International Crisis Group, 3 August 2017, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-northafrica/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/dangerous-gulf-horn-how-inter-arab-crisis-fuelling-regional-tensions.
[248] Will Brown and Zecharias Zelalem, ‘International Condemnation Rains down on Saudi Arabia after Telegraph Investigation into Hellish Detention Centres’, The Telegraph, 1 September 2020, https://www. telegraph.co.uk/global-health/climate-and-people/international-condemnation-rains-saudi-arabiatelegraph-investigation/.
[249] Interview with Gulf expert, 11 August 2020.
[250] Interview with Gulf expert, 12 August 2020.
[251] Analysis of Sudan researcher.
[252] Interview with two Gulf experts, 23 August 2020.
[253] ‘DP World Berbera’s Community Projects in Somaliland to Change Trajectory of Educational Opportunities’, DP World, 18 December 2019, https://www.dpworld.com/news/releases/dp-world-berberascommunity-projects-in-somaliland-to-change-trajectory-of-educational-opportunities/.
[254] Interview with Gulf expert, 20 August 2020.
[255] Interview with Gulf expert, 20 August 2020.
[256] ‘UAE launches remote programme to train 1 million medics’, Dubai 92, 12 August 2020, https://www. dubai92.com/trending/uae/uae-launches-remote-programme-to-train-1-million-medics/.
[257] Interview with researcher on Turkey and Africa region, 23 August 2020.
[258] These have proved to be very effective in bridging the gap between religious and scientific teaching. Conceived in a secular Kemalist environment, the Imam-Hatip offer a synthesis between traditional religious teaching and science-based Western style teaching.
[259] Gabrielle Angey, ‘The Gülen Movement and the Transfer of a Political Conflict from Turkey to Senegal’, Politics, Religion & Ideology 19/1 (2018): 53–68; Federico Donelli, ‘The Gülen Movement in Africa’.
[260] Interview with foreign policy adviser who served within the Turkish minister of foreign affairs, 19 August 2020.
[261] Currently, it is estimated that there are about 30,000 African students (mostly from Somalia and Sudan) in Turkey as a result of these study programmes.
[262] Interview with staff member, Africa Foundation, 24 August 2020.
[263] Interview with Turkish scholar on Africa and MENA region, 31 August 2020.
[264] Federico Donelli, ‘Persuading through Culture, Values, and Ideas. The Case of Turkey’s Cultural Diplomacy’, Insight Turkey 21/3 (2019).
[265] As of 2019, Eritrea is the only country in the Horn where Turkish TV series are not broadcast.
[266] Murat Ergin and Yağmur Karakaya, ‘Between neo-Ottomanism and Ottomania: navigating state-led and popular cultural representations of the past’, New Perspective on Turkey 56 (2017): 333–359.
[267] Interview with political economy scholar, 27 August 2020.
[268] Interview with TRT analyst, Africa desk, 22 August 2020.
