Angus Anderson’s policy paper, “International and Regional Competition: The Somaliland Model,” presented at the International Maritime Security Summit in April 2025, proposes that recognizing Somaliland could be a “stabilizing force” in the Red Sea region.
The paper identifies major international players (China, Russia, and Iran) and regional actors (Turkey, Israel, Egypt, Ethiopia, UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar) vying for regional influence. Anderson’s analysis emphasizes how these actors prioritize their own sovereignty (political control) and security (economic and maritime) in their foreign policy decisions.
The paper discusses the international competition between the US and countries like China, Russia, and Iran in the Horn of Africa. It suggests that recognizing Somaliland could counter Chinese influence and support political sovereignty.
Anderson argues that despite its unrecognized status, Somaliland possesses the qualities of a functioning state based on the Montevideo Convention, such as a permanent population, defined territory, an independent and effective government, and a legal capacity to enter relations with other states. He believes that recognizing Somaliland would advance the security interests of key players in the region by promoting stability.
The paper frames this argument within the context of “hybrid realism,” where nations prioritize their own strategic advantages (sovereignty and security) and mutual benefit. Recognizing Somaliland makes sense not out of some idealistic principle, but because it serves the concrete interests of powerful nations. Anderson suggests that a Trump re-election could lead to a shift in US foreign policy, potentially favoring Somaliland due to concerns about Chinese influence and regional stability.
The paper compares Somaliland’s situation to Taiwan’s, highlighting its alliance with another “unrecognized” state. Anderson advocates for Somaliland’s recognition, arguing that it aligns with international strategic interests related to sovereignty and security in the Red Sea region, particularly in the context of competition among global powers.
The complete paper is as follows:
International and Regional Competition: The Somaliland Model
Policy paper by Angus Anderson
International Maritime Security Summit (April 2025), Amman, Jordan
Arab Institute for Security Studies (ACSIS)
Somaliland’s quest for recognition is longstanding despite the latest push for engagement in the Red Sea basin. Geopolitical shifts in the Middle East, following the Arab Spring, diversification across the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and regional conflict(s) in the Horn of Africa continue to recenter international and regional state interests from the Arabian Peninsula to the Red Sea basin. International actors include China, Russia, and Iran, whilst regional actors include Türkiye, Israel, Egypt, Ethiopia, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. Two themes of contention underpin this recalibration in foreign policy for international and regional actors: sovereignty (political,) security (economic and maritime).
The turn to the Red Sea underlines the importance of the Somaliland model as a potential flashpoint across sovereignty and security. President Donald Trump’s re-election to the White House is forcing a rethink on U.S. foreign policy in the world, with U.S. East Africa policy, specifically the U.S.’ mission in Somalia, pending review. As the U.S. administration rethinks its policy on Yemen, with renewed airstrikes in Houthi provinces, Al-Shabaab threatens the regime in Mogadishu. The likelihood of a tilt in U.S. foreign policy in Somalia grows stronger with the latest visit by the Somaliland Foreign Minister in April 2025 to Washington and a pending visit by the Taiwanese Foreign Minister at the end of this month.
Therefore, this paper will provide a comprehensive analysis of the Somaliland model —amongst international and regional competitors — with policy recommendations in favor of Somaliland recognition.
Historical Context: Case for Recognition
Somaliland’s case for recognition predates official `independence’ in 1991. Two state actors are responsible for Somaliland’s history in the twentieth century: Great Britain and the former colony of Italian Somaliland, Somalia (post-1961).
Two Waves of Independence
Somaliland independence follows two distinct periods of independence: independence and re-independence: 26th to 30th June 1960 (independence), 1st July 1960-1991 (union), and 1991-2025 (re-independence).[1]
The First Wave
The British Empire held Somaliland as a protectorate between 1887 until the 25th of June 1960, when Hargeisa declared independence from Great Britain.
With the wave of post-colonialism, during the 1960s, Somaliland was granted its independence on the 26th of June 1960 by Royal proclamation of her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II.[2] Thirty-five countries, including P5 members of the United Nations Security Council welcomed its sovereignty in June 1960 until the reintegration of Somaliland into Italian Somalia by the 1st of July 1960. This process of reintegration in 1960 was understood as a ‘voluntary union’.[3]
The Second Wave
However, a political union with Mogadishu preceded successive rounds of resistance to reintegration.
A rebel group, the Somali National Movement (SNM), emerged in Somaliland by the 1980s. The SNM opposed the military junta of President Siyad Barre, who seized power in Mogadishu in 1969.
Barre’s rule resulted in multiple rounds of inter-clan violence between the dominant clan in Somaliland, the Isaaq clan, and other clans in Italian Somalia. Estimates around the loss of life, during the ten-year liberation war (1981-1991), stand between 50, 000 —100, 000 fatalities in Somaliland because of the civil war.[4]
The civil war ended with the collapse of the Barre regime in Mogadishu and the reassertion of independence by Somaliland in 1991. By 2001, Somaliland passed an official constitution legitimized by popular support through a public referendum and successive elections.[5]
Therefore, advocates for recognition underline the period of independence following British rule. Somaliland is commonly termed — across scholarship — as an ‘unrecognized state’ following two waves of independence.
Typological Classification: The Somaliland Model
Somaliland is defined as a ‘unrecognized state’ in alignment with the requirements for statehood under customary international law.
Legal Statehood
The criterion for statehood is commonly cited under the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States.[6] The Convention of 1933 focuses on four criterion for statehood: a permanent population, a defined territory, an independent and effective government, and a legal capacity to enter relations with other states.
Advocates in favor of Somaliland independence cite its permanent population, ethnically different to the tribes in Greater Somalia, territory defined by the British protectorate and recognized between 25th June-30th June 1960, an independent autonomous government in Hargeisa separate to the federal system of Somalia, and Somaliland’s diplomatic engagement with numerous UN member states including P5 members, relevant regional interlocutors, and allies: the U.S., UK, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Taiwan.
Statehood in a System of Hybrid Realism: Sovereignty & Security
However, the current international system — as policymakers understand it — is shifting towards a state of hybrid realism where nation-states prioritize their own power and influence through state sovereignty, competitive alliances,[7] and strategic investments[8] across a system of regional poles: a multipolar system.[9]
Hybrid Realism — a form of realism where states prioritize their own mutual benefit through material gain, however, some collective norms apply although for mutual benefit: sovereignty (political) and security (maritime).
Sovereignty and security are therefore prioritized on the condition of material gain than any normative value for third-party institutions such as the UN, WTO, and AU. In doing so, the Horn of Africa must be viewed through this theoretical lens of hybrid realism as nation-states compete and cooperate via strategic alliances for their material gain: sovereignty (political) and security (economic, maritime).
Hybrid Realism, Somaliland Recognition:
-
Sovereignty
Political Sovereignty — the right of a state to determine their own political system, laws, leadership, and policies without external coercion or internal legitimacy.
-
Security
Economic Security— vested commercial networks to maintain stable and sustainable economic conditions —protecting key industries, resources, infrastructure, and markets from shocks.
Maritime Security —protection of maritime passages, the global commons, for the flow of global commerce.
Therefore, relevant state actors — namely the U.S., UAE, Israel, and European allied states — judge Somaliland’s recognition through relative gain even if notions of sovereignty and security benefit the wider international community.
Axes of Competition in the Horn of Africa — Sovereignty & Security (Hybrid Realism)
International Competition
Axis of Resistance: U.S. versus China, Russia, and Iran
Recognition of Somaliland intersects with the Trump administration’s foreign policy shift on China, whilst also offering a strategic counterweight to an emerging alliance of U.S. adversaries between China, Russia, and Iran.
Political Sovereignty: U.S. versus China
U.S. support for UN member states’ political sovereignty offers Washington a viable avenue to intervene in Somaliland because of Beijing’s support for destabilizing forces inside Somaliland’s de facto borders. For instance, Chinese assistance to the SSC in Sool state sustains inter-clan rivalry between the Isaaq majority clan in Somaliland and the Dhulbahante clan under the SCC-Khaatumo administration.[10] Whilst Hargeisa successfully suppressed secessionist attempts, with the tacit support of Beijing, active support by Beijing and Mogadishu for the SSC-Khaatumo aims to disrupt the political sovereignty of Somaliland aspirations. In effect, recognition of SSC-Khaatumo — as an administrative enclave separate from Somaliland or neighboring Puntland — reduces Somaliland’s territorial claim and with it the extension of de facto political sovereignty to the post-1991 territory.
Small State Diplomacy: Somaliland Sovereignty Shares Parallels with Taiwan in East Asia
Somaliland recognition offers the U.S. an avenue to align its objectives in East Asia with policies in the Horn of Africa by upholding political sovereignty. For instance, Beijing’s role in the African continent has tied influence on infrastructure development through the Belt and Road Initiative, whilst U.S. International Development (USID) cuts further undermine Washington’s diplomatic clout in Africa.
Since 2000, China has used the BRI to influence small state diplomacy; Eswatini and Somaliland remain the only African (de facto) states to recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state, in effect, isolating Somaliland’s ambitions to ally itself with other ‘unrecognized’ states in the international community.[11]
Figure 1: Changes in Recognition of Taiwan by African Countries (2000-)
China’s actions in Africa are no coincidence as Taiwan faces ongoing military and intelligence breaches of its sovereign borders. In March this year, Taiwanese officials reported tampering of underwater telecommunication cables, whilst Beijing continues to violate international laws on maritime sovereignty in the South China Sea.
One high-level Somaliland diplomatic official discussed these measures, citing the “price tag” for U.S. or Israeli recognition of Somaliland, as Hargeisa is open to discussions with all countries if it leads to official recognition.
Therefore, Somaliland recognition offers the U.S. complete alignment for U.S. strategy on countering Chinese expansionism in two regions of U.S. security and economic interest: (South-) East Asia and the Horn of Africa. In doing so, U.S. recognition would offer a turn commitment to the defense of sovereign nations, in addition to countering Chinese hegemony, should Taipei and Hargeisa satisfy U.S. economic interests in exchange for recognition.
Maritime Security: U.S. versus China, Russia, and Iran
At the state level, a deepening alliance between U.S. adversaries — noticeably China, Russia, and Iran in the Red Sea—underscores the need for greater strategic depth where the axis seeks to undercut the commercial interests of non-aligned state parties. For instance, the Israeli campaigns against Hamas, Hizbullah, IRGC Iraqi militias, and now the Houthis has dealt a serious blow to Tehran’s regional foreign policy.
Iran’s foreign policy is now focused on Yemen, whilst Hizbutlah seeks rearmament amidst attempts to state-build, whilst the new Syrian leadership focuses on redevelopment without doctrine. In doing so, Houthi attacks on maritime shipping resume with the real risk of significant escalation because of the unlikelihood of a renewed ceasefire in Gaza, intelligence gaps on Houthi targets remain significant, and the U.S. appetite for any ground offensive in Yemen on western and northern Yemen is limited.
Intelligence Gaps in Yemen
According to Israeli sources, close to the U.S.-Israeli bombing runs on Hodeidah port, intelligence gaps remain significant in Yemen with many Houthis seeking refuge in tribal areas of Saada governorate.[12]
Mutual Benefit(s): Commercial Interests
At the same time, Houthi maritime actions have benefited Chinese and Russian commercial interests at the expense of U.S. and European industry.[13]
According to Mohammed al-Karnmi, a Yemeni journalist familiar with the recruitment process from Yemen to Russia via Oman, the Houthis have actively recruited manpower for Russia’s war in Ukraine.[14]
Official documents show the latest shipment of Yemeni recruits, arriving in Moscow via Muscat, as the Russians recruit battle-hardened Yemeni men — chanting Ansarullah slogans —rather than exploited economic migrants looking for a better life in Russia.[15]
Concurrently, Chinese maritime firms have increased transshipment via Doraleh port in Djibouti as supply bottlenecks and inelastic demand sustain high profits for Chinese shipping giants.
Ship traffic through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait declined by 55% (November 2023 — February 2024). However, Djibouti’s port revenues rose by 41% (December 2023 — April 2024) because of Chinese trans-shipment.[16]
Tehran-Beijing: Economic & Defense Partnership
The alliance between Iran and China goes beyond economic opportunism as China aligns its economic and defense partnership with Iran to counter the U.S. in the Horn of Africa, in addition to the MENA more broadly.
In a recent report, United Against Nuclear Iran found that Tehran increased Iranian exports of oil to China by 10.75% in 2023 whilst more than 90% of Iran’s total exports reached Chinese markets by 2024.[17]
Separate to economic support, China is providing the Houthis with Chinese-made components to target Red Sea vessels in exchange for immunity for Chinese-flagged ships. This follows multiple U.S. Treasury announcements in 2024, which added a dozen Chinese, Iranian, and Houthi entities to the U.S. sanction list for acquiring, funding, smuggling, and providing dual-use material to the Houthis.[18]
China’s Role in the Horn of Africa Opens the Door to Iran: Djibouti, Yemen, and Somalia
China’s tacit support for the Houthis risks supporting greater instability in the Horn of Africa between Houthis, Al-Shabaab, and Djibouti officials because of the triangular diplomacy via arms smuggling between the three (non-)state officials. For instance, Beijing’s insistence on pursuing its Belt and Road Initiative strategy between ‘the MENA — Africa — Europe’ guides its support for maritime port access in Somalia and Djibouti, whilst its ‘One China policy’ discourages secessionist attempts by any Somaliland-Taiwan alignment. In doing so, Beijing’s support for (non-)state actors — namely Djibouti and the Houthis — implicate China’s involvement in sustaining conflict in Iran’s axis of resistance both in the Levant, Yemen, and the axis’ ideological proxies in Somalia: Al-Shabaab.
Djibouti’s ties to Houthi networks[19] casts a shadow on China’s indirect involvement with other Iranian-aligned shadow networks at the center of maritime insecurity in the Horn of Africa: Al-Shabaab and regional piracy networks.
According to shipping data, China’s exports to Al-Hodeidah sustained a serious increase in volume between 2023-2024 following the start of Al-Aqsa Flood by the Houthis.
Chinese shipping firms increased exports to the Houthis in Al-Hodeidah port to 1,900 containers, up 427% (October 2023-April 2024), whilst Djibouti transshipment volumes increased from a mere 19% (December 2023) to over 60% in the same time frame up to April 2024.[20]
In doing so, China’s use of Djibouti as a staging ground for economic opportunism in tum sustaining the war in Yemen, through trade and maritime port rents, contributes to ongoing maritime insecurity waged by the Houthi militia.
Concurrently, China’s support for Djibouti and the Houthi militia helps sustain maritime insecurity in Puntland, Somalia, and the surrounding Indian Ocean because of the triangular diplomacy between Djibouti officials, the Houthis, and Al-Shabaab.
According to the UN Monitoring Group, Djibouti’s has a “deep state” in Somalia active since 2010 tying Djibouti officials to Somali officials implicated Al-Shabaab active areas,[21] whilst Houthi militia, according to reports, are investing in alliances with Al-Shabaab in the Somali province of Puntland, an area adjacent to southern Yemen.[22]
The illicit arms and fuel trafficking trade has been a leading factor in the Houthis’ ties with Al-Shabaab. In February 2025, reports revealed that representatives of the two groups had met at least twice in July and September 2024, in Somalia, as the Houthis evade an UN arms embargo with a keen eye to sustaining its effective campaign in the Gulf of Aden whilst supporting instability in and around Somalia. In turn, the fragile collapse of state security in Somalia — with the resurgence of Al-Shabaab in recent months — diverts international efforts on sanctions whilst negating any effective maritime coalition to tackle the Houthis in the Gulf of Aden.
Therefore, the Houthis’ growing alliance with non-state actors in Somalia supports Iranian foreign policy by offshore bases. Iranian weapons and resources flow to and from Yemen, circumventing the UN arms embargo, via Tanzania and Kenya to Somalia, arriving in Houthi-controlled ports in Yemen. Specific entry points include Ras al-Aara in Lahj Governorate in Somalia as arms are smuggled into Yemen.[23]
Smuggling routes into Yemen operate via a roundabout network of covert ties between Djibouti officials, Houthi officials, and Somali (non-)state actors supervised by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Beijing’s support for Djibouti, via Doraleh port as part of its BRI initiative, and diplomatic cover for the Houthis at the UNSC makes China one patron of a wider axis of resistance alongside Iran and Russia in the Horn of Africa.
Djibouti and Somalia’s operations as a launchpad for illicit arms and fuel smuggling to sanctioned (non-)state actors are recognized by the Somaliland government, as Hargeisa faces ongoing threats by Al-Shabaab and secessionist attempts in its eastern regions.
Maritime security is, therefore, a unique policy area worth exploring for future recognition by the U.S. administration, seeking to formulate a comprehensive policy on Yemen whilst countering Chinese, Iranian, and Russian attempts to leverage material gains in the Horn of Africa.
Regional Competition
Geography, Vision 2030s, Maritime Access, and Ideological Ties
Regional actors are also competing on issues of sovereignty and security across the Horn of Africa.
On sovereignty, tensions rising between some Red Sea littoral states — noticeably Egypt, Eritrea, and Somalia — against some Red Sea allies and their GCC supporters: GCC actors and Israel who are operating in the Horn of Africa from afar.
On security, commercial interests play into GCC rivalries on agricultural exports, mineral components, and logistics access. GCC actors are competing on internal access to agricultural sector for food security, private rights to mineral extraction, and port access for maritime trade.
However, economic security is also tied to maritime security links for regimes tied to Islamist factions or with Islamist tendencies as we see across Somalia, Djibouti, Sudan, and Egypt. Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar are often found to support regimes that have ties or remain associated with Islamist groups in the state contrary to the UAE; this is evident with the Sudanese Armed Forces in Sudan, Djibouti officials, and the Somali government alongside Al-Shabaab.
Political Sovereignty: Interference in the Red Sea
Egypt-Eritrea-Somalia
Egypt, alongside Eritrea and allied Somalia, reject non-coastal states’ role in Red Sea security in turn boiling down to issues over political sovereignty in recent months. For instance, Ethiopia’s nature as a landlocked country constrains its reliance to Red Sea states north-east and south-west of its borders: Eritrea and Djibouti. Colonial-era tensions, between Ethiopia and Eritrea, citing the Tigray conflict, has ramped up tensions between Addis Ababa and Asmara as Eritrean and Egyptian government officials reject Ethiopian irredentism. Access to Asmara’s maritime ports would relieve pressure on Ethiopia’s economy at the loss of Eritrea’s fundamental sovereignty. Therefore, an issue of maritime security boils down to who has access and jurisdiction to Eritrean ports.
Ethiopia-Somaliland vs Djibouti, Türkiye, and Somalia
Similar arenas of competition, along the same issues of political sovereignty, arise in Somaliland as Addis Ababa formerly gained access to Berbera port in Somaliland yet this was negated by Somali-Turkish pressure. In 2023, Ethiopia and Somaliland signed a Memorandum of Understanding pledging port rights to Berbera port in exchange for recognition, yet this was later nullified under the Ankara Declaration[24] following Türkiye and Somalia’s joint pushback of the MoU.[25] Accordingly, animosity between Cairo and Addis Ababa — dating back to issues of water politics on the Nile — shape Cairo’s support for ‘Red Sea state security only’ as a disguise for countering Ethiopia’s regional growth. As such, Cairo’s policy on ‘Red Sea security for Red Sea states only’ seeks to contain Ethiopia on the issue of sovereignty as maritime limitations dials up the pressure on mutual issues of riparian transboundary management. Therefore, maritime contention on water politics transcends a broader consensus against Ethiopian and Somalilander interests regarding political sovereignty.
Trilateral Summit (17 October 2024): Cairo-Asmara-Mogadishu
The trilateral summit held between Egyptian, Eritrea, and Somali leaders reaffirmed an anti-Ethiopian alliance based on issues of sovereignty that limit Ethiopian maritime access in addition to Somaliland recognition. Outcomes of the summit reaffirmed Mogadishu’s evolving support for the longstanding alliance between Cairo and Asmara as the failed MoU prompted Somali-Egyptian defense cooperation in August 2024.[26] Military support publicly pledged to combat the resurgence of Al-Shabaab, yet Cairo has warned Ethiopia that a renewal of the MoU with Somaliland risks direct military confrontation because of the threat to Somali ‘territorial integrity.’ Therefore, the recognition of Somaliland is somewhat of a political football for wider issues on sovereignty in the Horn of Africa that risks Somali-Egyptian military aggression for Addis Ababa yet provides self-determination for Landers seeking independence from Somalia.
Security: Commercial & Maritime Security
GCC states’ interactions with Somaliland can be analyzed through a geoeconomic lens as Gulf states compete for commercial access in two sectors: agricultural access for food security and port access for maritime trade. Together, each GCC actor is leveraging its position as the shift towards diversification, in non-oil trade, forces the KSA, the UAE, and Qatar to entrench their role across the African continent.
Commercial: Food Insecurity
Food insecurity is an ongoing issue for GCC states following a surge in global food prices during the 2000s and the recent external shocks: COVID-19, the Ukraine war, and climate change. Abu Dhabi and Riyadh conduct agricultural diplomacy, where the UAE has invested considerable capital in Sudan’s agricultural market, whilst Saudi has sought cooperation in Sudan’s agricultural market although competing with the UAE in other Red Sea states, notably Eritrea and Djibouti. By investing in Horn of Africa agricultural markets, Abu Dhabi and Riyadh are meeting their food security needs whilst leveraging political influence inside the Horn of Africa. However, both kingdoms support different factions inside Sudan and thus compete on agricultural access by political proxies.
Estimates show that the UAE imports 90% of its food whilst KSA imports up to 80% of food consumed across the kingdom.[27] Most Emirati investments are in Sudan and Ethiopia whilst KSA is attempting to compete with the UAE in Sudanese agricultural sector.[28]
Maritime Security: Port Access
Investments by each GCC actor is driven by food insecurity yet is shaped by political allegiances. For instance, the UAE shared the highest difference in trade volume with Sudan compared to KSA and Qatar with Somalia, including Somaliland, in close second.[29] By doing so, the choice of partners for agricultural trade is directly linked to politics and the supply-side capacity of each GCC state to harness its logistics sector to export such high volumes of goods from these Red Sea states to national ports in the GCC.
Figure 2: Total Trade between KSA, UAE, and Qatar in Horn of Africa (2017-2021, US$ Mn)[30]
| Saudi Arabia | UAE | Qatar | |
| Djibouti | $2,494,700.54 | $4,052,361.81 | $129,985.92 |
| Eritrea | $24,786.61 | $1,308,260.43 | $328.65 |
| Ethiopia | $1,371,497.24 | $4,744,679.10 | $47,420.41 |
| Somalia | $585,404.92 | $6,397,363.60 | $38,856.10 |
| Sudan | $5,759,145.25 | $15,001,068.19 | $370,072.41 |
| South Sudan |
$7,192.13 | $1,149,511.35 | / |
Therefore, all three states may be on a similar path of diversification, looking to invest in food security for the sake of long-term security, yet the volume of trade and its geographical focus is influenced by each GCC state’s supply-side capacity and whether each Gulf regime favors the recipient actor. In exchange, business is political as proven by Emirati support for agriculture in Sudan — concerning the RSF — in addition to Somali investment(s) in Somaliland, specifically Berbera port owned by Emirati giant, DP World.
In doing so, the politics of GCC investment in food exports in the Horn of Africa is patterned by competition over maritime access to strategic ports shaped by often politically salient dynamics between GCC monarchies and Horn of Africa regimes. For instance, Abu Dhabi and Khartoum’s relationship in addition to Somaliland, predate the Arab Spring yet were reinforced by the wave of Islamism(s) that removed successive Arab leaderships by c2011. As such, GCC actors are keen to gain a foothold in all Horn of Africa states, yet patterns of competition over agricultural access and maritime bases differ by political cleavages.
Therefore, Abu Dhabi’s zero tolerance for Islamism, alongside its neighbor KSA, often aligns with secular anti-Islamist forces in the Horn of Africa, namely Somaliland and Ethiopia. However, Doha and Türkiye’s support for Mogadishu is perceived as an endorsement of the Somali regime that uses Islam as a guiding political force in public life, like Türkiye and Qatar, contrary to the UAE and increasingly its neighbor, KSA.
Figure 3: International & Regional Alliances in Horn of Africa (DET)
Policy Recommendations: Somaliland Recognition in a Hybrid Realist Order
Recognition of Somaliland by international and regional allies of Somaliland will achieve the two pillars shaping inter-state competition in the Horn of Africa: sovereignty and security.
The international community, specifically the alliance of states weighing up Somaliland recognition, should formalize strategic engagement with Somaliland. Allies of potential formal recognition include international partners — noticeably the U.S., UAE, Israel, Taiwan, and UK — whilst Ethiopia and Kenya are staunch regional allies of Hargeisa.
International: Policy Recommendations
United States: Formalize Strategic Engagement with Somaliland
Action: The U.S. should upgrade existing informal ties to a formal diplomatic mission in Hargeisa.
Rationale: Recognition aligns with the U.S.’ counterweight to China, Russia, and Iran across the Indo-Pacific, specifically Taiwan, in addition to the Horn of Africa as Somaliland and Taiwan deepen maritime cooperation.
Security Leverage: Washington can use Berbera port as a logistics fallback hub to Camp Lemonnier (Djibouti) to hedge against China’s dominance over Red Sea states such as Djibouti.
Political Message: Upholds political sovereignty of democratic nations, whilst building on commercial and maritime realist interests for U.S. maritime vessels, trade, and potential mineral deals between D.C., Hargeisa, and Taipei.
Regional: Policy Recommendations
United Arab Emirates: Expand Security & Investment Guarantees
Action: Deepen strategic port cooperation and expand Emirati investment in Berbera corridor infrastructure.
Rationale: Counters Qatari-Turkish influence in Mogadishu; strengthens the UAE’s anti-Islamist doctrine (post-Arab Spring) through alignment with secular Somaliland leadership. Abu Dhabi’s leadership also opens the door to normalization, with Israel, should the UAE and Israel recognize Somaliland.
Outcome: Secures UAE’s food and agri-trade corridors while projecting maritime influence through DP World extension and wider post-Sudan Red Sea sphere, specifically in Sudan and Yemen.
Political Message: Aligns with UAE secular foreign policy, against Islamist extremism, in favor of pro-secular, pro-normalization, and multi-vector diplomacy.
Ethiopia: Internationalize the MoU with Somaliland
Action: Seek multilateral recognition for Berbera corridor access under AU mediation or a Red Sea transit framework, with the backing of the U.S., UAE, and Israel.
Rationale: Ethiopia must counter a growing alignment between Cairo-Asmara-Mogadishu without triggering military escalation.
Political Message: Reframe MoU as an economic cooperation agreement tied to food security whilst dialing down rhetoric on conflict with Eritrea.
Summary
Somaliland’s case for recognition is re-emerging as a strategic imperative amidst escalating competition over sovereignty and maritime security in the Red Sea basin. With hybrid realism defining today’s multipolar order, state interests are increasingly driven by material gain over normative alignment.
Somaliland’s geographic position, political stability, and port infrastructure offer unique advantages to allies seeking strategic depth against rival axes led by China, Iran, and Russia. The re-election of Donald Trump, renewed U.S. airstrikes in Yemen, and maritime insecurity around Bab el-Mandeb underscore the urgency for a recalibrated U.S. and allied policy in the Horn of Africa.
Recognition of Somaliland aligns with both sovereignty and security goals for key partners such as the U.S., UAE, Israel, and Taiwan. International recognition presents an opportunity to reinforce the sovereignty of small states, maritime supply chains, counter hostile regional networks, and support a stable, secular, and democratic actor. Regionally, Somaliland offers Ethiopia maritime access whilst bolstering anti-Islamist alliances across the Gulf, Levant, and Horn.
Together, the Somaliland model offers international and regional allied powers a solution to issues of sovereignty and maritime security defining the competition over influence in the multipolar world, specifically the Horn of Africa, today. President Trump’s pending review of American foreign policy, in the Horn of Africa policy, will determine whether U.S. and allied partners such as the GCC will deepen cooperation with Somaliland over Somalia through recognition.
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About the Author
Angus (Gus) Anderson is the Editor-in-Chief of The Daily Euro Times. He is based between London and the GCC, overseeing a team of writers, graphic designers, videographers, guest writers, and podcast interviewees on DET’s podcast: The Euro Digest.
Gus holds an MPhil from the University of Oxford in Modern Middle Eastern studies, with Arabic, and a BA in International Relations from the University of Exeter.
He has an acute interest and lived experience of politics, business, and languages across the Middle East, North Africa, and East Africa. He speaks British English, Arabic (Fusha/Levantine), a little Swahili, and is looking to study Russian and Mandarin when finds the time.
Previously, Gus has worked and lived in Oxford, Amman, Hebron, Lake Victoria (Kenya), Somaliland, and the GCC.
Email: editor@dailyeurotimes.com
X: @gus__anderson
Footnotes
[1] U.S. State, National Security Council Report, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v14/d55.
[2] United Nations, “Attainment of independence by the Trust Territory of Somaliland under Italian administration by 1960,” https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/212212?In=en&v=pdf.
[3] Somaliland Government, “The recognition of Somaliland: A brief history,” https://www.ft.dk/samling/20161/almdel/URU/bilag/265/1786944.pdf.
[4] Ingiriis, “We Swallowed the State as the State Swallowed Us,” 237.
[5] ETH Zurich, “The political development of Somaliland and its conflict with Puntland,” 1.
[6] Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, https://www.ilsa.org/Jessup/Jessup15/Montevideo%20Convention.pdf.
[7] Walt, Taming American Power (2005).
[8] Morgenthau, Politics Among Notions (1948).
[9] Haass, “A World in Disarray: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order.”
[10] Nour, “China’s Interference in Somaliland: Backing SSC Rebels in Somaliland, 1.
[11] BBC, “Somaliland and Taiwan: Two territories with few friends but each other,” 1.
[12] Crisis Group “Saada Yemen” https://www.crisisgroup.org/trigger-list/iran-us-trigger-list/flashpoints/saada-yemen.
[13] Atlantic Council, “The United States’ Houthi terrorist designation unmasks Russia’s Yemen strategy,” https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/houthi-terrorist-designation-russias-yemen-strategy/.
[14] Al-Karami, “Houthis Recruit Military Yemenis for Russian Frontlines In New Development,” https://dailyeurotimes.com/houthis-recruit-military-yemenis-for-russian-frontlines-in-new-development/
[15] Econ DB Shipping, “Djibouti DJ JIB” https://www.econdb.com/rnartime/ports/DJ%20JIB/Djibouti/.
[16] Ibid.
[17] United Against Nuclear Iran, “Iran’s Oil Exports and Shipping Activities,” https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/issues/irans-oil-exports-and-shipping-activities.
[18] U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Houthi Weapons Smuggling and Procurement networks,” https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2627.
[19] Ahmed, “Djibouti dodges scrutiny despite China, Iran, Houthi ties and links to illicit activities,” https://mei.edu/publications/djibouti-dodges-scrutiny-despite-china-iran-houthi-ties-and-links-illicit-activities
[20] Econ DB shipping, “Al Hudaydah YE HOD,” https://www.econdb.com/maritime/ports/YE%20HOD/Al%20Hudaydah/.
[21] Ahmed, “Djibouti dodges scrutiny despite China, Iran, Houthi ties and links to illicit activities,” https://mei.edu/publications/djibouti-dodges-scrutiny-despite-china-iran-houthi-ties-and-links-illicit-activities
[22] Jalal and al-Jabarni, “Dhows, Drones, and Dollars: Ansar Allah’s Expansion into Somalia,” https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/03/dhows-drones-and-dollars-ansar-allahs-expansion-into-somalia?lang=en.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Republic of Türkiye, “Ankara Declaration” https://www.mfa.gov.tr/etiyopya-federal-demokratik-cumhuriyeti-ve-somali-federal-cumhuriyeti-nin-ankara-bildirisi.en.mfa.
[25] Atlantic Council, “Nine months later: The regional Implications of the Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU,” https://saxafimedia.com/nine-months-later-ethiopia-somaliland-mou/.
[26] Reuters, “Egypt sends arms to Somalia following security deal,” https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/egypt-sends-arms-somalia-following-security-pact-sources-say-2024-08-28/
[27] Global Ventures, “How the UAE and KSA are tackling food security issues,” https://www.global.vc/thoughts/how-the-uae-and-ksa-are-tackling-food-security-issues.
[28] World Bank 2017-2021, https://wits.worldbank.org.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Middle East Council, “The Gulf and Horn of Africa: investing in Security,” https://mecouncil.org/publication/the-gulf-and-the-horn-of-africa-investing-in-security/.
