The first cracks in Ethiopia’s diplomatic relations with Somalia began to appear in May 2022, following Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM)’s election to the Somali presidential office. It would be his second time serving the five-year term, with his first ending in 2017 after he was unseated by Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed (Farmajo).
Farmajo’s presidency was characterized by warm relations with Addis Ababa. When Abiy Ahmed assumed leadership in 2018 and reconciled with Eritrea, Somalia was part of a trilateral axis in the Horn that many had hoped would herald the coming of lasting peace and improved economic integration.
However, the hopes have faded nearly as quickly as they had appeared. A little more than two years into the presidency of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), Ethiopia and Somalia are at the heart of escalating tensions that threaten to spill over into conflict, with other interest groups getting more deeply involved in the Horn.
Born in Somalia’s Hiran region, HSM is a member of the Hawiye clan, one of the most dominant in the coastal nation. He built his political reputation on education advocacy and through engagement in research and work with CSOs.
HSM is leader of the Union for Peace and Development party. During an electoral debate in 2022, he pledged that all Somali citizens would be passengers on a “train of change,” with some interpreting his campaign messaging as a reflection of the ‘Greater Somalia’ agenda.
HSM won reelection in 2022 in three rounds of elections that were delayed by no less than 18 months. Many Somalis at the time opined that HSM was the ‘lesser of the evils’ on a ballot that had 38 candidates.
His first term in office was marked by corruption scandals, inaction, and administrative mediocrity, according to analysts and reports.
HSM forged close ties with the Somali wing of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood during his time working in the education sector. When he regained office in 2022, Egyptian President el-Sisi was quick to bring HSM under his wing. The UN and the collective west is also fast to lift the decades-long arms embargo on Somalia, while the IMF and World Bank announced a USD4.5 billion debt relief and cancellations for Somalia.
Ethiopia, on the other hand, was not included on the list of countries that made up the itinerary for Hassan Sheikh Mohamud‘s first official state visits during his second term in power.
He flew instead to Cairo in the months following his resumption of office. There, he sat down with el-Sisi to discuss a number of concerns, among them the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD).
He has made similar visits in the years since, and has repeatedly stated that “Egypt will not allow anyone to harm Somalia.”
In 2023, HSM agreed to allow Egypt to establish a military base in Somalia and maintain a presence on the Somali coast. He also reportedly began considering a military pact with Turkey, which was realized in early 2024.
This year kicked off with a bang as Ethiopia and Somaliland signed a sea access for recognition deal on New Year’s Day, invoking the wrath of Mogadishu.
The MoU has been at the center of an escalating spat between Ethiopia and Somalia in the eight months since it was signed, and the tensions only appear to be growing more intense.
Last month, Somali officials called for the withdrawal of all Ethiopian peacekeeping troops in Somalia if the government of Abiy Ahmed was unwilling to void its deal with Somaliland.
Ethiopia has played a key role in AU-led peacekeeping missions in Somalia for close to two decades. The African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), the third and latest round, is set to begin in 2025 as Al-Shabaab continues to pose a threat to Somalia and the region at large.
HSM’s decision to appoint Mukhtaar Roobow Mansuur, a former member of Al-Shabaab leadership, to his cabinet has also caused a stir in Addis Ababa.
Al-Shabaab has grown more daring during HSM’s tenure, with the Ethiopian government foiling an attempt to cross into Oromia’s Bale Zone and establish a base there in July 2023.
Nonetheless, Mogadishu has declared its desire to see Ethiopian troops replaced with Egyptian military personnel for the upcoming AU mission. Egypt has already begun moving troops and military supplies to Somalia, with the first batch landing last month.
Cairo is reportedly planning to deploy up to 10,000 troops in Somalia.
“Many believe that Somalia’s invitation to the Egyptian military was triggered by the MoU. The reverse is true. Somalia was already making overtures to Egypt in 2023. Ethiopia was triggered by Somalia’s actions and by Egypt’s military presence in Somalia. Ethiopia took action by signing the MoU with Somaliland,” said a peace and security analyst, speaking anonymously.
“The aggressor is Somalia; Ethiopia reacted. HSM knows Al-Shabaab and Egypt are Ethiopia’s top national security threats. He is using both against Ethiopia,” said the analyst.
He sees Egypt’s efforts to gain a military foothold in the Horn as a strategy to intimidate Ethiopia and foster discord and proxy wars as a way to divert focus from development aspirations, including the GERD.
Meanwhile, Ethiopia is looking to establish a naval presence on the Red Sea to protect its international trade as well as counter Egyptian influence.
The long-lived tensions between Addis Ababa and Cairo were the subject of letters submitted to the UN Security Council by both parties in recent weeks.
Tesfaye Yilma, Ethiopia’s UN rep, wrote to the Council on September 6, 2024, in response to a letter five days prior from Egypt rejecting Ethiopia’s fifth and latest round filling the GERD.
Egypt criticized the “unilateral” decisions Ethiopia is making with regards to the dam.
Tesfaye, in reply, urged the UN Security Council to “take note of Egypt’s repeated threat to use force against Ethiopia”.
“Ethiopia, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, will be steadfast in defending its national development projects putting the country firmly on the path of socio-economic progress and prosperity,” reads his letter.
It rejects the “litany of unfounded allegations” forwarded to the Council by Egypt and calls for bilateral and regional mechanisms to resolve differences.
The last round of trilateral negotiations featuring Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt wrapped up in December 2023 with no agreement after Egypt declared it would no longer take part in the talks despite el-Sisi pledging to do so during a July visit to Cairo from Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed.
Tesfaye accuses Egypt of holding a vested interest in perpetuating its self-claimed monopoly on the Nile River and obstructing a mutually beneficial outcome to the dispute.
“Ethiopia, on the other hand, demonstrated commitment to all the negotiations to reach a mutually acceptable outcome. Despite Egypt’s continued violations, Ethiopia exhaustively implemented the Declaration of Principles on the GERD,” reads the letter. “Ethiopia also continued to exhibit good neighborliness by taking extra measures that ensure maximum flow of water downstream.”
Ethiopia has also requested Egypt to ratify the Cooperative Framework Agreement on the Nile River Basin, which has been submitted to the AU.
The UN Security Council stated the issues between Ethiopia and Egypt are being reviewed at the regional level, implying that the AU and IGAD are the primary platforms dealing with the case.
“Negotiations mediated by friendly countries will continue before it gets to IGAD and the AU. The UNSC will be involved only if all these platforms are exhausted,” said an analyst.
Two rounds of Turkish-brokered talks in Ankara between Ethiopia and Somalia have failed to cool tensions between the two countries.
Whether more talks will be able to ease fears of a potential military confrontation remains to be seen as Somaliland steadfastly pursues the terms of the MoU. This week, the Somaliland government announced the details of the deal’s implementation strategy have been finalized.
