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This article, “Berbera and Beyond: Ethiopia in the Israel–Somaliland Nexus,” discusses the potential “Israel-Somaliland Nexus” and its impact on Ethiopia, particularly regarding access to the sea and regional influence.

Here’s a concise breakdown:

  • Ethiopia’s Need for Sea Access: As a landlocked country, Ethiopia views port access as crucial for its economic survival. The Berbera port in Somaliland is presented as a potential alternative to Djibouti, offering a shorter and cheaper trade corridor.

  • Israel’s Interest in Somaliland: Israel’s interest stems from the disruption of Red Sea shipping lanes due to Houthi attacks. Berbera offers a strategic location for Israel to ensure maritime links to Asia and Europe and to monitor the region. The article also mentions potential Israeli interest in countering Turkish influence.

  • The Berbera Opportunity: DP World’s involvement in Berbera’s development, including port expansion and free-zone plans, creates a foundation for economic integration. A coalition involving Emirati investment, Israeli security expertise, and Ethiopian trade could transform Berbera into a significant Red Sea asset.

  • Potential Challenges: Egypt is wary of Ethiopia gaining greater access to the Red Sea, especially through a port outside its influence. Egypt is likely to support Somalia’s central government to undermine any deal with Somaliland.

  • Recommendations for Ethiopia: The article suggests Ethiopia should prioritize security integration with Israel, the UAE, and Somaliland, including intelligence sharing and coordinated maritime patrols. It also emphasizes diplomatic balance, urging Ethiopia to maintain relations with the Arab world and the African Union, and to present Berbera as an economic necessity that complements Somali sovereignty. Finally, Ethiopia should plan for potential sabotage and destabilization efforts.

  • Overall Significance: The Red Sea is becoming a crucial arena where transport economics, maritime security, and great-power competition intersect. Berbera offers Ethiopia a chance to reduce its reliance on Djibouti and gain leverage in the region.

The complete piece is as follows:

Berbera and Beyond, Ethiopia in the Israel–Somaliland NexusBerbera and Beyond: Ethiopia in the Israel–Somaliland Nexus

By Yonas Yizezew

In a region where many actors are in play, reported diplomatic interest and talks between Israel and Somaliland will unfold a multi-dynamics situation (Rende, 2024). While framed as bilateral engagement, this development strikes at the heart of Ethiopia’s most vital national interests in security, economic survival, and regional influence. Understanding this isn’t about distant geopolitics, it’s about Ethiopia’s path to stability and prosperity in a rapidly shifting landscape.

The Houthi missiles attack on the Red Sea shipping, Egypt’s persistent maneuvers, and Ethiopia’s own legitimate quest for sea access aren’t isolated events. They form a complex, dangerous, yet potentially transformative puzzle where the Israel-Somaliland gambit could be a crucial piece for the region.

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For a landlocked Ethiopia, every port arrangement is less a matter of preference than a matter of national survival. The reported quiet conversations about Israel edging toward a deal with Somaliland are therefore not distant noise, they are potential tectonic shifts (Rende, 2024).

If handled rightly, Berbera could become more than an alternative to Djibouti, as evidenced in the MoU between Ethiopia and Somaliland. It could be the corridor that breaks a structural chokepoint in Ethiopia’s economy. But if handled poorly, it will become another arena where external powers shape Ethiopia’s options without Addis at the table.

Alternative routes through Sudan or Kenya are distant, underdeveloped, or unstable, except the Port of Assab. The January Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Somaliland was a strategic move to escape a strategic suffocation. This promised potential recognition of Somaliland in exchange for leased military and commercial access to the port of Berbera. At the time, a viable, shorter, potentially cheaper corridor to the sea seemed within reach.

When it comes to Israel, its interest in Somaliland is sensible when read through basic strategic arithmetic. The collapse of safe passage through the southern Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb since late 2023 has raised insurance premiums and pushed carriers to take the long way around Africa (Saul & Reid, 2025). For Israel, which depends on prompt maritime links to Asia and Europe through its port of Eilat, ports on the Gulf of Aden offer redundancy and security of supply.

Somaliland’s Berbera sits at a natural transshipment node, with accessibility and under a regional authority willing to court outside partners. The logic is that when a major sea lane becomes fragile, nearby high-quality ports acquire outsized strategic value, especially its engagement with Somalia.

In addition, Israel might seek to counter Turkey’s influence in the region, mirroring the rivalry between the two countries in Syria, where each tries to increase its leverage and blunt the other’s gains (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2025).

Furthermore, Berbera is not an abstract possibility. DP World’s involvement has already translated into tangible infrastructure and commercial frameworks. The port’s phased expansion, a free-zone plan, and existing agreements across Hargeisa, DP World, and Addis create a foundation on which faster economic integration can be built. That said, the planned corridor is a developing physical asset that, if scaled and properly connected to Ethiopia’s eastern hinterland, can competitively challenge Djibouti’s near-monopoly (DP World, 2021).

Into that commercial dynamic steps geopolitics. Israel’s courting of Somaliland is a strategic hedge more than commercial pragmatism. A presence on the Gulf of Aden gives Israel eyes on Yemeni Houthis, the Bab el-Mandeb chokepoint, and a degree of influence over maritime routes that have suddenly become vulnerable (Jerusalem Post 2024).

Reports that Washington may be moving toward recognition of Somaliland only accelerate the momentum. American diplomatic cover would make follow-on partnerships easier for others. For Ethiopia as its ally, Israel’s arrival could be a force multiplier with Israeli security expertise and surveillance capabilities hardening the Berbera corridor against sea-borne and littoral threats (Yarom, 2025).

The UAE already sits at the center of this emergent architecture. DP World’s concession, Abu Dhabi’s regional posture, and the logic of the Abraham Accords combine capital, operational capacity, and political will (Yarom, 2025).

In practice, this creates a potent coalition with Emirati investment and operating the port, Israeli know-how improving security and surveillance, and Ethiopian trade providing the throughput that makes the whole project commercially viable. That mix turns Berbera from a regional upgrade into a strategic Red Sea asset. For Addis Ababa, aligning its economic and diplomatic weight with these partners could convert a port into a durable lifeline.

However, a strategic opportunity invites strategic resistance. Cairo views any enhancement of Ethiopian access to the Red Sea, especially via a port outside traditional Egyptian influence (like Djibouti), with profound suspicion. An Ethiopia-Somaliland-Israel alignment would be seen in Cairo as a double threat.

A calibrated Egyptian response was to be expected, and it is already underway. Cairo will likely double down on supporting Somalia’s central government in Mogadishu, hoping to scuttle any deal with Somaliland and keep Ethiopia contained. Expect increased Egyptian diplomatic pressure, potential covert support for anti-Somaliland elements like the SSC-Khatumo militias in eastern Somaliland, and efforts to rally the Arab League against any recognition moves. Ethiopia must therefore treat stabilization of Somaliland as a strategic imperative as much as a commercial one.

Ethiopia’s MoU hinted at possible future recognition of Somaliland. Israel’s engagement adds immense weight to Somaliland’s quest for legitimacy. While full UN recognition remains distant, this functional engagement of trade, security cooperation, and diplomatic talks chips away at the taboo.

That brings us back to the practical policy Ethiopia should pursue, which is security and balance. Security integration is the major pillar. A loose, informal understanding will not survive the pressures of maritime conflict, transnational crime, or proxy competition.

Ethiopia should institutionalize intelligence sharing with Israel, the UAE, and Somaliland, coordinate maritime patrols, and explore technologies that shore up port resilience, including surveillance and counter-missile measures where appropriate. Israeli experience in port security is relevant, so too is the need to ensure any foreign security presence serves Ethiopian sovereignty rather than undermining it.

Diplomatic balance is the other requirement. Addis cannot burn bridges across the Arab world or alienate institutions like the African Union. Raising the MoU again with Somaliland, as Berbera must be presented as an economic necessity, a pragmatic route that complements, not supplants, Somali sovereignty claims or the integrity of existing regional arrangements, with the support of the Emirates. At the same time, Ethiopia should sustain discreet channels with Hargeisa, support its governance and capacity efforts, and work with partners to defuse potential flashpoints in contested areas such as the SSC-Khatumo region.

Finally, plan for sabotage and second-order effects. Expect targeted efforts to destabilize the corridor, whether through political maneuvers, proxy support to local militias, or information campaigns. Ethiopia’s response must be layered in protective investments in governance and services that reduce local grievances, contingency security arrangements that limit disruption, and a diplomatic campaign that isolates actors who would benefit from instability.

The Red Sea has become more than a shipping lane. It is an arena where transport economics, maritime security, and great-power competition intersect and where Ethiopia’s future prosperity will be materially shaped. Berbera offers a practical escape from over-reliance on Djibouti and a geopolitical lever against adversaries who would fence in Ethiopian development.

The Author: Yonas Yizezew, Researcher, Horn Review

REFERENCES

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The SaxafiMedia.

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