Steven A. Cook argues that Saudi Arabia miscalculated by opposing Israel’s recognition of Somaliland and may have overlooked a strategic opportunity against the Houthis and Iran
RIYADH — Saudi Arabia may have miscalculated by opposing Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, according to Steven A. Cook, a columnist at Foreign Policy and the Eni Enrico Mattei senior fellow for Middle East and Africa studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.
In an article published by Foreign Policy on Aug. 5, Cook argued that Riyadh’s opposition to Israel’s move reflected political rivalries and regional alignments that may have obscured a potential strategic advantage for the kingdom.
“In early this year, the Saudis committed strategic error,” Cook wrote. Rather than welcoming Israel’s recognition of Somaliland — or at least tolerating it — Saudi Arabia publicly opposed the decision alongside Turkey, Qatar and Arab member states of the African Union.
Cook’s assessment rests on a broader argument about the competing interests shaping the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. He contends that the governments opposing Israel’s recognition have different strategic reasons for doing so, while Saudi Arabia’s interests may have pointed in another direction.
For Egypt, Cook said, opposition was understandable because Ethiopia — a major rival in Cairo’s regional calculations — has developed close relations with Somaliland. Turkey’s position, he argued, is similarly rooted in Ankara’s expanding political, economic and security presence in Somalia and the wider Horn of Africa.
“Turkey also opposed it because Somaliland grants the Israelis a foothold in the Horn of Africa, where Ankara has been working to bolster its presence for over a decade,” Cook wrote.
Qatar, meanwhile, has maintained relationships with multiple actors in the region while pursuing its own economic interests. Cook noted that Doha has investments in Somaliland and characterized its regional diplomacy as an effort to maintain influence across competing political camps.
But Saudi Arabia, he argued, had a different strategic calculus.
“An independent Somaliland, allied with Israel and allowing an Israeli presence on its territory, would exert pressure on the Houthis and the IRGC,” Cook wrote, referring to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. “This should have been in Riyadh’s interest, even if Saudi Arabia could not publicly celebrate it.”
The argument centers on geography.
Somaliland occupies a strategically important position along the Gulf of Aden, close to the Bab el-Mandeb maritime chokepoint and across the water from Yemen. Any expansion of Israeli political, intelligence or security ties there could potentially affect the regional balance surrounding the Red Sea and place additional pressure on Iran-backed Houthi forces.
For Saudi Arabia, which has faced years of security threats from the Houthis, that possibility could carry significant strategic value.
Cook suggests that Riyadh’s opposition may instead have been influenced by its increasingly complicated relationship with the United Arab Emirates. Abu Dhabi has developed extensive commercial and strategic interests in Somaliland, particularly around Berbera, and has pursued a broader network of partnerships along the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.
“It seems that Saudi leaders were so fiercely angry with the Emiratis — whom they believed were complicit with the Israelis in Somaliland — that it prevented them from recognizing the potential strategic gain,” Cook wrote.
That rivalry, in Cook’s view, illustrates a broader problem in Saudi foreign policy: the risk that immediate political grievances can obscure longer-term strategic interests.
The kingdom’s regional partnerships also present a complication. Turkey, Egypt and Qatar have shared interests with Riyadh on some issues, including maintaining Somalia’s territorial unity. But Cook argues that those governments cannot necessarily be expected to share Saudi Arabia’s priorities in confronting the Houthis or Iran.
“Furthermore, Turkey, Egypt, and Qatar — Saudi Arabia’s allies in preserving Somalia’s unity — are unlikely to help Riyadh confront its problem with the Houthis,” he wrote.
The distinction is important because the dispute over Somaliland is no longer confined to the question of Somalia’s territorial integrity. It is increasingly connected to the wider competition for influence across the Horn of Africa, the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.
Israel’s relationship with Somaliland could therefore become one element of a broader regional realignment involving Ethiopia, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt and Iran.
For Riyadh, Cook argues, the challenge is to assess those developments according to Saudi Arabia’s own strategic interests rather than through the lens of existing alliances and rivalries.
“To improve their position, the Saudis must abandon the principles and emotions that have guided their policymaking and develop a more precise understanding of their strategic environment,” Cook wrote.
Such a recalibration would not necessarily require Saudi Arabia to endorse Israel’s policy toward Somaliland. Nor would it mean abandoning its longstanding relations with Somalia or its partnerships with Egypt, Turkey and Qatar.
Instead, Cook’s argument is that Riyadh needs greater strategic flexibility as the balance of power around the Red Sea changes.
The stakes are considerable. The Houthis have demonstrated their ability to threaten maritime traffic in and around the Red Sea, while Iran continues to cultivate influence through regional partners. At the same time, Israel and the UAE have expanded their strategic relationships across the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea.
Against that backdrop, Somaliland’s location gives it importance beyond its long-running campaign for international recognition.
Cook’s conclusion is ultimately a warning about strategic agency.
“Only then will they have the opportunity to shape the future of the region, rather than letting others shape it on their behalf,” he wrote.
For Saudi Arabia, the question is whether its response to Somaliland will remain primarily a matter of diplomatic alignment — or become part of a broader reassessment of how Riyadh intends to protect its interests in an increasingly contested Red Sea region.
