The Return of the Periphery: After October 7, Israel has returned to the Horn of Africa as the Red Sea regains strategic importance. Security concerns, the Houthi threat and the recognition of Somaliland reveal a broader shift in Jerusalem’s regional strategy.
By Asher Lubotzky
Since its establishment in 1948, Israel has maintained a strategic interest in the Horn of Africa. Geography and security considerations have been – and remain – the principal drivers of its engagement with the region. Often overlooked, even within Israel, is the fact that Israel is a Red Sea state. The Horn of Africa and the southern Red Sea lie in close proximity to the country and encompass some of the world’s most strategically significant maritime routes and chokepoints. The port of Eilat, Israel’s gateway to Africa and Asia, depends on access through these waterways. As a result, developments in the Horn and the Red Sea have long occupied an important place in Israel’s strategic thinking.
Israel periphery doctrine
Until the 1970s, Israel’s rivalry with Egypt – a country far larger in both territory and population – shaped its engagement with the Horn of Africa. Israel developed a close strategic partnership with Ethiopia, another rival of Egypt and a country that at the time also controlled Eritrea. Prior to the Ethiopian Revolution of 1974, Israel maintained a substantial diplomatic, military and intelligence presence in Addis Ababa.
Historical and religious ties between the two countries undoubtedly facilitated cooperation, but the relationship was driven primarily by geopolitical and security considerations. Ethiopia was a cornerstone of Israel’s Periphery Doctrine, which sought alliances with non-Arab (or non-Muslim) states and groups on the margins of the Middle East to counter common adversaries. In this context, both countries viewed Nasser’s Egypt as a major strategic threat and cooperated closely in intelligence and security matters.
The same strategic logic extended to Sudan and Yemen. Israel initially sought to cultivate relations with newly independent Sudan in the 1950s. When Khartoum increasingly aligned itself with Arab nationalism, however, Israel shifted its attention to the southern Sudanese insurgency, developing close ties with the rebel movement and eventually becoming one of its most important foreign supporters. Confronting Egypt in the southern Red Sea was likewise the principal rationale behind Israel’s involvement in Yemen during the 1960s. There, Israel provided assistance to the royalist forces fighting the Egyptian-backed republican regime during the North Yemen Civil War.
The late 1970s brought profound changes to Israel’s position in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region. In 1977, Israel and Egypt began negotiations that culminated – after the Camp David Accords (1978) – in the 1979 peace treaty, effectively ending the conflict between the two states. At the same time, Ethiopia’s imperial regime was overthrown by the Marxist Derg, bringing Israel’s special relationship with Addis Ababa to an end, although limited contacts persisted.
Elsewhere, the first phase of the southern Sudanese insurgency concluded with the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement, while the royalists in North Yemen were decisively defeated in 1970. By the end of the decade, Israel had lost many of its regional partners – most notably Ethiopia – but had also made peace with its principal adversary, Egypt. As a result, Israeli strategic interest in the Horn of Africa diminished significantly in the following decades.
The Horn of Africa after October 7: a return to the past?
The rise of the Houthi movement in Yemen during and after the Arab Spring (2011) initially attracted limited attention in Israel. Although the Houthis’ ties to Iran were well known, they were largely perceived as a local insurgent movement with limited regional ambitions. Moreover, the threat appeared to be adequately contained by others. Saudi Arabia, its Gulf partners and various international coalitions devoted significant resources to countering the Houthis, reducing the need for direct Israeli involvement. This assessment changed dramatically after Hamas’ attack on Israel on October 7, 2023. The war that followed transformed the Houthis from a peripheral concern into a direct and increasingly significant challenge to Israeli national security.
The Houthis soon joined the conflict alongside Hamas, Hezbollah and other Iranian-aligned militias in Iraq and Syria. On October 19, 2023, they launched cruise missiles and drones toward Israel. Over the following months, the scale and reach of Houthi attacks increased considerably. By the summer of 2024, Houthi missiles were reaching central Israel, including the Tel Aviv metropolitan area, with Ben Gurion Airport emerging as a frequent target.
In July 2024, a Houthi drone struck Tel Aviv, killing one civilian – the first and, at the time of writing, only Israeli fatality directly attributable to Houthi attacks. By the time Israel and Hamas reached a ceasefire agreement (October 2025), the Houthis had launched approximately 500 missiles and drones at Israel. Although the pace of attacks declined thereafter, Houthi forces continued to target Israel intermittently during the Israel-Iran conflict of 2026.
Initially, Israel appeared ill-prepared to respond to the Houthi threat. It took nine months – and the death of an Israeli civilian – for the Israeli Air Force to conduct its first direct strike against the Houthis. On July 20, 2024, Israel attacked Houthi infrastructure in Yemen in what was then the longest-range strike mission in Israeli history. By August 2025, Israel had carried out at least six additional rounds of strikes in Yemen. Israel’s initial difficulties reflected years of limited attention to the Yemeni theatre. Reportedly, intelligence coverage was relatively underdeveloped, as reflected in the early focus on visible infrastructure targets such as ports, fuel depots and logistical facilities.
The Houthi campaign exposeda significant gap in Israel’s southern strategic posture. Israel found itself confronting a threat for which it possessed limited intelligence capabilities, little operational preparation, minimal military infrastructure and few regional partners. This realization helped catalyze Israel’s renewed engagement with the Horn of Africa beginning in 2025. Ethiopia – the most powerful country in the Horn and one that remained friendly toward Israel – occupied a central place in this strategy.
Between early 2025 and early 2026, the two countries exchanged multiple high-level visits, including President Isaac Herzog’s visit to Ethiopia and Israel’s announcement of the opening of a new economic attaché office in Addis Ababa, which would become its fifth economic representation in Africa. During the same period, Ethiopia’s voting behavior on Israel-related resolutions at the United Nations became more favorable toward Israel. Unlike its longstanding practice of voting in favor of resolutions condemning Israel, Ethiopia abstained on several major UN General Assembly resolutions concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in 2025.
Jerusalem’s bet on Somaliland
The most dramatic manifestation of Israel’s renewed Horn strategy was its recognition of Somaliland as an independent and sovereign state on December 26, 2025. The decision appears to have followed months of quiet negotiations. Relations quickly deepened thereafter through ambassadorial exchanges, cooperation programs and high-level visits. The move was unprecedented in Israeli diplomacy: never before had Israel recognized a state whose independence lacked broad international recognition. It also generated significant criticism across the Arab and Muslim worlds, particularly from Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey – three countries with which Israel had hoped to mend relations. Why, then, did Israel decide to formalize the relationship and incur the diplomatic costs associated with recognition?
Israeli officials emphasized both the legal and moral justification for recognizing Somaliland. Yet, those arguments had existed for decades. What changed, was the re-emergence of the Red Sea as a central arena in Israel’s national security considerations following the Houthi threat. Alliances with states that can help Israel confront its principal adversaries – most notably Iran and its network of regional allies – have long been a central pillar of Israeli strategy. Particularly valuable are partnerships with countries located near what Israeli security officials refer to as “operational arenas,” providing operational access, intelligence opportunities and political leverage against common adversaries.
The aftermath of the 2026 Iran War (known in Israel as Operation Roaring Lion) reinforced the understanding that the Red Sea is a strategic arena for Israel and its allies. Although the Houthis were initially slow to join the war on Iran’s side, they demonstrated growing confidence following the ceasefire by joining Iran in attacks against Israel on June 7, 2026. In July, the Houthis resumed attacks against Saudi Arabia and announced a blockade of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
Yet security considerations alone do not fully explain the decision. Israel and Somaliland could have continued their reported cooperation without formal recognition, as many states do in similar circumstances. The significance of October 7 therefore extends beyond the re-emergence of the Red Sea as a security concern. The attacks also contributed to a broader shift in Israeli strategic thinking. Many Israelis came to view the shock of October 7th as a consequence of excessive caution and an unwillingness to proactively shape the country’s security environment.
In the years that followed, a greater willingness emerged among policymakers to take diplomatic and military risks in pursuit of strategic objectives, even at the cost of provoking regional criticism. This trend was reinforced by Donald Trump’s return to office in 2025. Although the administration was not directly involved in the recognition decision, its limited concern for diplomatic convention and its relative indifference toward Africa reduced the perceived international costs of such a move.
At the same time, Israel’s prospects for deeper regional integration had diminished. Following the Gaza war, the expansion of the Abraham Accords – particularly to Saudi Arabia – appeared less likely than at any point in the previous decade. Meanwhile, one of Israel’s few regional partners, the United Arab Emirates, maintained close ties with Somaliland and quietly welcomed the growing relationship between Jerusalem and Hargeisa. Faced with fewer opportunities to expand its position within the existing regional order, Israel became more willing to pursue what had long been a diplomatic taboo: formal recognition of Somaliland. In this sense, the narrowing of one strategic pathway helped open another.
In many respects, Israel’s post-October 7 policy in the Horn of Africa represents a return to familiar strategic principles. As in the 1950s and 1960s, Israel has sought partnerships along the Red Sea and on the periphery of the Middle East in order to counter common adversaries and secure vital maritime routes. The centrality of national security considerations, the search for regional partners and the geopolitical importance of the Horn all reflect longstanding patterns in Israeli foreign policy.
Yet the current strategy also marks a significant departure from the past. Recognition of Somaliland demonstrated a willingness to incur diplomatic costs and challenge established international conventions in pursuit of perceived strategic interests. In that sense, Israel’s renewed engagement with the Horn is both a continuation of an old logic and a product of a new post-October 7 strategic mindset.
Originally published by the Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI) on August 05, 2026. Republished with attribution.
