Inside Washington’s Somaliland dilemma, David Shinn reveals what U.S. policy really means, examining the prospects for Somaliland recognition and Washington’s strategic interests in the Horn of Africa.
By Saxafi Media
HARGEISA, Somaliland — U.S. policy toward Somaliland remains caught between Washington’s formal commitment to Somalia’s territorial integrity and growing strategic interest in Somaliland’s ports, security partnerships and geopolitical position along the Red Sea, according to former U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia David Shinn.
In an exclusive interview with Dr. Ismail Qodax, Shinn, a veteran American diplomat with 37 years of Foreign Service experience, offered a detailed assessment of Washington’s evolving approach to Somalia, Somaliland and the wider Horn of Africa.
The conversation examined the prospects for Somaliland’s international recognition, Israel’s decision to recognize Somaliland, U.S. strategic interests in Berbera, Ethiopia’s regional role, Egypt’s rivalry with Addis Ababa, China’s expanding influence, the growing involvement of Gulf states and the future of American engagement in Africa.
Shinn, who previously served as U.S. ambassador to Ethiopia and later taught at George Washington University, argued that Washington’s policy toward the Horn is increasingly shaped by competing strategic priorities rather than a single coherent regional doctrine.
Washington’s Somaliland policy: Recognition remains off the table — for now
The most consequential part of the interview concerned Somaliland’s long-running campaign for international recognition.
Shinn pointed to a May 2026 U.S. State Department statement to Congress that reaffirmed Washington’s position that the United States recognizes the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Somalia, including Somaliland.
But he emphasized that the same policy framework acknowledges the importance of maintaining engagement with Hargeisa.
The United States, Shinn noted, has been expanding its contacts with Somaliland authorities, while U.S. Africa Command has maintained regular engagement and explored potential areas of cooperation.
He also highlighted Washington’s recognition of Somaliland’s ports as potential alternatives to congested regional facilities.
That combination, Shinn suggested, illustrates the central tension in U.S. policy: Washington continues to recognize Somalia’s territorial integrity while simultaneously treating Somaliland as an increasingly relevant strategic partner.
A more recent statement cited by Shinn came from Gen. Dagvin R.M. Anderson, commander of U.S. Africa Command, who reiterated that U.S. policy remains centered on Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
According to Shinn, Anderson also said there were no current plans to establish a U.S. military base in Somaliland.
Yet the former ambassador cautioned that the debate in Washington is far from settled.
Congressional figures, particularly Sen. Ted Cruz, have advocated a different approach and have pushed for U.S. recognition of Somaliland. That creates a potentially significant divide between the executive branch and Congress.
“So, it’s a little hard to know what is going on between the executive branch in Washington and the legislative branch,” Shinn said, describing the future of U.S. policy as uncertain.
For now, he said, the executive branch’s existing position appears clear. But he added a warning: “Who knows? This could all change in the future as the situation changes on Capitol Hill.”
Israel’s recognition has not yet produced a diplomatic cascade
The interview also examined Israel’s recognition of Somaliland and the strategic calculations behind the relationship.
Shinn described Israel’s decision as significant because Somaliland had spent decades seeking formal recognition from another sovereign state.
“Israel is the first to do so,” Shinn said, noting that Somaliland maintains relationships and liaison arrangements with several countries but had not previously secured formal recognition from a U.N. member state.
Still, Shinn rejected expectations that Israel’s decision would automatically trigger a wave of recognition.
“There were some who were prognosticating that there would be a series of additional countries,” he said, including the United States and Ethiopia. “That has not happened, and I don’t see that happening anytime in the immediate future.”
Instead, he characterized the development as principally an Israel-Somaliland relationship whose broader diplomatic consequences remain uncertain.
Shinn argued that Israel’s calculations are closely connected to security concerns in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.
“Israel is deeply concerned about the Red Sea,” he said, pointing to the Houthi threat in Yemen and Israel’s interest in understanding developments across the maritime corridor.
From Israel’s perspective, Somaliland’s geographic position could provide an important vantage point for monitoring activity across the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea.
Shinn said he was skeptical of reports that Israel was preparing to establish a permanent military base in Berbera. But he considered increased Israeli military activity in the area more plausible.
“You might very well in the days ahead see Israeli military ships in and out of Berbera,” he said. “You might very well see Israeli planes in and out of the airport at Berbera.”
For Somaliland, meanwhile, recognition by Israel represents something different: a potential opening in its decades-long diplomatic campaign.
The central question is whether that opening can be translated into recognition by other countries.
Somaliland’s strategic geography is becoming harder for Washington to ignore
Somaliland’s position on the Gulf of Aden has become increasingly important as maritime insecurity, regional rivalries and competition over Red Sea access intensify.
Berbera sits close to one of the world’s most strategically important maritime corridors, linking the Indian Ocean with the Red Sea and the Suez Canal.
Shinn’s assessment suggests that Washington may increasingly distinguish between its political position on Somaliland’s status and its practical assessment of Somaliland’s strategic value.
That distinction could become more important as regional security dynamics evolve.
The United States already maintains a major military presence in neighboring Djibouti, where its principal Horn of Africa facility provides an important platform for regional operations.
But the concentration of military infrastructure around Djibouti, combined with instability elsewhere in the region and growing maritime competition, makes alternative logistical and commercial facilities strategically relevant.
Shinn nevertheless cautioned against interpreting U.S. engagement with Somaliland as an imminent shift toward recognition.
A more ambiguous American approach to Somalia
The former ambassador also described what he sees as growing uncertainty in Washington’s approach to Somalia.
For years, the United States and its European partners invested heavily in security assistance and state-building efforts. But Shinn said Washington appears increasingly discouraged by the limited results of those efforts.
“I think it’s frankly gotten somewhat discouraged with the whole state-building effort,” he said.
The emerging approach, he argued, increasingly places responsibility for political institution-building on Somalia’s federal government rather than assuming that outside powers can engineer a functioning state.
At the same time, Washington continues to maintain relationships with authorities beyond Mogadishu, including Puntland, Jubaland and Somaliland.
That creates what Shinn called “mixed signals.”
The United States, he said, is simultaneously reaffirming support for Somalia’s federal sovereignty while maintaining practical contacts with regional authorities that sometimes disagree sharply with Mogadishu.
“I think it is a little confusing at this point,” he said.
Security cooperation, however, is likely to continue.
Shinn noted that the United States has remained particularly active in efforts against Islamic State militants in Puntland and northern Somalia, while U.S. operations against al-Shabaab in southern Somalia represent another major component of American counterterrorism policy.
The distinction is important because it suggests that Washington may be separating its security objectives from its broader state-building ambitions.
Ethiopia remains Washington’s pivotal Horn of Africa relationship
Despite growing competition from China and the expanding role of regional powers, Shinn said Ethiopia remains the most important country in the Horn of Africa from Washington’s perspective.
“The United States has always seen Ethiopia as probably the single most important player in the Horn of Africa,” he said.
That strategic assessment, he argued, is unlikely to change under successive U.S. administrations.
Shinn pointed to Washington’s recent efforts to strengthen its relationship with Addis Ababa, particularly through economic engagement and major infrastructure projects.
He suggested that the United States is increasingly interested in competing with China economically rather than relying exclusively on traditional diplomatic or security tools.
That competition is becoming particularly important as China expands its role in African infrastructure, telecommunications, defense and investment.
Shinn argued that Washington will continue trying to prevent instability around Ethiopia, including potential conflicts involving Eritrea, Sudan and internal Ethiopian actors.
The challenge, however, is that U.S. influence has limits.
“The U.S. is going to be focused on trying to ensure that there not be conflict, that there be political stability,” Shinn said. “But it’s not always in a strong position to ensure that that is the case.”
Egypt’s Horn strategy is driven by the Nile
Egypt occupies a different position in Shinn’s analysis.
While the United States has traditionally regarded Egypt as an important strategic partner, Shinn said Cairo’s engagement in the Horn of Africa is overwhelmingly shaped by one issue: Nile water security.
“Everything that Egypt does in the Horn of Africa is focused in one way or another on does this impact negatively or positively on its continuing access to its water quota from the Nile,” he said.
That strategic imperative, he argued, explains Egypt’s expanding relationships with Somalia and Eritrea and its opposition to Ethiopia gaining greater access to the Red Sea.
Cairo views Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam as a strategic threat to its water security and therefore has strong incentives to cultivate relationships with countries that can counterbalance Addis Ababa.
Shinn described Egypt’s approach as relatively narrow, arguing that Cairo’s regional partnerships are often evaluated through the prism of its rivalry with Ethiopia.
The implications extend beyond the Nile.
Any deterioration in relations among Egypt, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia could complicate U.S. efforts to maintain stability across the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea.
China is reshaping the regional balance
China’s growing influence emerged repeatedly throughout the discussion.
Shinn pointed to China’s expanding role in Egypt, including infrastructure, defense and the space sector, as evidence of Beijing’s ability to establish relationships across multiple strategic domains.
He said the growing Chinese presence gives countries such as Egypt greater flexibility because they are no longer dependent on a single external partner.
The same dynamic is visible throughout Africa.
Unlike Washington, whose engagement is often fragmented across security, humanitarian assistance and diplomacy, China has pursued a more sustained strategy built around infrastructure, trade, investment and strategic partnerships.
The result is an increasingly competitive environment in which African governments can choose among multiple external powers.
For Washington, Shinn suggested, the challenge is not simply to counter China but to develop a more coherent long-term strategy for Africa.
The limits of transactional diplomacy
Shinn was particularly critical of the Trump administration’s approach to Africa, arguing that an excessively transactional policy risks weakening American influence over the long term.
He criticized the dismantling of USAID and reductions in the institutional capacity supporting U.S. development assistance.
“Can you improve USAID? Sure,” he said. “Can you change some of the programs, even cancel some of the programs? Yes, absolutely.”
But abolishing the organization altogether, he argued, was a serious mistake.
Shinn also criticized restrictions affecting African travelers seeking U.S. visas, arguing that closing or consolidating visa-processing facilities creates unnecessary obstacles without necessarily improving American national security.
He warned that Washington’s growing emphasis on critical minerals could also distort its engagement with Africa.
“There has to be an interest in the entire continent, not just those that have critical minerals,” he said.
His argument reflects a broader concern among former American diplomats: that an Africa policy centered primarily on immediate commercial or strategic returns may sacrifice the relationships that have traditionally underpinned U.S. influence.
The Gulf powers: investment and interference
The growing involvement of Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and other middle powers has added another layer of complexity to the Horn.
Shinn acknowledged that Gulf States have made significant investments in the region, but argued that their political and military involvement can sometimes worsen conflicts.
Sudan is the clearest example, he said.
Outside support for rival parties has helped sustain the conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, making foreign intervention part of the war’s underlying structure.
“If the outside powers would end their support for the Rapid Support Forces and the Sudan Armed Forces, I think you could bring that conflict to an end a lot faster,” Shinn said.
He distinguished this from investment in infrastructure and development, which he said can benefit local populations when properly structured.
But even investment requires scrutiny.
Shinn warned that some Gulf-funded agricultural projects are designed primarily to supply food markets in the Gulf rather than local populations, raising questions about who ultimately benefits from the investment.
His prescription was straightforward: regional powers should invest more and intervene less politically.
“If they would put their money into more investment and stay further and further away from the political side of things, I think everybody would be better off for it,” he said.
The Horn’s international institutions face serious constraints
The discussion also turned to the African Union, Intergovernmental Authority on Development and United Nations.
Shinn offered a mixed assessment.
The United Nations remains important in humanitarian operations, including refugee assistance, health programs and food aid. But he described the African Union as disappointing in its ability to resolve major political crises.
IGAD faces an even more fundamental problem, he argued: its member states themselves are often divided or involved in regional disputes.
“When you have members who are sort of fighting against each other, you’re never going to have an organization that can be effective in resolving problems,” Shinn said.
The implication is that regional institutions cannot easily mediate conflicts when the governments that control those institutions are themselves parties to competing geopolitical struggles.
Democracy remains an overlooked issue
For Shinn, one of the most important long-term solutions is also one of the least emphasized in current international policy: democratic governance.
He argued that external powers should devote more attention to strengthening democratic institutions across the Horn of Africa.
Somaliland, he said, is comparatively strong in this regard.
“Somaliland is probably the top of the list in terms of being a relatively democratic country,” Shinn said, while acknowledging concerns including press freedom.
His broader criticism was that international actors, including the United States, have become less willing to make democratization a central component of their engagement with African governments.
“I don’t see any outside country or organization, including the United States, making much of an effort to encourage democratization in the Horn of Africa these days,” he said.
Ultimately, however, Shinn argued that political change cannot simply be imposed from abroad.
“In the final analysis, it’s up to the people and the governments of all of these countries to decide that they want to be more democratic,” he said.
The diaspora as an overlooked force
The interview ended with a discussion of the role of the Horn of Africa’s vast diaspora communities.
Shinn identified diaspora investment as one of the region’s most significant sources of positive external influence.
Somaliland provides one of the clearest examples.
“A lot of what has happened in Somaliland has been at the hands of the diaspora in Europe and the United States, Canada,” he said.
Ethiopia has similarly benefited from diaspora investment, while Somalis from the federal republic have also contributed capital, expertise and remittances to their communities.
Political influence is more complicated.
Divisions within diaspora communities can make it difficult for policymakers in Washington to determine which voices represent broader community interests.
“When the American political system gets confused, it doesn’t know who to believe or what side is the one to accept,” Shinn said.
As a result, competing factions can effectively neutralize one another.
For Shinn, the greater opportunity lies in channeling diaspora influence toward investment, institution-building and civic engagement rather than political polarization.
A changing strategic landscape
Shinn’s assessment presents Somaliland’s recognition campaign as part of a much larger transformation in the Horn of Africa.
The region is no longer defined primarily by U.S.-Soviet rivalry or the post-Cold War democratic agenda. Instead, it has become a crowded strategic arena involving the United States, China, Turkey, Gulf states, Egypt, Israel, Ethiopia, Somalia and other regional actors.
For Somaliland, that environment presents both an opportunity and a danger.
Its strategic location, relative political stability and access to the Gulf of Aden have increased its value to external powers. Israel’s recognition has given Hargeisa an important diplomatic breakthrough.
But Shinn’s analysis suggests that recognition by one country does not automatically translate into a broader diplomatic cascade.
For Washington, the challenge is equally complicated.
The United States must balance its formal recognition of Somalia’s territorial integrity against the growing strategic value of Somaliland, while simultaneously managing relations with Ethiopia, Egypt, Somalia, Djibouti and a widening group of external powers.
The result is a policy that remains deliberately ambiguous.
For Somaliland, that ambiguity may be frustrating. But it also leaves open a space in which changing geopolitical realities, congressional pressure and evolving Red Sea security requirements could eventually alter Washington’s calculations.
As Shinn put it, the current U.S. position may be clear today. Whether it remains so will depend in part on how rapidly the strategic landscape around the Horn of Africa changes.
Watch the full interview: David Shinn interview on U.S. policy toward Somaliland and the Horn of Africa
