This article, “Somaliland Recognition Won’t Cause Al-Shabaab Backlash,” argues that the United States should recognize Somaliland and cut off aid to Somalia.
The author, Michael Rubin, believes that recognizing Somaliland, a pro-Western democracy with a strong security record, wouldn’t cause a backlash from Al-Shabaab. He contends that Al-Shabaab thrives on Somalia’s poor governance and corruption, from which it profits, and that Somali leaders divert US security assistance for their own political gain rather than fighting the terrorist group.
Recognizing Somaliland and cutting off aid to Somalia would, according to Rubin, weaken Al-Shabaab and promote stability in the region, as Somaliland’s self-sufficiency should be the model for Somalia.
He dismisses the idea that recognizing Somaliland would rally Somalis around Al-Shabaab, stating that the group’s strength is tied to poor governance, not Somali nationalism.
The complete piece is as follows:

Somaliland Recognition Won’t Cause Al-Shabaab Backlash
The United States Should Recognize Somaliland and Cut off Assistance to Mogadishu to Deny Al Shabaab the Ability to Profit off Somalia’s Corruption
By Michael Rubin
For more than three decades, Somaliland has governed itself as an independent country. Its democracy features real elections leading to peaceful transfers of power. It has its own currency, its own passports, and its own foreign policy. Unlike Somalia, that tilts toward China and fails to maintain basic security even in its own capital, Mogadishu, Somaliland is safe and secure; in one of the world’s most unstable regions, Somaliland has not experienced a terror attack since 2008, a record of safety greater than that of Morocco, Saudi Arabia, or Egypt.
Somalia’s partnership with the United States has always been parasitic, not symbiotic.
While Somalia hired a number of lobbyists across Washington, D.C., to promote the fiction that stability required Somali unity, facts speak louder than spin. Djibouti’s independence, for example, neither destabilized the region nor provoked terror. Somaliland, meanwhile, has slowly won notice in Washington for its democracy, its pro-Western, pro-Taiwan orientation, and the gains to American national security that partnership could bring.
Still, the State Department has resisted, with the Africa Bureau’s diplomats arguing that working with, let alone recognizing, Somaliland would undermine its partnership with Somalia and could unleash a cascade of instability.
Both these arguments are, on their face false. Somalia’s partnership with the United States has always been parasitic, not symbiotic. The United States has invested billions of dollars into Somalia over the past twenty-five years with nothing to show for it; the same Somali politicians whom the State Department embraces and promotes embrace Beijing over Washington. Nor does sudden concern about recognition triggering a cascade of collapse and secession make sense: The United States recognized Eritrean and South Sudanese independence, both of whose cases for independence were far weaker than Somaliland’s.
With the State Department shutting down efforts to cooperate with Somaliland, but the Pentagon and intelligence community deeming such cooperation as consistent with the U.S. national interest, Congress has had enough. This is why it was included in the Fiscal Year 2026 State and Foreign Operations appropriations bill a directive requiring the State Department to review U.S. relations with Somaliland.
That review is underway, though Secretary of State Marco Rubio has broadened it to include the entire Horn of Africa, risking dilution of Somaliland’s case. Having lost every argument so far, diplomats—and some congressional staff—now argue that U.S. recognition of Somaliland would backfire by causing Al-Shabaab to rally Somalis around the flag and direct their anger against the United States. In a sense, this is the latest manifestation of Washington’s tendency toward self-deterrence: Moving the U.S. Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem could empower Al Qaeda; countering Hezbollah could provoke Iran; helping Ukraine might anger Russian President Vladimir Putin; or welcoming Taiwan’s elected leader could provoke Chinese dictator Xi Jinping.
Al Shabaab thrives off poor governance rather than Somali nationalism.
Such logic always falls flat for the same reason. It ignores that the animosity driving America’s enemies has nothing to do with any particular grievance and is instead rooted in ideology. Over recent decades, Al-Shabaab’s strength has grown in proportion to the U.S. embrace of Mogadishu for two reasons: First, Somalia’s corruption benefits the Al Qaeda affiliate.
There is a reason why Al Shabaab permeates Somalia but is absent in Somaliland, where the elected government is representative and demonstrates real capacity. Second, Somalia’s leaders divert U.S. security assistance to counter their own political enemies rather than to fight Al Shabaab. To suggest Somaliland recognition would jumpstart Al Shabaab recruitment ignores the simple fact: Al Shabaab thrives off poor governance rather than Somali nationalism. Mogadishu’s leaders are a disgrace to Somali nationalism, not its defenders.
If Washington’s security goal is to defeat Al Shabaab, the best policy would be to recognize Somaliland in order to consolidate Somaliland’s gains. It should then cut off assistance to Mogadishu to deny Al Shabaab the ability to profit off Somalia’s corruption. Simply put, Somaliland’s ability to thrive, develop capacity, and secure its territory absent foreign assistance should be the model for Somalia, not continuing the appeasement of decades past or denying Somaliland the freedom it deserves.
About the Author:
Dr. Michael Rubin
Michael Rubin is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and director of policy analysis at the Middle East Forum. A former Pentagon official, Dr. Rubin has lived in post-revolution Iran, Yemen, and both pre-and postwar Iraq. He also spent time with the Taliban before 9/11. For more than a decade, he taught classes at sea about the Horn of Africa and Middle East conflicts, culture, and terrorism, to deployed US Navy and Marine units. Dr. Rubin is the author, coauthor, and coeditor of several books exploring diplomacy, Iranian history, Arab culture, Kurdish studies, and Shi’ite politics. He can be reached at X (formerly Twitter) @mrubin1971



























