The Houthis’ latest political and military moves are setting them on a collision course with the United Arab Emirates in the broader Red Sea region.
Firstly, the Houthis’ attacks on shipping, which started last November after the Gaza war began, continue unabated, with the group striking targets from the southern Red Sea to the Arabian Sea, near Nishtun, close to the Omani border, and the island of Socotra. The attacks have impacted the volume of commercial traffic transiting through Red Sea ports, some of which are operated by the Dubai-based trading and logistics company DP World. In the event that the crisis continues in the long term, economic and infrastructural projects along the coast of the southern Red Sea could be negatively affected, limiting the development of an area where the UAE has significant investments and geopolitical influence.
Secondly, the “maritime front” opened by the Iran-backed Yemeni militant group in solidarity with Gaza has slowed Saudi-Houthi diplomatic talks aimed at achieving a cease-fire in Yemen, further worsening the country’s economic situation. This indirectly affects the Emirati-backed forces in Yemen, which are stuck in political limbo: The secessionist Southern Transitional Council (STC), which is formally part of the internationally recognized government, increasingly has to cope with grim economic conditions in the territories under its control. A new wave of popular protests recently broke out in Aden due to electricity shortages and a lack of social services.
Thirdly, US intelligence has revealed that the Houthis and al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Somalia, are working to develop tighter relations, with the former potentially providing weapons to the latter. Such a scenario, previously hinted at by the United Nations, would enhance collaboration between the two groups, both of which share an anti-Emirati sentiment and have successfully targeted, albeit in separate ways, the UAE and its soldiers abroad.
Protracted maritime attacks challenge Emirati Red Sea interests
The UAE has a number of notable investments along the Red Sea coast, particularly in port management. According to the World Bank, most Red Sea ports have been negatively affected by the Houthis’ attacks on shipping, with traffic volumes down by around half compared to pre-crisis levels. DP World operates several ports in the broader Red Sea region, including the port of Jeddah in Saudi Arabia, where it has recently invested in the construction of a logistics park. Since the Red Sea crisis began, Jeddah port has registered a nearly 70% drop in call capacity, with regional transshipment volumes particularly hard hit, an issue that has also affected the DP World-operated Ain al-Sokhna port in Egypt.
In 2023, Abu Dhabi Ports Group obtained port concessions and agreements for other ports in the region. The re-routing of maritime traffic due to the Red Sea crisis has not been entirely bad news for the UAE, though, as shipping companies have increasingly opted to move cargo using the land corridors from Dubai to Jeddah and, to a lesser extent, from Dubai to Haifa.
Nevertheless, the UAE finds itself in an uncomfortable position. The Emiratis have various economic, commercial, and military interests in the Red Sea region, and enduring maritime insecurity affects their long-term strategy. The same is true for Saudi Arabia; however, the Emiratis are now reliant on the Saudis with regard to the Houthis, as Riyadh is directly engaged in talks with them. This means Abu Dhabi is trying to indirectly solve — or at least mitigate — an issue that has direct implications for its national strategy. And so far, despite months of US airstrikes and two multinational naval missions, the US-led “Prosperity Guardian” and the European “Aspides,” the Houthis have not halted their attacks on shipping.
In fact, this strategy is increasing the armed movement’s regional significance and negotiating power, most of all with Saudi Arabia. For this reason, a cease-fire in Gaza is unlikely to reliably stabilize the broader Red Sea region, since the Houthis could later resume attacks against shipping to support their short-term political goals — a scenario that can’t be ruled out as long as diplomatic talks drag on.
Emirati-backed forces in Yemen face the economic implications of the Houthis’ war
As the Red Sea attacks continue, the internationally recognized institutions of Yemen, of which Emirati-backed forces are part, are stuck in political limbo. In fact, they haven’t been invited to join the Saudi-Houthi talks thus far and have been forced to wait for a diplomatic breakthrough — most of all, the southern secessionists — before deciding on their next steps. Furthermore, Yemen’s internationally recognized institutions now have to cope with the economic and social implications of the Houthis’ maritime attacks, and the areas held by Emirati-backed forces, such as Aden, have been especially hard hit.
Before the 2015 war started, oil revenues, although declining, still represented 75% of the government’s budget in Yemen. But the Houthis’ drone attacks against oil export terminals — al-Dabba in Hadhramawt and Rudum in Shabwa — in late 2022 halted exports, resulting, according to Prime Minister Ahmed Awad bin Mubarak, in the loss of more than $2 billion in revenue. Since late 2023, this has also combined with a notable decrease in the volume of traffic through the port of Aden and, to a lesser extent, Mukalla due to the Houthis’ attacks, thus further eroding the government’s revenues.
Since May 2024, popular protests have thus re-emerged in Aden, the main city run by the Emirati-backed STC, as social services have worsened, public salaries have been delayed, and electricity shortages have become more common. Street demonstrations are now more numerous and bigger than they were in previous years as a result of the effects of the Red Sea crisis, prompting the Yemeni authorities to deploy security forces and armored vehicles in Aden. In areas controlled by anti-Houthi forces, the authorities are no longer able to pay public salaries or, all too often, to cover the cost of imported fuel — a necessity given the limited domestic refining capacity.
Toward closer Houthi-Shabaab collaboration?
Moreover, it now seems that the Houthis are working to strengthen their cooperation with al-Shabaab as well. In June 2024, US intelligence stated that the two groups had discussed a deal for the Yemeni militants to provide weapons to the al-Qaeda affiliate, although as yet there is no direct evidence of an actual weapons transfer. Such a deal would provide the Houthis with funds to further support their war in Yemen and, likely, could also help them to target commercial vessels in the western Indian Ocean. In turn, al-Shabaab would enhance its offensive capabilities by acquiring more advanced weapons systems.
In 2021, a report by the Global Initiative Against Organized Crime (GITOC) already highlighted the weapons nexus between Yemen and Somalia, as some of al-Shabaab’s arms came directly from shipments Iran sent to the Houthis in Yemen. In 2023, the final report of the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen cited “the existence of a closely coordinated smuggling network that operates between Yemen and Somalia, receiving weapons from a common source,” namely Iran.
Anti-UAE sentiment is on the rise among violent groups in the subregion
Both the Houthis and al-Shabaab receive weapons from Iran and share anti-US, anti-Israel, and anti-UAE sentiments. Not only are conflicts and terrorism on the rise in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa (including Sudan, Yemen, and Somalia), both of which are central to Emirati strategy, but anger against the UAE’s activism there has increased among violent actors operating in the same subregion. This is mainly due to the enduring Emirati military influence in Yemen and its training support to security forces in Somaliland, the Somali army, and local security forces in Puntland.
The UAE withdrew its troops from Yemen in 2019. However, in early 2022 the Houthis attacked the UAE four times and hijacked the Emirati cargo ship Rawabi in the Red Sea. In 2023, the UAE signed a security agreement with Somalia “to eradicate al-Shabaab” from the country, providing military training to its army.
In June 2023, the UAE carried out its first kinetic military operation against jihadists there. Al-Shabaab subsequently called the UAE an “enemy” for backing the Somali government in the fight against terrorism and, in February 2024, three Emirati soldiers were killed by a terrorist that infiltrated a UAE-run military facility in Mogadishu. In Yemen, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula — part of the al-Qaeda terror network with which al-Shabaab is affiliated — has often targeted UAE-backed Yemeni forces in the southern governorates.
On a collision course?
The longer the Red Sea crisis continues, the more the UAE’s economic and geopolitical strategy in the broader region will be challenged by the implications of the Houthis’ attacks. The attacks risk limiting not only the UAE’s commercial and infrastructural ambitions but also its geopolitical influence in the areas controlled by Yemen’s southern secessionists, which face growing public discontent. Also, as instability drags on, possible collaboration between violent groups sharing an anti-Emirati sentiment in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and the Horn of Africa could result in growing cooperation based on mutual convenience and, in the medium to long term, shared goals.
Given such a complicated context, the UAE seems, for the moment, to be waiting for Saudi Arabia’s next steps toward a cease-fire in Yemen to mitigate the varied implications of the ongoing Red Sea maritime crisis.
