A new Hudson Institute report argues the US and its allies should recognize Somaliland following Israel’s move, citing Red Sea security, counterterrorism strategy and geopolitical competition in the Horn of Africa
WASHINGTON — When Israel formally recognized Somaliland in late December, the move was initially treated as a diplomatic outlier. But a new report from the Hudson Institute argues it should instead serve as a blueprint for Washington and its NATO allies.
In a Feb. 13 analysis titled “Why the US and Its Allies Should Follow Israel’s Lead and Recognize Somaliland,” policy analyst Tsiporah Fried contends that Western hesitation reflects a strategic inconsistency — and that recognition would advance American security and economic interests in the Red Sea corridor.
“Somaliland is everything the US and its NATO allies claim to seek in a regional partner,” Fried writes, describing the territory as stable, democratic and strategically positioned along one of the world’s most sensitive maritime chokepoints.
Her argument lands at a moment of heightened geopolitical competition in the Horn of Africa, where Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar met Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi in Hargeisa on Jan. 6, underscoring Jerusalem’s commitment to formal ties.
Historical and Legal Case
Fried’s report challenges the notion that Somaliland is merely a secessionist entity. The territory, formerly British Somaliland, briefly existed as an independent state in June 1960 before voluntarily entering into union with Italian-administered Somalia — a union she describes as legally flawed and never fully ratified.
After the collapse of the Somali state in 1991, Somaliland reclaimed independence and built functioning institutions, holding elections and maintaining internal security in contrast to decades of turmoil in Somalia.
“Refusing to even consider recognition for Somaliland, which has met the Montevideo criteria for statehood for more than 30 years, makes international law an arbitrary instrument,” Fried argues, referencing the 1933 convention outlining requirements for statehood.
The legal framing is designed to appeal to policymakers wary of undermining the African Union’s long-standing norm of territorial integrity. Fried acknowledges that recognition carries political risk but points to precedents such as Kosovo and South Sudan, where incremental recognition gradually shifted diplomatic consensus.
Strategic Geography
At the heart of the argument is geography.
Somaliland’s coastline runs along the Gulf of Aden near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait — the narrow passage linking the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea and Suez Canal. Disruptions in this corridor, including Houthi attacks on commercial vessels, have underscored its global economic importance.
The deep-water port of Berbera, modernized through Emirati investment, is increasingly viewed as a potential strategic asset for Western-aligned powers seeking diversified footholds in the Horn of Africa.
“Stability in this corridor affects a major share of global trade,” Fried writes, adding that recognition would enhance Western situational awareness and strategic depth in a contested maritime theater.
For the United States, which already operates Camp Lemonnier in neighboring Djibouti, Somaliland could offer “diversified basing options” and a more reliable counterterrorism partner against Al-Shabaab, she argues.
Countering Regional Rivals
The report also situates recognition within broader geopolitical competition.
It points to Iran-backed Houthi activity in Yemen, Qatar’s ideological influence networks, and Turkey’s expanding role in Somalia as part of a complex strategic landscape. Recognition of Somaliland, Fried suggests, would signal a firmer Western posture against political Islam and destabilizing regional actors.
“Such a move would demonstrate the West’s renewed willingness to confront this threat directly,” she writes, framing recognition as part of a broader anti-Islamist alignment stretching from Europe to the Red Sea.
Critics caution that such steps could inflame tensions with Somalia’s federal government and complicate US relations with Turkey — a NATO ally with deep investments in Mogadishu.
“There are real diplomatic trade-offs,” said a former US State Department official familiar with Horn policy. “Recognition is not just about Somaliland; it’s about the ripple effects across Africa and within NATO.”
Risks and Calculations
Fried acknowledges potential backlash, including security risks if militant groups exploit diplomatic turbulence. She argues, however, that worst-case forecasts often overstate second-order effects, citing previous US foreign policy decisions that did not trigger predicted regional conflagrations.
“The question is not whether recognition is legitimate,” she concludes, “but how much longer Western nations will look the other way at the cost of their strategic credibility.”
For now, the Biden administration has maintained a cautious posture, emphasizing support for Somalia’s territorial integrity while deepening quiet engagement with Somaliland authorities.
Whether Israel’s recognition becomes an isolated diplomatic experiment or the beginning of a broader Western shift may hinge less on legal debate than on evolving security realities in the Red Sea.
As maritime competition intensifies and alliances recalibrate, Somaliland’s once-marginal status is increasingly intersecting with great-power strategy — forcing Washington and its allies to weigh principle against pragmatism.
