The article, “Egypt is cozying up to Somalia to thwart Ethiopia,” discusses the growing tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia, primarily stemming from Ethiopia’s construction and operation of the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Blue Nile. Egypt perceives the dam as a significant threat to its water and food security.
To counter Ethiopia’s influence, Egypt is strengthening its ties with Somalia. Recent actions include Egypt sending military aid to Somalia, including weapons and plans to deploy soldiers for peacekeeping missions. This marks the first military support from Egypt to Somalia in decades and is viewed as a strategic move to pressure Ethiopia regarding its actions involving the dam.
Somalia is also involved in disputes with Ethiopia over a maritime deal Ethiopia made with Somaliland, which grants it access to a port and may lead to political recognition of Somaliland. Somalia has reacted strongly to this agreement, especially with Egypt’s backing, threatening to support armed opposition groups against Ethiopia.
Additionally, Egypt aims to enhance its influence in the Horn of Africa while ensuring its national security, particularly regarding the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a crucial maritime route. There are concerns that Ethiopia’s port deal could bolster its military presence and influence in the region, posing risks to Egypt’s security.
The article underscores the complexities of regional dynamics, highlighting how Egypt’s increasing support for Somalia may provoke further confrontations with Ethiopia, raising fears of a possible proxy conflict. Despite the escalation, Egyptian officials state their commitment to resolving disputes diplomatically while indicating that national security and water rights are critical issues that could force alternate measures if necessary.
The complete article is as follows:
Egypt is Cozying Up to Somalia to Thwart Ethiopia
By Shahira Amin
Tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia have escalated in recent days. Relations between the two African countries, already strained since 2011 due to Ethiopia’s construction and filling of the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Blue Nile—a project Egypt views as a major threat to its water and food security—have further deteriorated. The recent downturn comes after Egypt forged closer ties with Ethiopia’s rival, Somalia.
On August 27, Egypt sent two C-130 military planes carrying weapons and ammunition to Mogadishu—the first military aid from Egypt to the Horn of Africa country in more than four decades. The move irked Addis Ababa and provoked a stern rebuke from Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, who warned that Ethiopia would not stand idle while other actors take measures to “destabilize the region.”
Two weeks earlier, on August 14, Cairo signed a defense pact with Mogadishu that would see Egypt send five thousand soldiers to Somalia by the end of the year to participate in the new African Union-led Support and Stabilization Mission (AUSSOM) that will replace the current African Union Transition Mission (ATMIS), which has been in Somalia since 2022. The planned dispatch of troops to Somalia will be Egypt’s first contribution to African Union (AU) peacekeeping missions in the country. The new mission will implement peace-building measures such as institutional reforms and capacity-building for Somali civil servants.
Under the security agreement, Cairo reportedly plans to dispatch five thousand more soldiers to be deployed separately. It remains unclear whether the Egyptian forces will, in fact, replace the approximately ten thousand Ethiopian troops whom are part of the ATMIS. While the remaining seven thousand are stationed in several regions under a bilateral agreement between Ethiopia and Somalia, Mogadishu will likely reject a future Ethiopian contribution to the AUSSOM once ATMIS ends its mission as it has already threatened to expel the Ethiopian troops.
In addition to sending troops, weaponry, and ammunition to Somalia, Egypt plans to conduct joint military exercises with the country. The planned exercises—which will include ground, air, and naval forces—are perhaps intended as a show of force to send a warning message to neighboring Ethiopia over the dam filling, as Hassan Nafaa, political science professor at Cairo University, told me.
“It is not surprising that Egypt would seize the opportunity to deploy troops in Somalia,” Nafaa said. He noted that Cairo hoped the deployment of Egyptian soldiers along Somalia’s shared border with Ethiopia would serve as “a deterrent” to pressure Addis Ababa to reconsider its position vis-à-vis Egypt and refrain from harming Cairo’s interests. “It will also give Egypt a privileged position in the event of a confrontation erupting should Ethiopia make any further moves to harm Egypt or if the flow of the Nile is disrupted.”
Why Addis Ababa is concerned
Egypt’s cozying up to Somalia has alarmed Addis Ababa, which is at odds with Mogadishu over a maritime deal that Ethiopia sealed with Somaliland, on January 1. The agreement gives landlocked Ethiopia access to the port of Berbera on the southern coast of the Gulf of Aden for commercial purposes and leases 20 kilometers (12.4 miles) of its coastline for fifty years to Ethiopia to set up a naval base.
Somaliland authorities hope that, in return for the use of its port, Ethiopia will recognize Somaliland as an independent state, thus becoming the first United Nations (UN) member state to do so since it regained its independence in 1991. Unsurprisingly, Ethiopia’s maritime deal sparked anger in Somalia, which slammed it as an “act of aggression” and prompted Mogadishu to recall its ambassador from Addis Ababa.
Seemingly emboldened by Egypt’s support, Somali authorities have gone further, threatening to support armed groups fighting against the Ethiopian government if Addis Ababa goes ahead with its port agreement with Somaliland. Talks mediated by Turkey to resolve the dispute between the two neighboring countries have thus far failed to reach a breakthrough, despite Ankara declaring that notable progress has been achieved.
A third round of negotiations slated for September 17 has been postponed by Somalia, dashing hopes for the easing of tensions anytime soon. No official reason has been given for the cancelation, but Borkena, an Ethiopian online news site, cautioned “Egyptian political and military moves to exploit the tension between Somalia and Ethiopia might further complicate the Ankara-initiated talks.”.
Ethiopia’s port agreement with Somaliland has also ruffled feathers in Egypt. “Cairo is worried about Ethiopia having a naval base in Somaliland that would likely bolster its influence in the Horn of Africa; the port deal would give the rival country Red Sea access, which constitutes a threat to Egypt’s national security,” Nafaa explained.
It is no surprise that Egypt has thrown its weight behind Somalia in its ongoing dispute with Ethiopia, not least because of the North African country’s widening rift with Ethiopia over the GERD. Cairo has exhausted all avenues in its efforts to dissuade Ethiopia from unilaterally filling the dam, which it sees as an existential threat.
Negotiations with Ethiopia have failed to gain traction despite US and World Bank-led mediation between 2019 and 2020 under the Donald Trump administration and South African mediation thereafter. Egypt has also raised the issue at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), sending a letter to its head on September 1 in which it accused Ethiopia of violating international law by continuing to fill the dam without agreement from downstream countries. It also accused Addis Ababa of lacking the political will to resolve the dispute.
Ethiopia, in turn, rejected the accusations as “a litany of unfounded allegations” from Cairo in a letter it sent to the UNSC in response to the Egyptian complaint. Addis Ababa also urged Cairo to ”abandon its aggressive approach” toward the hydroelectric dam which will generate much-needed electricity and, therefore, is crucial for Ethiopia’s development. Still, Egypt’s 116.9 million-strong population relies almost entirely on the Nile for its freshwater needs. With Ethiopia having completed its fifth filling of the dam in mid-August, Cairo’s concerns are growing that the filling of the dam will disrupt the flow of Nile waters, undermining Egypt’s essential water supplies.
What Egypt is concerned about
Egypt’s long-standing dispute with Ethiopia over the GERD is not the only reason behind the warming of ties between Cairo and Mogadishu. “Somalia is a member of the League of Arab States (while Ethiopia is not); as a Muslim country, it has more in common with Egypt than Ethiopia,” Nafaa noted.
Religion aside, Egypt has strategic interests in Somalia. Major General Samir Farag, senior strategist at the Security and Defense Advisory Board of Egypt, told me that securing the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, located north of Somalia and at the southern entrance of the Red Sea, is ”a national security priority” for Egypt as the waterway secures the Suez Canal, which is significant for Egypt. Farag lamented the losses incurred by Egypt as a result of the Houthi attacks on commercial ships in the Red Sea in the wake of the Hamas-Israel war which have forced shipping companies to seek alternate—albeit longer and costlier—routes around Africa, leading to a significant reduction of more than 50 percent in Suez Canal revenues.
Farag added that Somalia’s security and stability are important pillars for the security of the entire region. He cited piracy incidents off the coast of Somalia as posing ”an ominous threat to global trade during times of conflict and instability.” Armed Somali pirates have taken advantage of the instability in the Red Sea to make a comeback in recent months, seizing ships and hijacking their crews for ransom. This occurred after NATO-led international naval forces that had patrolled the Gulf of Aden moved their ships toward Yemen in the wake of the Houthi attacks on commercial vessels, leaving a security vacuum for the pirates to exploit.
“Under the defense pact signed by Egypt and Somalia, Egypt will train and help strengthen the Somali army to enable it to counter terrorism in the country,” Farag said in reference to the threat posed by al-Shabaab, the al-Qaeda-affiliated Islamist group based in Somalia and which has also been wreaking havoc elsewhere in East Africa.
Over the last decade, the Egyptian military and police have battled against Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)-affiliated militants who had sought to establish an Islamic state in the Sinai Peninsula; the authorities have also cracked down fiercely on members of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic group that rose to power in an election after President Hosni Mubarak was forced to step down in 2011.
Since the ouster of Islamist President Mohamed Morsi by military-backed protests in 2013, tens of thousands of Muslim Brotherhood members and supporters remain behind bars in Egypt; hundreds of others have been killed with impunity or forced into exile. President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s regime, which sees itself as a bulwark against Islamists, believes it can help the Somali government rid the country of al-Shabaab, whose goal is to overthrow the central government and ultimately establish an Islamic state in accordance with its strict version of Sharia.
In comments made during a January 21 press conference in Cairo with his Somali counterpart, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, Sisi reiterated his country’s readiness to defend Somalia against any threats.
“We will not allow anyone to threaten Somalia,” Sisi said. “I am saying this very clearly, don’t test Egypt and try to threaten its brothers, especially if our brothers ask us for support.”
Ahmed responded with veiled warnings to Egypt and Somalia that there would be “a severe retaliation” if any country attempted to invade Ethiopia. At a ceremony marking Ethiopia’s Sovereignty Day on September 8, Ahmed said that Addis Ababa has no intention of creating conflict. Still, he warned that his country would “humiliate” any nation that threatened its sovereignty—without naming a specific country—though his threats were clearly directed at Egypt and Somalia.
While it is doubtful that Ethiopia would wage war directly on either of its rivals, some analysts have warned that deploying Egyptian troops along Somalia’s border with Ethiopia could lead to a proxy conflict between Cairo and Addis Ababa, with Somalia as the battleground. However, Farag dismissed the speculation and ruled out any prospective use of force against Ethiopia. He affirmed that Egypt would continue to pursue all legitimate channels, including diplomacy, to protect its interests.
That remains to be seen, especially as Sisi has declared that Egypt’s water share is a national security issue and a red line that cannot be crossed. In an address to mark the launch of the national megaproject Haya Karima in 2021, Sisi said, “Cairo has various options to protect its national security.” Still, he did not rule out the military option—hinting at the possible use of force against Ethiopia should the circumstances require military intervention.
Nevertheless, Egypt’s intervention in Somalia—intended to promote regional peace and security—has instead inflamed regional tensions. It does, however, signal a shift toward a more assertive role for Cairo in African affairs and diplomacy after decades of Egypt turning its back on Africa following a failed 1995 assassination attempt against Mubarak in Addis Ababa by gunmen allegedly supported by elements in the Sudanese intelligence under the Islamist-backed Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir.
Egypt might just be flexing its muscle to pressure Addis Ababa to reach an agreement on the GERD. What is certain is that Egypt is seeking to thwart Ethiopia’s Red Sea access, which Cairo views as a national security threat and fears could further destabilize maritime trade in the vital waterway. For Egypt, which is in the midst of a profound economic crisis, taking these significant foreign policy positions means averting default and getting back on its feet.
