5. Discussion and Conclusion
Both South Sudan and Somaliland have a colonial pedigree related to the former British Empire, pursued former colonial borders after suppression from their central governments, and both their parent states had good diplomatic relations with China since the 1960s. Their unilateral declarations of secession from their non-colonial parent states, Somalia and Sudan, respectively, however received very different response from China. As was first hypothesized, China’s stance towards the Friendly Relations Declaration of the UN Charter would have an influence on China’s stance towards secessionism; as self-determination is the first step towards secession (Hechter 1992). China’s statements against the UN Charter indeed largely justified China’s reaction towards the Somaliland secession, as it was no secession after colonial subjection. Moreover, at the time China had just received international criticism due to its repressive response to domestic uprisings. Then again, China’s domestic separatist groups in Xinjiang and Tibet, and the secessionist government in Taiwan are still present to this day, which have possibly made China’s stance towards secessionism, even foreign, even more sensitive (Zhu and Blachford 2005). Therefore, China’s recognition of South Sudan is contradictory, as the secessionist territory was just as valid as Somaliland’s secession relative to the content of the UN Charter, and it can therefore not be explained by China’s stance towards the Charter.
Self-determination is however not enough for a new state to function within the international arena. New states often need aid or assistance to build up their country, which will only be provided when being perceived as a member of concerning international organizations like the UN (Kreuter 2010). External recognition, a necessary prerequisite to be seen as a legal state, is according to international law only legal after internal recognition. China’s approach to this law has always been very strict due to its principles of sovereignty and non-interference in other state’s affairs. The ‘five principles of co-existence’ worked as a mutual and reciprocal understanding, and recognizing a secessionist state would undermine these principles. Moreover, as both countries have had very good relations with China, having helped China in its pursuit to regain its seat in the UN and with the support of the ‘one China’ principle, China’s recognition of Somaliland and South Sudan would undermine these supportive relations. On that account, internal recognition of the host state was thus a necessary prerequisite for China to consider granting its recognition.
Alden (2009, p. 564) however argued that China’s “new type of strategic partnership with Africa”, illustrates how China’s state-centric principles of foreign policy are adaptive in comparison to its internal policies with respect to sovereignty and secessionism. This might be backed by China’s recognition of South Sudan. Why China abandoned these principles during its close relations with Sudan’s central government in Khartoum, could be explained by the fact that the deliberations between el-Bashir as head of the National Congress Party and John Garang as leader of the SPLM had generated a mutual agreement for the structure of the CPA. As this agreement entailed the possibility of secession after a trial period in which the north would get the chance to make unification attractive, the odds were higher that an eventual secession would be internally recognized, and thus would become ‘authorized’ under international law (Vidmar 2012, p. 545). This would make the future recognition of a sovereign South Sudan a lesser breach with China’s relation with Sudan and therewith China’s own principles of sovereignty and noninterference. However, the ambivalence of China’s political role in Sudan is illustrated on the one hand by the height of its aid, which China had to put in to maintain good relations with both parties during the CPA. On the other hand, China’s (still) ongoing arms trade with both the GoS and the GoSS thus is in complete contradiction to the aforementioned.
In Somaliland, deliberations on independence between different parties occurred before its declaration of independence, but without relevant actors from the central government in Mogadishu. The government had become completely absent after Barre’s fall, even to this day. Moreover, no proper assessment was made prior to the declaration of Somaliland’s’ independence on the time, the scope, the depth and the durability of the separatist sentiment. Differently put, neither an official referendum, nor a preceding trial-coexistence period was held to assess the internal legitimacy of the declaration. The support for the secession came primarily from the Isaaq clan, who were the majority of the population in Somaliland. Representatives of other clans, the few of whom were present during the conference in Burao and who actually did formally support the declaration, later claimed they only did so in order to keep the peace (Bryden 2004, p.24). Comparing the two secession processes thus showed how the principles of China’s foreign policy differently applied and therefore differently affected China’s eventual decision to recognize South Sudan and not Somaliland.
According to Shambaugh (2011) the People’s Liberation Army has an increasing influence in China’s foreign policy. This has made China less passive when it comes to its own interests and more willing to make risks in its pursuit. The third expected reason for China’s different reactions to both cases, which may have been due to the different timings of both secessions, was China’s political and economical involvement with the host state and the secession state prior to and during the secession. As became clear from the case study, China’s relations with the Somalia and Sudan were both typically politically motivated from the beginning. As Somalia’s underdevelopment was also reflected in the development of its national resource extraction, China’s motivation to cooperate with Somalia was not based on potential and lucrative future oil contracts. It was only in 2002 when first signs of China’s interest in potential oil reservoirs on Somalia’s territory became clear (Aiddata, n.d.). Until now, Somalia’s main export product has always been livestock, a very low priority product on China’s import list. However, Somalia was an important supportive actor for China in the regaining of its membership and seat in the United Nations. This had boosted the bilateral relation with diplomatic positivity in terms of mutual benefit and mutual development.
Despite the instability in the country, China’s involvement in Sudan became much more intense and strategic in both political and economical ways, due to its economical initiatives in the 1990s and its increasing demand for oil (Zhao 2008). China’s major oil State Owned Enterprises, particularly the CNPC, were largely responsible for setting up the oil infrastructure through which large amounts of oil would later be transported from the south to the north of Sudan. This led to China’s unique relation with Khartoum. However, when the SPLM started to attack China’s oil installations, because its government supported their opponent, China increasingly started to breach with its principles of sovereignty and non-interference (Carlson 2011). It took up a mediating role, stimulating both parties to negotiate and pursue peace and stability.
China played a very different part in both secessions as became clear by prior described circumstances, which may also be partially due to the different time periods in which these secessions have occurred. A gap of 20 years separates both secessions; a time in which China’s global power has increased due to its fast economic development and its high expenditure on defense. The final expectation of this case study was that China’s growing power also influenced its stance towards secessionism. A growing power would namely imply a lesser threat or lower pressure from the West on China’s domestic cases of secession. Meanwhile, due to China’s growing power, Western criticism on China’s secessionist cases morphed into a discussion on human rights to establish a normative dialogue at least.
China’s recognition of South Sudan was still under internal and external pressure. Internally, peace would contribute to a more efficient and safer oil trade. In addition, as has become clear, South Sudan still had to put pressure on China using China’s oil installations in the south as a leverage, as it did not trust China even after the CPA came in force and friendly relations were established. Were it not for the previous ongoing violence between the two parties that instigated international pressure for peace, and which became a danger for China’s oil interests, then South Sudan’s secession would have been more similar to China’s secessionist regions at home. Aside from this, China’s recognition of South Sudan’s secession also put less pressure on the Chinese government with respect to secession movements in Xinjiang, Tibet or Taiwan, since no mutual agreement with the host state would be possible in their cases. However, this approach oddly enough supports the will to fight of the more extreme separatist Uyghurs. External pressure for China’s involvement in South Sudan’s secession process was based on the fact that China was the only foreign relation that could actually influence el-Bashir, and so within the UNSC China was pushed to step up as a mediator.
According to Large (2009, p. 626) China’s behavior in Sudan is the most controversial relation in China’s recent rise in Africa. It is therefore harder to argue that the conclusions of this case study can contribute to further expectations in other African countries with respect to China’s possibly changing stance towards secessionism as well as for previous cases like Somaliland. Based on the previous findings, it is plausible to state that China’s economic interests are becoming more important than its principles of sovereignty and non-interference, although China may try to hold on to them for as long as possible. However, in that respect, Somaliland simply could not have enjoyed that advantage at the time, natural resources were not yet discovered and China was no world power yet, which have made a difference since (Appendix 8). The fact that no official trade data was available for China’s trade with Somalia before and during
Somaliland’s secession, made the comparison even more difficult. However, clear is that China had no oil interests in the country at the time, and that may well have been the crucial difference between the two cases. For a more consistent support of this assumption, more comparative research must be done on other separatist movements in other African countries with relations to China. However, taking the prior case study into account, China’s growing power might generate an even smaller chance that a secessionist case will be recognized by China in the future.
On the other hand, as Kerr and Xu (2005) argue, changes in China’s foreign policy might still occur specifically with respect to security situations. According to Wheeler (2002) China’s support in the UN has been strong in cases with violations of human rights in external conflicts with a more international character, thus only when the conflict is not a domestic affair of a state. China’s position in the case of Darfur fairly illustrates this. China might thus be changing into a more stable, responsible international actor in a different way by providing more personnel to UN peacekeeper organizations in Darfur and South Sudan, although it still prefers peaceful negotiations to interventions (Large 2009). There are signs that China is working on improvements in the field of human rights (Xinhua, 2013), and that it is increasingly breaching with the principle of non-interference. During the writing of this thesis, news got out through various unofficial media reports that China is going to send 850 extra UN peacekeepers to South Sudan in an effort to contain the civil war that started last December. This is an intervention, as the first of its kind in terms of its magnitude. This might again only be for the protection of China’s interests in the country, but which is still the same as taking more responsibility in security situations.
At present-day China still lacks a diplomatic strategy for its African relations, as its rhetoric through the years has not changed much. However, as the content of bilateral relations has changed with respect to growing bilateral interests, this strategy might be wise to develop (Strauss 2009, p. 793). The assumption that the OAU’s opinion about Somaliland’s secession, as well as the AU’s ‘non-indifference’ principle with respect to the Darfur crisis influenced China’s further reaction to the secessionist states, seems fairly grounded when looking at the present. The FOCAC, to which the AU is a member, has become an increasingly important institution for economic engagements. And in January 2013, China finished the building of the new $200 million AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, as a ‘gift to Africa’ (UN Africa Renewal 2013). Due to the influence of the AU and its growing economic interests, China’s view of its international responsibility might therefore still change.
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