On January 15, 2025, John Moolenaar, Chairman of the U.S. House Subcommittee on China, sent a letter to outgoing Secretary of State Antony Blinken recommending the opening of a U.S. representative office in Hargeisa, the capital of Somaliland. The move is intended to strengthen U.S. strategic interests in the Horn of Africa and counter China’s growing influence in the region.
Moolenaar stressed that without U.S. engagement, China could steer Somaliland’s interests in its favor, consolidating its presence around the Red Sea and beyond.
However, his concerns seem unjustified since China does not recognize the sovereignty of Somaliland and supports Somalia’s position on the issue. And so in a Chinese ambition to expand its military presence in the area, after its base in Djibouti, it is not certain that Somaliland is an option for Beijing.
Although the United States, like most of the international community, does not officially recognize Somaliland as a sovereign state, Moolenaar clarified that establishing an office in Hargeisa would not conflict with the United States’ current recognition of the Somali government.
The proposal comes as Somaliland, which declared independence in 1991, hopes the incoming Trump administration will improve its chances of international recognition with U.S. support.
In the past, several African and anti-China officials in the Trump administration—Tibor Nagy and Peter Pham—had publicly shown themselves more willing to consider some form of recognition for this state of 4 million people.
Somaliland occupies a strategic geopolitical and commercial position, with key global military and maritime interests in the region. Hence the interest of several major powers in its issue. Its positioning could help the United States in its ambition to counter China. In particular, the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait in the Gulf of Aden, between Berbera in Somaliland and Yemen, is a crucial passage point for global trade.
