CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION OF THE FINDING
The main purpose of this research was to study the issues that have impeded Somaliland’s quest for international recognition over the last 28 years. In what follows, the researcher will draw on the responses of the interviewees, compare, and contrast these with the main points set out in the literature review. This will be followed by a general synopsis of the findings, with conclusions and recommendations for future study.
5.1 Interview Analysis
The interviews per se were informative and educational even for this researcher, who has a detailed knowledge of the issues that have affected Somaliland foreign policy over the last two decades. The researcher transcribed each of the interview recordings and then analyzed the text for principal themes and sub-points. These were then collated and subjected to further examination to determine if any other residual issues or aspects could be derived from the text.
5.1.1 Recognition
Although the quest for international recognition has spanned some 28 years, authorities in Somaliland have argued that these efforts should be viewed not as a secession but rather the dissolution of an unsuccessful marriage (Kaplan, 2008: 152). This is a view that is strongly echoed by Mohamed “internationally people believe that Somaliland has seceded from Somalia, Somaliland is rather withdrawing from a failed union”.
Shire also noted that “Historically, if you look at all of the countries that have separated, let’s say Ethiopia and Eritrea, a process which started back kin 1952 and concluded in 1993, so you can see I mean, it took 40 years to come to fruition, Even in South Sudan, independence has taken 50 years and was finally accomplished in 2011, so it’s a process that takes time, you know, but we are confident because we have a very strong case that international community will recognize”. Moreover, Doughty noted that: “a lot of people are not aware of the unique history or indeed the history of the relationship with Britain, and so I think making it possible for people to understand that, even to understand where Somaliland is, to understand how it is very different from Somalia, in terms of trade, business, development, safety and security, all of those things are very important. If you don’t know, you will unfortunately get quite negative opinions of the situation in the Horn of Africa at the moment, and that means it’s important we change people’s perceptions so they know that Somaliland is open for business, it’s open for educational exchange, its open for visiting and it’s certainly something we are trying to do”,
The participants further contend that it is not unusual for states that formed unions with other states for either brief or extended durations to reclaim their independence. The case of Senegal and Mali was cited, in which the Federation Security Council recommended UN membership of the Federation on 28 June 1960; Egypt and Syria were also advanced as an additional example. The participants made a point of emphasising that recognition of Somaliland’s status would invariably take time even though Somaliland conformed to all the tenets expected of a functioning democratic state. It was also noted that despite the building of a peaceful and democratic state and the support of the international community, these things in themselves might somehow not be enough to secure recognition.
Irro said that:
“Our case has not been headed by the international community because they may not see how it would be in their interests to do so, so we can say that sometimes there is a double standard at work in addressing these issues., I do remember one American reporter, who came to my office as speaker of the parliament, he asked me why the United States should recognise Somaliland, I answered that the best reason may be that we have oil, so I think we have to create not only a good history and good reports for the international community, but we have to create mutual interest as well”.
Shire also noted that the Republic of Somaliland met the criteria of statehood based on the Montevideo Convention on Statehood of 1933, and that this is accepted by many countries, He further argued that:
“Legally in international law Somaliland has fulfilled all the requirements of a sovereign state, that is, it has an international boundary, has a government in authority, has a permanent population, has the ability and the capacity to enter into agreements with international organizations and other countries, so it has completely fulfilled all the requirements as was agreed at Montevideo 1933. Our people also voted in a referendum for statehood and in 2001, 97 percent of voters voted for the constitution which underlies it”
Unfortunately, however, its unique claim to statehood has been undermined by the international community’s preoccupation with making peace in Somalia and the now common practice of collective consideration of issues involving recognition. Mohamed further specified that the “international community is backing or has already undertaken a lot of efforts to get Somalia back on track as a country and as a nation, so that I think, that massive effort or massive support that Somalia has been given by the international community has to some extent undermined Somaliland’s efforts to be recognized as a country because its position would seem to be that when Somalia becomes stable, Somaliland and Somalia will talk and still that question remains”.
Besides, the main diplomatic issue for Somaliland had been to set out its position in relation to the south, where the general principle of avoiding active interference did not preclude their being friends (Gurdon: 69). However, the former Somaliland president, A.A.Mohamed Siilanyo, who initiated and implemented a new strategy of settling differences peacefully and amicably through dialogue, has amended the policy of avoiding direct interference from Somalia.
The other problem that has emerged is that to date numerous meetings have been conducted in various countries, (the UK, the UAE, Turkey, and Djibouti), and unfortunately, no tangible progress was made, the talks were suspended, because of the evident lack of commitment and seriousness on the part of the Somalia government. Moreover, the unwillingness to engage in dialogue on the part of the current Somali government particularly over the last 3 and half years, since the new president of Somalia Mr Farmaajo assumed office, has proven problematic and gives no sign of imminent change. On the other hand, Shire stated that:
“We have started talks with Somalia in 2012, with the aim of resolving our differences peacefully and amicably, and that process is now suspended, but at the same time we haven’t left the talks, we are still ready to resume talks as soon as the environment allows it. We were supposed to meet in March of this year (2018), but as you know as a result of all the protests that arose from the agreement made with the DPW and Ethiopia to develop the port of Berbera we had to suspend the talks”.
This lack of progress is disheartening as the international community at the 2012 London Conference recommended talks between Somaliland and Somalia about their future, and since then little, if anything, has been achieved. It would appear that the support and recognition extended to the Somali government by many members of the international community, which was meant to encourage the development of peace, governance and the rule of law in Somalia, have been seen as a carte blanche for pressing for re-union. This does not bode well for the future of the talks and the need for direct involvement of the international community in this process is more pressing than ever, Shire also emphasised the point that:
“We are two different states as the Somalia state and the Somaliland state we started talks in 2012 with the aim of resolving our differences peacefully and amicably, but that process is now suspended, but at the same time we haven’t left the talks, we are still ready to resume the talks as soon as circumstances allow., We were supposed to meet in March this year (2018), but you know as a result of the protests that occurred following the agreement made with the DPW and Ethiopia to develop the port of Berbera, we had to suspend the talks. As a result, we are sort of in a situation where we are neither at peace nor at war. We have seen wars and how destructive they are, and we don’t want to take that path, we want, you know, to settle everything between us peacefully and amicably, and we would like, you know, to eventually be a member of the community of nations in this part of the world, and we would like to have a very close working relationship with all of our neighbours including Somalia”.
The other problem is that the EU, the U.S.A, the AU, and the UN, are all maintaining that the Somalia and Somaliland issue is a mutual process for the two countries. All participants to the process have emphasized the need for the continuation of dialogue, as this provides an opportunity for cooperation and the peaceful settlement of the issues between Somalia and Somaliland. Echoing Irro’s view, he stated, “We have to find a mechanism either through negotiations or through mediation that will allow us to arrive at a solution”. Conversely according to Doughty “I will genuinely say the conditions are the strongest that they have been at the moment and I think the new government and the level of diplomatic engagement that they are making around the world is very important. I think just focusing on Britain is a mistake. It is a crucial part of it, but you have to build confident support for Somaliland in as many places as possible, and when you get a critical mass of support, I think we will see recognition. I think there will be a new government in the UK and that could be an important chance to lobby and influence them. I know Gavin Williams is very close to Boris Johnson maybe he will have some influence over him, we will certainly be campaigning for Boris Johnson to recognize Somaliland, and hopefully, he will. I do not agree with Boris Johnson on many things, but if he can make a good decision on Somaliland we will welcome it, yeah I’m very optimistic”.
5.2 Further Discussion of the findings in relation to the wider literature
All participants were consistent in their views with respect to the difficulties that Somaliland had faced because of its effective isolation from the international community. In each case, they emphasized the implications, of this isolation, and the hardship in terms of economics, security, health, and education. They were also of one voice in advocating international recognition for Somaliland as the only effective and realistic solution that would address these issues.
5.2.1 Economic:
Somaliland has a very fragile economy that is highly dependent upon livestock exports and diaspora remittances (Pegg et al; 2014: 199). Today, Somaliland’s economy is growing, but under strain. Over the past 20 years, new businesses have sprung up, yet its infrastructure is poor. Some 70% of the population is under the age of 30. The formal youth unemployment rate is 75%. This situation has been exacerbated by a paucity of skills, as a result of which there is a contrasting dependency on foreign talent. (Mills et al, 2019).
As Irro explained:
“Economically there are no international financial institutions in Somaliland and they are not coming, because we don’t have any form of international recognition, and that’s the major barrier to trade and cash because without cash, we can’t open a simple letter of credit or LC in Hagias. If somebody wants to buy something from Europe or China, they have to go to Djibouti or Dubai and take sacks of money to Djibouti or Dubai”.
The World Bank (2014b) recently estimated Somaliland’s 2012 GDP per capita at US$348, which makes Somaliland the fourth poorest country in the world: the sub-Saharan average per capita GDP is more than four times greater at $1435. In 2019, the Somaliland government budget was just $200 million, three-quarters of which is spent on salaries and operational expenses. GDP is estimated at $646 per capita annually for four million people. (Mills et al: 2019). However, the danger is that successive generations of Somalilanders living abroad, will become more detached and remote from their homeland and that this remittance will gradually fall as a result (Poore, 2009, p.133). Besides remittances, which provide 55% of the GDP of $2 billion, Somaliland depends on its sale of camels and goats, though this has suffered with a Saudi foot-and-mouth disease import ban except during the Haj, which has resulted in a halving of annual exports to 1.2 million (Mills et al; 2019). A further problem arises in that the Saudis have actively worked to sabotage Somaliland’s economy by refusing to import its livestock since 1997. (Kaplan, 2008, p.154) The inability to utilize Berbera port for livestock exports from the second half of 1988 to 1991 and then again from 1997 had a detrimental impact on the livestock business. This was particularly egregious as livestock exports were central to the income of both the rural and urban populations. The consequences of this were that the livestock business was essentially decimated. In addition, on-going interference with the import trade generally and its resultant impact on homegrown businesses had a catastrophic effect on the wider economy and the social infrastructure.
The ambiguous diplomatic status of Somaliland has also consistently proven to be a major obstacle in enabling Somaliland to receive foreign aid. France, which built the 175,000- ton-per-year Berbera cement plant, was asked to provide technical assistance and support in relation to its rebuilding, but expressed the view that it could not do so until diplomatic recognition had been received (Gurdon, p.69). These accords with Mohamed’s view, who claimed that, “The economic and financial impact in Somaliland has been considerable as a result of this disconnect with the international system”. In addition, over 27 years later, neither the UK nor the wider international community has recognized Somaliland as a sovereign nation. This excludes the country from membership of the Commonwealth and other vital international institutions that facilitate economic growth and development. (Zac et al., 2018). What is more, members of the British Parliament have recognized how important recognition would be for Somaliland’s economic health. The irony is that the United Kingdom and other bilateral donors support Somaliland, while impeding its efforts to support itself (Poore, 2009, p.133). Besides, without international recognition, donor funding is just $150 million annually, most of which goes on roads and water infrastructure, and much of the rest on boosting agriculture. By comparison, war-torn Somalia receives more than $1billion annually, in a perverse system, which rewards chaos and penalizes stability and democracy. (Mills et al: 2019).
5.2.2 Security
While the destruction and devastation wrought by the war was far from insignificant, commercial development and business are thriving with the construction of numerous hotels and shopping centers changing the very face of the city. Public transportation is now readily available and people can walk the streets in safety. The airport brings new visitors to the country daily, and all signs are that the Somaliland people are slowly beginning to recover from the trauma of the war and its effects. Shire noted, “Somaliland has been a very responsible partner to the international community, in terms of fighting piracy, in terms of fighting extremism, in terms ensuring security in this part of the world, the security of Ethiopia, the security of Djibouti, and the security of our neighbors”.
On the other hand, with regard to Somaliland’s security and its wider impact, international recognition has the potential to improve Somaliland’s capacity to control its borders, to enhance its anti-piracy activities, and to bolster the fight against crime and terrorism. Non-recognitions mean that Somaliland essentially remains outside of those mechanisms created by the international system for regulating the flows of people, money and goods across national frontiers. (Pijovic, 2014, p.28). With respect to internal matters, as Irro explains:
“We don’t get training in the security sector or in other fields because we are not recognized”.
This has resulted in a considerable loss of revenue from cross-border trade, which in turn benefits criminals and smugglers. A further advantage of international recognition would be that it would allow the government of Somaliland to partake in various intelligence-sharing schemes with a consequent enhancement in its capabilities to fight terrorist threats in the country at large. As Mohamed points out “The international community is busy with the problem of Somalia, the attention of the whole of the international community is focused on Somalia because of the piracy problem, because of Al-Shabab, because of terrorism, and a host of other issues. Somaliland is meanwhile seen as stable and safe”. To further emphasize the importance of security, “The UK continues to confront the global threat of terrorism, Somaliland acts as a trusted local partner to the international community in one of the world’s most unstable regions. Successive Somaliland governments have made security, both domestically and across the Horn of Africa, a top priority, preventing the terrorist insurgencies that exist beyond Somaliland’s southern border from taking root in the country”. (Zac et al., 2018)
Yet, while the threat of a response from Al-Shabaab is undoubtedly a serious one, it is questionable whether the right of a people to self-determination should be held hostage to the fortunes of a terrorist organization (Pijovic, 2014, p.25). There is a lot at stake for the international community. Somaliland’s security situation is stable because it is well governed. It will not necessarily remain this way forever, not least since the Ethiopian government has become distracted from foreign policy concerns given the scale of its own internal difficulties (Mills et al., 2019).
5.2.3 Health and Education
These problems are multi-faceted and adversely affect not just the economic and financial spheres, but also the social and cultural. With respect to health and education, the humanitarian loss has been considerable, with the effects evident across all strata of society. Despite this, the international community’s focus remains resolutely on Somalia to the detriment of its neighbor. An additional problem presents in relation to international travel, as Irro notes:
“Our citizens can’t travel anywhere; they have to find different kinds of passports, all kinds of passports from Djibouti, to Ethiopia and Somalia”.
Irro further added that in the absence of appropriate travel documents, and an adequate medical system in the country, “our sick people can’t go to hospitals; it’s very difficult for them either, after a long struggle they go to India or Turkey, so all these elements are related and have a direct impact of lack of recognition”.
Other indicators of poverty also highlight in stark detail the difficulties that Somaliland faces. The World Bank, (2014a) estimates that 1040 mothers die for every1000, 000 births, and a figure approximately three times higher than neighboring Ethiopia and five times higher than neighboring Djibouti. A starker indicator is that one out of 14 children in Somaliland dies before the age of one, as against one out of 21 in neighboring Ethiopia. With respect to educational deficiencies, one out of two children in Somaliland aged six to 13 does not attend primary school (World Bank, 2014a; Pegg: et al., 2014, p.200). The result is that Somaliland is one of the most impoverished states in the world. Its healthcare system destroyed by the war “is only slowly reviving with assistance from international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), agencies of the United Nations, and private clinics. Education has suffered, and eighty percent of Somaliland children were not school in 2004” (Poore, 2009, p.134). In addition, the current literacy rate is less than 45% and stands at just 20% for women.
5.3. Key Issues Faced by Somaliland in relation to achieving recognition
5.3.1. Somalia Government:
Somalia is unwilling to engage in any form of dialogue and continues to obstruct any efforts aimed at reconciliation and it would appear that for the foreseeable future this situation would remain unchanged. This reluctance to participate in any form of discussion extends across the full spectrum of Somalia society from politicians to the general populace. The strength of these sentiments has emboldened Somali politicians and goes some way towards explaining their persistent reluctance to enter into dialogue. However raising this issue with Doughty, of Somalia government for their reluctant to acknowledge Somaliland’s aspirations and to open any form of dialogue with them to resolve the problem, Doughty specified that; “I have a meeting coming up very shortly with UK ministers to raise these concerns – we do it all the time, sometimes we get understanding here, sometimes we get less understanding there and I think it’s a question of attention. Unfortunately, there are other matters at the moment, perhaps if we didn’t have other global crises and foreign policy challenges to deal with, there would be more time to consider matters like this, so, as ever, we ought to try to fight to find the space to discuss this, but I’m optimistic at the moment, I feel there is much more support for Somaliland recognition, than there has been for a very long time, I think there are more MP’s talking about it, there are more cross-party talks about it, senior ministers are talking about it, and I think that’s a good thing”.
5.3.2. International Community:
With regard to the international community’s reluctance to address the issue of recognition, the UN, the UK, and the USA have all consistently stated that it is a case for the African Union, (AU), and give no indication of any willingness to move discussion forward. The AU contends that Somaliland must work to resolve differences, but mindful of the potential dangers this presents with respect to other secessionist states, the African Union (AU) holds that the post-colonial borders are sacrosanct, in order to avoid the possibility of large-scale instability, as the contested nature of Africa’s internal borders is an on-going challenge to regional peace across the continent (Hoehne, 2009, p.257). The borders of Somaliland at present are the same as those that held during the protectorate, and remained unchanged during its independence years from the British Crown in 1960. (Nur. 2018), The AU mission to Somaliland in 2005 was of the view that Somaliland’s case was “unique and self-justified”. Despite this, the AU’s current position in relation to Somaliland lacks any justification.
The UN, which has invested extensive resources in promoting stability and unity in Somalia as a whole views Somaliland as an impediment to those goals rather than as any sort of beacon of stability. (Keating, 2018). In contrast, the Somali government that the United States recognizes is riddled with corruption and is struggling to govern, protect its people, and deliver basic services. It does not have support among ordinary Somalis. Its top leadership is constantly fighting over factional interests and the spoils of foreign aid. Without the support of African Union troops, it would collapse. Despite billions in foreign aid, U.S. counter-terrorism efforts, and some 22,000 AU troops, Somalia is still unstable and dangerous. Many African and UN soldiers, including U.S. Rangers and Delta soldiers, have lost their lives to bring peace and order to that sad country. (Mohamed, 2018)
With regard to African countries, Somaliland has enjoyed considerable support from South Africa and a number of other African countries. In 2019, a delegation of Uganda parliamentarians was in the Somaliland capital, Hargeisa, on a fact-finding mission, on the 28th anniversary of its gaining independence, (May 18), led by the Uganda Parliamentary Committee Chairman from the Foreign Affairs committee, Hood Katuramu. The team from Kampala said it was time Uganda and the Africa Union recognized Somaliland as an independent state (Ayieko: 2019). A place that has made something out of virtually nothing” is how former Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo described the progress made by Somaliland, during his 2019 visit in Hargeisa (Mills et al: 2019). Furthermore, members of the Uganda Parliament committee Akurut Violet Adome said Somaliland has met all the requirements to be recognized as a state and wondered why a country already doing business with investors from other African nations, the Middle East, and Europe cannot be given international recognition. “Somaliland has placed its case internationally and proved it deserves to be recognized. We will implore our president, Yoweri Museveni, to move fast and to recognize this nation,” said Adome. (Ayieko; 2019). There is also a Somaliland parliamentary delegation currently in Uganda attending the 64th Commonwealth Parliamentary Conference of 2019 in Kampala. This Somaliland parliamentary delegation received an official invitation from the Ugandan President, Yoweri Museveni, and was greeted by the Ugandan Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sam Kutesa, reflecting the bilateral relationship, collaboration, and strengthening of ties between the two countries.
As to the US, in 2007, a US defense official described Somaliland to the Washington Post as “an entity that works”, and said that in the Pentagon’s view “Somaliland should be independent” (Keating. 2018). Overall, the United States has proven far more open to the idea of an independent Somaliland, but this is tempered by the view that the AU should initiate the first move (Caplin. 2009, p.9). Nevertheless, the dramatic, dynamic rapid changes evident in the Horn of Africa, with China now able to out-leverage the United States in Djibouti, it behoves the Trump administration to find an alternative to Djibouti now. Ethiopia is not recourse, both because it has no port and because Chinese investment and trade likewise ties it far more to Asia than to the West. Eritrea hosts a United Arab Emirates port and may cooperate with Israel as well, but an uncertain political transition, poor facilities, and a horrendous human rights situation make a U.S. presence untenable. Somaliland, however, could be an alternative. Its main port, Berbera, hosts one of the longest airstrips in Africa. During the Cold War, the United States maintained a military presence and, as one official in Berbera quipped during a recent trip, NASA’s contract for facilities on the airfield technically remains valid and so they could return “tomorrow.” (Rubin. 2019).
Most importantly, Somaliland authorities want the United States there. As China and Russia both make approaches to Somaliland, the democratically elected, Western-leaning Somaliland government has been holding out for the United States, although it cannot do so indefinitely. The problem to date has been the State Department. The State Department now pursues a bizarre and expensive one-Somalia policy; effectively cutting off direct dealings with Somaliland for fear that interaction with Somaliland might anger Mogadishu, whose government cannot even control its own capital city. This deference is ridiculous on many levels, both because the Somali government’s ability to control and govern in Mogadishu is more theoretical than real, and it has recently deferred to China itself, has flirted with terrorism and, last but not least, is neither on a par with Washington and Washington should i not defer its national interests to Mogadishu. (Rubin, 2019)
The UK has tended to be compassionate to Somaliland’s case and given expression to that support on a number of occasions, particularly the UK’s All Party Parliament Group for Somaliland, (APPG), which has looked to highlight Somaliland’s successes in enacting a peaceful and democratic state. According to Doughty “The All-Party group has existed for many years and includes members of Parliament and members of the House of Lords as well and all parties take a keen interest in all matters related to Somaliland and indeed the Horn in general. However, we are completely non-partisan and we will welcome visitors and speakers from all the parties in Somaliland, and I would say that the majority of the members of the group support recognition. Others have a keen interest in Somaliland and its affairs and maybe don’t have a clear position on recognition”.
What is more, APPG argues that, “On this 58th anniversary of Somaliland’s independence from the UK, the day that makes its Commonwealth credentials quite explicit, we call on the UK government to begin the process of bringing Somaliland into the international community, with all the opportunities, benefits, and added prosperity that will provide for the country, its citizens, and its allies”. (Zac, et al; 2018). However, with respect to the UK government taking the lead in solely recognizing Somaliland, Doughty stated that, “Ultimately it would have to be a very high-level political decision and I think you will have to have the Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs Minister and others willing to back that up, and I think understandably the UK will want to ensure that happens in as orderly a fashion as possible. They have always maintained that it has to be a decision for the Somali people although Somaliland voted itself for independence and very clearly so, I think they are conscious that that you don’t want that kind of unilateral situation to develop where you create tension unnecessarily with Somalia and elsewhere. I’m very hopeful the UK will play a role in facilitating dialogue between Somaliland and the Somalia government and perhaps we can get a situation where many of those issues are dealt with and recognition can go ahead”.
Equally, as Doughty further noted:
“My own view is that Somaliland should be recognized, I think it’s unique, there is a historical, legal, cultural and quite frankly British-national-interest context to this and I think people often make the mistake of overlooking Somaliland as a succession kind of state, but it’s not, of course. Historically it was independent and part of a voluntary union with Italian Somaliland. Of course, after the horrific events of the late 1980’s and late 90’s it took the decision to leave and it is a source of great sadness for me that it has not been recognised by the international community. However, I’m hopeful that the situation is changing because of course de facto Somaliland has operated as an independent state and very proudly so”.
5.3.3. Geo-political Interest:
Egypt has however, vehemently opposed recognition of Somaliland, and has worked assiduously to block Ethiopian trade access to the coast and to thwart its economic and political aspirations, with a view to reducing Egypt’s downstream share of the Nile (Pavkovic. et al., 2011, p.502). Moreover, the former Egyptian Secretary General of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, was influential in preventing UN recognition of Somaliland’s bid for sovereignty in the early 1990s. Saudi Arabia has supported Egypt’s stance and has led Arab League opposition to Somaliland (Pavkovic. et al., 2011, p.502). However, in 2019, Al Sayyed Hamdi Sanad Loza, the Egyptian Deputy Minister of that country’s Foreign Ministry arrived in Hargeisa of Somaliland at the head of a delegation, for a visit that will take several days. The Egyptian delegation will be conferring with counterparts as well as an unspecified number of key government ministries, agencies, and institutions to explore areas of cooperation and mutual interest. This entails a foreign policy shift from Egypt with regard to current changes and the rapid development of the geostrategic significance of the Horn of Africa. This may also result in Egypt altering its stance on Somaliland recognition if Somaliland provides tacit recognition of Egypt’s right to its downstream share of the Nile.
Several countries eager to foster stability in the Horn of Africa have created the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, which works towards Somali unity, fearing that recognition of Somaliland would serve as a precedent for other secessionist states in East Africa. Neighboring Arab countries and East African nations such as Eritrea are also hopeful of a unified Somalia because within the Horn of Africa, a resurgent Somalia would be the only country with the necessary strength and resources to counter a pre-dominant Ethiopia (Caplin, 2009, p.8). Nonetheless, current political changes in the Horn of Africa and the recent visit of the Eretria Foreign Minister to Somaliland as well as that of Ethiopia’s new Prime Minister Mr Abiy, who is advocating and pursuing economic regional cooperation, freedom of movement and bilateral relations between countries in the Horn of Africa may eventually resolve the decade-long dispute between Ethiopia and Eretria. Notwithstanding that, Ethiopia has at present cultivated good relations with Somaliland in order that it might be able to secure access to the coast through Berbera. Eritrea’s secessionist war from 1961 onwards and its independence in 1993 left the Horn’s most populous country, Ethiopia, landlocked and wholly reliant on the overused port of Djibouti. (Pavkovic. et al., 2011, p.503).
On the other hand, Djibouti, which provides Somaliland with important air and trade links, is also in favor of the current position. The port of Berbera and its vast airstrip could furnish greater competition for military bases and trade flows to Ethiopia. (Pegg et al., 2014, p198). However, this sentiment has changed recently as Dubai DP World invested in Somaliland’s Berbera port and Berbera airport for military purposes. Therefore, Djibouti’s concern at present has become extraneous to the issue at hand, and may well change with their becoming a fervent supporter of Somaliland recognition.
Moreover, according to a leaked declassified confidential cable from the British Embassy in Nairobi, the “brilliant progress” that had been made in Somaliland was spoken of in glowing terms, with Her Majesty Government (HMG), policy of non-recognition questioned. The British Embassy in Addis Ababa, which covers Somaliland, has long argued for the HMG’s recognition of Somaliland. The Foreign Commonwealth Office, Africa Directorate pushed back aggressively, noting that recognition of Somaliland had the potential to de-stabilize the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). (Telegraph: 2011). As Doughty stated: “I think that the UK government believes in a cautious approach to foreign policy, particularly in relation to issues of self-determination, and they are very nervous of doing anything that could in anyway upset or cause further instability in the region, I think, in particular, there has been concern for a long time about the poor situation in Somalia and it is very worried about further inflaming that situation, to be honest”.
In contrast, the visit of the former UK Defence Secretary, Mr Gavin Williams, to Somaliland in 2019 clearly indicated the strategic importance of the Horn of Africa, and this marked a renaissance in UK interest in the region, hence the need for Somaliland to engage promptly and to recommend facilitating the UK’s access to a military base in Somaliland. This partnership may well necessitate a change in HMG’s previous policy and a full endorsement of the case for the recognition of Somaliland
As Doughty further pointed out:
“I think it’s a very important consideration, and it’s the argument that I have made on many occasions to government ministers, that by not recognizing Somaliland we are allowing other people to attempt to achieve influence in that region which is a bizarre thing to do, given that Somaliland sees Britain as one of its closest friends and allies. As such, this seems a mad thing to do and I certainly do not want to see Russia, China or others, you know, somehow unduly influencing or attempting to set their own agendas in Somaliland or indeed the Horn generally. You only have to see for yourself when you travel through the region the influence of other countries’ agendas. I have some concerns about some other relationships with the Gulf States and not in terms of trade and economics. When we see the terrible conflict in the Yemen so near to us, I do not want Somaliland to be caught up in anyway in the kind of great game that is going on between the powers in the region and that’s why Britain should be playing a positive and supportive role”.
However, the geo-political importance of all of these issues, spanning as they do, the political, economic, strategic and military spheres, highlights the considerable difficulties Somaliland faces as it works towards gaining international recognition.
5.4 Looking to the future
While Somaliland awaits a change in this complex interplay of international relations, its leaders have every incentive to maintain their democratic credentials by ensuring that the present multi-party political system is maintained and endures. In doing so, the case for recognition is enhanced and the contrast between the successful reconstruction of Somaliland and the degraded infrastructure of Somalia becomes more apparent (Pavkovic et al., 2011, p.503). Doughty further argues that:
“One thing I will say though is that, it’s absolutely crucial that Somaliland continues to develop and improve issues in relation to human rights, women’s rights, and journalistic rights and that it doesn’t get caught up in other conflicts and issues in the region. I also think that the parliamentary election should go ahead, because we saw that the presidential election was successful and very positive, but we can’t allow the parliamentary elections to continue to be put off again and again and again and I will urge all the parties of Somaliland for the good of Somaliland whatever their individual disputes or differences to support those elections. The absence of elections will have an adverse impact on the reputation of Somaliland in any talks or discussions in relation to recognition. So my message to the leaders of the parties is clear: whatever your differences, whatever your disagreements, whatever your disputes, we all need to deliver elections and everybody should recognise that that will send a powerful signal at international level.
In relation to the foreseeable future, Doughty additionally recommended that:
“I think the validity of the claim, is well established, but it needs to be said again and again and again, and I think a campaign that employs legal and historical evidence and that highlights the national security case for the UK would be beneficial. I think it is also important that the positive developmental journey that Somaliland has been on be emphasized. I think all those things together make a very, very strong case, It needs to be emphasized all of the time, however I think more could be made of the regional security dimension. I think more people need to recognize the consequences of the UK not being seen to support Somaliland and that there could be very negative consequences not only for Somaliland itself, but also for UK interests in the region, and I think that point should be make more strongly. I also think the story about how Somaliland has been able to largely prevent the type of terrorist violence and security issues that we have seen elsewhere in Somalia and some other places in the region convey a very powerful message to the UK government I also think we need to be pragmatic and realise that things will not happen overnight. There needs to be an orderly process and it should be one that doesn’t cause further complications, so I think the more the Somaliland government can reassure the UK government on this matter, the better. The last thing I will say is that the more countries besides the UK that Somaliland gets on-board the better. I know there have been recent delegations to Guinea Conakry; I know there are links with Guinea Bissau, and links with other countries. Somalilanders in European countries such as Finland, Sweden, the Netherlands, and other places may be able to further our case and give the UK government the confidence to act.
Conclusion
The current assessment is that Somaliland, despite the numerous obstacles, which present to official recognition, will retain its sovereignty. While these challenges are many, diverse and complex, a renewed focus on the internal rule of law, democracy and good governance will effectively make its case for recognition and enable it to weather the myriad issues that currently confront it. As the interviews have so clearly illustrated, these range from geo-political strategic considerations to economic and military concerns. Some relate not just to the immediate issues that persist between the two countries, but also wider regional considerations. The interviews would also appear to indicate that until a resolution to the problems in Somalia itself is achieved, the international community would not realistically broach the issue of recognition. While the interviewees were aware of the numerous problems that hamper progress, there was also an evident undercurrent of hope and resilience. As such, this research would appear to accord with those arguments advanced in the literature, but also bring to the fore the critical importance of maintaining the elements of a functioning democracy, as it is these, which will ultimately prove hard to ignore when the question of international recognition is finally addressed
