Somaliland Elections 2024: In the context of Somaliland’s contentious port deal with Ethiopia, the presidential election on November 13 holds important stakes for independence and shifting power dynamics.
Somaliland is due to hold a presidential election on 13 November 2024.
The results of the election will be important for two main reasons. First, what the leadership outcome will mean for Somaliland’s democratic credentials? Second, it will have implications for Somaliland’s push for recognition as an independent state.
Thirty-three years ago, Somaliland declared its unilateral withdrawal from the Somali Union. It is an independent state in reality but unrecognized in law. Like other unrecognized states such as Taiwan, it doesn’t fly a flag at the United Nations in New York. It also suffers from a lack of access to global financing, and humanitarian and development aid, most of which must come via Mogadishu.
Somaliland’s determination to achieve recognition was evident in January 2024 when it signed an agreement with neighboring Ethiopia. Under this deal, Ethiopia would get access to the sea via a 19km strip of coastline, possibly near the port of Berbera (though three sites have been identified), and Addis Ababa would recognize Somaliland’s statehood. The agreement, which has yet to be ratified, was met with a storm of protests, including from Somalia.
Somaliland is run by the ruling party, Kulmiye, which is led by Muse Bihi Abdi, Somaliland’s president since 2017. The party has been in power since 2010. The main opposition party is Waddani (also spelled Wadani), led by Abdirahman Mohamed Abdilahi (or Ciro/Irro).
I have carried out a decade of research and fieldwork in Somaliland. In my view, this election carries weight in terms of Somaliland’s democratic health, as well as its prospects for peace and stability – within its borders and in the region.
Somaliland’s democracy, like all democracies, relies on giving politicians and parties the chance to win elections. It is the voters who will decide who gets to run Somaliland next, and they face a clear choice between Kulmiye and Waddani.
Political landscape
Somaliland’s 2024 presidential election will be a test of its democratic institutions and a critical moment in its quest for independence.
Kulmiye can point to milestones on the road to Somaliland’s recognition. It was in power when Somaliland and Taiwan (Republic of China) recognized one another and swapped diplomats.
The party can also claim success for a strategy to get support from western states for Somaliland’s formal recognition. This includes the staffing and funding of Somaliland’s overseas missions in London, Washington DC, and Dubai, among others. These act as non-accredited embassies for the country.
Their work resulted in a non-official visit to Washington, DC by Bihi in 2022. The same year, a UK parliamentary delegation visited Hargeisa.
Somaliland and Ethiopia also reached an agreement in January 2024. This is the closest Somaliland has come to gaining official recognition from another state.
Like the ruling party, the opposition party Waddani fully supports the agreement with Ethiopia. It sees recognition from Somaliland’s huge neighbor – which also happens to host the headquarters of the African Union – as a first step to gaining official recognition.
However, based on my recent interviews with a Waddani official, the party is likely to adopt a broader approach if it wins the upcoming election. Instead of focusing solely on Western states like the US and the UK, Waddani plans to approach African and global south states, such as Senegal and Kenya, for support.
This potential shift reflects an understanding that both regional and global dynamics are changing.
Waddani’s broader diplomatic strategy is reinforced by its recent coalition with KAAH (the Somali acronym for Alliance for Equity and Development). KAAH is a young political association rather than a formal political party. Somaliland has a constitutional limit of three official parties.
KAAH was formed, in part, by experienced politicians. In building a coalition, Waddani and KAAH hope to displace Somaliland’s current third party, the Justice and Welfare Party.
KAAH’s support is partially based in Somaliland’s eastern region, which has experienced violent upheavals in recent years. This coalition promises to better incorporate the eastern regions and clans into the government should Waddani win.
Regardless of the outcome of the election, one issue unites Somaliland’s political parties: the push for independence.
Regional implications
A peaceful election would reinforce Somaliland’s claim as a stable, democratic entity.
Mogadishu should not expect any winds of change to blow from Hargeisa if Waddani wins. Three generations and counting have been raised in a de-facto independent Somaliland and they remember the violent dissolution from the Somali Union. This included the bombing of Hargeisa, the destruction of Berbera port, and the displacement of thousands of people. Somalilanders largely support independence.
Neither Waddani nor Kulmiye will be wishy-washy on this issue. And there will be forward movement on the Ethiopia-Somaliland agreement. This is likely to lead to increased tensions in the Horn region. As it is, Ethiopia and Somaliland are disturbed by the prospect of a resurgent Somalia supported by Egypt with arms and troops.
There won’t be a shooting war – Mogadishu still has far too many problems with al-Shabaab, clan infighting, and a lack of resources and training. But history shows that states take extreme measures if they feel existentially threatened.
Mogadishu’s stance is to retake Somaliland at all costs. And it has much of the world’s tacit support for its “one Somalia” policy. That makes Somaliland a textbook case of an existentially threatened state.
Risks that lie ahead
There are some risks of instability regardless of who wins the election.
The Isaaq clan controls much of the political and economic landscape. This may intensify tensions, especially if minority clans feel sidelined. Waddani’s promise of inclusivity may appeal to marginalized groups, but clan-based grievances have grown over the past decade.
There’s also the risk of unrest among Isaaq loyalists if power shifts too much. And allegations of electoral fraud or voter suppression could fuel protests.
After 2022’s violent postponement due to election disputes, maintaining peace will require transparency, clan reconciliation, and careful oversight to prevent renewed conflict.
Despite these risks, Somaliland is again (better late than never) going to the polls. Regardless of who wins, this is good news for Somaliland and its ongoing push for independence recognition.
Brendon J. Cannon
Associate Professor, Khalifa University
Brendon J. Cannon is an associate professor specializing in international security at Khalifa University of Science and Technology in Abu Dhabi, UAE. His research focuses on the relationship between security studies and geopolitics, particularly in relation to transformative technologies. He studies the Indo-Pacific region, especially the western Indian Ocean and eastern Africa. Cannon has published several academic articles in journals such as African Security, International Politics, Defence Studies, and Third World Quarterly. Before his current position at Khalifa University, he held academic roles in Nairobi and Hargeisa. He earned his Ph.D. from the University of Utah in 2009. Follow him in X at @cannon_brendon
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