This article, “Assessing the Prospect of the U.S. Recognizing Somaliland’s Independence,” published on August 29, 2025, by Stratfor, assesses the likelihood of the U.S. recognizing Somaliland’s independence, focusing on the potential consequences and factors influencing the decision.
Here’s a breakdown:
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The U.S. is considering recognizing Somaliland: The Trump administration is exploring recognizing Somaliland in exchange for basing rights, seeking to reduce reliance on Djibouti.
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Somaliland offered a military base and mineral deals: Somaliland has offered the U.S. a military base and access to critical minerals in exchange for recognition.
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Somaliland’s Stability and U.S. Interests: Somaliland is relatively stable compared to Somalia and strategically located. Some in the U.S. government see recognizing it as beneficial, especially given concerns about Djibouti’s ties to China.
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Somaliland’s conditions for US recognition: Somaliland is likely to normalize ties with Israel, but it will be reluctant to take in large numbers of resettled Palestinians from Gaza, which will likely delay U.S. recognition until after Israel’s 2026 legislative election
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Somalia opposes recognition: Somalia opposes Somaliland’s independence and is working to undermine its legitimacy by supporting breakaway movements within Somaliland, exploiting clan divisions.
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International pressure: Key U.S. allies and Somalia’s allies (Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia) will likely lobby against recognition.
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U.S. Presidential Prerogative: The decision to recognize a state rests with the U.S. President and doesn’t require Congressional approval.
In conclusion, the article suggests that while U.S. recognition of Somaliland is possible, it is not guaranteed and depends on several factors, including internal Somaliland politics, regional dynamics, and U.S. strategic interests. The article leans towards the idea that recognition is unlikely before Israel’s 2026 elections.
The complete assessment is as follows:
Assessing the Prospect of the U.S. Recognizing Somaliland’s Independence
While unlikely to happen before Israel’s 2026 legislative election, the United States is growing more likely to recognize Somaliland’s statehood in the medium term to secure basing rights in the territory, which would likely undermine U.S.-Somalia security cooperation, drive Mogadishu closer to Turkey, and threaten a political crisis in Somalia.
On Aug. 8, U.S. President Donald Trump said that his administration was ”looking into” recognizing the independence of Somalia’s breakaway region of Somaliland. This came after Bloomberg reported on July 30 that Somaliland’s government had offered to grant Washington access to a military base on its territory as well as critical mineral deals in exchange for the United States’ recognition of its statehood.
Furthermore, Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi, known as Irro, confirmed that his government had held talks with the U.S. Department of Defense and the U.S. ambassador in Somalia. Nonetheless, a State Department official told Fox News on Aug. 28 that the department was not in ”active discussions” with Somaliland representatives and that the United States recognized Somalia’s territorial integrity, which he said ”includes the territory of Somaliland.”
Meanwhile, the Financial Times reported on Aug. 7 that the Boston Consulting Group had been modelling the costs associated with a hypothetical resettling of Palestinians from Gaza to Somalia and Somaliland on behalf of Israeli businesspeople. While officials in Somaliland have denied that they were in talks to accept the relocation of Palestinians from Gaza to the territory, Israeli officials have insisted that negotiations on the matter between the two governments were ongoing.
- On Aug. 14, Texas Sen. Ted Cruz, the chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health Policy, publicly called on the Trump administration to recognize Somaliland’s statehood. Cruz stressed that the territory was a ”critical” security partner for the United States, had established close ties with Taiwan, and ”voiced support” for the Abraham Accords.
- In response to growing U.S. momentum in favor of recognizing Somaliland’s statehood, Somalia’s Embassy in the United States posted on X on Aug. 21 that Somaliland was not ”monolithic” and that ”many communities” in the territory rejected ”partition” from Somalia.
Over the last few years, key elements within Trump’s Republican Party have pressed for the United States to recognize Somaliland’s independence in exchange for securing basing rights in the territory, arguing that it would reduce Washington’s reliance on China-friendly Djibouti to project power in the Bab el-Mandeb region.
Somaliland formally declared independence from Somalia in 1991 following the ousting of former military ruler Mohamed Siad Barre. While Barre’s toppling plunged much of Somalia into decades-long instability, Somaliland remained mostly peaceful, as its local elites set up political institutions that enabled several peaceful transfers of power and the organization of broadly free and fair elections.
Despite this, no country has formally recognized Somaliland’s statehood, and successive U.S. administrations have remained committed to the ”One Somalia” policy to avoid encouraging more secessionist movements in sub-Saharan Africa. However, for the last few years, key elements within the Republican Party have advocated for the recognition of Somaliland’s independence in exchange for securing basing rights in the territory.
While the United States already has a large military facility in neighboring Djibouti, critics have pointed to Djibouti’s perceived pro-China slant since Beijing set up a military facility in the country in 2017. This criticism has grown since 2024, when Djiboutian authorities refused to authorize the United States to use its Camp Lemonnier base to conduct surveillance missions or offensive operations against the Yemen-based Houthis.
Against this backdrop, U.S. advocates of a recognition of Somaliland, who enjoy significant influence within the Trump administration, argue that doing so would reduce the United States’ reliance on a China-friendly country to project power in the strategic Bab el-Mandeb region, which connects the Red Sea to the broader Indian Ocean.
- Unlike the rest of Somalia, Somaliland was colonized by the United Kingdom rather than Italy, and the territory briefly declared independence in 1960 before uniting with Somalia. However, the region faced a mounting insurgency during the 1980s in response to Barre’s repression against the Isaaq clan — Somaliland’s most populous clan. Pro-Isaaq groups eventually seized control of the territory in the early 1990s.
- U.S. think tank Freedom House ranked Somaliland’s ”Freedom in the World Score” at 47/100 in 2025, making it the second ”freest” country in East Africa after Kenya and putting it ahead of countries such as Morocco and Tunisia.
- Djibouti’s Camp Lemmonier is the only permanent U.S. military base in Africa and hosts around 4,000 military and civilian personnel.
- The pro-Trump Project 2025 political initiative, published by the right-wing think tank Heritage Foundation, explicitly called for ”the recognition of Somaliland statehood as a hedge against the U.S.’s deteriorating position in Djibouti.”
- In recent years, Somaliland’s closest partners have been the United Arab Emirates and Ethiopia. In January 2024, landlocked Ethiopia signed a memorandum of understanding with Somaliland that set the basis for Addis Ababa to recognize the territory’s independence in exchange for securing military and commercial access to the Gulf of Aden. However, the agreement’s implementation has stalled following Ethiopia’s entry into technical talks on maritime access with Somalia’s federal government.
Somaliland will likely be willing to normalize ties with Israel, but it will be reluctant to take in large numbers of resettled Palestinians from Gaza, which will likely delay U.S. recognition until after Israel’s 2026 legislative election, as Irro hopes for the election of a more moderate Israeli government that de-escalates the Gaza war.
Irro’s reported offer to host a U.S. military facility meets a key demand from U.S. advocates for recognizing Somaliland’s independence. However, the Trump administration is likely to initially demand that Somaliland recognize Israel’s statehood as part of its broader efforts to expand the Abraham Accords.
Despite deep-seated anti-Israeli sentiment among Somaliland’s population that has been exacerbated by the Gaza war, Irro will likely agree to these demands, especially in the event of a sustained de-escalation in Gaza. However, pro-Israel elements within the Trump administration will likely press for the United States to also request that Somaliland resettle thousands of Gazans, which is something Irro will be more reticent to agree to, given the high risk of widespread domestic and international backlash.
This will likely delay a U.S. recognition deal until after Israel’s 2026 legislative election, as Somaliland’s government will wait to see if the ballot ushers in a more moderate government that scraps plans for the mass-relocation of Gazans abroad — in addition to making a normalization of ties with Israel more palatable domestically.
However, Netanyahu and his far-right allies’ re-election would not act as an insurmountable roadblock, as a continuation of Gaza’s ongoing humanitarian crisis would make Irro more willing to take in resettled Palestinians from the war-torn Strip, especially if this remains a U.S. prerequisite for recognition. That said, Netanyahu’s re-election and an open-ended perpetuation of the Gaza war could also see the Trump administration back down on its demands for the resettlement of Palestinians from Gaza and/or Somaliland’s recognition of Israel’s statehood — driven by an acknowledgment of Irro’s political constraints, as well as pressure from China hawks in the White House to more rapidly reduce the United States’ reliance on Djibouti to project power around Bab el-Mandeb.
- Under U.S. law, statehood recognition is a presidential prerogative and does not require congressional approval. This means Trump will still be able to recognize Somaliland if the Republican Party loses control of both the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives in the 2026 midterm elections.
- Israel’s next elections are scheduled for late October 2026, but they could be held as early as the start of 2026 if Netanyahu’s government collapses.
Key U.S. allies in the Middle East will try to dissuade Trump from recognizing Somaliland’s statehood, while Somalia’s federal government will likely expand its support to breakaway movements in the territory, which will heighten the risk of clashes in western and eastern Somaliland.
Turkey and Egypt have built strong ties with Somalia’s federal government in recent years, and both are set to lobby the Trump administration against recognizing Somaliland’s independence. Saudi Arabia will likely follow suit as it seeks to preserve the status quo in the Red Sea region.
While these efforts are unlikely to by themselves dissuade Washington from recognizing Somaliland’s statehood, all three countries will likely be willing to make concessions to the United States on separate issues, thereby creating tradeoffs for Washington that could reduce the likelihood of it recognizing Somaliland.
Meanwhile, Somalia’s federal government is highly likely to leverage Somaliland’s clan-based divisions to undermine Irro’s legitimacy and the territory’s perceived stability. This strategy was evident in late July, when Mogadishu formally recognized the new Northeastern State, located in eastern Somaliland, as a separate entity within Somalia’s federal system, while simultaneously strengthening its ties with community leaders in Somaliland’s western Awdal region as of mid-August.
In addition to providing political support to the Northeastern State and the Awdal region, Somalia’s federal government may advance humanitarian and development programs in both areas with the support of local elites in order to assert its authority over parts of Somaliland’s territory.
While Mogadishu faces structural financial constraints made worse by U.S. aid cuts, it may still be able to fund these initiatives by securing financial support from Qatar or Turkey. But even in the absence of significant economic pledges, growing political support from the federal government could still embolden forces affiliated with the Northeastern State to seize territory currently under the control of Somaliland’s government that they claim as rightfully theirs.
Meanwhile, Mogadishu’s outreach to the Awdal region will likely prompt certain local elites to act with greater autonomy, which could eventually compel Somaliland’s government to suppress dissent in Awdal and reassert its authority.
- While the majority of Somaliland’s population hails from the Isaaq clan, a substantial portion of the territory’s population is inhabited by the Darod and Dir clans and associated sub-clans, whose community leaders have historically proven less supportive of the Somaliland government’s push for independence.
- In late 2022, protests erupted in Somaliland’s eastern city of Las Anod following the killing of a Darod politician. While Somaliland’s government initially cracked down on demonstrators, it withdrew from the town in early 2023, effectively leaving it to be run by Darod elders. These elders then formed the Khatumoo State, the precursor of the Northeastern State.
- The Awdal State Movement has argued in favor of creating a new Awdal state under Somalia’s federal system that would comprise areas inhabited by the Gadabuursi and Isa communities, which are Dir sub-clans. On Aug. 18, Somaliland denounced a meeting between Turkey’s ambassador to Somalia and Sultan Wabar, an Awdal community leader who led a failed insurgency against Somaliland’s government in 2015.
A U.S. recognition of Somaliland would risk plunging Somalia into an institutional crisis and undermining U.S.-Somalia counterterrorism cooperation, which would likely prompt Mogadishu to seek greater security assistance from Turkey and potentially Egypt.
In the event of a U.S. recognition of Somaliland, Somalia would likely mobilize international support to reassert support for its territorial integrity and potentially file lawsuits against the United States before international bodies. However, Mogadishu would likely initially seek to maintain counterterrorism cooperation with the United States, given its precarious position in the fight against al Qaeda-linked al Shabaab.
Nonetheless, the overall deterioration of the two countries’ relationship would likely eventually prompt the Trump administration to reduce or suspend security cooperation, which could involve a withdrawal of U.S. military personnel from Somalia. This risk would be unlikely to deter Somalia’s federal government from firmly condemning the United States’ decision to recognize Somaliland’s independence, given the massive nationalist backlash from the public in Mogadishu that it would have to manage. Indeed, criticism of the federal government’s failure to secure the country’s territorial integrity would threaten to trigger riots and/or infighting within the federal government.
Meanwhile, al-Shabaab militants would likely capitalize on the government’s weakened legitimacy to expand attacks and recruitment. Moreover, turmoil in Mogadishu and central Somalia could also prompt the states of Puntland and/or Jubaland to further assert their political autonomy vis-à-vis the federal government.
Against this backdrop, Mogadishu would seek external security support, given its already strained military capabilities. While Somalia is a secondary consideration for Turkey, given ongoing events in Syria, Ankara would likely be willing to modestly increase its troop presence in the country, given its commercial and strategic interests in the Horn of Africa. However, Egypt could also serve as a potential security partner, though Cairo would likely condition deployments of additional troops and/or military equipment on Somalia taking a stronger stance against Ethiopia, Cairo’s regional rival.
- Turkey and Somalia have developed strong security ties over the past decade, as seen with the opening of the TURKSOM camp in Mogadishu in 2017, which trains Somalia’s elite Gorgon forces. In April, Turkey deployed 500 military personnel to Somalia, including 300 commandos and 200 drone specialists, raising Ankara’s total troop figures in the country to 800. This deployment came after Turkey’s legislature approved the deployment of up to 2,500 troops to Somalia for a two-year period in July 2024.
