The article “Barre’s Genocidal Shadow: How the UN and OAU Shielded a Regime and Condemned Somalilanders to Suffer” argues that Somaliland deserves international recognition as an independent state, separate from Somalia. Here’s a breakdown:
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Main Argument: Somaliland meets all the criteria for statehood under international law, but isn’t recognized due to the lingering influence of former officials from the Siyad Barre regime (Somalia’s military dictatorship) within international organizations like the UN and OAU (now the AU). These officials used their positions to undermine Somaliland’s claim to independence.
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Key Points:
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Historical Treaties: Somaliland, as the former British Somaliland Protectorate, had 83 international treaties that demonstrate its legal personality before its brief union with Somalia in 1960.
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Invalid Union: The 1960 union with Somalia lacked proper legal ratification, making it invalid. Somaliland’s reassertion of independence in 1991 is therefore a restoration of its original sovereignty, not secession.
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1954 Cession to Ethiopia: The UK’s transfer of Somaliland territory to Ethiopia in 1954 demonstrates the UK’s legal control and, thus, Somaliland’s international legal standing.
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Barre Regime Influence: Former Barre regime figures manipulated international organizations to prevent Somaliland’s recognition and deny the rights of its people, who suffered genocide under Barre.
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Meets Statehood Criteria: Somaliland fulfills the Montevideo Convention criteria for statehood: defined territory, permanent population, effective government, and capacity for foreign relations.
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Conclusion: Recognizing Somaliland is a legal and moral imperative. It would promote regional stability, acknowledge the suffering of its people, and encourage peace and cooperation.
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Recommendations:
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The AU and UN should reassess their stance on Somaliland.
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Somalia should respect pre-1960 boundaries.
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States should recognize Somaliland bilaterally.
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Legal scholars should review Somaliland’s case.
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Human rights organizations should support Somaliland.
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In essence, the article presents a case for Somaliland as a state that was wrongly denied recognition due to political maneuvering and the legacy of a repressive regime.
The complete piece is as follows:
Barre’s Genocidal Shadow: How the UN and OAU Shielded a Regime and Condemned Somalilanders to Suffer
By M. Amin,
A Freelance Journalist and a Researcher,
Hargeisa, Somaliland
Executive Summary & Introduction
The Republic of Somaliland fulfills all established criteria of statehood under international law. It possesses a defined territory, a permanent population, an effective government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. However, more than three decades after reclaiming its independence in 1991, Somaliland remains unrecognized—not due to a legal deficiency, but because of the lingering political influence of the very regime that committed genocide against its people.
Following the collapse of Somalia’s military dictatorship under Siad Barre, key figures from his regime secured influential positions within international organizations, most notably the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the United Nations (UN). These individuals—who should have been held accountable for grave human rights violations—were instead given diplomatic cover, allowing them to shape international narratives in ways that continued to oppress the survivors of their regime.
A central example is Osman Abdillahi Said, a former high-ranking diplomat under Barre, who was elected Assistant Secretary-General of the OAU in June 1991. Within weeks, he played a central role in the adoption of Resolution CM/Res.1340 (Abuja, June 1, 1991), which reaffirmed the “territorial integrity” of Somalia and declared Somaliland’s decision to withdraw from the failed 1960 union as “null and void.” This resolution—crafted just months after the Somali National Movement liberated Somaliland from the genocidal regime—ignored the reality of state collapse and the atrocities committed by the Barre government.
Similar patterns are seen in the actions of Fatun Mohamed Hassan and Abdirahman Jama Barre, both regime loyalists who used ethnic and clan-based arguments to deny Somaliland’s rights in international forums.
This memorandum outlines four lines of evidence that affirm the legal and moral case for Somaliland’s restored independence:
- International Treaties – A body of 83 international treaties extended to the British Somaliland Protectorate by the United Kingdom, which remain legally valid and applicable today, establishing Somaliland’s historic legal personality.
- The 1960 Union’s Invalidity – The hurried and extra-constitutional nature of the union between Somaliland and Somalia renders it legally null and void under international treaty law.
- British Precedent in 1954 – The UK’s unilateral cession of Somaliland territory to Ethiopia in 1954, against Somali protest, illustrates that the UK exercised full international legal control over the territory—affirming its status as a subject of international law.
- Post-1991 Manipulation – Former Barre officials exploited positions in the UN and OAU/AU to continue political domination over Somaliland, preventing survivors of genocide from representing themselves on the world stage.
In sum, Somaliland is not a breakaway region—it is a state that voluntarily entered into a union that failed catastrophically. That failed union, imposed by an authoritarian regime and later defended by its remnants through international institutions, has no legal force today. The world must correct its course: recognition of Somaliland is not only a legal imperative but a moral one.
International Treaties and Somaliland’s International Legal Persona
From postal conventions to ILO labor laws and the 1957 Slavery Abolition Convention, the UK extended 83 treaties to the Somaliland Protectorate between 1906 and 1960. These treaties were unique to Somaliland—not Somalia—demonstrating international legal capacity, not colonial subordination. The UK’s own FCDO database still lists Somaliland separately in treaty records as a continuing party.
The UK’s 1954 cession of territory to Ethiopia further demonstrates this legal personality. As legally analyzed in Maritime Briefings Vol. 1, No. 3, the UK defended its authority to bind Somaliland internationally under protectorate agreements. This case confirms that Somaliland was not a colony, but an international legal entity with a standalone capacity.
Invalid Union of 1960 and Reason for Restoration
Somaliland gained independence on 26 June 1960, then voluntarily joined the Italian Somalia Trust Territory on 1 July 1960. However, no formal union treaty or constitution was ever ratified. According to The Somali Republic: An Experiment in Legal Integration, this union lacked the essential legal formalities. The result? No sovereign absorption or extinguishing of Somaliland’s legal identity—only a temporary administrative association.
After the collapse of Somalia in 1991, Somaliland reasserted this pre-existing statehood. Under the Vienna Convention on Succession of States, a state emerging from a failed or incomplete union has right to “resume” its original sovereignty and treaty obligations. Somaliland is not seceding; it is restoring.
The 1954 Cession to Ethiopia – Legal Precedent
In 1954, the UK ceded parts of British Somaliland (Haud, Reserved Area) to Ethiopia under the 1897 Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty. The UK justified this under protectorate agreements, not colonial authority. According to Maritime Briefings, this transfer validated the concept that a protectorate has its own international legal personality and can be represented by its protector on its own behalf. This case underscores Somaliland’s prior right to statehood and legal continuity.
OAU Political Intervention by Barre-Regime Figures
Osman Abdillahi Said, a high-ranking official in the Barre regime, leveraged his position in June 1991 as OAU Assistant Secretary-General to lead Resolution CM/Res. 1340. The resolution declared Somaliland’s independence attempt “null and void” under the Charter—despite the legal invalidity of the union.
Continued Political Sabotage by Barre-Era Elites
The campaign against Somaliland continued long after Osman’s reversal. Fatun Mohamed Hassan, a Barre regime figure given illegal immunity post-1991, continued UN advocacy opposing Somaliland. Abdirahman Jama Barre, Siad Barre’s cousin, told the UN in 1993 that “Isaaq only live in two cities & are too volatile,” suggesting only a Darod can govern Somalia.
These statements were not legal analyses—they were tribalist justifications used to deny Somaliland’s self-determination. Meanwhile, Ahmed Mohamed Aden Qeybe, formerly Somalia’s Foreign Minister, oscillated in his support depending on his position—revealing self-interest, not principle.
Legal Statehood Criteria – Montevideo and Vienna
Somaliland fulfills all Montevideo Convention (1933) criteria:
- Defined territory—borders from the British protectorate.
- Permanent population—~5M citizens with diversified clans.
- Government—democratic institutions, elections, judiciary, army.
- Capacity for foreign relations—engagement with states and NGOs.
Additionally, the treaty succession doctrine (Vienna, 1978) allows Somaliland to resume the 83 pre-1960 treaties, reinforcing continuity.
Vindicating statehood, the UNPO affirms that recognition is a formal acknowledgment of existing facts, not a creation of a state (UNPO position).
Conclusion and Recommendations
The case of Somaliland is not one of secession—it is one of state restoration after the collapse of a legally invalid union and decades of violent repression under a genocidal regime. From 1960 to 1991, the Somali Republic—formed in haste without a binding constitutional or ratified treaty—was marked not only by internal fragmentation but by expansionist policies toward neighboring states.
Somalia’s federal governments, past and present, have repeatedly disregarded international boundaries, provoking disputes with Ethiopia (e.g., the 1964 and 1977-78 Ogaden wars), Kenya (including the 1963–64 border skirmishes and ongoing maritime boundary disputes), and now Somaliland itself (from 1991 to 2025), as it seeks to dominate a neighbor that reasserted its sovereignty decades ago.
These actions are the direct legacy of the Siyad Barre regime’s ideology—an ideology that has been sheltered within UN and AU frameworks long after the dictatorship fell. Figures tied to that regime, such as Osman Abdillahi Said and others, used their positions in international institutions to suppress the legal rights of the very populations their regime brutalized.
Today, Somalilanders—survivors of genocide—are forced to negotiate international relations under the shadow of that same regime, whose ideology still shapes the policies of Mogadishu.
Recognizing Somaliland is not only a legal obligation—it is a humanitarian necessity and a strategic imperative for regional peace. Somaliland’s recognition would anchor stability in the Horn of Africa by institutionalizing peace where conflict once ruled.
A clear example is Togwajale, a once-mined, militarized town on the Ethiopia-Somaliland border. Since Somaliland’s liberation, Togwajale has transformed into one of the busiest cross-border trade hubs in the Horn of Africa, shifting from landmines to logistics. This is the promise of recognized sovereignty—peace, trade, and prosperity.
Furthermore, recognition will end the ambiguity that fuels armed conflict, including the recent clashes in Las Anod, and provide a framework for cooperation, security, and shared resource development in the region. Somaliland’s ability to build functioning democratic institutions, despite being denied formal recognition, shows its resilience and readiness to be a responsible member of the international community.
Recommendations
- The African Union and United Nations must revoke or reassess Resolution CM/Res.1340, adopted under the influence of regime-affiliated figures, and update their position based on clear legal and historical evidence.
- Somalia’s federal government must be urged to respect pre-1960 international boundaries and cease its efforts to delegitimize Somaliland’s sovereignty or export conflict to neighboring regions.
- States should proceed with bilateral recognition of Somaliland, following the example of nations that recognized other restored or breakaway states under international law.
- Legal scholars, international law tribunals, and UN bodies should review Somaliland’s status through the lens of treaty succession, restoration of sovereign statehood, and right to self-determination under the UN Charter.
- Human rights organizations and democratic institutions should amplify support for Somaliland as a peaceful, democratic state that emerged from genocide and tyranny.
Recognizing Somaliland is not just an acknowledgment of history—it is a promise to survivors that their suffering has not been in vain, a stabilizing force for the Horn of Africa, and a gateway to responsible resource development and cross-border cooperation. The time to act is now. Delay only emboldens those who once oppressed, while recognition empowers those who choose peace.
