Constructing Commercial Empire: The UAE In The Red Sea And The Horn

The Logic of Empire

DP World’s further expansion into this region demonstrates that Emirati imperial power actually permeates local and regional politics in ways not always perceptible to those engaged in the highest levels of statecraft. As such, we cannot fully understand the nature of Emirati power without analyzing the convergence of state and capital in the Emirates and its effects on local politics, state formation, and economic development in the periphery. However, the fact that Emirati state policy and Gulf-based capital seem increasingly powerful in molding the political topography of the region, and Somaliland in particular, does not mean that these processes can only be understood from above.

Rather, the reorganization of political power, economic networks, and changing urban dynamics constitute the messy terrain in which foreign capital and Emirati policy operate. Therefore, as DP World acts increasingly more and more like a state, it is forced to confront local and regional politics, making it an undeniably political actor.

It is, of course, tempting to read the expansion of Emirati power into the Red Sea and the Horn simply as the result of GCC rivalries, great power politics, and the war in Yemen. These interpretations are unquestionably valid and the effects of dramatic port acquisition in the Red Sea on geopolitical relations are palpable. But these explanations often obscure as much as they reveal. In this framework, the shifting politics of the Red Sea appear to be driven solely by great powers pitted inextricably against one another.

Preexisting rivalries and ill-defined “strategic interests” are projected onto the region in a zero-sum manner. Conflicts are understood through the lens of great power competition, often after the fact. Economic considerations are either sidelined or taken as a secondary concern, separated from larger political interests. Following the arguments laid out by Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, the British historians of imperialism, it appears that “trade follows the flag.”

Geopolitical calculations may drive Emirati policy at the state level, but the interests of commercial entities are equally important.

As such, it is crucially important to locate these developments in a broader history of counter-piracy, counterterrorism, supply chain security, and the expansion of markets in the Gulf. Without paying attention to this broader history, it becomes increasingly difficult to understand why this recent flurry of commercial and military developments in the Red Sea is taking place in a potentially explosive manner. By focusing on commercial entities such as DP World, we can generate a better understanding of what existing Emirati power looks like in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea.

Geopolitical calculations may drive Emirati policy at the state level, but as this report demonstrates, the interests and actions of commercial entities are equally important in understanding how these policies play out on the ground. Inter-state relations are generally understood to be the most important expression of international politics, yet analyses of private companies tightly wedded to state power reveal the limits of such conventions. Logistics giants, such as DP World, operate in far more regional terms and are not confined to the same territorial logics of traditional nation-states.

As such, if Emirati foreign policy seeks to control, regulate, and mediate maritime routes and territorial hinterlands around the Arabian Peninsula, the interests and actions of private companies will also shape the modalities of Emirati imperial power. Through the logic of empire, the question of whether trade follows the flag or vice versa is rendered moot. The important thing to understand is that commercial and strategic interests in the Gulf will continue to play a leading role in shaping the future of the region for years to come.

COVER PHOTO: AERIAL VIEW OF A CONTAINER SHIP IN THAILAND. SOURCE: ANUCHA SIRIVISANSUWAN/GETTY IMAGES

Notes

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2. For an explanation, see Ishaan Tharoor, “The Persian Gulf Crisis Explained,” Washington Post, June 6, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/06/06/the-persian-gulf-crisis-over-qatar-explained/.
3. Mike Davis, “Fear and Money in Dubai,” New Left Review41 (2006): 47.
4. DPI is a so-called FZE, or free-zone establishment, a type of limited liability company established in an Emirati free zone.
5. Andrew Critchlow, “Dubai Inc. Is in Need of Change at the Top,” Wall Street Journal, October 21, 2009, https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB125605837214896881.
6. “DP World PLC,” MarketScreener, accessed November 15, 2019, https://www.marketscreener.com/DP-WORLD-PLC-6500032/company/.
7. DP World, “Who We Are,” accessed November 11, 2019, https://www.dpworld.com/who-we-are/leadership; Andrew Woods, “Architects of a Brave New World—Inside Nakheel,” Construction Global, April 11, 2018, https://www.constructionglobal.com/facilities-management/exclusive-architects-brave-new-world-inside-nakheel.
8. Simeon Kerr, “Bin Sulayem Exit Ends Tumultuous Era,” Financial Times, December 13, 2010, https://www.ft.com/content/b722858a-06ec-11e0-8c29-00144feabdc0.
9. Robin Wigglesworth, “Dubai Names New Chair for Troubled Group,” Financial Times, December 13, 2010, https://www.ft.com/content/cd6769c2-060c-11e0-976b-00144feabdc0.
10. In the year ending November 2019, DP World acquired Unifeeder (€660 million), P&O Ferries (£332 million), partnered with Virgin Hyperloop, and has either bought port operators or won concessions all across Africa, the Middle East, India, and Latin America.
11. Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, The United Arab Emirates: Power, Politics and Policy-Making(Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2016).
12. “Somalia and the Gulf Crisis,” International Crisis Group, June 5, 2018, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/260-somalia-and-gulf-crisis.
13. Adam Hanieh, “Ambitions of a Global Gulf,” Middle East Report 289(Winter 2018), https://merip.org/2019/03/ambitions-of-a-global-gulf/.
14. Sharmila Dhal, “How UAE’s Food Security Agenda Will Impact You,” Gulf News, January 26, 2019, https://gulfnews.com/uae/how-uaes-food-security-agenda-will-impact-you-1.61574013.
15. “World Economic Outlook Database,” International Monetary Fund, October 2019, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2019/02/weodata/index.aspx.
16. “Doraleh—Djibouti,” DP World, accessed November 11, 2019, https://www.dpworld.com/what-we-do/our-locations/Middle-East-Africa/Djibouti/doraleh.
17. Hawa Ismael and George Vandyck, “Forecasting Container Throughput at the Doraleh Port in Djibouti through Time Series Analysis,” Applied Mechanics, Mechatronics and Intelligent Systems—Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference(Singapore: World Scientific, February 2016), 341.
18. Aaron Maasho, “Ethiopia to Take Stake in Port of Djibouti, Its Trade Gateway—State Media,” Reuters, May 1, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/ethiopia-djibouti/ethiopia-to-take-stake-in-port-of-djibouti-its-trade-gateway-state-media-idUSL8N1S81QA.
19. “We need Eritrean ports,” Zenawi told Alex de Waal in an undated conversation. “We will reach the capacity of Djibouti soon and we need to diversify our access to the sea.” See de Waal, “The Future of Ethiopia,” 8.
20. Bernd Debusmann Jr, “DP World Chairman Says 2019 Will Be Challenging,” Arabian Business, February 4, 2019, https://www.arabianbusiness.com/politics-economics/412540-dp-world-chairman-says-2019-will-be-challenging.
21. “Jebel Ali Port,” DP World, Accessed November 15, 2019, https://www.dpworld.com/what-we-do/our-locations/United-Arab-Emirates/UAE/dp-world-Jebel-ali.
22. Rafeef Ziadah, “Constructing a Logistics Space: Perspectives from the Gulf Cooperation Council,” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space36, no. 4 (2018): 672.
23. Simeon Kerr, “DP World to Buy Jebel Ali for $2.6bn from Dubai World,” Financial Times, November 13, 2014, https://www.ft.com/content/7b9ddc22-6b32-11e4-ae52-00144feabdc0.As bin Sulayem, the CEO, put it: “Acquiring a strategically located asset integral to Jebel Ali’s continued success enhances our competitive advantage and aligns with our strategy of providing port-centric integrated logistics solutions at key gateway locations.” See “DP World Completes Jebel Ali Free Zone Takeover,” World Maritime News, March 17, 2015, https://worldmaritimenews.com/archives/154971/dp-world-completes-jebel-ali-free-zone-takeover/.
24. Sean Cronin, “DP World Rejects Yemen Port Claim,” National, June 21, 2012, https://www.arabianbusiness.com/dp-world-rejects-yemen-port-allegations-462858.html.
25. Alex de Waal, “Pax Africana or Middle East Security Alliance in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea?,” World Peace Foundation Occasional Paper no. 17, January 2019, https://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/files/2019/01/Pax-Africana-or-Middle-East-Security-Alliance-finaL-2.pdf, 14.
26. Johan Mathew, Margins of the Market: Trafficking and Capitalism across the Arabian Sea, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2016). As historian Michael Kempe notes: “The exercise of maritime policing functions was here inseparable from the effort to gain political hegemony.” Kempe, “‘Even in the Remotest Corners of the World’: Globalized Piracy and International Law, 1500–1900,” Journal of Global History 5, no. 3 (2010), 369.
27. Deborah Cowen, The Deadly Life of Logistics: Mapping Violence in Global Trade(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014), 157.
28. Cowen, The Deadly Life of Logistics, 135.
29. Afyare Elmi and Said Mohammed, “The Role of the GCC Countries in Ending Piracy in the Horn of Africa,” Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, September 2016, https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/lists/ACRPS-PDFDocumentLibrary/The_Role_of_the_GCC_in_Ending_Piracy_in_the_Horn_of_Africa_September_2016.
30. International Crisis Group, “Somalia and the Gulf Crisis,” 11.
31. , 11.
32. , 4.
33. de Waal, “Pax Africana,” 12.
34. “Regional Integration Key to Maritime Security, Say Industry Experts,” Zawya, May 7, 2015, https://www.zawya.com/mena/en/press-releases/story/Regional_integration_key_to_maritime_security_say_industry_experts-ZAWYA20150507142624/.
35. Elmi and Mohammed, “The Role of the GCC Countries,”
36. “Final Declaration of the United Arab Emirates Ministry of Foreign Affairs High-Level Counter-Piracy Conference 2011, Co-Organised with Global Ports Operator DP World, April 18–19, 2011,” accessed November 11, 2019, downloadable as a PDF at https://www.defense.gouv.fr/content/download/172565/1862292/file/Final%20Declaration,%20Conf%C3%A9rence%20de%20Dubai%20sur%20la%20lutte%20conter%20la%20piraterie%20(%C2%AB%20Dubai%20I%20%C2%BB),%2018-19%20avril%202011.pdf.
38. The case of Matthew Hedges is instructive. Hedges is a British doctoral student interested in Emirati foreign policy. He was arrested and placed in solitary confinement for almost six months following his two-week research trip to the Emirates. Less publicity has been given to the arrests of Emirates-based activist Ahmed Mansoor, along with four other Emiratis (known as “The United Arab Emirates Five”). Mansoor voiced his opposition to the Emirates government and was detained in March 2017. He remains in prison.
39. Anthony McAuley, “P&O Ports to Develop in Puntland,” National, April 6, 2017, https://www.thenational.ae/business/p-o-ports-to-develop-in-puntland-1.64351.
40. “Puntland Facts and Figures, 2012–2017,” Puntland State of Somalia, Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, 2018, http://pl.statistics.so/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Puntland-Facts-and-Figures-2017-Year-book-2018-1.pdf, 21–23.
41. Charlie Mitchell, “DP World Launched $442m Port Expansion in Somaliland,” National, October 11, 2018, https://www.thenational.ae/business/economy/dp-world-launches-442m-port-expansion-in-somaliland-1.779605.
42. Neha Bhatia, “Dubai’s Shafa Al Nahda Outlines Staffing Plan for DP World Contract,” Construction Week Online, October 29, 2018, https://www.constructionweekonline.com/article-50588-dubais-shafa-al-nahda-outlines-staffing-plan-for-dp-world-contract.The president of Somaliland recently announced that the Emirates is no longer constructing a military airport, and that it will be converted into a civilian airport.
43. International Crisis Group, “Somalia and the Gulf Crisis,” 15.
44. Matina Stevis-Grindeff, “Middle East Power Struggle Plays Out on New Stage,”Wall Street Journal, June 1, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/global-powers-race-for-position-in-horn-of-africa-1527861768?ns=prod/accounts-wsj; Nizar Manek, “U.A.E. Military Base in Breakaway Somaliland to Open by June,” Bloomberg, November 6, 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-11-06/u-a-e-military-base-in-breakaway-somaliland-seen-open-by-june.
45. “Berbera Port Facilities: Somali Republic,” Central Intelligence Agency, February 22, 1966 (declassified September 10, 2006), https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP78T05929A001400060006-4.pdf.
46. Rafeef Ziadah, “The UAE and the Infrastructure of Intervention,” Middle East Report290 (Spring 2019),https://merip.org/2019/07/the-uae-and-the-infrastructure-of-intervention/.
47. “2.1.2 Somalia Port of Berbera,” Logistics Capacity Assessment, July 30, 2018, https://dlca.logcluster.org/display/public/DLCA/2.1.2+Somalia+Port+of+Berbera.
48. “Berbera Special Economic Zone,” DP World, July 2018, http://warshiil.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Berbera-SEZ-Somaliland-DP-World-Presentation-July-2018.pdf.
49. In India, DP World has also been working to develop “hyperloop” technology, and has partnered with the National Investment and Infrastructure Fund to invest in infrastructure across the country.
50. “Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2002 (2011),” United Nations, June 27, 2012,https://fas.org/man/eprint/semg.pdf, 138.
51. Cowen, The Deadly Life of Logistics, 158.
52. Alex de Waal, The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa: Money, War and the Business of Power (New York: Wiley, 2015), 182.
53. Matthew Cole, “The Improbable Comeback of Erik Prince,” Intercept, May 3, 2019, https://theintercept.com/2019/05/03/erik-prince-trump-uae-project-veritas/.
55. “P&O Ports Wins 30-Year Concession for Port of Bosasso in Puntland,” P&O Ports, April 12, 2017, http://www.poports.com/media/po-ports-wins-30-year-concession-for-port-of-bosasso-in-puntland.
56. Elias Biryabarema, “Gunmen Kill Dubai-Owned P&O Ports Executive in Somalia’s Puntland,” Reuters, February 4, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-security-p-o/gunmen-kill-dubai-owned-po-ports-executive-in-somalias-puntland-idUSKCN1PT0IO.
57. Ronen Bergman and David K. Kirkpatrick, “With Guns, Cash and Terrorism, Gulf States Vie for Power in Somalia,” New York Times, July 22, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/22/world/africa/somalia-qatar-uae.html.
58. David Shinn, “In Red Sea Region, Competing Outside Powers Complicate U.S. Interests,” United States Institute for Peace, December 19, 2008, https://www.usip.org/publications/2018/12/red-sea-region-competing-outside-powers-complicate-us-interests.
59. International Crisis Group, “Somalia and the Gulf Crisis,” 1.
60. , 2.
61. “Qatar Supports Somalia with Projects Worth $200m,” Middle East Monitor, November 29, 2017, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20171129-qatar-supports-somalia-with-projects-worth-200-million/; International Crisis Group, “Somalia and the Gulf Crisis,” 6.
62. International Crisis Group, “Somalia and the Gulf Crisis.”
63. , 10.
64. As two journalists recently put it in Foreign Policy: “The infusion of Emirati money means a lot more than being able to accommodate bigger ships and process more containers. For many, this set of investments is being viewed as an accelerant for the territory’s attempts to achieve formal independence from Somalia.” Matt Kennard and Ismail Einashe, “For Somaliland and Djibouti, Will New Friends Bring Benefits?,” Foreign Policy, March 19, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/19/somaliland-somalia-horn-of-africa-djibouti-military-oil-uae-qatar-berbera-port/.
65. DP World, “Berbera Special Economic Zone.”
66. Stevis-Grindeff, “Middle East Power Struggle Plays Out on New Stage.”
67. Kenneth Mwenda, “US $400m Road Project Linking Ethiopia to Somaliland’s Berbera Port Kicks Off,” Construction Review Online, April 5, 2019, https://constructionreviewonline.com/2019/03/us-400m-road-project-linking-ethiopia-to-somalias-berbera-port-kicks-off/.
68. Hanieh, “Ambitions of a Global Gulf.”
69. “Documentary: DP World–Berbera Delivering Sustainable Development,” Horn Cable TV, published to YouTube, Dec 25, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bzAyPia-58s.
70. Stevis-Grindeff, “Middle East Power Struggle Plays Out on New Stage.”
71. Tom Gardner, “Multi-Million Dollar Deal for Somaliland’s Historic Port Sparks Land Rush,” Reuters, April 4, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somaliland-landrights-port/multi-million-dollar-deal-for-somalilands-historic-port-sparks-land-rush-idUSKBN17624B.
73. Mohammed Ibrahim Abdi, “Dredging and Reclamation of Berbera Port, Somaliland,” undated, accessed November 11, 2019, http://berberanews.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Dredging-Reclamation-of-Berbera-Port-Somaliland-vmia.docx.pdf, 2.

74. Ibid., 3.

75. Ibid., 4.

76. “Tax Hike Sparks DP World Berbera Protest,” Port Strategy, March 18, 2019, https://www.portstrategy.com/news101/world/africa/tax-hike-sparks-dp-world-berbera-protest.

77. Ibid.

78. Gardner, “Multi-Million Dollar Deal for Somaliland.”

79. “Somaliland: Berbera Port Workers Revolt against DP World Management Strategies,” Somaliland Sun, March 12, 2017, http://www.somalilandsun.com/somaliland-berbera-port-workers-revolt-against-dp-world-management-strategies/.

80. “Somaliland: Construction Workers Have Gone on Strike over Low Wages,” Somaliland Standard, July 11, 2019, https://somalilandstandard.com/somaliland-construction-workers-have-gone-on-strike-over-low-wages/; “Market Update Somalia,” Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, via ReliefWeb, March 21, 2019, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Market-Data-Update-February-2019.pdf.

81. “DPWOWRD” [sic], published to the YouTube channel Hadhwanaag News, July 11, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FhuejKk6ULE&fbclid=IwAR3WGa2CzS9qnbsaltVvif-pSxZhF7evmyMNNVRYJtBxthWjiQQ47SS8M2I.

82. Finn Stepputat and Tobias Hagmann, “Politics of Circulation: The Makings of the Berbera Corridor in Somali East Africa,” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 37, no. 5 (2019): 794–813.

83. Gardner, “Multi-Million Dollar Deal for Somaliland.”

84. Mark Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), 111.

85. de Waal, Real Politics of the Horn of Africa, 137.

86. Ibid., 136.

87. Ibid., 137.

88. Ibid., 140.

89. Odindo Ayieko, “Somaliland: Making Do with What They Have,” East African, July 14, 2019, https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/africa/Somaliland-Making-do-with-what-they-have/4552902-5195354-2tncfk/index.html.

90. “Livestock Sector Guide,” Somaliland Biz, accessed November 11, 2019, http://www.somalilandbiz.com/sector-guides/livestock/.

91. These include the Livestock Export Association, Meat and Milk Association, Somaliland Veterinary Association, and the United Livestock Professionals of Somaliland Association.

92. Adam Hanieh, Money, Markets, and Monarchies: The Gulf Cooperation Council and the Political Economy of the Contemporary Middle East, vol. 4 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 118.

Rohan Advani

Rohan Advani was a senior policy associate at The Century Foundation. His research interests include the political economy of infrastructure, corruption, and trade in the Middle East, focusing on the influence of Gulf-based capital in the Levant.